College Policy Debate Forums
November 18, 2017, 01:47:32 PM *
Welcome, Guest. Please login or register.
Did you miss your activation email?

Login with username, password and session length
News: IF YOU EXPERIENCE PROBLEMS WITH THE SITE, INCLUDING LOGGING IN, PLEASE LET ME KNOW IMMEDIATELY.  EMAIL ME DIRECTLY OR USE THE CONTACT US LINK AT THE TOP.
 
   Home   Help Search Login Register CEDA caselist Debate Results Council of Tournament Directors Edebate Archive  
Pages: 1 [2] 3
  Print  
Author Topic: Restrict Presidential War Powers Controversy Proposal  (Read 28747 times)
BruceNajor
Newbie
*
Posts: 30


« Reply #15 on: April 22, 2013, 07:10:38 PM »

I would very much disagree with that. Most of the solvency I've seen talks about the need to create an oversight policy to reign in unfettered drone use to solve things like (1) other countries drone policies, (2) limit errant strikes, (3) more effective use.  

But the "Ban drones" aff would probably be topical, and I don't mean to say no one suggests stopping drone strikes, so that aff would be available if you think the advantage lit is ONLY solved by banning drones.  I would not think that would be the most strategic aff, given that the oversight / due process CP probably does in fact sufficiently solve the aff, which would prove my point.  

Either way, I think that is potentially a relevant solvency indict that the aff will likely overcome more often than not, as opposed to a reason drone affs would not be strategic.
Logged

Bruce Najor
Wayne State Debate
BruceNajor[at]Gmail[dot]com
Adam Symonds
Sr. Member
****
Posts: 349


« Reply #16 on: April 22, 2013, 07:21:55 PM »

I would very much disagree with that. Most of the solvency I've seen talks about the need to create an oversight policy to reign in unfettered drone use to solve things like (1) other countries drone policies, (2) limit errant strikes, (3) more effective use.  

But the "Ban drones" aff would probably be topical, and I don't mean to say no one suggests stopping drone strikes, so that aff would be available if you think the advantage lit is ONLY solved by banning drones.  I would not think that would be the most strategic aff, given that the oversight / due process CP probably does in fact sufficiently solve the aff, which would prove my point.  

Either way, I think that is potentially a relevant solvency indict that the aff will likely overcome more often than not, as opposed to a reason drone affs would not be strategic.

I'll get back to you when I do some independent research. The topic paper on drones does not cite any evidence that demonstrates the assertions in your first paragraph here to corroborate (1)(2) or (3).
Logged
dheidt
Newbie
*
Posts: 8


« Reply #17 on: April 22, 2013, 07:31:26 PM »



I don't disagree with your characterization of this problem in general, but I don't think you've really addressed the specific nature of how this problem manifests on this topic with congress as the actor. The aff has congress pass legislation prohibiting particular presidential powers, but when the president goes ahead and does it anyway, the Court is the final arbiter. The evidence IN the topic paper says the court doesn't back congress up on these limitations.

As far as the war turns the aff argument, there is no FIAT solvency on this question for the aff - the aff is fiating congress because it is legislation. They don't get the court. The claim that the court will defer to the President over Congress is not answered by fiat.

This topic paper is outstanding.  It also includes this recommendation (p.90):  "The controversy literature suggests two obvious agents for the resolution – Congress or the Courts. Some of the case areas are better suited for congressional action while others are best suited for judicial action. We believe that it would be best if potential wording papers could include both agents."  

I think this resolves your concern?  I would be concerned too if the agent required Congress; historically the XO CP (on the college CIC topic and the HS detain without charge topic) was a good strategy but didn't break the topic.  However, a lot of affirmatives were successful because they could garner precedent-based advantages from the court.

Edit: no part of this post should be treated as an endorsement of a court agent, which would be the worst thing since, well, the courts topic.  

If your interpretation of "Some of the case areas are better suited for congressional action while others are best suited for judicial action. We believe that it would be best if potential wording papers could include both agents" means the aff fiats both congress and the court, then it addresses my concern, but that's not what they mean in the paper. Instead, they are pointing towards flexibility for the aff to either have congress OR the court as their actor depending on the quality of the solvency evidence. When the aff is legislation, I don't see how that addresses the concern that the Court will defer to the President and grant emergency powers in crises.

My assumption is that an option with both agents would be included, based on that sentence.  Perhaps I am wrong and the community will vote for a topic with a singular agent.  I hope that is not the case, but it would not be the end of the world if Congress were the agent.  The FISA-related solvency concern you brought up is important, but not a deal breaker.  FISA was a permissive statute that expanded presidential power; there is a lot of room for judicial interpretation.  A clear Congressional directive limiting discretion could resolve this.  I know from past topics (detain without charge and Quirin) that there is definitely evidence to support this, at least in the detention context.


Logged
kelly young
Full Member
***
Posts: 237



WWW
« Reply #18 on: April 22, 2013, 09:02:02 PM »

Hello, my name is Kelly and I'm a bad person when I engage CEDA Forums discussions. I am powerless over my irrationality when posting on CEDA Forums (and many other life situations). I want to take this moment to apologize for past, current, and (likely) future transgressions. With that said, I will try to keep this brief and let other authors of the paper (here’s looking at you, Najor and Koch) fight the turf battles. I’m just a ham-and-egger and I’m too sleep-deprived with a 12-day old infant at home to do post-by-post refutation.

To some of the broader issues raised:

#1: Congress can’t solve because the president will ignore and courts will defer in war.
DHeidt’s characterization of why the Courts defer to the Executive is fairly accurate from his earlier posts. I believe the Christopher Schroeder evidence on page 15 speaks to this in maintaining that the problem with status quo legislative efforts is that they begin with solid proposals and the political process of passage creates compromises that ultimately undermine the value of limitations. Indeed, that evidence points to FISA as an example of when effective oversight was implemented.

As for the Courts, the Courts do not defer to the executive as much as with the Political Question Doctrine, they defer to both of the other branches to resolve the issue. If Congress provides clear restraints without dozens of caveats, compromises, and exceptions for presidential authority, the courts are more likely to act. Problem isn’t so much presidential declaration of extra-constitutional powers (although that has certainly happened) as it is that congress has failed to provide a meaningful check to guide the courts. This is a rather important solvency debate, but not one that is to the level of being a deal breaker. Courts don't back up congress because congress makes little meaningful effort to provide real oversight/due process due to political compromise.

Stack provides this kind of argument:

Kevin M. Stack Assistant Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, “The Statutory President,” Iowa Law Review, Jan 2005, pp. LN

This uncertainty has high costs. The absence of a framework for review of presidential assertions of statutory authority does nothing to check the incentives of the president and his counsel to seek the widest possible construction of the president's authority. While wide constructions are not in themselves objectionable, without oversight from other actors, they pose the risks associated with the concentration of power. Moreover, Congress -  [*542]  one potential source of constraint and oversight - has been a less than robust monitor of the president's assertions of statutory authority. The incentives for Congress to delegate authority broadly have been well documented. n6 But despite the breadth of congressional delegations generally, and delegations to the president in particular, Congress has provided scant formal policing of the president's own assertions of authority under those delegations. Between 1945 and 1998, Congress legislatively overturned only four of the more than 3,500 executive orders issued. n7 For a wide range of institutional reasons, from constituent-driven pressures to the costs attendant to coordinated action, Congress is a poor source of constraint on presidential action. n8 The judiciary thus has a critical role to play in monitoring presidential compliance with statutory authority and requires a theory of review to do so.


And, even if congressional action fails to place legal restraint on the president, Congress can place political restraints through the process of the plan

James Meernik, Assistant Professor of pol sci @ Univ of North Texas, 1995, “Congress, the President, and the Commitment of the U. S. Military,” Legislative Studies Quarterly (20.3), online at JSTOR.

Why does Congress continue to try to regulate the use of force when it never succeeds in handicapping the president's power to deploy the armed services abroad? Quite simply, by continually threatening to invoke the WPR or pass other regulatory legislation, Congress reminds the president that it has a rightful role in the process, which it may flaunt at its own discretion. By pressing the president to take the broad parameters of congressional concerns into account, Congress might prevent the executive from pushing presidential powers too far (Crabb and Holt 1988; Reveley 1981). Thus, although Congress may not succeed in placing legal restraints on presidential authority, it can place political restraints on the executive branch.


Obviously, this isn’t a ton of evidence or probably satisfactory enough, but there is a lot more of this type of evidence out there. This is just what I have laying around from initial research on the controversy paper.

#2: We should have courts as an actor:
Yes – as DHeidt already noted, we as the topic authors agree. We centered the paper around “statutory limitations” as a term-of-art/mechanism but we believe that Courts decisions would reinterpret or apply other controlling statutes to restrict presidential war powers. Personally, I believe the Congress v. President part of the controversy is better and deeper in literature, but the Courts are very important as well. I don’t think the current paper needs to be overhauled for future wording papers to examine the Court only. The concern about congress being unable to solve due to court deference is answered above.

#3: this isn’t really a legal topic
Perhaps true from a certain perspective. The main reason I included this argument was because when I mentioned the controversy idea to Gordon Stables, he said, “Hey, it would be a legal topic.” I don’t think most court topics are all that legal (btw, we have no good working definition of what a legal topic is. The CEDA definition in the rotation amendment does in fact make most topics “legal”) because they boil down to agent CPs and politics. I think this is a pretty good controversy whether it’s categorized as a legal one or not. The best lit is found in law reviews. The questions of authority and even with agent should act are all huge constitutional controversies. If that’s not a legal topic, I’m not sure what would meet that bar besides a repeat of the previous Courts topic.


#4: “It would be disappointing if most of the affs on the topic are to add "oversight" to the ability of the president to carry out executions without due process because that would just become two teams arguing about who should die and when.”
I’m not sure Najor’s point was that most affs would be weak oversight without due process. Even with due process, these affs can distinguish themselves from the “ban X action” CPs. One option is possibly the conservative/hawk approach – due process adds legitimacy to kill only truly bad people (and if you find this argument repulsive, you don’t have to make it) – or the progressive argument about precedence. We found that one of the appealing advantages to the topic was that a diverse group of people, from libertarians to progressives, could find arguments to make on the affirmative. I’m not sure this is a disadvantage to the topic.
But I didn’t work on the specific areas other the OSOs, so I will let other folks speak to these questions.

#5: Precedence Advantages/addons are vague and won’t defeat specific net-benefit scenarios.
I guess this is true is your assumption is that the only impact scenario to the precedence argument is a vague balance of powers/SOP impact. While that’s certainly an option, it’s not the only one. The warrant for most of the arms races arguments (drones/OSOs), soft power/international credibility (detention) arguments assume the precedence internal link. Granted, we didn’t really anticipate that we’ve have to provide detailed 2AC A2 the CP in a controversy paper, so you do have us that our evidence in the paper isn’t as stellar as you’d hope for in a deep 2AC/block debate on this in an actual round. I’m not sure any controversy paper typically rises above this bar.
Here’s at least one good card that congressional restraints bolster short-term US diplomatic and military credibility, that could lead to a number of specific scenarios.

Leslie H. Gelb and Anne-Marie Slaughter, Gelb is president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations. Slaughter is the dean of the Woodrow Wilson School of International and Public Affairs, “Declare War,” The Atlantic, Nov 2005, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/11/declare-war/304301/2/

The process and the declaration itself would strengthen American credibility—and negotiating power—in the diplomatic run-up to war. Troublemakers abroad have seen the pressure that our government feels to cut and run when conflict turns ugly. Beyond that, many have doubted that the White House would follow through on its threats at all. Saddam Hussein apparently didn't think either President Bush would have the support to attack him. Nor did the Haitians think President Clinton had the stomach for war after he precipitately yanked U.S. troops out of Somalia. But if a president ran the declaration gauntlet and built public support, he would gain enormous credibility for his threats.


There’s a 100% chance that I will not have time during finals week and in between feed my child to do a lot more research on this, so if others want to explore this in more detail, please feel free. Is this a concern that should be explored? Certainly and I appreciate the discussion so far to help folks talk this out. Is this something that a wording paper might better address than the controversy paper that is already too long in length than is expected? Probably. But I imagine people far smarter and with more free time than me should handle this in the short term.

Thanks for the discussion so far.

Kelly

« Last Edit: April 22, 2013, 09:27:49 PM by kelly young » Logged

Director of Forensics/Associate Professor
Wayne State University
313-577-2953
kelly.young [at] wayne.edu
www.wsuforensics.org
johnpkoch
Newbie
*
Posts: 8


« Reply #19 on: April 22, 2013, 09:53:50 PM »

Thanks everyone so far for the feedback. Questions about solvency mechanisms and advantages for drones were definitely discussed over beers and cigars on more than a few nights during the writing of this paper. I was initially concerned that in order for the affirmative to solve that they would have to either ban drones and/or completely amend the 2001 AUMF. The former I think is beneficial for critical teams, but not strategic probably for policy teams. The latter, as the paper points out, turns out to just not be true. As Bruce points out, the two major advantages are international precedent and regional stability.

In terms of stability, Micah Zenko (footnote 35) writes:
"Like any tool, drones are only as useful as the information guiding them, and for this they are heavily reliant on local military and intelligence cooperation. More important, significant questions exist about who constitutes a legitimate target and under what circumstances it is acceptable to strike. There is also the question of net utility: To what extent are the specific benefits derived from drone strikes offset by the reality that the strikes often alienate the local government and population? And there is the reality that drones are proliferating but, as is often the case with new technologies, the international legal and regulatory framework is lagging behind.

Zenko puts forward a substantive agenda. He argues that the United States should end so-called signature strikes, which target unidentified militants based on their behavior patterns and personal networks, and limit targeted killings to a limited number of specific terrorists with transnational ambitions. He also calls Congress to improve its oversight of drone strikes and to continue restrictions on armed drone sales. Finally, he recommends that the United States work internationally to establish rules and norms governing the use of drones.”

This card highlights the need for Congressional oversight and that the affirmative does not have to defend banning drones. There is no author that I encountered when researching possible policy advantages that advocated for banning drones. They advocate for creating a legal framework (Congressional statutes or courts) and banning certain practices, such as signature strikes. The above card indicates to me that doing these recommendations, or some variation of them, solve without banning the use of drones.

In terms of civilian deaths, regional stability and increased terrorism, Paul Harris (footnote 39) writes:

“Now Robert Grenier, who headed the CIA's counter-terrorism center from 2004 to 2006 and was previously a CIA station chief in Pakistan, has told the Guardian that the drone programme is targeted too broadly. "It [the drone program] needs to be targeted much more finely. We have been seduced by them and the unintended consequences of our actions are going to outweigh the intended consequences," Grenier said in an interview.
Grenier emphasised that the use of drones was a valuable tool in tackling terrorism but only when used against specific identified targets, who have been tracked and monitored to a place where a strike is feasible. However, recent media revelations about Obama's programme have revealed a more widespread use of the strike capability, including the categorising of all military-age males in a strike zone of a target as militants. That sort of broad definition and the greater use of drones has outraged human rights organisations.

The BIJ has reported that drone strikes in Pakistan over the weekend hit a funeral gathering for a militant slain in a previous strike and also may have accidentally hit a mosque. That sort of action adds credence to the claims that the drone campaign is likely to cause more damage by creating anger at the US than it does in eliminating terrorist threats.

"We have gone a long way down the road of creating a situation where we are creating more enemies than we are removing from the battlefield. We are already there with regards to Pakistan and Afghanistan," he said.

Grenier said he had particular concerns about Yemen, where al-Qaida linked groups have launched an insurgency and captured swathes of territory from the over-stretched local army. US drones have been active in the country, striking at targets that have included killing US-born cleric Anwar al-Awlaki and his 16-year-old son...

"That brings you to a place where young men, who are typically armed, are in the same area and may hold these militants in a certain form of high regard. If you strike them indiscriminately you are running the risk of creating a terrific amount of popular anger. They have tribes and clans and large families. Now all of a sudden you have a big problem … I am very concerned about the creation of a larger terrorist safe haven in Yemen," Grenier said.”

Thus, this evidence indicates that ending signature strikes is sufficient to help alleviate anti-American tension and restore balance to where we kill more terrorists than we create. In fact, he sees the utility of drones, so he certainly does not want to ban them.

As for international precedent, Paul Weldman (footnote 36) writes:

As Peter Bergen and Jennifer Rowland of the New America Foundation wrote, "Just as the U.S. government justifies its drone strikes with the argument that it is at war with al Qaeda and its affiliates, one could imagine that India in the not too distant future might launch such attacks against suspected terrorists in Kashmir, or China might strike Uighur separatists in western China, or Iran might attack Baluchi nationalists along its border with Pakistan."

Kristin Roberts (http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/when-the-whole-world-has-drones-20130321) also notes this problem and writes:

"It’s a classic and common phase in the life cycle of a military innovation: An advanced country and its weapons developers create a tool, and then others learn how to make their own. But what makes this case rare, and dangerous, is the powerful combination of efficiency and lethality spreading in an environment lacking internationally accepted guidelines on legitimate use. This technology is snowballing through a global arena where the main precedent for its application is the one set by the United States; it’s a precedent Washington does not want anyone following.

… Hyperbole? Consider this: Iran, with the approval of Damascus, carries out a lethal strike on anti-Syrian forces inside Syria; Russia picks off militants tampering with oil and gas lines in Ukraine or Georgia; Turkey arms a U.S.-provided Predator to kill Kurdish militants in northern Iraq who it believes are planning attacks along the border. Label the targets as terrorists, and in each case, Tehran, Moscow, and Ankara may point toward Washington and say, we learned it by watching you. In Pakistan, Yemen, and Afghanistan.

This is the unintended consequence of American drone warfare. For all of the attention paid to the drone program in recent weeks—about Americans on the target list (there are none at this writing) and the executive branch’s legal authority to kill by drone outside war zones (thin, by officials’ own private admission)—what goes undiscussed is Washington’s deliberate failure to establish clear and demonstrable rules for itself that would at minimum create a globally relevant standard for delineating between legitimate and rogue uses of one of the most awesome military robotics capabilities of this generation."

Once again, no banning of drones necessary to solve, only the need for a clear precedent guiding the use of drones.

I hope this answers your concerns. I will not have much time to respond the next few days, as it is the end of the semester, but I will respond when I can and will catch up with this discussion later this week.
Logged
darthsuo
Newbie
*
Posts: 8


« Reply #20 on: April 22, 2013, 10:04:05 PM »

#5: Precedence Advantages/addons are vague and won’t defeat specific net-benefit scenarios.
I guess this is true is your assumption is that the only impact scenario to the precedence argument is a vague balance of powers/SOP impact. While that’s certainly an option, it’s not the only one. The warrant for most of the arms races arguments (drones/OSOs), soft power/international credibility (detention) arguments assume the precedence internal link.

This. Malgor is undoubtedly right, the "end the program" CP + politics/prez powers DA will mold the topic. I think it'll push affs in a good direction though -- away from "yo like, torture is bad" (duh) and more toward a defense of actual statutory limitations on prez powers. I think "vivid politics scenario" vs. "genero/nebulous prez powers" is a bit unfair. The evidence presented so far seems to indicate that voluntary restraint on the part of the executive is insufficient to satisfy observers (domestically and internationally) of our commitment to a particular issue.

So, offense/defense-y: aff has generic SOP scenario and specific (vivid, even) credibility/signalling advantage that the CP probably doesn't solve, neg has CP that solves "program bad" advantage probably and a generic prez powers good scenario and politics. That's a position I'd be willing to take as the aff (if I were willing to read an aff with a plan).

Also, as Najor said, think about how unconvincing the following statement is: Obama unilaterally banning drones will in no way affect his political capital, but if Congress legislates a halt to drone activities he's done for. Politics does not seem to be a very good net benefit to the XO CP, which means the neg is forced to the generic impact, not the aff.

That said, it's clearly useful to have a discussion about these issues before people decide/wording is hashed out
« Last Edit: April 22, 2013, 10:07:57 PM by darthsuo » Logged
Paul Elliott Johnson
Full Member
***
Posts: 134


« Reply #21 on: April 22, 2013, 10:07:45 PM »

I'm just happy that Obama will finally find his war-happy agenda stopped in the mud.

#TCOT
#Benghazi
#ObamaLied
Logged
johnpkoch
Newbie
*
Posts: 8


« Reply #22 on: April 22, 2013, 10:09:58 PM »

I also want to add that on drones, Affirmative have a good shot of winning against an XO/internal  CP on arguments besides object fiat. Bill Moyers (http://billmoyers.com/2013/02/12/the-hubris-of-the-drones/) writes:

“Yet without any meaningful checks—imposed by domestic or international political pressure—or sustained oversight from other branches of government, U.S. drone strikes create a moral hazard because of the negligible risks from such strikes and the unprecedented disconnect between American officials and personnel and the actual effects on the ground.”

Honestly though, there are solvency advocates for courts, Congress, president, and the SQ, which is why this is such a fruitful topic for debate (http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20130430_art004.pdf)

“These concerns might be addressed by adding  what in effect amounts to a drone or counterterrorism court. Senator Feinstein has recently proposed
developing a special court to oversee the implementation of lethal drone strikes—one that might serve as a check on executive power.34 Similar to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, a court which meets in secret to rule on requests to
wiretap suspected terrorists, this proposed court would grant judges some oversight of who could be targeted by drones.

James Robertson, a retired federal judge, has argued in The Washington Post that monitoring and approving policy runs counter to a long and widely-accepted view of the role of the judiciary in government. He contends that a judge issuing an
“advisory opinion” to condemn a person who is not present to defend himself is a violation of the defining features of American justice. Instead, Robertson
argues that such decisions should be left to Congress or the executive branch. 35

Indeed, others have argued that such an approach jeopardizes counterterrorism efforts and that oversight would be best located within
the executive branch. Former solicitor general Neal Kaytal, for example, has argued that federal judges lack expertise and could delay counterterrorist operations, as they are unused to operating on fast timetables or making the sort of pre-emptive judgments that would be required of a court that oversees drones.36 Rather, he argues that a better review process would be one that takes place within
the executive branch, with the most senior national security advisors adjudicating cases argued by expert lawyers.37

One can disagree about which reviews by what kind of authority would serve best our system of justice while not unduly hobbling security.
And adding a layer of review might be justified. However no one can argue that these decisions are made lightly and without careful deliberations, both
about the individuals involved and the principles that guide these deliberations.
These restraints are maintained despite evidence showing that terrorists are both aware of these self imposed limitations and use them to their advantage
by stationing combatants, supplies, and weapons in mosques, schools, and private homes. In his book The Wrong War: Grit, Energy, and the Way Out of
Afghanistan, Bing West quotes American servicemen reporting that the “Taliban fight from compounds where there are women and children . . . [so] we can’t push the Talibs [sic] out by mortar fire without being blamed for civilian casualties.”38 West also reports that Taliban troops often fired at American soldiers from private homes, mosques, buildings owned by the Red Crescent, and other locales where civilians were likely to be.”
Logged
Malgor
Full Member
***
Posts: 220


« Reply #23 on: April 23, 2013, 12:47:59 PM »

well, this thread has been informative.  I do think the evidence you have (national journal card) would pass for an affirmative internal link to a pretty decent credibility advantage.  It does seem the aff can get some internal links off the precedent/rule....but the cp will still solve that.  It will solve a lot of it. 

what is going to be the solvency deficit exactly?  "oh you don't have legally defined norms"- even the evidence presented is more about other countries using US action as an excuse.  Hard for me to imagine the solvency deficit when the counterplan has the executive say "you know what, drones, we're not going to use those anymore bc we think they violate moral and international law."  How is that less influence than congress passing what would be an actual death panel to oversee prez powers?  My experience with these cps judging and debating has been quite the opposite.  Countries that want to use drones aren't modeling the US, they are just looking for an excuse to use drones.  They have that regardless.

darthsuo, first i'd like to say you should read a plan-not the Royal you, but you in particular.  also, i do agree with you that the end the program cp will mold the topic, and i agree that the genero affirmative advantage of prez powers bad versus the politics disad is an unfair characterization.  The result, however, may not be desirable.  The aff is going to have to come up with increasingly specific yet fantastic and loosely constructed scenarios for credibility.  it's the only way they will achieve the magnitude/timeframe necessary for the solvency deficit to matter.  It will also mean a precipitous decline in the quality and realism of affirmative advantages.  It's an example of how debate finds a way but in the process decreases the quality of the controversy.

been a great back and forth and i really do have a much better idea of where the topic will go.  i'd say this topic will probably win on the 2nd round of counting.  Foreign policy + shiny wars + circumvents legal requirement.  Even K debaters love talking about shiny wars.  treaties should split enough 1s to get it to rd 2.  who is organizing the betting on this?




Logged
Trond Jacobsen
Newbie
*
Posts: 15


« Reply #24 on: April 23, 2013, 01:16:46 PM »

[deleted] in the interest of comity.
Logged
darthsuo
Newbie
*
Posts: 8


« Reply #25 on: April 23, 2013, 02:12:34 PM »

darthsuo, first i'd like to say you should read a plan-not the Royal you, but you in particular.  

<\3
« Last Edit: April 23, 2013, 02:14:10 PM by darthsuo » Logged
Jessica Kurr
Jr. Member
**
Posts: 89


« Reply #26 on: April 23, 2013, 07:20:51 PM »

Thoughts on what the DC Circuit Court, and subsequent SCOTUS appeal, would mean for the detention part of the topic?

http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/04/congresss-war-crimes-power-at-issue/?utm_source=feedly

"After pondering the issue for more than a month, the D.C. Circuit Court voted on Tuesday to review anew Congress’s power to create new war crimes that apply to alleged terrorist acts that occurred even before those laws were enacted.  In ordering en banc review in the case of a Yemeni national held at Guantanamo Bay, the Circuit Court nullified a Circuit panel decision in January overturning three war crimes convictions of that individual.

The coming decision by the seven-judge Circuit Court almost certainly will be appealed to the Supreme Court, by whoever loses at the Circuit Court, and that could lead to a major new ruling on the powers of the special military commissions that have had a troubled seven-year history at the U.S. military prison on the island of Cuba.

The rehearing order came in the case of Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman al Bahlul, who has been described by military prosecutors as a propagandist for the late terrorist leader, Osama bin Laden.  He was sentenced to life in prison after being convicted by a military tribunal of providing material support to terrorists, conspiracy to commit terrorist acts, and soliciting others to do so.

Although the en banc Circuit Court will be reviewing the government case involving Bahlul, the actual target of its review will be a decision by a different panel of the Circuit Court last October, in the case of another Yemeni national — Salim Ahmed Hamdan, often described by prosecutors as a driver for Osama bin Laden.  It was in overturning Hamdan’s conviction on a “material support” charge that the Circuit Court narrowed the powers of military commissions to try crimes that did not exist in U.S. or international law at the time of the conduct charged as criminal.  It was on the basis of that ruling that the Circuit Court wiped out Bahlul’s convictions, leading the Obama administration to ask for en banc review in early March."

The article continues, but I figured that would be enough to understand the concern. It seems like an entire area of the topic has the possibility of being thrown into limbo. I remember similar things happened on the MENA topic.
Logged
BruceNajor
Newbie
*
Posts: 30


« Reply #27 on: April 23, 2013, 07:47:00 PM »

Thanks for the question Jeff,

This seems like a non-issue to me for several reasons:

1) The article you posted concludes it is unlikely to be a ruling made during the course of the topic (let alone work its way up to the Supreme Court)

"With the hearing set for the end to September, it probably will be well into the following year before a final decision emerged.  Once that decision is reached, the losing side will have ninety days to seek Supreme Court review."

2) The decision today seems to be an expansion (or at least pondering an expansion) of negative uniqueness.  I'll quote just the first paragraph:

"After pondering the issue for more than a month, the D.C. Circuit Court voted on Tuesday to review anew Congress’s power to create new war crimes that apply to alleged terrorist acts that occurred even before those laws were enacted.  In ordering en banc review in the case of a Yemeni national held at Guantanamo Bay, the Circuit Court nullified a Circuit panel decision in January overturning three war crimes convictions of that individual."

3) The reason I say this is because the original decision this article cites was this:

"Today, the D.C. Circuit court vacated the military commissions convictions of Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman al Bahlul, including a conviction for conpiracy. The reversal of al Bahlul’s conviction for conspiracy highlights the dispute between the Convening Authority and Chief Prosecutor over whether the conspiracy charge against the 9/11 defendants should go forward." (http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/01/911-defense-counsel-on-todays-al-bahlul-decision-from-dcca/)

So I think your argument only has an implication for the topic if we were to infer that a out of character liberal ruling were coming, I'll answer that scenario:

1) This wouldn't be the first time the Court has vacated a charge by a commission (see Adnan Farhan Abdul Latif).  The Court occasionally finds charges have been in error, then it gets appealed by the government, and to my knowledge, they have yet to lose (or at least release someone).  What you have cited appears to be exactly the problem with the status quo from the affirmative perspective, and thus uniqueness FOR the negative.

2) EVEN IF the most liberal of Court ruling were to happen, it would just strip the charges from one detainee.  The Courts have already distinguished Boumediene to make this a non issue for detention outside Guanatanamo Bay, and the evidence cited in the topic paper makes a very strong claim that a Supreme Court review of that is VERY unlikely in the present system.

Thank you for bringing this to our attention and allowing a response Jeff!
Logged

Bruce Najor
Wayne State Debate
BruceNajor[at]Gmail[dot]com
FrancesWoodworth
Guest
« Reply #28 on: April 25, 2013, 07:32:28 PM »

Adam asks -
Quote
2. Can you elaborate more on what you think the aff is going to do about the "executive just doesn't do that anymore" CP? I'm unconvinced that this is an example of object fiat, on the one hand, and I worry that the evidence against this CP actually supports the neg strategy. So object fiat - if the resolution is "increase and/or enact statutory limitations/restrictions on the CINC/presidential war powers to..." as you suggest, the XO CP to voluntarily stop doing whatever program the aff ends does not appear to be an object of the resolution. For one thing, the resolution is about restricting powers, rather than forcing presidential action. For another, the CP does not change the president's power, it simply eliminates a bad program that flows from that power.

I think this is a clear cut example of object fiat. To me, object fiat is when you take the object of the resolution and make it the subject of the counterplan. For instance, on the China topic, a counterplan that has China end the one-child policy is a clear example of object fiat.

What is the object of the resolution in this case? The president (or the president's power). The executive counterplan to not do ______ makes the president the subject of the plan statement.

Further, the distinction made about presidential power v. presidential action should only enhance the claim of object fiat. The president's power enables actions made by the president. Again if the object of the resolution is presidential power, the counterplan to have the president act within or even against that power flips the object to the subject.

What would be object fiat if this isn't?

Regardless, I've just started looking at the paper and I think it had some very interesting potentialities, but I'll reserve my broader judgement for now. I just love object fiat.

N.B. - Object fiat should not be understood to be the object of the affirmative advantage...

I disagree that Object fiat is fiating the object of the resolution, rather it is probably more abusive to fiat object of the advantage. Example:

On the democracy assistance topic, under your interpretation, it would not have been object fiat for a CP to fiat Saudi Arabia doesn't destabilize Bahrain, since Saudi Arabia was not in the resolution, but that CP probably is object fiat.

Also, what if the advantage is "EU models our domestic policy, which is bad"? Would you argue a fair CP is to have the EU stop doing that policy? I think that's an example of Object fiat too.
Logged
sspring
Jr. Member
**
Posts: 51


« Reply #29 on: April 25, 2013, 09:14:07 PM »

Quote
On the democracy assistance topic, under your interpretation, it would not have been object fiat for a CP to fiat Saudi Arabia doesn't destabilize Bahrain, since Saudi Arabia was not in the resolution, but that CP probably is object fiat.

Yep, that's not object fiat. There may be other problems with it, international fiat, etc, and its probably not all that strategic because the perm solves the link to your Saudi relations da, and resolves alot of solvency questions about the aff itself. But the Saudi Arabia CP tests the necessity of US action to address democracy in Bahrain. If the CP solves the aff it proves that US action isn't necessary.

Only the CP to have Bahrain act would be object fiat, because having Bahrain act subverts the question of the necessity of US action in promoting democracy in Bahrain.

What about this example - H1B visas are good because they give the Indian legislature some reason to pass labor reform (or any other x country political process advantage)? The affirmative is certainly not necessary to that policy decision and I would hope that most would agree that the CP to have the Indian legislature pass labor reform is a legitimate and necessary CP to limit out these kind of advantages.
Quote
Also, what if the advantage is "EU models our domestic policy, which is bad"? Would you argue a fair CP is to have the EU stop doing that policy? I think that's an example of Object fiat too.


Again same as above, not object fiat, probably a good CP. The aff probably should have an advantage not premised on modelling that provides a justification for US action, at the very least. Again the CP may have some other issues, such as uniform action, international fiat, and so on, but I think that what you are objecting to is international fiat, not object fiat.
« Last Edit: April 25, 2013, 09:27:51 PM by sspring » Logged
Pages: 1 [2] 3
  Print  
 
Jump to:  

Powered by MySQL Powered by PHP Powered by SMF 1.1.19 | SMF © 2013, Simple Machines
SMF customization services by 2by2host.com
Valid XHTML 1.0! Valid CSS!