

Wording: Parts & Pieces, 2011-12

The USFG should (substantially) increase/expand (its) democracy assistance to/in/for “some construction of a list of countries in the Middle East and North Africa.”

Suggested:

The USFG should expand democracy assistance in one or more of these countries: X, Y, Z, P, L, M, N.

Variations on wording would be in the list of countries.

I. “Its” Democracy Assistance

Suggestion: Skip the modifier “its.”

Borrowing an observation from an astute topicality mind in the community, I should first point out that “its” does not appear in the topic area paper stem recommendation. We can have a good debate with the USFG as the agent that does not require the extra possessive to be jammed into the topic. In other words, we do not need to restrict the democracy assistance being expanded to “only that which belongs to the U.S.” If the aff wants to defend an expansion of democracy assistance by augmenting existing programs that may not be under the State Department or USAID, that should be topical. The U.S. often operates by working alongside other entities, especially by providing funding and other resources. Opening some of this space to the affirmative makes for better solvency evidence and a more realistic connection to democracy assistance.

Removing “its” would not open the floodgates to obscure forms of democracy assistance, it would just slightly expand the mechanism that the US can pursue and make the process of democracy assistance more realistic and better for a season’s worth of debates. Just taking the NED as one example, this is an entity outside the normal purview of “its” actors, yet the NED and similar institutions matter for solvency and they receive democracy assistance for particular countries from the US. The fact that the Dept. of State is attempting to coordinate agencies involved in democracy assistance (NED, State DRL, and USAID) speaks to this reality.

G.A.O., Sept. ‘09 (“DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE: U.S. Agencies Take Steps to Coordinate International Programs but Lack Information on Some U.S.-funded Activities,” acsd 5/22/11, <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09993.pdf>)

Partly to lessen the risk of duplicative programs, State recently initiated efforts to reform and consolidate State and USAID foreign assistance processes. GAO reviewed (1) democracy assistance funding provided by USAID, State DRL, and NED in fiscal year 2008; (2) USAID, State DRL, and NED efforts to coordinate their democracy assistance; and (3) USAID efforts to assess results and evaluate the impact of its democracy assistance. GAO recommends that, to enhance coordination of U.S.-funded democracy assistance, the Secretary of State and the USAID Administrator work jointly with NED to establish a mechanism to routinely collect information about NED’s current projects in countries where NED and State or USAID provide democracy assistance. These entities concurred with our recommendation.

The NED is a good mechanism for the affirmative and is part of overall democracy assistance supported and funded by the US. Expanding democracy assistance should include entities like the NED.

N.E.D. Report on Democracy Assistance, ’06 (“The Backlash against Democracy Assistance” A Report prepared by the National Endowment for Democracy for Senator Richard G. Lugar, Chairman Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate June 8, 2006 <http://www.ned.org/docs/backlash06.pdf>, acsd 5/23/11)

Yet despite these disturbing developments, which in some cases are prompting practitioners in the field to revert to methods used in closed societies during the 1980s, democracy assistance NGOs are active today in more countries than ever before. The new climate has actually validated the mission and the nongovernmental structure of the NED “family,” which has proven its ability to work effectively in sensitive and repressive political climates. Democracy assistance NGOs have always been active within a diverse range of states—from closed societies to fragile or emerging democracies—for which the strategies, operating procedures and funding arrangements honed over more than 20 years remain relevant and effective. The NED family in particular has extensive experience of channeling assistance to dissidents, labor unions, human rights activists, and other advocates for democratic change within repressive societies.

If we look at various parts of democracy assistance that have been cut in the past (Egypt as an example), we can see that some of the assistance is not necessarily “its” democracy assistance, but it is still democracy assistance provided by the US and meaningful to debate. In this case, democracy assistance given to GONGOs (government organized NGOs) or assistance to the government itself could be construed as forms of democracy assistance that are not “its.”

Shadi Hamid, '10 (Issue #15, Winter 2010, “The Cairo Conundrum” <http://www.democracyjournal.org/15/6726.php?page=5>, acsd 5/23/11)

More striking, however, are the drastic cuts in democracy assistance to Egypt contained in the Obama Administration’s 2010 budget request. The decrease of 60 percent (from \$54 million to \$20 million) from Bush’s final request is especially jarring in a year when democracy aid shot up for countries like Morocco and Yemen. As it turns out, Egypt, with a population of more than 80 million, received less democracy assistance than either the West Bank and Gaza or Lebanon, each with about 4 million people. According to the Project on Middle East Democracy’s annual budget analysis, only about 1 percent of total bilateral assistance to Egypt was earmarked for democracy and governance, and a sizable portion of even that 1 percent went to either GONGOs—government organized non-governmental organizations—or the Egyptian government itself. Under the Obama Administration’s direction, the 2009 omnibus appropriations act included specific language limiting the amount of economic assistance that could be used for democracy and governance, the first time that such language has ever been used in legislation.

These GONGOs are everywhere and are important to debate for both sides—the negative would definitely have ground here as well.

MOISÉS NAÍM, '07 (Foreign Policy, APRIL 18, 2007 What Is a GONGO? How government-sponsored groups masquerade as civil society. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2007/04/18/what_is_a_gongo, acsd 5/23/11)

The Myanmar Women's Affairs Federation is a GONGO. So is Nashi, a Russian youth group, and the Sudanese Human Rights Organization. Saudi Arabia's International Islamic Relief Organization is also a GONGO, as is Chongryon, the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan. GONGOs are everywhere, in China, Cuba, France, Tunisia, and even the United States. GONGOs are government-sponsored non-governmental organizations. Behind this contradictory and almost laughable tongue twister lies an important and growing global trend that deserves more scrutiny: governments funding and controlling nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), often stealthily. Some GONGOs are benign, others irrelevant. But many, including those mentioned above, are dangerous. Some act as the thuggish arm of repressive governments. Others use the practices of democracy to subtly undermine democracy at home. Abroad, the GONGOs of repressive regimes lobby the United Nations and other international institutions, often posing as representatives of citizen groups with lofty aims when, in fact, they are nothing but agents of the governments that fund them. Some governments embed their GONGOs deep in the societies of other countries and use them to advance their interests abroad.

GONGOs are not uniformly good or bad, providing room for debates about particular manifestations of NGOs. The NED itself is a GONGO, making it dated to use the possessive “its” in reference to democracy assistance. This gray area provides for a solid educational backdrop into the process and offers grounded debate for solvency and links.

MOISÉS NAÍM, '07 (Foreign Policy, APRIL 18, 2007 What Is a GONGO? How government-sponsored groups masquerade as civil society. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2007/04/18/what_is_a_gongo, acsd 5/23/11)

Democratic governments have their own GONGOs, too. The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) is a private, nonprofit organization created in 1983 to strengthen democratic institutions around the world through nongovernmental efforts. It is a GONGO funded by the U.S. government. In several countries, receiving money from the NED is considered a crime. President Vladimir Putin's government has denounced foreign-funded support for political reform by groups such as NED as subversive and anti-Russian. A Chinese newspaper called U.S.-backed democracy promotion "self-serving, coercive,

and immoral."A similar set of institutions can provide accurate information about the backers, independence, goals, and track records of different NGOs. The globalization and effectiveness of non-governmental organizations will suffer if we don't find reliable ways of distinguishing organizations that truly represent democratic civil society from those that are tools of uncivil, undemocratic governments. Such bodies will help donors and citizens decide whom and what to believe. It will also make life harder for GONGOs with the worst intentions.

Finally, even if definitions of democratic assistance vary, "its" (belonging to the US) democratic assistance is primarily under the auspices of US AID and occurs within four categories: rule of law, civil society, the elections process, and governance. This process would govern democracy assistance expanded by the U.S. whether it is "its" or not.

McMahon, Dean's Prof. Applied Politics @ Binghamton, '02 (Edward R., Director, Center on Democratic Performance, "The Impact of U.S. Democracy and Governance Assistance in Africa: Benin Case Study." acsd 5/23/11, Aug 29-Sept 1, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PCAAB068.pdf)

U.S. Democracy Assistance: Donor agencies may differ somewhat in their definition of democracy assistance, and some may direct their resources towards one or two sub-categories. The model developed by USAID covers many of the themes addressed by donors. It is divided into four main subcategories. These areas of focus include rule of law, civil society, elections and political processes, and governance.

II. The Preposition (preceding the list of countries)

Possibilities

Assistance IN list X? Assistance TO list X? Assistance FOR list X? Assistance WITHIN list X? Assistance TOWARD list X, etc.

The selection of a preposition to precede the list of countries will make a difference for debates about “government-to-government” assistance vs. other types of assistance and it will have an effect on the scope and design of topical affirmative action. In many ways, the preposition will connect back to the “its” modifier and form the narrow wedge of the resolution. Keeping that wedge broad enough to sustain a season of debate is an important goal.

In a few articles there are some uses of assistance “for” a country and assistance “within” or “toward” a country, but ultimately the choice comes down to “to” vs. “in” based on predictable meaning and frequency of use. If we want to approximate the way democracy assistance is distributed in the status quo and give the affirmative enough space to find healthy solvency evidence we should go with either the preposition “to” or the preposition “in.”

“to” vs. “in”

To begin, selecting “to” does not automatically lock-in a “must be government-to-government” topicality argument. There are multiple reasons why “to” does not mean only government-to-government: 1. the topic might say “country,” not government, 2. a majority of democracy assistance goes to groups within the recipient nation *other* than the government, and, 3. *expanding* or *increasing* democracy assistance may require branching out to other agents in the country. More specifically, USAID democracy assistance operates by seeding programs working for democracy and funding NGOs working for democracy in a given country.

Natl. Research Council Report, '08 (Improving Democracy Assistance: Building Knowledge Through Evaluations and Research (2008) IMPROVING DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE, Building Knowledge Through Evaluations and Research, Committee on Evaluation of USAID Democracy Assistance Programs, Development, Security, and Cooperation Policy and Global Affairs, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12164&page=23, acsd 5/25/11)

USAID’s DG efforts include programs in countries undertaking democratic reforms and countries that are not yet seeking such reforms. Most of the projects are not carried out by USAID personnel but through contracts and grants with private firms and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). USAID’s main role in democracy promotion is thus to plan projects and then select contractors to implement them, or choose local or international NGOs to receive grant support for their activities.

And, thanks to Matt Struth for posting this card

Savun and Tirone, University of Pittsburg Political Science assistant professor, ‘11

[Burcu, University of Pittsburg Political Science assistant professor, and Daniel, University of Pittsburgh political science Ph.D. Candidate, "Foreign Aid, Democratization, and Civil Conflict: How Does Democracy Aid Affect Civil Conflict?," American Journal of Political Science, Vol 55 Issue 2, p233-246, April 2011, Wiley Online Library, accessed 5-16-11]

The critics of foreign aid efficacy also assume that foreign aid always goes to the government of the recipient country. Although most of the development aid goes to the governments of the recipient countries, democracy assistance aid is usually disbursed to a variety of sectors in the recipient country (Crawford 2001; Scott and Steele 2005). For example, Crawford (2001) shows that in

1994 and 1995 an average of 54% of the European Union's political aid programs were implemented by the recipient governments, and this percentage was only 5.1% for Swedish political aid (124). Similarly, Crawford reports that between 1992 and 1995, central and local governments were the main beneficiaries of 54% of the EU political aid. This number was 35.4% for Sweden and 55.7% for the United States, and 92.9% for the United Kingdom. On the other hand, civil society organizations, such as prodemocracy groups and human right groups, were the main beneficiaries of 46% of the EU political aid, 64.6% of the Swedish aid, 44.3% of the U.S. aid, and 7.1% of the U.K. democracy aid programs (138). These figures indicate that, unlike development aid, **the majority of democracy aid goes to nonstate actors.**

We do need to make a choice on this preposition, and some simple comparisons might make the choice a little easier. Using the word “to” puts the recipient country in a more passive position, the inert object being manipulated through the assistance. It also makes it seem as though the “democracy” itself is being imported, somehow “sent” from the US “to” those without. Democracy really should exist, even submerged as just a possibility, in all people in all countries. The word “in” starts with the assumption that some form of democracy, no matter how nascent, exists *in* the country in question.

Corresponding well with the meanings of “increase” or “expand,” the preposition “in” implies that the movement and agency for democracy is already present and not completely imported from external sources. If you were to move to a country, you would most likely be moving from abroad, but if you were moving in a country, you would already be there and you would be reorienting your local location *within* the country.

Because democracy assistance is about the promotion of democracy in a specific country, using “to” makes sense and would not limit out assistance to opposition. Thanks to Dave Arnett for the card:

Lappin-Faculty of Political Sciences at the University of Belgrade-10

“What we talk about when we talk about democracy assistance”, 2010 - Volume 4, Issue 1 <http://www.cejiss.org/sites/default/files/8.pdf>

Finally, on the positive side, **there is the distinct instrument of democracy assistance**. Democracy assistance differs from all other forms of democracy promotion in several important ways. First, it is distinct from military action insofar that it does not ‘enforce’ democracy, and from international interim administration insofar that it does not ‘manage’ democracy. Second, **democracy assistance is directed primarily and exclusively at fostering democracy, as opposed to classical development aid** in which democracy is usually only a secondary concern. Third, democracy assistance is distinct from positive political conditionality insofar that it encompasses direct and active measures, rather than passive tools. **Democracy assistance** can be further differentiated from political conditionality insofar that it is neither a reward nor a punishment, neither a carrot nor a stick, but rather **a ‘booster’ to internal groups already working towards democratisation**. Democracy assistance is not concerned with ‘exporting democracy’ (Schraeder 2002) or ‘spreading democracy’ (Hobsbawm 2004) irrespective of the readiness of a given country; rather, **democracy assistance explicitly recognises that ‘the primary motive force for democratisation is and must be internal to the country in question’** (Burnell 2000c: 9), and that the exclusive intention is ‘to help domestic actors achieve what they have already decided they want for themselves’ (Carothers 2007b: 22). Democracy assistance is therefore a very precise instrument within a broader democracy promotion paradigm.

And, democracy assistance “to” a country is designed to expand democracy “in” that country. One is the other.

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“What we talk about when we talk about democracy assistance”, 2010 - Volume 4, Issue 1 <http://www.cejiss.org/sites/default/files/8.pdf>

Carothers (2000: 188) offers a route out of this dilemma in his argument that democracy assistance should be considered all aid ‘for which the primary purpose, not the secondary purpose or indirect purpose, is to foster democracy in the recipient countries. It does not therefore include economic and social aid programmes.’

“In” is a good choice

Democracy assistance “in” is the best choice for a deep, in-depth debate all season long. We will be fine with either of the big two prepositions, but using “to” will give the negative a little more ammunition in a topicality debate that attempts to exclude opposition groups and NGOs. The negative would still have to win that “to” means “exclusively in the direction of”, that “country” means “the government of,” and that democracy assistance makes sense if limited to aid that goes directly through a target country’s central government. Those are all tough arguments to win and the combination makes it an uphill battle for the negative, yet a still a hill that can be reached. Using “in” on the other hand, opens up some additional ground for the affirmative’s mechanism because it becomes more about the people within the region and less about going through the state alone. The word “in” does give the negative some other ground, however, including an extra-topicality argument that some democracy assistance goes to democracy movements that are not physically “in” the specific country. Examples of this are assistance programs for refugees or asylum-seekers or even student-exchange programs. A narrow conception of “in” would potentially exclude some of those programs because they take place outside the country itself. Overall, including the extra-topicality questions of “no NGOs” vs. “No student exchanges,” the “in” preposition is a better debate to engage in because the negative can still hold on to links about the “regional” vs. “country-by-country” focus and the aff can actually act on the levels necessary to effectuate democratic change.

The debates about “in” are more on-topic than the debates about “to.” From 2006-08, US AID implemented democracy assistance in over 90 countries. State DRL (Dept. of State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor) and the private National Endowment for Democracy (NED) all give democracy assistance “in.”

G.A.O., Sept. ‘09 (“DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE: U.S. Agencies Take Steps to Coordinate International Programs but Lack Information on Some U.S.-funded Activities,” acsd 5/22/11, <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09993.pdf>)

In fiscal years 2006- 2008, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which has primary responsibility for promoting democracy abroad, implemented democracy assistance projects **in** about 90 countries. The Department of State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (State DRL) and the private, nonprofit National Endowment for Democracy (NED) also fund democracy programs in many of these countries.

It is true that oppressive governments will take steps to block the effectiveness of democracy assistance—that is a strong negative argument—but that does not mean that democracy assistance only goes to a state that is cooperating and has given consent; rather, most democracy assistance is, in some way or another, working against the state government in question, actually providing assistance “in” the country instead of “to” it.

N.E.D. Report on Democracy Assistance, ‘06 (“The Backlash against Democracy Assistance” A Report prepared by the National Endowment for Democracy for Senator Richard G. Lugar, Chairman Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate June 8, 2006 <http://www.ned.org/docs/backlash06.pdf>, acsd 5/23/11)

Foreign governments’ efforts to impede democracy assistance—from legal constraints on NGOs to extra-legal forms of harassment—have recently intensified and now seriously impede democracy assistance **in** a number of states. This backlash is

particularly pronounced in the former Soviet states of Eurasia, as well as in China, Venezuela, Egypt, and Zimbabwe. Representatives of democracy assistance NGOs have been harassed, offices closed, and staff expelled. Even more vulnerable are local grantees and project partners who have been threatened, assaulted, prosecuted, imprisoned, and even killed. In addition to impeding democracy assistance efforts, regimes are adopting pro-active approaches, channeling funds to anti-democratic forces and using ersatz NGOs to frustrate genuine democratization. All of this has had a “chilling effect” on democracy assistance, intimidating some groups and activists, and making it more difficult for them to receive and utilize international assistance and solidarity.

(). “IN” makes sense in terms of the flexibility necessary for democracy assistance and the focus on governance on the ground.

Atlantic Council Report, '08 (A RESEARCH PROJECT OF THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY “Enhancing Democracy Assistance” January 05, 2008, <http://www.acus.org/publication/enhancing-democracy-assistance>, acsd 5/24/11)

While recognizing that the distinctions among them are not iron-clad, the report offers context-specific recommendations for each. For authoritarian regimes, this report stresses advocacy to expand the space for political activity and to diffuse political power. It describes strategies for nurturing and supporting underground media and discreetly assisting **in-country NGOs**, minimizing the risk of regime reprisals. This report also maintains that although support for governance should reinforce democracy assistance, under authoritarian regimes such support must include a democratization component to avoid the risk of undermining the overall process of democratization. Governance support is especially important **in countries** where reform-oriented governments have recently come to power. If they cannot deliver on expectations by providing improved social services and economic growth, a backlash will likely ensue against both the government as well as the concept of democracy as a viable form of government....In 2007, the US Government (USG) will spend about \$1 billion on **democracy assistance in 50 countries** (excluding Iraq and Afghanistan). Using these funds effectively requires a flexible approach that incorporates a range of delivery systems suited to the type of regime, the type of assistance, and the geographic location of the beneficiary country. Working through NGOs helps avoid the stigma that typically accompanies direct efforts by the USG, so in addition to project financing, this report proposes that the US Congress fully and more flexibly support the National Endowment for Democracy and political party institutes to insure their rapid response to democratization opportunities. Relevant government agencies and NGOs should work together to develop the **broad outlines for democracy assistance in particular countries**, and enhance communication and cooperation in Washington.

(). Democracy assistance is about developing democracy in other nations.

Natl. Research Council Report, '08 (Improving Democracy Assistance: Building Knowledge Through Evaluations and Research (2008) IMPROVING DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE, Building Knowledge Through Evaluations and Research, Committee on Evaluation of USAID Democracy Assistance Programs, Development, Security, and Cooperation Policy and Global Affairs, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12164&page=23, acsd 5/25/11)

Over the past 25 years, the United States has made assistance for the development of democracy **in** other nations a key element of its national security policy.

More helpful cards on the preposition cut by Arnett and others:

(). Democracy assistance is a program “in” a target country, and is implemented within the target state.

Office for Promotion of Parliamentary Democracy, EU-10 Getting Acquainted: Setting the Stage for Democracy Assistance http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/oppd/Page_8/getting_acquainted_web.pdf

"Democracy assistance – one of the tools of democracy promotion – can be defined as: all programmes and projects which are openly adopted, supported and/or (directly or indirectly) implemented by (public or private) foreign actors, (mainly) take place in target countries, in principle with the consent or toleration of these countries' authorities, and are explicitly designed to directly contribute to the liberalisation, democratisation or consolidation of democracy of the target country.14

Office for Promotion of Parliamentary Democracy, EU-10 Getting Acquainted: Setting the Stage for Democracy Assistance
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/oppd/Page_8/getting_acquainted_web.pdf

In order to work, and intensively engage with local actors and institutions, democracy assistance is in principle implemented within the target state rather than abroad. The nature of some assistance projects, such as study visits, may exceptionally involve assistance implemented externally. Democracy assistance programmes and projects are implemented openly rather than secretly. However, individual aid recipients can at times, for their own protection, remain unidentified. Secret money transfers may help democratisation processes, but are different in nature to assistance.

(). Democracy assistance is from developed countries and is designed to promote democracy IN target countries.

Ishaq Rahman-Hasanuddin University, Makassar-10

DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE IN INDONESIA (1999 – 2009): BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL LIBERALISM AND POLITICAL REALISM
www.scribd.com/.../Democracy-Assistance-in-Indonesia-1999-2009-Between-International-Liberalism-and-Political-Realism

In this study, democracy assistance is defined as assistance from developed countries to promote democratization and strengthen democracy in countries that have not fully adopted democracy, especially in developing countries. This assistance aims to strengthen democratic political culture, democratic political behavior, and political institutions of democracy.

(). US democracy assistance occurs “in” countries

The National Committee on American Foreign, Saltzman Institute of War and Peace at Columbia, The Atlantic Council-‘8 ENHANCING DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE

http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/65/Enhancing%20Democracy%20Assistance.pdf

In 2007, the US Government (USG) will spend about \$1 billion on democracy assistance in 50 countries (excluding Iraq and Afghanistan). Using these funds effectively requires a flexible approach that incorporates a range of delivery systems suited to the type of regime, the type of assistance, and the geographic location of the beneficiary country. Working through NGOs helps avoid the stigma that typically accompanies direct efforts by the USG, so in addition to project financing, this report proposes that the US Congress fully and more flexibly support the National Endowment for Democracy and political party institutes to insure their rapid response to democratization opportunities. Relevant government agencies and NGOs should work together to develop the broad outlines for democracy assistance in particular countries, and enhance communication and cooperation in Washington. On the country level, implementers of democracy assistance would benefit from structured opportunities for sharing information and collaboration.

III. “Expand” vs. “Increase”

INCREASE? Expand? Widen? Enhance? Strengthen? Double? etc.

“Increase” would probably be the default here, but there are reasons to think about using one of the other options as well. Democracy assistance requires more than consolidation—new approaches are necessary, particularly in this region of the world.

Phillips, American U., '09 (By David Phillips Created 12/22/2009, New Frontier In Democracy Assistance , Atlantic Council, <http://www.acus.org/print/6088> Director of the Program on Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding at American U., acsd 5/25/11)

While the end of the Cold War signaled a victory for the forces of democracy, today's global setting is in flux and democracy faces an uncertain future. Democracy assistance no longer consists of consolidating pro-democracy movements through training, capacity building and technical support. Current challenges require new approaches that are more responsive and relevant, especially in the Arab and Muslim world where extremists reject democracy as a Western construct. The U.S. should not falter from championing democracy. Not only is democracy the best system of governance to realize human potential, it also advances U.S. national security by providing a political alternative to those who might otherwise mistakenly conclude that they can advance their aspirations through sensational violence.

The better generic solvency evidence talks about changing perspectives and adopting new guidelines, seeking out new approaches, reconceptualizing democracy assistance to meet contemporary realities. Improving democracy assistance is about more than just increasing assistance—it is about expanding, enhancing, multiplying.

Atlantic Council Report, '08 (A RESEARCH PROJECT OF THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY “Enhancing Democracy Assistance” January 05, 2008, <http://www.acus.org/publication/enhancing-democracy-assistance>, acsd 5/24/11)

This report recognizes that democracy assistance is essential to the promotion of US foreign policy and global interests, and offers political and technical recommendations in order to enhance democracy assistance. Today's global setting poses several distinct challenges to democracy assistance. Countries such as China offer an alternative model of governance that promotes economic development without political reform, while wielding substantial economic leverage. Populist authoritarian regimes and illiberal democracies, such as those of Venezuela and Iran, claim popular legitimacy while cracking down on internal dissent. Challenges to democratization have also been exacerbated by the Iraq War and the Global War on Terror (GWOT), which have fueled anti-Americanism around the globe, undermined US credibility, overstretched US resources, and compromised domestic support for democracy assistance. Democracy's foes maintain that US democracy assistance is merely a pretext for undermining governments hostile to America's interests. They have limited the activities of local non-governmental organizations (NGOs), restricted the independence of the media, and impeded the flow of foreign resources to local pro- democracy groups. Many use counter-terrorism as justification for cracking down on dissent. At home, domestic critics of democracy assistance point to the ongoing problems in Iraq and the victory of Hamas in the Palestinian Authority as evidence that democracy assistance is not in the interest of the United States. But an assessment of several decades of successful democracy assistance reveals important lessons that can serve as guiding principles for making future efforts effective and pragmatic: (i) be patient, (ii) maintain modesty, (iii) tread softly, (iv) localize leadership, and (v) recognize the limits of military intervention. America's role should be to stand behind, not in front of democracy movements. In order to address negative perceptions of democracy assistance around the world and to rebuild bipartisan support at home, it is necessary to reframe the means and ends of assistance efforts. The democracy assistance community can maximize the impact of its activities by planning for the long term, insuring better training and preparation for field staff, and emphasizing more rigorous project evaluation. This report offers recommendations to hone proven approaches to democracy assistance, specifically, programs that strengthen civil society, prepare elections, assist political party development, and support democratic governance. It also identifies different regime types that are the focus of democracy assistance -- authoritarian states, illiberal democracies, free-wheeling kleptocracies, and post-conflict states. While recognizing that the distinctions among them are not iron-clad, the report offers context-specific recommendations for each. For authoritarian regimes, this report stresses advocacy to expand the space for political activity and to diffuse political power. It describes strategies for nurturing and supporting underground media and discreetly assisting in-country NGOs, minimizing the risk of regime reprisals. This report also maintains that although support for governance should reinforce democracy assistance, under authoritarian regimes such support must include a democratization component to avoid the risk of undermining the overall process of democratization. Governance support is especially important in countries where reform-oriented governments have recently

come to power. If they cannot deliver on expectations by providing improved social services and economic growth, a backlash will likely ensue against both the government as well as the concept of democracy as a viable form of government. For illiberal democracies, this report highlights the importance of an independent judiciary and the rule of law in constraining despotic tendencies. To guard against inadvertently strengthening illiberal leaders, it recommends linking governance with democracy assistance while emphasizing participation, contestation, and accountability. In particular, it proposes security sector reform with a focus on democratic policing and human rights training. Recommendations for free-wheeling kleptocracies focus on strengthening civil society through support for watchdog groups and grassroots organizations that stimulate local associational life, rather than elite NGOs. This report also stresses long-term work with political parties, so that when an election leads to a shift in power it will result in durable democratic reform. For post-conflict states, it is important to balance the need for elections as visible evidence of democracy's progress with concerns that elections may empower anti-democratic leaders. Voter registries should accurately reflect pre-war populations, and a transitional justice system should be instituted to promote reconciliation and help address the legacy of violence as the political transition unfolds. Improving security and cultivating social and economic development will also help break the cycle of violence that undermines democracy assistance efforts. In 2007, the US Government (USG) will spend about \$1 billion on democracy assistance in 50 countries (excluding Iraq and Afghanistan). Using these funds effectively requires a flexible approach that incorporates a range of delivery systems suited to the type of regime, the type of assistance, and the geographic location of the beneficiary country. Working through NGOs helps avoid the stigma that typically accompanies direct efforts by the USG, so in addition to project financing, this report proposes that the US Congress fully and more flexibly support the National Endowment for Democracy and political party institutes to insure their rapid response to democratization opportunities. Relevant government agencies and NGOs should work together to develop the broad outlines for democracy assistance in particular countries, and enhance communication and cooperation in Washington. On the country level, implementers of democracy assistance would benefit from structured opportunities for sharing information and collaboration. US democracy assistance is most successful when it is undertaken in cooperation with other countries and multilateral organizations. For example, the European Union (EU) has been a magnet for reform since the end of the Cold War, as well as a generous sponsor of democracy assistance. In the context of EU expansion, its Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA) provide a democratization track for countries that aspire to membership. This report emphasizes international cooperation that respects donor preferences based on their history of involvement in particular countries and regions and their expertise in specific program areas. It proposes the creation of donor affinity groups with the goal of empowering donors to take responsibility for specific countries, regions, and/or thematic areas. To maximize the potential role of the United Nations, the report suggests that the Secretary General affirm the world body's commitment to democracy and make an active effort to marshal consistent support from member states. This report also highlights the fate of democracy in the Arab and Muslim World. It recognizes the risks posed by extremists who scorn liberalism and reject the path of politics, opting instead to pursue their goals through violence. It affirms, however, that there is nothing inherent in the character of Muslims that is inherently prone to radical ideology or that makes democratization impossible. The democracy deficit in the Arab and Muslim world is a problem of supply, not demand. Stagnant democratic development has been exacerbated by America's preference for stability and support for authoritarian regimes. The incoming administration and the democracy assistance community have an opportunity to change this and improve prospects for democracy in the Arab and Muslim world. What does Hamas' electoral victory and the ascent of Hezbollah mean for the future of democracy assistance? There is no place for violence in the political process, and governments should ban armed political groups from participating in elections if they do not renounce violence. However, it is also critical that policymakers not mistakenly conclude that democracy is somehow incompatible with Islam, or that democracy assistance is futile when addressing mostly Muslim countries. Many Muslims believe otherwise, rejecting fanaticism, invoking the religion's longstanding tradition of pluralism, cosmopolitanism, and open-mindedness, and affirming that the Islamic process of consultation is entirely consistent with democratic debate. The democratization of the Arab and Muslim world, and successful democracy assistance more broadly, requires patience, persistence, and the recognition that short-term setbacks should not undermine long-term goals.

The point is that we want to make sure the affirmative advocates a meaningful change, but we do not want to hamstring that change by restricting action to an "increase," when a lot of the solvency evidence is talking about something more comprehensive—a reframing. The verb phrase "should expand" might best encapsulate what we are talking about here. Keep in mind that the status quo has been "increasing" democracy assistance and will continue to do so, making it necessary to allow broader affirmative action. We have already selected "democracy assistance" instead of something more flexible like "support for democracy," so we should find a verb that gives the affirmative some space instead of trapping the aff within the status quo. US democracy assistance has been increasing substantially since 1990. It has become a larger percentage of assistance overall and grown ten-fold from 1990 to 2006.

Azpuru, Finkel, Perez-Linan, and Seligson, Vandy, Pitt, Pitt, Vandy, '08 (“What has the United States Been Doing?” Journal of Democracy Volume 19, Number 2, April 2008 pp. 150-159)

Because budgets reflect priorities, it is fair to assume that if democracy assistance is a top issue on the U.S. foreign-policy agenda, resources will be allocated accordingly. This first exploration of the data seeks to determine how democracy assistance ranks in comparison to other types of aid provided by the United States via USAID. A multiyear analysis of the data shows that USAID's democracy assistance worldwide was quite limited in the early 1990s, but has been steadily growing, even relative to other forms of assistance and even when we apply controls to take inflation into account. In constant (2000) dollars, democracy assistance increased from US\$128 million in 1990 to \$902 million by 2005. In current dollars, the expansion represented a roughly tenfold increase from \$103 million in 1990 to more than \$1 billion in 2005. In terms of the overall USAID budget, DG represented only 7.7 percent of the total in 1990, a figure that grew to 12.3 percent by 2005. Moreover, the scope of assistance has expanded, not only in dollars but also in terms of geographical coverage and the number of subsectors that have received funds. The increase in DG assistance is shown in Table 1, which tracks the outlays in all categories of USAID assistance for the sixteen-year period. In 1990, outlays for DG lagged far behind those for the agriculture and growth, health, education, and environment sectors. By 1994, however, DG had surpassed education, and by 2001 it had overtaken environmental funding to become the third-largest category of USAID expenditures. Note that these changes came *before* the even greater increases that swelled the DG budget after the start of military operations in Afghanistan (October 2001) and Iraq (March 2003). Clearly, democracy assistance has been a rising priority for the United States at least since 1990—a trend that pre-dates the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, but which accelerated in the aftermath of those assaults.

These increases in democracy assistance have not slowed down, despite budget cuts and a shrinking economy. The G8 Pledging Billions to Arab Spring, beginning with Tunisia and Egypt.

Globe and Mail, '11 (May 27, “G8 pledges \$20-billion for Arab Spring countries” by Campbell Clark
<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/g8-pledges-20-billion-for-arab-spring-countries/article2036932/>, acsed 5/27/11)

The world's big wealthy democracies have endorsed a \$20-billion package of assistance to Egypt and Tunisia, asserting a willingness to support transitions to democracy in North Africa and the Middle East. Leaders of many of the Group of Eight countries meeting in Deauville, France, had raised fears that the pro-Democracy movements dubbed the Arab spring could be derailed by economic hardship which could lead to a rise of extremism. They closed their summit with a “declaration on the Arab spring” that pledged to concrete economic and political reforms across North Africa and the Middle East, starting with Egypt and Tunisia, two countries which ousted dictators but face economic downturn. “We stand ready to extend this long term global Partnership to all countries of the region engaging in a transition towards free, democratic and tolerant societies, beginning with Egypt and Tunisia, in association with countries wishing to support transition in the region,” the G8 declaration stated. The prime ministers of both Egypt and Tunisia had come to the summit seeking billions of dollars to address budget gaps, launch economic-development programs, and to seek capital for job-creation initiatives. Tunisia’s foreign minister, Jalloul Ayed, said Friday that the money is key to securing the country’s path to democracy by providing hope, especially to young people that sparked the revolution that overthrew dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. “It’s the young Tunisians who took ownership of it. And those young Tunisians today, many of them are looking for work, are impatient. And so the biggest challenge that we have today is one where we have to manage expectations,” he said. The G8 declaration calls for a marshalling of \$20-billion in funds from international and multi-lateral financial institutions like the World Bank, as well as bilateral aid from G8 members and other nations. “G8 members are already in a position to mobilize substantial bilateral support to scale-up this effort. We welcome support from other bilateral partners, including from the region,” the declaration stated. The declaration did not specify which funds would come from which institution or country, instead tasking finance ministers and foreign ministers from the G8 – Canada, the U.S., Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Russia – with hammering out details “over the next few months. Several G8 nations have offered their own aid packages to Egypt and Tunisia – though Prime Minister Stephen Harper indicated Thursday that Canada doesn’t expect to offer its own bilateral aid package. Instead, he said he favours aid being delivered through multilateral development banks, noting that Canada has increased its loan-guarantee backing for several such banks since 2009. The G8 declaration called for one of those Canadian-backed development banks, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, to extend its lending to North African nations like Egypt and Tunisia.

The other issue with “increase” is that it can be quite short-lived—a quick burst of financial support that winds up being transitory and far more fleeting than issues surrounding human rights and civil society. In fact, most democracy assistance programs stretch out for a decade or more, making the process about sustainable and long-term change. Selecting a verb that goes along with the central phrase in the resolution should reflect the long duration and extended commitment that is most often associated with democracy assistance. “Expand” or “strengthen” may fit these realities

more than “increase.” Democracy Assistance is typically long-lasting, not a quick fix. Most recipient countries receive aid for an average of 10 years.

Azpuru, Finkel, Perez-Linan, and Seligson, Vandy, Pitt, Pitt, Vandy, '08 (“What has the United States Been Doing?” Journal of Democracy Volume 19, Number 2, April 2008 pp. 150-159)

The data show that USAID's democracy assistance reflects a long-term U.S. commitment to furthering democratic development in particular countries, rather than a quick-fix approach lasting only one or two years. Many of the countries that have received democracy assistance have done so for long periods during the sixteen years tracked in this study; the median number of years during which the countries received such assistance was 10.5 years. 11 Latin American countries, which began to democratize twenty years ago, are a good example, as they have received democracy assistance during the entire period under study. 11. This figure probably underestimates the continuity among recipients, since our observations are limited to the period from 1990 through 2005. Space limits prevent us from discussing volatility in levels of investment, which is a different but closely related issue that deserves careful attention.

Democracy assistance has expanded greatly since the end of the Cold War.

Azpuru, Finkel, Perez-Linan, and Seligson, Vandy, Pitt, Pitt, Vandy, '08 (“What has the United States Been Doing?” Journal of Democracy Volume 19, Number 2, April 2008 pp. 150-159)

Since the end of the Cold War, democracy assistance has become an explicit and increasingly large component of many bilateral and multilateral aid programs. This is in sharp contrast to the Cold War period itself, when democracy assistance was either absent entirely from donors' portfolios or was simply the byproduct of other programs. The recent expansion of democracy assistance, along with the U.S.-led military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, has spurred a spirited debate on the ethics and efficacy of democracy-promotion activities.

Finally, a card on “strengthening” democracy assistance in the face of a backlash against such aid. Democracy assistance must deal with the new forms of backlash and soft resistance to the promotion of democracy in many countries.

Gershman & Allen, '06 (“The Assault on Democracy Assistance,” Journal of Democracy, Volume 17, Number 2, April 2006, pp. 36-51 Gershman is president of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). Michael Allen, special assistant to the vice-president for government and external relations at NED, is editor of the online publication Democracy Digest (www.demdigest.net))

The practical manifestation of this trend has been a proliferation of democracy-assistance programs funded by governments, multilateral bodies such as the United Nations and the European Union, international financial institutions, and independent foundations. Such programs, which have gained broad international support, provide technical and material assistance to governments that are trying to consolidate democracy, as well as to nongovernmental groups that seek to monitor public institutions and processes, promote human rights and access to information, and encourage democratic participation. Just as this trend has taken root in the international system, however, a counter-trend has emerged of resistance to democracy programs, especially those that seek to empower civil society; promote free media; and strengthen democratic political parties, institutions, and processes. ... The new backlash presents a special challenge to democracy-assistance organizations that need to maintain an in-country presence to carry out programs which provide training and technical assistance to local activists. In addition to carrying on with their normal programs, such organizations are finding it necessary to invest more time and effort in quasi-diplomatic activities: explaining their programs to local authorities; providing guarantees—through communication and transparency—that their work has no partisan or oppositional agenda; and engaging members of ruling parties in programs. Confidence-building measures of this kind may help to insulate democracy-assistance programs from political pressures and give a degree of protection to local activists while preserving the integrity of the relationship between the international NGOs and their local, grassroots partners. Another way to insulate democracy assistance from political pressures is to strengthen its international and multilateral character. Much of this assistance, of course, is provided by government agencies and private or quasi-governmental foundations in established democracies. But the national character of such institutions need not preclude joint programs, shared funding of NGOs, and regular meetings to coordinate assistance in priority countries or to strengthen cooperation in different functional areas, such as party building, media assistance, or civil society development. Such collaboration is useful in itself and also sends the message that democracy assistance is an international activity which is not meant to further the narrow foreign policy objectives of any particular government.

IV. The Adverb before the Verb

SUBSTANTIALLY increase/expand? Massively, Significantly? Dramatically? Structurally? Comprehensively, etc.

I have included the various definitions of “substantially” below but would suggest either, 1. not using an adverb at all; or, 2. trying to find an adverb that provides variety and more meaning in the context of democracy assistance. A small increase in democracy assistance will not be able to solve as much of the case, so there is a disincentive for the aff to go too small, especially with a number of agent counterplans that could easily provide the funding for a small project and not risk the “US bad” positions.

Even “significantly” expand democracy assistance would give some variation on the well-worn substantially debates. With some additional research, it might be possible to use something like “structurally expand,” or “meaningfully expand,” but I think it might make sense in this context to leave the adverb off completely.

A few contextual cards talking about “dramatic” or large increases in democracy assistance.

Azpuru, Finkel, Perez-Linan, and Seligson, Vandy, Pitt, Pitt, Vandy, '08 (“What has the United States Been Doing?” Journal of Democracy Volume 19, Number 2, April 2008 pp. 150-159)

It is also instructive to examine the relative share of USAID's total DG disbursements in the different regions of the world vis-à-vis other types of assistance.⁶ In some localities, DG assistance has become one of the largest elements in the U.S. foreign-aid portfolio. This is true, for example, in the former Soviet-satellite countries of Central and Eastern Europe, where DG aid formed less than 10 percent of USAID's regional spending up to 1995. From 1995 on, DG assistance to the countries of this region began to increase until in 2004 it accounted for nearly half the funds allocated there. USAID democracy programs in Eurasian states such as Ukraine began in 1992, and until 1996 they represented only about a tenth of all the USAID money flowing into the region. After 2001, however, DG funding steadily increased from 20 percent of USAID's total funding to Eurasia that year to 36 percent in 2005.

Iraq and Afghanistan are both good examples of major expansions in democracy assistance to a particular country.

Azpuru, Finkel, Perez-Linan, and Seligson, Vandy, Pitt, Pitt, Vandy, '08 (“What has the United States Been Doing?” Journal of Democracy Volume 19, Number 2, April 2008 pp. 150-159)

The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have produced the sharpest change in democracy spending since 1990. There was a dramatic increase in democracy aid to the Middle East and the Mediterranean in 2003, which can be explained entirely by the infusion of funds into postinvasion Iraq (which represented 85 percent of the democracy budget for the Middle East in 2003, 86 percent in 2004, and 80 percent in 2005). Likewise, democracy funding to Asia, which includes Afghanistan, increased dramatically after 2001. Together, funds allocated to Iraq and Afghanistan alone represented 23 percent of the total democracy budget for all regions in 2003, 43 percent in 2004, and 26 percent in 2005. The heavy allocation of funds to these two countries has meant a shift of resources away from other areas of the world.⁷

Sometimes the evidence points to a change that is not very large, making a contextual argument against a particular plan for its insignificance on a certain level. For examples, changing the timeframe of implementation is minimal—contextually should be excluded.

Hyde, Prof. Poli Sci at Yale, '10 (Susan, The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science March, 2010 628 *Annals* 72, “FIELD EXPERIMENTS IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS AND POLICY”)

Yet there is reason to believe that this incentive structure is not a serious barrier to randomization. Although practitioners tend to be wary of crusading academics of all stripes, field experimental methods appear to be attracting some momentum in fields that

are closely related to IR theory. Organizations such as the World Bank have proven willing to adopt field experimental methods in the study of development programs (Duflo and Kremer 2004; Miguel and Kremer 2004; Olken 2007), and organizations such as USAID and the Millennium Challenge Corporation have begun to use these methods in evaluating the effectiveness of foreign aid (Millennium Challenge Corporation 2009; National Research Council 2008). Where the interests of researchers and policymakers overlap, field experimentation is most likely to be successful. Anecdotally, it appears that field experimentation is the easiest sell when there is an existing demand among policymakers to identify which policies and practices work and which do not. Because field experiments can be used to adjudicate between competing theories in a transparent manner, the effects of various programs can be compared in a scientifically rigorous manner (see Olken [2007] for an excellent example). Even lacking this type of scenario, many possible applications of randomization **represent minimal change from existing practice and therefore do not require additional expenditures**, such as the randomized phasing in of a development project over time in contrast to the planned phasing in of a development project based on some other arbitrary or non-random criteria. To the extent that these **small changes** would allow researchers to study important and interesting research questions at little cost to the partner organizations, there are large payoffs to persuading organizations that cooperation is worthwhile. I now propose several topics within IR that can be productively studied with field experimental methods.

And there is the old stand-by violation: sub-sets or some other deployment of “essentially, without material qualification.” If the affirmative is just too small—or too specific within a category of a category, an adverb like “substantially” can come into play. There are some affirmative areas on the edge of “big enough” to debate. One example that can easily be framed as a huge part of democracy assistance or a sub-set of a sub-set, is “Rule-of-law assistance.” I still think going without the adverb makes for a cleaner debate, but the advocates of using substantially have an argument, especially against aff. cases that expand a small type of “rule-of-law” assistance, contending that there should be a topicality check against the tiny cases.

Wortham, Prof. Law Catholic U., '06 (Leah, Spring, Clinical law Rev., “Aiding Clinical Education Abroad.” *12 Clinical L. Rev.* 615
LDM=Law and Development Movement)

Carothers refers to a "democracy template" that had emerged in democracy assistance work. ⁿ¹⁵⁶ Three categories comprise the template: "elections, state institutions, and civil society." ⁿ¹⁵⁷ The category concentrating on state institutions includes five targets of aid, namely constitutions, judiciaries, legislatures, local government, civil-military relations. Within the state institution category, however, he also identifies a "Rule-of-Law Assistance Standard Menu," reproduced as Figure One, in which improving legal education becomes slotted as a subcategory of "upgrading the legal profession." ⁿ¹⁵⁹

FIGURE ONE: Rule-of-Law Assistance Standard Menu from Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad ⁿ¹⁵⁸

Rule-of-Law Assistance Standard Menu
[lrw,15d]
[lrw,5d]
-- Reforming institutions
-- Judicial reform
-- Legislative strengthening*
-- Refraining prosecutors
-- Police and prison reform
-- Bolstering public defenders
-- Introducing alternative dispute resolution
[lrw,5d]
-- Rewriting laws
-- Modernizing criminal laws
-- Updating civil laws
-- Introducing new commercial laws
[lrw,5d]
-- Upgrading the legal profession

-- Strengthening bar associations

Improving legal education [emphasis added]

[lrw,5d]

-- Increasing legal access and advocacy

-- Stimulating public interest law reforms

-- Supporting advocacy NGOs that use law to pursue social and economic goals

-- Aiding NGOs that promote judicial and legal reform

-- Training journalists to cover legal matters

-- Underwriting legal aid clinics

* Legislative strengthening relates to rule-of-law change but also serves political process goals; accordingly, it is often treated by USAID and other donors as a separate category of aid.

V. Introducing the List

Possibilities:

ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING? One or more of the following countries? At least two of the following? One of the following? Just state the list with an “and/or” before the last country? The following (implying all)? No more than two of the following? Some of the following? Maybe we find a construction that does not use the word “following”?

To start, there are a number of previous resolutions we can borrow from on this question. The phrase “one or more of the following countries” (twice), “one or more of the following nation-states,” and “one or more of the following nations” have all appeared in college policy topics over the past twenty years.

We should probably name the elements that precede the colon instead of leaving that up for grabs, so assume that noun is “countries” for the sake of argument. The other assumption is that we are trying to find a wording that would allow affirmatives to expand democracy assistance in all of the countries mentioned in the topic if they so desire, but they must at least pick one. At that point, we are most likely going to want to narrow down to four choices: two formulations of the list using the “*at least one of...*” construction and two formulations using the “*one or more of...*” construction. The sub-variations are based on using “*these*” or using “*the following.*”

“at least one of these countries:” /OR/ “at least one of the following countries:

vs.

“one or more of these countries:” /OR/ “one or more of the following countries:”

How to select among these four? I would opt for the “at least one of” because I do not feel right about the word “or” ever being used in a debate resolution, but I also do not think it matters all that much. “One or more” will work just as well. There are not many cards for this, but it is more common to use “the following (countries):” with a colon than it would be to use a colon with “these countries:”. Forcing a choice out of those fairly uncommitted opinions, the suggested phrase would be “at least one of the following countries.”

Fund For NGOs.org, ‘11 (Jan 23,<http://www.fundsforngos.org/latest-funds-for-ngos/eep-mekong-call-proposals-renewable-energy-wastetoenergy-energy-efficiency-projects-open/>,EEP Mekong Third Call for Proposals for Renewable Energy, Waste-to-Energy and Energy Efficiency Projects is now open, acsed 5/25/11)

The proposed projects must be implemented in at least one of the following Mekong Partner Countries: Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand and Vietnam.

Library Development Systems, No Date (Nebraska Library Commission, <http://www.nlc.state.ne.us/libdev/autoplan.html>, acsd 5/25/11)

The bibliographic records should contain at least one of the following identifiers: LCCN (Library of Congress Control Number), ISBN (International Standard Book Number), or ISSN (International Standard Serial Number).

ICT Asia, No date (7TH CALL FOR PROPOSALS, REGIONAL PROGRAM STIC-ASIE / ICT-ASIA, PRESENTATION, http://www.ict-asia-france.org/call-for-proposals/6AAP-STIC_Asie_presentation-en.pdf, acsd 5/23/11)

In partnership with France, the program involves the ten member countries of the Association of SouthEast Asian Nations (ASEAN: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam), Far East (China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan) and South Asia (India and Pakistan). Selecting and funding integrated basic and applied research projects fostering technological innovation and technological transfer with a regional focus between France and at least two partnering Asian countries, including at least one of the following countries: Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam;

2005-2006 NFA-LD Topic History (www.nationalforensics.org/lincoln.../past.../2005-2006-topic-history, acsd 5/23/11)

Winning Resolution: resolved: that the united states federal government should adopt a policy to increase the protection of human rights in one or more of the following nations: tibet, bhutan, afghanistan, nepal, myanmar, thailand, east timor, indonesia, philippines, and/or pakistan.

Open Society Institute, Grant Instructions '10 (acsd 5/23/11, <http://www.soros.org/initiatives/arts/focus/caucasus/grants>)

Enhancing Collaborative Practices and Developing Public Cultural Spaces support projects that include activities in one or more of the following countries: Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

The Roma Cultural Program supports projects that include activities in one or more of the following countries: Afghanistan, Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.

VI. “Countries” vs. “governments” vs. “nations”

Do the political entities we are referring to fall under the label of “countries,” “states,” “nations,” “nation-states,” or “governments”? Given the arguments advanced for a broad preposition more conducive with funding NGOs and opposition movements, using “government,” “state,” or “nation-state” seems to be the wrong direction. Striking the narrow terms, we are left with “nation” and “country,” both good choices. “Country” is most often the label of choice and is probably the best term to use in the context of democracy assistance. US AID supports democracy programs in countries and territories.

Natl. Research Council Report, '08 (Improving Democracy Assistance: Building Knowledge Through Evaluations and Research (2008) IMPROVING DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE, Building Knowledge Through Evaluations and Research, Committee on Evaluation of USAID Democracy Assistance Programs, Development, Security, and Cooperation Policy and Global Affairs, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12164&page=23, acsd 5/25/11)

Since 1990, USAID has supported democracy programs in approximately 120 countries and territories with budgets ranging from tens of thousands to hundreds of millions of dollars. The most comprehensive analysis of USAID DG spending estimates total expenditures between 1990 and 2005 at \$8.47 billion in constant 2000 U.S. dollars (Azpuru et al. 2008).

The term “country” goes well with the preposition “in,” but regardless of the preposition, “country” is a good noun to use for the list—it poses some boundaries, distinguishes the list from an approach to the overall region, and it is flexible enough to open up some topicality debates on how assistance conceives of “country.” It also represents what USAID often uses to talk about the kind of political unit discussed in the topic paper.

Natl. Research Council Report, '08 (Improving Democracy Assistance: Building Knowledge Through Evaluations and Research (2008) IMPROVING DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE, Building Knowledge Through Evaluations and Research, Committee on Evaluation of USAID Democracy Assistance Programs, Development, Security, and Cooperation Policy and Global Affairs, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12164&page=23, acsd 5/25/11)

USAID is the single largest provider of funding for democracy assistance. However, in many countries USAID is just one agency among many others providing democracy assistance.³ Although each donor agency plans and carries out its own programs, coordination with other donors occurs on several levels: within countries among donors, through bilateral channels, and through such multilateral venues as the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Ideally, USAID and other providers of DG assistance would be guided in achieving their goals by a well-defined theory of democratic development that could identify where a recipient country stood on feasible trajectories toward stable democracy and which elements or driving factors needed to be supplied or strengthened in order to overcome obstacles and move forward on such a trajectory. It would then select among programs known to provide or strengthen those specific elements and tailor their implementation to that country’s specific needs.

More evidence supporting the “country” approach in the context of USAID and democracy assistance. This is from the same Atlantic Council evidence in the “verb” section above.

Atlantic Council Report, '08 (A RESEARCH PROJECT OF THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY “Enhancing Democracy Assistance” January 05, 2008, <http://www.acus.org/publication/enhancing-democracy-assistance>, acsd 5/24/11)

Relevant government agencies and NGOs should work together to develop the broad outlines for democracy assistance in particular countries, and enhance communication and cooperation in Washington. On the country level, implementers of democracy assistance would benefit from structured opportunities for sharing information and collaboration. US democracy assistance is

most successful when it is undertaken in cooperation with other countries and multilateral organizations. For example, the European Union (EU) has been a magnet for reform since the end of the Cold War, as well as a generous sponsor of democracy assistance. In the context of EU expansion, its Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA) provide a democratization track for countries that aspire to membership. This report emphasizes international cooperation that respects donor preferences based on their history of involvement in particular countries and regions and their expertise in specific program areas. It proposes the creation of donor affinity groups with the goal of empowering donors to take responsibility for specific countries, regions, and/or thematic areas.

We would be fine using the word “nation” as well, although that might open up slightly more of a debate about what constitutes “the nation of X.” The notion of cultural identity and nationalism connecting to a group of affiliated “people” and less to a given political unit comes through the term “nation” more than through the term “country.” For our purposes, the places and groups of people we are contemplating (Egypt, Tunisia, etc.) are referred to as countries and nations fairly interchangeably.

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MORE CARDS (Misc.)

(). Democracy assistance, in a comprehensive sense, is the aid—material and instructional—given to encourage the specific components of a democracy. Democracy Assistance involves a broad array of tactics within the larger strategy of Democracy promotion.

Moehler, Prof. Comm. U. Penn., '10 (Devra C. The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science, March, 2010, *628 Annals* 30 “Introduction: Democracy, Governance, and Randomized Development Assistance”)

Since the 1980s, democracy and governance (DG) promotion programs have proliferated at an ever-increasing rate. Governments, international financial institutions, multilateral bodies, and international and domestic nongovernmental organizations provide assistance targeted at inducing democratic transitions in authoritarian polities; consolidating democracy where it exists; and increasing government effectiveness, transparency, and responsiveness to citizens across all regime types. Donors currently support explicit efforts to expand press freedom, establish rule of law, enhance government service delivery, strengthen civic culture, increase voter turnout, ensure free and fair elections, reduce corruption, and improve upon a myriad of other DG goals (Gershman and Allen 2006).

(). Democracy assistance now includes “good governance.”

Azpuru, Finkel, Perez-Linan, and Seligson, Vandy, Pitt, Pitt, Vandy, '08 (“What has the United States Been Doing?” Journal of Democracy Volume 19, Number 2, April 2008 pp. 150-159)

Using a newly constructed dataset of all U.S. expenditures in foreign assistance channeled via the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) from 1990 through 2005, this essay traces the growth of global democracy assistance since the end of the Cold War. It shows that what had begun as a largely regional effort in Latin America in the late 1980s has grown into a world-wide effort, expanding in magnitude and diversity, branching out into areas such as "good governance" (essentially decentralization and the fight against corruption) that were given little attention in the early 1990s.

(). Democracy assistance has expanded greatly since the end of the Cold War.

Azpuru, Finkel, Perez-Linan, and Seligson, Vandy, Pitt, Pitt, Vandy, '08 (“What has the United States Been Doing?” Journal of Democracy Volume 19, Number 2, April 2008 pp. 150-159)

Since the end of the Cold War, democracy assistance has become an explicit and increasingly large component of many bilateral and multilateral aid programs. This is in sharp contrast to the Cold War period itself, when democracy assistance was either absent entirely from donors' portfolios or was simply the byproduct of other programs. The recent expansion of democracy assistance, along with the U.S.-led military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, has spurred a spirited debate on the ethics and efficacy of democracy-promotion activities. Yet too little is known about the overall trends in U.S. democracy assistance since the end of the Cold War. This essay fills that gap, and in so doing places Iraq within the broader context of what the United States has done in the realm of democracy assistance worldwide since 1990.

(). Democracy assistance is third largest form of aid distributed by USAID, behind health and agriculture.

Azpuru, Finkel, Perez-Linan, and Seligson, Vandy, Pitt, Pitt, Vandy, '08 (“What has the United States Been Doing?” Journal of Democracy Volume 19, Number 2, April 2008 pp. 150-159)

Democracy assistance is now among the top categories to which the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) directs funds, the only larger ones being health and what USAID calls agriculture and economic growth. In 1990, by contrast, as the Cold War was nearing its end, democracy assistance was near the bottom, ahead only of funding for humanitarian concerns. In brief, what began as a largely regional effort in Latin America in the late 1980s has now become a worldwide

endeavor—one that has expanded in magnitude and diversity, and that has branched out into areas, such as governance, that in the early 1990s received only scant attention.

(). Assistance is a sub-set of Democracy Promotion, a description of any form of action designed to support democracy in a country. Democracy assistance is only one form--the form of promotion that involves providing funds or direct assistance for democracy.

Azpuru, Finkel, Perez-Linan, and Seligson, Vandy, Pitt, Pitt, Vandy, '08 ("What has the United States Been Doing?" Journal of Democracy Volume 19, Number 2, April 2008 pp. 150-159)

In the post-Cold War era, U.S. foreign-policy discourse has consistently underscored the importance of aid designed to foster democracy and economic development. Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush both have emphasized that supporting the growth of democracy in the world is an essential task. President Clinton in his 1994 State of the Union address called the promotion of democracy and human rights the "third pillar" of his foreign-policy agenda,¹ and President Bush has time and again highlighted the prominence that democracy building around the world takes among his foreign-policy goals. Before beginning, it is vital to make a conceptual distinction between democracy promotion and democracy assistance, as this essay focuses exclusively on the latter. Democracy promotion refers to an array of measures aimed at establishing, strengthening, or defending democracy in a given country. Such measures may range from diplomatic pressure to conditionality on development aid to economic sanctions, and even to military intervention. Democracy assistance is a *form* of democracy promotion. It provides funds or direct assistance to governments, institutions, or civil society actors that are working either to strengthen an emerging democracy or to foster conditions that could lead to democracy's rise where a nondemocratic regime holds power. This analysis examines democracy assistance only—what Thomas Carothers has called "the quiet side" of U.S. democracy promotion.² Until now, the absence of comprehensive and systematic data on the magnitude and distribution of U.S. democracy assistance—where, on what, and in which quantities these funds have been spent—has prevented analysts from identifying patterns of assistance and has frustrated rigorous empirical research into democracy aid's impact. Earlier studies rest on data regarding foreign assistance that fail to distinguish democracy assistance from other types of development aid. Our use here of a newly assembled dataset showing all U.S. foreign-assistance through USAID over a sixteen-year period (1990 through 2005) allows us to clarify some of those questions and to identify patterns in the data. Our major aim is to describe where U.S. democracy assistance went during those years and in what amounts, using the most comprehensive multiyear data currently available, so as to provide a solid point of departure for future studies.³ This analysis will clear up at least some of the confusion and ambiguities that currently muddy the topic of U.S. democracy aid. The database we use tracks USAID democracy-assistance funds from 1990 to 2005 and comprises 44,958 records that capture the composition of USAID budgets for specific activities in all sectors for that period.⁴ The dataset contains the most extensive and finely grained information on USAID expenditures in the democracy and governance sector (hereafter DG) currently available for scholarly analysis.⁵

1. James Meernik, Eric L. Krueger, and Steve C. Poe, "Testing Models of U.S. Foreign Policy: Foreign Aid During and After the Cold War," *Journal of Politics* 60 (February 1998): 63–85. 2. Thomas Carothers, *U.S. Democracy Promotion During and After Bush* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007), 10; available at www.carnegieendowment.org/files/democracy_promotion_after_bush_final.pdf. 3. See Steven E. Finkel, Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, and Mitchell A. Seligson, "The Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2003," *World Politics* 59 (April 2007): 404–39. 4. The database is available at www.pitt.edu/~politics/democracy/democracy.html. Part of the data was initially compiled by John Richter at USAID and the database was later expanded by Andrew Green, a USAID Democracy Fellow, in 2004–2005. The database includes the funds allocated to democracy assistance by USAID. In consultation with Andrew Green, we developed a series of aggregation routines to generate yearly totals for: a) DG spending at the country level; b) DG subsectors [Elections, Rule of Law, Civil Society, and Governance] at the country level; c) non-DG sectors [Agriculture and Economic Growth, Education, Environment, Health, Humanitarian Assistance, Human Rights, and Conflict Management and Mitigation] at the country level; d) programs that operate at the regional level [in any of the fields just described]; and e) programs that operate at the subregional level [in any of the fields]. 5. Although USAID is the main channel for U.S. democracy assistance, it should be noted that not all DG money goes through USAID. We do not include funding from other institutions such as the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). According to the data presented by the annual report on U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, funds allocated internationally by NED between 1990 and 2004 represented on average 5.1 percent of the annual USAID Democracy and Governance budget during the same period. See James Scott and Carrie Steele, "Assisting Democrats or Resisting Dictators: The Nature and Impact of Democracy Support by the United States National Endowment for Democracy, 1990–1999," *Democratization* 12 (August 2005): 439–60.

(). Democracy assistance can be prioritized for different regions (the Middle East in second to Latin America from 1990 to 2005), but the real variations occur in the country-by-country figures.

Azpuru, Finkel, Perez-Linan, and Seligson, Vandy, Pitt, Pitt, Vandy, '08 ("What has the United States Been Doing?" Journal of Democracy Volume 19, Number 2, April 2008 pp. 150-159)

It is also instructive to examine the relative share of USAID's total DG disbursements in the different regions of the world vis-à-vis other types of assistance.⁶ In some localities, DG assistance has become one of the largest elements in the U.S. foreign-aid portfolio. This is true, for example, in the former Soviet-satellite countries of Central and Eastern Europe, where DG aid formed less than 10 percent of USAID's regional spending up to 1995. From 1995 on, DG assistance to the countries of this region began to increase until in 2004 it accounted for nearly half the funds allocated there. USAID democracy programs in Eurasian states such as Ukraine began in 1992, and until 1996 they represented only about a tenth of all the USAID money flowing into the region. After 2001, however, DG funding steadily increased from 20 percent of USAID's total funding to Eurasia that year to 36 percent in 2005. Across the rest of the globe, DG assistance has not bulked quite so large vis-à-vis other types of U.S. aid. In 2005, for instance, USAID spent about 20 percent of its total Latin American budget, 12 percent of its Middle Eastern budget, 8 percent of its African budget, and just 5 percent of its Asian budget on aid to promote democracy and improve governance. We have examined democracy funding in comparison to other types of assistance across the various global regions. But how do regional totals for democracy funding compare to one another? The regional allocation of democracy assistance helps to paint a picture of USAID's priorities during the period under study. Between 1990 and 2005, Latin America and the Caribbean received the largest aggregate share (20 percent) of USAID democracy funds, followed by the Middle East, Africa, Eurasia, and Europe, with about 16 percent in each case (see Table 2). Comparatively, Asia received the smallest share of the DG aid provided by USAID during that period, getting only 12 percent of the total. Overall, though, there appears to be surprisingly little regional variation in the distribution of democracy assistance. Yet when we examine the last column in Table 3, we see that on a per-country basis, the differences are sharp. Excluding the Pacific-island region of Oceania, African countries received the lowest allocation per country, while the former Soviet Bloc received the highest. Some of these differences are in part a response to the variation in per-capita GNP, but much of the DG funding is spent in ways that vary little from one region of the world to another—contracts for international technical assistance, for example—and thus the variation reflects real differences in the amount of DG "effort" per country. There are, moreover, sharper distinctions in the regional distributions over time, as Table 3 on p. 156 shows. ⁶ See Table A (USAID Democracy Assistance as a Percentage of the Total Aid Received by Regions, 1990–2005). This and other supplementary graphics are available at www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/gratis/AzpuruGraphics-19-2.pdf.

(). Iraq and Afghanistan have received massive amounts of democracy assistance, almost 25% of the total in 2005. Their allocations have been so heavy that assistance to other countries has suffered.

Azpuru, Finkel, Perez-Linan, and Seligson, Vandy, Pitt, Pitt, Vandy, '08 ("What has the United States Been Doing?" Journal of Democracy Volume 19, Number 2, April 2008 pp. 150-159)

The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have produced the sharpest change in democracy spending since 1990. There was a dramatic increase in democracy aid to the Middle East and the Mediterranean in 2003, which can be explained entirely by the infusion of funds into postinvasion Iraq (which represented 85 percent of the democracy budget for the Middle East in 2003, 86 percent in 2004, and 80 percent in 2005). Likewise, democracy funding to Asia, which includes Afghanistan, increased dramatically after 2001. Together, funds allocated to Iraq and Afghanistan alone represented 23 percent of the total democracy budget for all regions in 2003, 43 percent in 2004, and 26 percent in 2005. The heavy allocation of funds to these two countries has meant a shift of resources away from other areas of the world.⁷ ⁷ See Table B (U.S. Democracy Assistance by Region, 1990–2005) and Table C (Recipients of USAID Democracy Assistance, 1990–2005) at www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/gratis/AzpuruGraphics-19-2.pdf

(). Among the four types of democracy assistance, Civil Society receives 38%, Governance receives 29%, Rule of Law is 19% and Elections 14%.

Azpuru, Finkel, Perez-Linan, and Seligson, Vandy, Pitt, Pitt, Vandy, '08 ("What has the United States Been Doing?" Journal of Democracy Volume 19, Number 2, April 2008 pp. 150-159)

It is often said that Western donors are satisfied simply to see electoral or procedural democracies set up in countries that previously had authoritarian governments. But does this mean that democracy assistance is geared only toward holding "free and fair" elections? Some years ago, Peter Burnell noted that international attention was shifting away from the promotion of elections to other kinds of assistance, such as civil society development. ⁸ To assess whether elections in fact have been the main goal of U.S. democracy assistance, we have examined the distribution of aid among the four subsectors of democracy assistance identified by USAID: Elections and Political Processes, Rule of Law, Civil Society, and Governance. ⁹ As Table 4 shows, in the post-Cold War era the Civil Society subsector, not Elections, has received the bulk of USAID's democracy assistance (38 percent of the total), followed by Governance, which garners between a quarter and a third of the total aid (29 percent). By contrast, investment in the Rule of Law has amounted to a mere 19 percent of the total, and only 14 percent has gone to support electoral

processes. While Civil Society was long the steady leader, the Governance subsector has expanded markedly over the years, surpassing even Civil Society after 2003.¹⁰ This area of growth is a reflection of the rising concern over corruption and how to control it, as well as the increasing attention to decentralization and local government.

8. Peter J. Burnell, *Democracy Assistance: International Co-operation for Democratization* (London: Frank Cass, 2000). 9. The area of Elections and Political Processes includes activities corresponding to various aspects of electoral assistance, support for the development of a political-party system, and legislative representation; Rule of Law includes human rights programs and funding for legal and judicial development; Civil Society includes programs promoting independent mass media, civic education, and labor; and Governance (a very broad category) covers anticorruption projects, decentralization, and local-government activities, among others. 10. See Table D (Distribution of U.S. Democracy Assistance by Sector, 1990–2005) at www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/gratis/AzpuruGraphics-19-2.pdf.

(). Most democracy assistance in the Middle East goes to Governance.

Azpuru, Finkel, Perez-Linan, and Seligson, Vandy, Pitt, Pitt, Vandy, '08 (“What has the United States Been Doing?” *Journal of Democracy* Volume 19, Number 2, April 2008 pp. 150-159)

The distribution of aid by subsector has varied across regions of the world. In most, civil society—and not the electoral process—has come in for the lion's share of aid. In Eastern Europe and Eurasia, for example, civil society assistance has comprised almost half the total democracy aid over the years. In the Middle East, on the other hand, the majority of DG assistance has gone to governance programs. In Latin America, meanwhile, the rule of law has been the dominant subsector. By contrast, the rule of law has been the lowest-funded sector in the former communist countries of Europe. Electoral assistance is relatively low everywhere, but especially in the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and Eurasia.

(). Democracy assistance varies in terms of the sector that receives emphasis—it's not a “one-size-fits-all” model.

Azpuru, Finkel, Perez-Linan, and Seligson, Vandy, Pitt, Pitt, Vandy, '08 (“What has the United States Been Doing?” *Journal of Democracy* Volume 19, Number 2, April 2008 pp. 150-159)

The increases in USAID Democracy and Governance expenditures since 1990 reflect a clear shift in U.S. priorities regarding democracy assistance, one that pre-dated the controversial military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Democracy assistance had already risen by 2001 to become one of the largest categories of USAID outlays worldwide, with a particular focus on regions such as Eastern Europe. Furthermore, the data show that electoral assistance per se has been only one area in which democracy funds have been invested, and clearly not the major one. In fact, civil society has been the key area of intervention—a sign that USAID democracy funding aims to promote more than the merely procedural dimensions of democracy. Moreover, the distribution of democracy assistance within each subsector varies by region—in other words, there is no “one-size-fits-all” model. Finally, the data show that democracy assistance is typically not short-term. Rather, at the country level USAID on average has provided democracy aid for about a decade.

(). U.S. Democracy assistance cannot create democracy on its own, but it can assist in many valuable ways.

Azpuru, Finkel, Perez-Linan, and Seligson, Vandy, Pitt, Pitt, Vandy, '08 (“What has the United States Been Doing?” *Journal of Democracy* Volume 19, Number 2, April 2008 pp. 150-159)

Scholars, committed democrats around the world, and perhaps even U.S. taxpayers may wonder to what extent U.S. foreign assistance has been an effective mechanism for supporting democracy abroad. It is unlikely that democracy aid alone can create or sustain a democratic regime. But such aid can help to establish self-sustaining democratic institutions at all levels—national and local—and it can empower domestic actors to monitor elections, defend human rights, provide independent news, fight corruption, and be effective citizens and leaders. By understanding in detail the past distribution of U.S. democracy assistance, policymakers and analysts can better determine where to direct funds in the future in order to achieve greater impact.

(). Democracy assistance must deal with the new forms of backlash and soft resistance to the promotion of democracy in many countries.

Gershman & Allen, '06 ("The Assault on Democracy Assistance," *Journal of Democracy*, Volume 17, Number 2, April 2006, pp. 36-51 Gershman is president of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). Michael Allen, special assistant to the vice-president for government and external relations at NED, is editor of the online publication *Democracy Digest* (www.demdigest.net))

The practical manifestation of this trend has been a proliferation of democracy-assistance programs funded by governments, multilateral bodies such as the United Nations and the European Union, international financial institutions, and independent foundations. Such programs, which have gained broad international support, provide technical and material assistance to governments that are trying to consolidate democracy, as well as to nongovernmental groups that seek to monitor public institutions and processes, promote human rights and access to information, and encourage democratic participation. Just as this trend has taken root in the international system, however, a counter-trend has emerged of resistance to democracy programs, especially those that seek to empower civil society; promote free media; and strengthen democratic political parties, institutions, and processes. This new phenomenon needs to be distinguished from the conventional resistance to democracy that is a central feature of such longstanding dictatorships as Cuba, Burma, North Korea, and Syria. These countries have never permitted democracy assistance and deal harshly as a matter of course with any sign of internal opposition. The new resistance takes place in countries where democracy assistance until recently has been possible and relatively unobstructed, even though independent NGOs and parties have often been subjected to various forms of official harassment. The difference today is that new legal restrictions on—and extralegal impediments to—democracy assistance have assumed menacing proportions and pose a major new threat to the advance and consolidation of democracy. The backlash against democracy promotion is largely a by-product of the proliferation of so-called hybrid regimes in the aftermath of democracy's third wave. The third wave has not been followed by a reverse wave of authoritarianism, but it has left behind many stalled or failed transitions. In these cases, autocrats have either replaced reformists after a brief interval of unsuccessful democratization, or have held on to power while accepting superficial liberalization and a modestly more open political space for democratic opposition. Hybrid regimes often retain certain formally democratic procedures, including relatively free (if not fair) elections, and permit civil society organizations to function and receive foreign assistance. But the underlying political realities are manipulated elections, a weak parliament, an overweening executive branch, state-controlled media, rampant corruption, and no recourse to an independent judiciary. Still, the fact that democratic oppositions continued to exist, had some room to operate, and could receive financial and technical assistance from democratic countries made it possible in some cases for opposition groups to mount significant efforts to expand the political space and even to challenge the ruling party. Such pressures succeeded in bringing the opposition to power in Slovakia in 1998 and subsequently in Croatia, Serbia, and Georgia. But it was the Orange Revolution in Ukraine at the end of 2004 that raised alarms in neighboring Russia and Belarus and sent out shockwaves that were felt as far away as China, the post-Soviet republics of Central Asia, and even Venezuela—all countries in which international democracy-assistance organizations had established a presence. The offensive against democratization, and particularly against forms of internationally funded democracy assistance, dates back to before the "color revolutions." The Kremlin expelled members of the U.S. Peace Corps and closed the Moscow office of the Solidarity Center, the U.S. labor movement's operation, several months before Georgia's 2003 Rose Revolution accelerated Kremlin concerns about the "contagion effect" of democratic breakthroughs. Yet Ukraine's Orange Revolution in particular clearly accentuated existing trends and prompted a more aggressive and coordinated response on the part of the world's authoritarians and autocrats.² The legal and extralegal measures adopted by regimes determined to stymie democracy assistance range from constraints to cooptation, from coercion to closure. Many states openly repress independent NGOs and other organizations representing an autonomous civil society. Other countries maintain a more ambiguous position by allowing NGOs to operate with a degree of autonomy, but always under a cloud of operational and political constraints and the threat of arbitrary interference or dissolution. The regimes of the broader Middle East have almost perfected this model, softening the harsh reality of authoritarian rule by permitting a degree of political space for relatively tame or managed NGOs while consistently undermining or harassing genuinely independent or assertive groups. In Egypt, for instance, NGOs must carefully gauge how much democratic advocacy they can afford to engage in at any given time. In addition to legal constraints, many regimes employ more "deniable" tactics such as the use of thugs or auxiliary forces—as in Venezuela and Egypt—to intimidate or assault activists. Also popular among some authoritarians is the creation and manipulation of pseudo-NGOs in an attempt to contest and confuse public and international opinion. The Venezuelan state under President Hugo Chávez has been notable for the variety and ingenuity of NGO harassment and subversion tactics it has tried, including abusive tax audits. Whatever the precise degree of leverage that each case will permit, it remains clear that the overall response must come at three distinct levels—the tactical, the political, and the normative. The tactical response involves the work of the indigenous NGOs and activists affected by the new restrictions as well as the international donor organizations and programmatic agencies that provide democracy assistance. The donors will have to be guided by the readiness of NGOs to accept assistance, as well as by the manner in which indigenous prodemocracy groups choose to deal with the legal and administrative barriers that their governments erect. In some instances, the NGOs may wish to test the new laws and procedures by publicly acknowledging the receipt of grant assistance and, where necessary, applying for permission to accept it. But governments may stall in granting permission or, as in the case of Uzbekistan, refuse to release funds deposited in designated bank accounts. In such instances, and once again in consultation with local NGOs, democracy assistance groups may need to revert to practices employed in formerly or currently closed societies. Such efforts might include creative funding arrangements, financing through third parties or third countries, running trainings and other programs in adjacent territories, and channeling support through exile groups. Different contexts demand different responses, but this is not new. Democracy-assistance organizations have long been involved in a diverse range of political contexts—closed societies, authoritarian and semi-authoritarian or hybrid regimes, and fragile or emerging democracies—and the strategies, operating procedures and funding arrangements honed over more than 20 years can be readily adapted to the new situation. For example, cross-border programs, requiring ample coordination and expertise, are run by NGOs based in Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Lithuania in order to aid media and human rights groups in Belarus and much farther afield in Central Asia. Similar work is done by NGOs based in the United States and Hong Kong in order to help colleagues in mainland China. Many of these initiatives take advantage of the Internet and other forms of communication that were unavailable to activists in communist Eastern and Central Europe only two decades ago. The new backlash presents a special challenge to democracy-assistance organizations that need to maintain an in-

country presence to carry out programs which provide training and technical assistance to local activists. In addition to carrying on with their normal programs, such organizations are finding it necessary to invest more time and effort in quasi-diplomatic activities: explaining their programs to local authorities; providing guarantees—through communication and transparency—that their work has no partisan or oppositional agenda; and engaging members of ruling parties in programs. Confidence-building measures of this kind may help to insulate democracy-assistance programs from political pressures and give a degree of protection to local activists while preserving the integrity of the relationship between the international NGOs and their local, grassroots partners. Another way to insulate democracy assistance from political pressures is to strengthen its international and multilateral character. Much of this assistance, of course, is provided by government agencies and private or quasi-governmental foundations in established democracies. But the national character of such institutions need not preclude joint programs, shared funding of NGOs, and regular meetings to coordinate assistance in priority countries or to strengthen cooperation in different functional areas, such as party building, media assistance, or civil society development. Such collaboration is useful in itself and also sends the message that democracy assistance is an international activity which is not meant to further the narrow foreign policy objectives of any particular government.

(). Broad definition of Democracy Assistance (= diplomacy, conditions, sanctions, trade policy)—also another piece of evidence for “in.”

Natl. Research Council Report, '08 (Improving Democracy Assistance: Building Knowledge Through Evaluations and Research (2008) IMPROVING DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE, Building Knowledge Through Evaluations and Research, Committee on Evaluation of USAID Democracy Assistance Programs, Development, Security, and Cooperation Policy and Global Affairs, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12164&page=23, acsd 5/25/11)

In recent years democracy assistance has become not merely a goal for diplomacy (although it remains that) but an increasingly frequent practical problem. A host of international and multilateral donor agencies and even military forces (both NATO and U.S.) have taken on the task of helping build democracies in highly challenging environments, including authoritarian and semi-authoritarian states, recently emerging and transitional democracies, and societies scarcely out of, or even in the midst of, violent conflicts (e.g., Ukraine, Bosnia, Egypt, Afghanistan, Iraq, Haiti, Democratic Republic of the Congo). U.S. efforts to assist the spread of democracy encompass a host of activities: diplomatic pressures, trade sanctions, economic development aid, military and political support for democratic forces, or in some cases (e.g., Zaire, Philippines) withdrawal of support for dictators.

(). Despite problems evaluating the effectiveness of democracy assistance, a recent cross-national study demonstrates that “higher levels of democracy assistance lead to higher levels of democracy.”

Natl. Research Council Report, '08 (Improving Democracy Assistance: Building Knowledge Through Evaluations and Research (2008) IMPROVING DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE, Building Knowledge Through Evaluations and Research, Committee on Evaluation of USAID Democracy Assistance Programs, Development, Security, and Cooperation Policy and Global Affairs, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12164&page=23, acsd 5/25/11)

Yet USAID’s current evaluation practices do not provide compelling evidence of the impacts of DG programs. While gathering valuable information for project tracking and management, these evaluations usually do not collect data that are critical to making the most accurate and credible determination of project impacts—such as obtaining baseline measures of targeted outcomes before a project is begun or tracking changes in appropriately selected (or assigned) comparison groups to serve as a control or reference group. USAID has been seeking better evidence for the effects of its DG projects. In 2000 the Office of Democracy and Governance created the Strategic and Operational Research Agenda (SORA). Under SORA, USAID has commissioned studies of its DG evaluations and underwritten a recent cross-national study of the effects of its democracy assistance programs since 1990. A very encouraging finding from that study is that democracy assistance *does* matter for democratic progress. The study (Finkel et al 2007; see also the second-phase study, Finkel et al 2008) found that, when controlling for a wide variety of other factors, higher levels of democracy assistance are, on average, associated with movement to higher levels of democracy. These results provide the clearest evidence to date that democracy assistance contributes toward achieving its desired goals.

(). Democracy assistance crucial to US national security policy.

Natl. Research Council Report, '08 (Improving Democracy Assistance: Building Knowledge Through Evaluations and Research (2008) IMPROVING DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE, Building Knowledge Through Evaluations and Research, Committee on Evaluation of

USAID Democracy Assistance Programs, Development, Security, and Cooperation Policy and Global Affairs, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12164&page=23, acsd 5/25/11)

Over the past 25 years, the United States has made assistance for the development of democracy in other nations a key element of its national security policy.

(). US Democracy Assistance is over \$1 billion a year, including Iraq and Afghanistan. Over \$8 billion from 1990 to 2005. USAID has been in 120 countries and territories.

Natl. Research Council Report, '08 (Improving Democracy Assistance: Building Knowledge Through Evaluations and Research (2008) IMPROVING DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE, Building Knowledge Through Evaluations and Research, Committee on Evaluation of USAID Democracy Assistance Programs, Development, Security, and Cooperation Policy and Global Affairs, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12164&page=23, acsd 5/25/11)

Since 1990, USAID has supported democracy programs in approximately 120 countries and territories with budgets ranging from tens of thousands to hundreds of millions of dollars. The most comprehensive analysis of USAID DG spending estimates total expenditures between 1990 and 2005 at \$8.47 billion in constant 2000 U.S. dollars (Azpuru et al. 2008). Total annual USAID DG expenditures currently run over \$1 billion; for fiscal year (FY) 2008 the request for DG, including both USAID and some much smaller amounts for the State Department, was \$1.45 billion, with \$374 million allocated to Iraq and Afghanistan (Congressional Budget Justification [CBJ] 2008).¹

(). DG (Democracy and Governance Assistance) is supported by officers and personnel in D.C. and overseas missions.

Natl. Research Council Report, '08 (Improving Democracy Assistance: Building Knowledge Through Evaluations and Research (2008) IMPROVING DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE, Building Knowledge Through Evaluations and Research, Committee on Evaluation of USAID Democracy Assistance Programs, Development, Security, and Cooperation Policy and Global Affairs, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12164&page=23, acsd 5/25/11)

The programs are supported by hundreds of DG officers and other personnel in Washington and at overseas missions. As of 2004, DG comprised the agency's largest category of technical expertise among direct hire personnel at just over 400 (USAID 2006), although not everyone in this category is doing DG work at any given time.

(). Current USAID funding for DG (Democracy and Governance) is relatively small.

Natl. Research Council Report, '08 (Improving Democracy Assistance: Building Knowledge Through Evaluations and Research (2008) IMPROVING DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE, Building Knowledge Through Evaluations and Research, Committee on Evaluation of USAID Democracy Assistance Programs, Development, Security, and Cooperation Policy and Global Affairs, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12164&page=23, acsd 5/25/11)

Yet the funding of DG efforts, given their high priority for U.S. foreign policy and frequent mandate to help transform political systems into democracies, is relatively modest. In many countries, projects that are not strictly DG but that respond to related national needs may find a home under the DG umbrella, so the amount of effort actually focused on democracy building is smaller than may at first appear.² Moreover, DG funds comprise only a small portion of what the United States spends on its international engagements. The total FY2008 budget request for foreign assistance, which includes DG programs, was \$20.3 billion (CBJ 2008:1).

(). USAID is largest provider of democracy assistance, but there are many sources

Natl. Research Council Report, '08 (Improving Democracy Assistance: Building Knowledge Through Evaluations and Research (2008) IMPROVING DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE, Building Knowledge Through Evaluations and Research, Committee on Evaluation of USAID Democracy Assistance Programs, Development, Security, and Cooperation Policy and Global Affairs, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12164&page=23, acsd 5/25/11)

USAID is the single largest provider of funding for democracy assistance. However, in many countries USAID is just one agency among many others providing democracy assistance.³ Although each donor agency plans and carries out its own programs, coordination with other donors occurs on several levels: within countries among donors, through bilateral channels, and through such multilateral venues as the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

(). US Democracy Assistance in need of an overarching concept of democracy.

Natl. Research Council Report, '08 (Improving Democracy Assistance: Building Knowledge Through Evaluations and Research (2008) IMPROVING DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE, Building Knowledge Through Evaluations and Research, Committee on Evaluation of USAID Democracy Assistance Programs, Development, Security, and Cooperation Policy and Global Affairs, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12164&page=23, acsd 5/25/11)

Ideally, USAID and other providers of DG assistance would be guided in achieving their goals by a well-defined theory of democratic development that could identify where a recipient country stood on feasible trajectories toward stable democracy and which elements or driving factors needed to be supplied or strengthened in order to overcome obstacles and move forward on such a trajectory. It would then select among programs known to provide or strengthen those specific elements and tailor their implementation to that country's specific needs.

(). Democracy has to be scrutinized conceptually first because the policies themselves have outpaced the assumptions holding up theories of democracy itself. The affirmative has to defend democracy to defend democracy assistance.

Natl. Research Council Report, '08 (Improving Democracy Assistance: Building Knowledge Through Evaluations and Research (2008) IMPROVING DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE, Building Knowledge Through Evaluations and Research, Committee on Evaluation of USAID Democracy Assistance Programs, Development, Security, and Cooperation Policy and Global Affairs, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12164&page=23, acsd 5/25/11)

“Unfortunately, the growth of widely accepted findings regarding the causes and consequences of democratization has lagged behind the growth of democracy assistance activities. Scholars continue to debate exactly how to define democracy, what pathways lead most reliably to full liberal democracy, what the necessary conditions are to achieve and stabilize democracies, and what the consequences are of transitions to democracy for various sets of institutions and geohistorical contexts (Lowenthal 1991, Lijphart 1999, Cox et al 2000, Przeworski et al 2000, Diamond and Plattner 2001, Mansfield and Snyder 2002, Bunce 2003, Chua 2003, Junne and Cross 2003, Acemoglu and Robinson 2005, Pevehouse 2005, Shapiro 2005, Bunce and Wolchik 2006, Tilly 2007). In policy terms this means that scholars can provide only qualified advice on how to move countries.”

(). Judgments about USAID are just guesses—assessment and evaluation of democracy assistance is shoddy at best.

Natl. Research Council Report, '08 (Improving Democracy Assistance: Building Knowledge Through Evaluations and Research (2008) IMPROVING DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE, Building Knowledge Through Evaluations and Research, Committee on Evaluation of USAID Democracy Assistance Programs, Development, Security, and Cooperation Policy and Global Affairs, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12164&page=23, acsd 5/25/11)

USAID has no standard terms for the various levels of its work. In this report “programs” is used to capture higher levels such as DG, which undertake various “projects” in countries, and these projects in turn may involve multiple “activities.” When speaking of evaluating “programs” or “projects” in this report, the committee refers to the evaluation of specific activities to determine whether they are having their desired impact. It is recognized that clusters of such activities may need to be evaluated to assess the overall impact of a large project or, even more broadly, of program activity in a given country or countries.

(). Democracy assistance can aim at modernization and liberalization (hoping to bring about democracy)

Michele Dunne, Ph.D. Carnegie Scholar, '04 (House International Relations Committee Hearing on "United States Economic Assistance to Egypt: Does it Advance Reform?" June 17, 2004 Visiting Scholar, Democracy and Rule of Law Program The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1562&proj=zdr1, acsd 5/22/11>)

Third, in planning a coordinated strategy of policy engagement and assistance programs, it is important to be honest and clear about the current political situation in Egypt. The Egyptian government has shown a readiness to modernize certain institutions - for example, the judiciary - and is now allowing discussion of liberalizing aspects of political life. It has not, however, shown any intention to democratize, by which I mean giving the Egyptian people the right and ability to change their government. All of the U.S. democracy assistance programs so far, and most under contemplation, aim at modernization and liberalization, which can certainly improve people's lives but do not necessarily lead to democratic transformation. Such transformation could eventually happen when the governing elite decides that it can no longer resist strong internal pressure for change, or as a result of visionary leadership.

(). Democracy Assistance is fairly common, but good data assessing its effectiveness on a country-by-country basis is not.

McMahon, Dean's Prof. Applied Politics @ Binghamton, '02 (Edward R., Director, Center on Democratic Performance, "The Impact of U.S. Democracy and Governance Assistance in Africa: Benin Case Study." acsd 5/23/11, Aug 29-Sept 1, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PCAAB068.pdf)

As part of its support for democratic development around the world, especially since the collapse of communism in the late 1980s, the international community has provided a significant amount of assistance for the promotion of democracy. While there is a modest, albeit growing, amount of literature on this issue, there are few independent analyses on a country basis of the effects of specific donor country democracy assistance. This is an issue of increasing importance as the notion of "good governance," including representative and transparent political systems, has become a central developmental concept. This paper examines what effect, positive or negative, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) support has had on democratic development in Benin, a key country in the development of democracy in Africa. The paper also presents some thoughts on broader issues concerning the efficacy of democracy assistance.

(). Democracy assistance has four main parts: rule of law, civil society, elections and political processes, and governance sub-sectors

McMahon, Dean's Prof. Applied Politics @ Binghamton, '02 (Edward R., Director, Center on Democratic Performance, "The Impact of U.S. Democracy and Governance Assistance in Africa: Benin Case Study." acsd 5/23/11, Aug 29-Sept 1, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PCAAB068.pdf)

The paper examines USAID efforts to promote democracy in Benin in the rule of law, civil society, elections and political processes, and governance sub-sectors of democracy assistance. The challenge of extrapolating conclusions too broadly from one case study is clear. This paper does conclude, however, that a qualitative analysis of the effectiveness of U.S. democracy/governance assistance to Benin is consonant with other assessments which determine that such assistance can be helpful in supporting indigenous moves towards democratic development and consolidation.

(). Democracy assistance may fail—that's common, but it's still democracy assistance. It's the nature of the assistance, not the result, that makes it democracy assistance).

McMahon, Dean's Prof. Applied Politics @ Binghamton, '02 (Edward R., Director, Center on Democratic Performance, "The Impact of U.S. Democracy and Governance Assistance in Africa: Benin Case Study." acsd 5/23/11, Aug 29-Sept 1, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PCAAB068.pdf)

There is clearly a wide range of opinion about whether democracy and governance programs have a positive impact. Skeptics assert that there is not. One scholar has concluded that "international pressure and the efforts of a small urban elite were able to initiate democratic transition where authoritarian governments were caught off-guard, but they are insufficient for democratic consolidation. . . . Even if the international community had sufficient commitment and a strong enough attention span, which it does not, the creation of democratic institutions cannot be accomplished from outside. . . . In the meantime, democracy

promotion, like structural adjustment, will be another experiment on relatively powerless Africans by (perhaps well intentioned) international ‘mad scientists.’”¹ Letitia Lawson, “External Democracy Promotion in Africa: Another False Start?” *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 37, no.1 (1999): 23

(). Democracy assistance works alongside indigenous movements and cannot succeed without them. It is all about indigenous democrats and providing assistance to those groups can only facilitate.

McMahon, Dean’s Prof. Applied Politics @ Binghamton, ’02 (Edward R., Director, Center on Democratic Performance, “The Impact of U.S. Democracy and Governance Assistance in Africa: Benin Case Study.” acsd 5/23/11, Aug 29-Sept 1, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PCAAB068.pdf)

In a more nuanced perspective, Joel Barkan has written that “it is important to note that these (i.e. democracy support) programs are at best programs that operate at the margin of the process—as facilitators of transitions that are driven mainly by the internal dynamics of the societies in which they occur and/or by the internal dynamics of the regimes that govern these societies. . . . While ‘like-minded donors’ can provide useful support to accelerate or consolidate the process, they cannot do so without indigenous democrats.”² Joel Barkan, “Can Established Democracies Nurture Democracy Abroad? Some Lessons from Africa,” in *Democracy’s Victory and Crisis*, ed. Axel Hadennius (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 395. Bratton has argued that international pressures are best understood in terms of their interactions with domestic political factors such as the presence in timing of mass protest, in the relative resourcefulness of state and social actors.³ In a similar vein, another observer has suggested that “countries may be justified in mounting efforts to promote democracy abroad, but such projects need to be carried out with care.”⁴ Michael Bratton, “International Versus Domestic Pressures for Democratization in Africa,” in *After the Cold War: Security and Democracy in Africa and Asia*, ed. William Hale and Eberhard Kienle (New York: Taurus, 1997), 160. 4. Michael Pinto-Duchhinsky, “The Rise of Political Aid,” in *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Regional Challenges*, ed. Larry Diamond (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 307.

(). Democratic assistance, when successful, really goes to democratic actors in the target countries or regions, not always to the state.

McMahon, Dean’s Prof. Applied Politics @ Binghamton, ’02 (Edward R., Director, Center on Democratic Performance, “The Impact of U.S. Democracy and Governance Assistance in Africa: Benin Case Study.” acsd 5/23/11, Aug 29-Sept 1, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PCAAB068.pdf)

Diamond takes a more strongly supportive position, arguing that “one of the distinguishing features of the Third Wave of democratization has been the salience of international influences . . . international and especially regional demonstration effects played a crucial role in stimulating and providing models for subsequent democratic transitions. No less influential were a variety of more tangible international pressures and inducements, including the growth of governmental and nongovernmental forms of assistance to democratic actors, and the increasing emphasis on human rights and democracy promotion in the foreign policies of established democracies, especially the United States.”⁵ There have also been many statements and some policies of recent U.S. administrations and democracy provision organizations that mirror this belief. The opening statement on the webpage of the International Republican Institute (IRI), for example, asserts that “by aiding emerging democracies, IRI plays a valuable role in helping bring greater stability to the world.”⁶ It is worthwhile noting here that this perspective has been reflected in increasing levels of U.S. government foreign aid to promote democracy and governance.

(). US democratic assistance is primarily under the auspices of US AID and occurs within four categories: rule of law, civil society, the elections process, and governance.

McMahon, Dean’s Prof. Applied Politics @ Binghamton, ’02 (Edward R., Director, Center on Democratic Performance, “The Impact of U.S. Democracy and Governance Assistance in Africa: Benin Case Study.” acsd 5/23/11, Aug 29-Sept 1, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PCAAB068.pdf)

U.S. Democracy Assistance

Donor agencies may differ somewhat in their definition of democracy assistance, and some may direct their resources towards one or two sub-categories. The model developed by USAID covers many of the themes addressed by donors. It is divided into four main subcategories. These areas of focus include rule of law, civil society, elections and political processes, and governance.

(). Within the rule of law, the focus is human rights in three key areas: legal reform, administering justice, and increasing citizen's access to justice.

McMahon, Dean's Prof. Applied Politics @ Binghamton, '02 (Edward R., Director, Center on Democratic Performance, "The Impact of U.S. Democracy and Governance Assistance in Africa: Benin Case Study." acsd 5/23/11, Aug 29-Sept 1, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PCAAB068.pdf)

The rule of law area addresses both constitutional and actual guarantees of basic human rights and basic principles of equal treatment of all people before the law. In many states with weak or nascent democratic traditions, existing laws are not equitable or equitably applied, judicial independence is compromised, individual and minority rights are not truly guaranteed, and institutions have not yet developed the capacity to administer existing laws. Three interconnected key sub-areas include supporting legal reform, improving the administration of justice, and increasing citizens' access to justice. Since this paper is focused on assessing the impact of assistance programming, it is useful to highlight how USAID itself has defined how progress can be identified. In USAID's Handbook of Democracy and Governance Program Indicators, rule of law activities are deemed to have been successful if they have resulted in strengthened rule of law and respect for human rights. This general notion is disaggregated into the following sub-categories: foundations for protection of human rights and gender equity conform to international standards; laws, regulations, and policies promote a market-based economy; equal access to justice; and effective and fair legal sector institutions.^{11...10} See Edward R. McMahon, "Assessing USAID's Assistance for Democratic Development: Is it Quantity Versus Quality?" Evaluation: The International Journal of Theory, Research, and Practice 7, no. 4 (Winter 2001).¹¹ U.S. Agency for International Development, Handbook of Democracy and Governance Program Indicators (Washington, DC: Management Systems International, 1998), 17.

(). The Civil Society component of democracy assistance is crucial, yet highly contested.

McMahon, Dean's Prof. Applied Politics @ Binghamton, '02 (Edward R., Director, Center on Democratic Performance, "The Impact of U.S. Democracy and Governance Assistance in Africa: Benin Case Study." acsd 5/23/11, Aug 29-Sept 1, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PCAAB068.pdf)

Civil society has been defined as the "associational realm between state and family populated by organizations which are separate from the state, enjoy autonomy in relation to the state, and are formed voluntarily by members of society to protect or extend their interests or values."¹² A wide variety of groups, including women's rights organizations, business and labor federations, media groups, coalitions of professional associations, civic education groups, bar associations, environmental activist groups, and human rights monitoring organizations receive assistance from USAID in this domain. The role of civil society in promoting greater political pluralism has been largely championed in democracy-related literature as a central element in the recent, "Third Wave" expansion of democracy around the world, although there have been an increasing number of critiques of civil society's impact, questioning, for example, the extent of partisanship, commitment, funding, and quality of organizations that make up civil society.^{13, 12} Gordon White, "Civil Society, Democratization and Development (I): Clearing the Analytic Ground," Democratization 1, no.3 (Autumn 1994): 379. ¹³ See Michael Clough, "Reflections on Civil Society" and David Rieff, "The False Dawn of Civil Society," The Nation 268, no. 7 (February 1999). In evaluating the impact of civil society programming, USAID looks at the "increased development of a politically active civil society." This includes a legal framework to protect and promote civil society, increased citizen participation in the policy process and oversight of public institutions, increased institutional and financial viability of civil society organizations, an enhanced free flow of information, and a strengthened democratic politic culture.¹⁴

(). The elections element of democracy assistance includes the entire process of elections.

McMahon, Dean's Prof. Applied Politics @ Binghamton, '02 (Edward R., Director, Center on Democratic Performance, "The Impact of U.S. Democracy and Governance Assistance in Africa: Benin Case Study." acsd 5/23/11, Aug 29-Sept 1, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PCAAB068.pdf)

There are a whole series of challenges that complicate the ability of nascent democracies to implement legitimate electoral processes. These can include inefficient or poorly organized election administration, insufficient education on the part of citizens about different stages of the political process, including elections; and a lack of effectively structured political parties. USAID

programs to address these problems have included election planning and implementation, political party development, voter education, and support for domestic and international monitoring groups. USAID's criteria for program effectiveness in this sub-sector are centered on the theme of "more genuine and competitive political processes." More specific issues include the development of impartial electoral frameworks, credible election administrations, an informed and active citizenry, effective oversight of the electoral process, a representative and competitive multiparty system, inclusion of women and other disadvantaged groups, and effective transfer of political power.¹⁵

(). The governance component of democracy assistance covers the overall functioning of democratic institutions

McMahon, Dean's Prof. Applied Politics @ Binghamton, '02 (Edward R., Director, Center on Democratic Performance, "The Impact of U.S. Democracy and Governance Assistance in Africa: Benin Case Study." acsd 5/23/11, Aug 29-Sept 1, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PCAAB068.pdf)

The concept of governance applies to a basket of issues dealing with the functioning of democratic institutions. These include anti-corruption activities, decentralization, civil-military relations, and legislative and local government functioning. USAID's programming in this subsector is designed to encourage and assist nascent democratic governments to integrate key principles such as transparency, accountability, and participation as they develop, and to improve their institutions and processes. USAID defines progress in governance activities as resulting in "more transparent and accountable government institutions." This is achieved by increased government responsiveness to citizens at the local level, heightened access by citizens to improved government information, strengthening of government ethical practices, improved civil-military relations supportive of democracy, more effective, independent, and representative legislatures, and more effective policy processes in the executive branch.¹⁶ Obviously, it is not realistic to expect that in a country study all of these categories would be shown to reflect across-the-board improvements as a result of U.S. assistance.

(). **US AID administers most US democracy assistance. In 2008, the majority of that aid went TO Iraq, China, Cuba, Iran, and North Korea.**

G.A.O., Sept. '09 ("DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE: U.S. Agencies Take Steps to Coordinate International Programs but Lack Information on Some U.S.-funded Activities," acsd 5/22/11, <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09993.pdf>)

Although complete data on USAID funding per country were not available, USAID mission data, compiled by State and USAID at GAO's request, show that in a sample of 10 countries, most democracy funds are programmed by USAID. In the 10 countries, annual funding per project averaged more than \$2 million for USAID, \$350,000 for State DRL, and \$100,000 for NED. In fiscal year 2008, more than half of State funding for democracy assistance went to Iraq, followed by China, Cuba, Iran, and North Korea, and NED funding for democracy programs was highest for China, Iraq, Russia, Burma, and Pakistan.

(). **From 2006-08, US AID implemented democracy assistance in over 90 countries. State DRL (Dept. of State's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor) and the private National Endowment for Democracy (NED) all give democracy assistance.**

G.A.O., Sept. '09 ("DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE: U.S. Agencies Take Steps to Coordinate International Programs but Lack Information on Some U.S.-funded Activities," acsd 5/22/11, <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09993.pdf>)

In fiscal years 2006- 2008, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which has primary responsibility for promoting democracy abroad, implemented democracy assistance projects **in** about 90 countries. The Department of State's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (State DRL) and the private, nonprofit National Endowment for Democracy (NED) also fund democracy programs in many of these countries.

(). Dept. of State attempting to coordinate agencies involved in democracy assistance (NED, State DRL, and US AID)

G.A.O., Sept. '09 (“DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE: U.S. Agencies Take Steps to Coordinate International Programs but Lack Information on Some U.S.-funded Activities,” acsd 5/22/11, <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09993.pdf>)

Partly to lessen the risk of duplicative programs, State recently initiated efforts to reform and consolidate State and USAID foreign assistance processes. GAO reviewed (1) democracy assistance funding provided by USAID, State DRL, and NED in fiscal year 2008; (2) USAID, State DRL, and NED efforts to coordinate their democracy assistance; and (3) USAID efforts to assess results and evaluate the impact of its democracy assistance. GAO recommends that, to enhance coordination of U.S.-funded democracy assistance, the Secretary of State and the USAID Administrator work jointly with NED to establish a mechanism to routinely collect information about NED’s current projects in countries where NED and State or USAID provide democracy assistance. These entities concurred with our recommendation.

(). US agencies are not well-coordinated on democracy assistance. Where there could be cooperation, there is duplicative effort.

G.A.O., Sept. '09 (“DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE: U.S. Agencies Take Steps to Coordinate International Programs but Lack Information on Some U.S.-funded Activities,” acsd 5/22/11, <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09993.pdf>)

USAID and State DRL coordinate to help ensure complementary assistance but are often not aware of NED grants. To prevent duplicative programs, State DRL obtains feedback from USAID missions and embassies on project proposals before awarding democracy assistance grants. State DRL officials generally do not participate in USAID missions’ planning efforts; some State and USAID officials told GAO that geographic distances between State DRL’s centrally managed program and USAID’s country mission-based programs would make such participation difficult. Several USAID and State DRL officials responsible for planning and managing democracy assistance told GAO that they lacked information on NED’s current projects, which they believed would help inform their own programming decisions. Although NED is not required to report on all of its democracy assistance efforts to State and there currently is no mechanism for regular information sharing, NED told GAO that it has shared information with State and USAID and would routinely provide them with information on current projects if asked.

(). Evaluating the success of “democracy assistance” is difficult. US AID tries assessment occasionally, but it is not a well-developed scheme of evaluation.

G.A.O., Sept. '09 (“DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE: U.S. Agencies Take Steps to Coordinate International Programs but Lack Information on Some U.S.-funded Activities,” acsd 5/22/11, <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09993.pdf>)

USAID uses standard and custom indicators to assess and report on immediate program results; USAID also conducts some, but relatively infrequent, independent evaluations of longer-term programs. The standard indicators, developed by State, generally focus on numbers of activities or immediate results of a program, while custom indicators measure additional program results. USAID commissions a limited number of independent evaluations of program impact. USAID mission officials told GAO that they did not conduct many independent evaluations of democracy assistance because of the resources involved in the undertaking and the difficulty of measuring impact in the area of democracy assistance. In response to a 2008 National Research Council report on USAID’s democracy evaluation capacity, USAID has reported initiating several steps—for example, designing impact evaluations for six missions as part of a pilot program.

(). Cuts contemplated for Egypt in democracy assistance before the success of the movement.

Shadi Hamid, '10 (Issue #15, Winter 2010, “The Cairo Conundrum” <http://www.democracyjournal.org/15/6726.php?page=5>, acsd 5/23/11)

More striking, however, are the drastic cuts in democracy assistance to Egypt contained in the Obama Administration's 2010 budget request. The decrease of 60 percent (from \$54 million to \$20 million) from Bush's final request is especially jarring in a year when democracy aid shot up for countries like Morocco and Yemen. As it turns out, Egypt, with a population of more than 80 million, received less democracy assistance than either the West Bank and Gaza or Lebanon, each with about 4 million people. According to the Project on Middle East Democracy's annual budget analysis, only about 1 percent of total bilateral assistance to Egypt was earmarked for democracy and governance, and a sizable portion of even that 1 percent went to either GONGOs—government organized non-governmental organizations—or the Egyptian government itself. Under the Obama Administration's direction, the 2009 omnibus appropriations act included specific language limiting the amount of economic assistance that could be used for democracy and governance, the first time that such language has ever been used in legislation.

(). Democracy assistance can clash with strict views of Islamic law.

Phillips, American U., '09 (By David Phillips Created 12/22/2009, New Frontier In Democracy Assistance , *Atlantic Council*, <http://www.acus.org/print/6088> Director of the Program on Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding at American U., acsd 5/25/11)

Democracy assistance typically focuses on constitutional arrangements protecting and promoting individual and minority rights. It often emphasizes electoral assistance and measures to strengthen political parties, independent media and civil society. This is anathema to political Islam, which emerged in the 20th century as an effort by fundamentalists to address challenges of the modern world. Rejecting innovation, they believe that any Muslim who deviates from Shari'a, the strict interpretation of Islamic law, is impure. Linking piety with an end to political corruption and misrule, they reject constitutional democracy as the basis for secular government that empowers human rulers over the law of God. Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad is the primary proponent of this radical political theology. He maintains that Islam and democracy are fundamentally incompatible: "Liberalism and Western-style democracy have not been able to realize the ideals of humanity. Today, these two concepts have failed. Those with insight can already hear the sounds of the shattering and fall of the ideology and thoughts of liberal democratic systems." (Open letter to President George W. Bush, May 2006).

(). Democracy is compatible with Islam, empirically,

Phillips, American U., '09 (By David Phillips Created 12/22/2009, New Frontier In Democracy Assistance , *Atlantic Council*, <http://www.acus.org/print/6088> Director of the Program on Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding at American U., acsd 5/25/11)

While Ahmedinejad believes that democracy represents the secularization of Christian and Western values and therefore lacks universal appeal, many Muslims reject fanaticism, citing Islam's traditions of pluralism, cosmopolitanism, and open-mindedness. Hundreds of millions of Muslims live in democratic countries, either as minorities or majorities in countries ranging from Turkey and Indonesia to Western Europe, and enjoy democratic freedoms. They maintain that the Islamic process of consultation is entirely consistent with democratic debate. The democracy deficit in the Arab and Muslim world is more a problem of supply than demand.

(). Successful democracy assistance from the U.S. requires taking a step back—stand behind democratic movements instead of in front of them.

Phillips, American U., '09 (By David Phillips Created 12/22/2009, New Frontier In Democracy Assistance , *Atlantic Council*, <http://www.acus.org/print/6088> Director of the Program on Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding at American U., acsd 5/25/11)

At this pivotal moment, the Obama administration would be well advised to reflect on America's Cold War experience and garner guiding principles for democracy assistance to the broader Muslim community. These principles proceed from the recognition that America's role should be to stand behind, not in front of democracy movements. The U.S. should not "lead" or "teach" democracy. It is most effective as a catalyst for change. To this end, patience is required; democratization is a process, not an event. Overheated rhetoric risks discrediting pro-democracy activists by making them appear as agents of a foreign power. The U.S. must tread softly; reform is ultimately driven by the societal demand of local stakeholders.

(). Window of opportunity Exists for the U.S. now—Obama set the table

Phillips, American U., '09 (By David Phillips Created 12/22/2009, New Frontier In Democracy Assistance , Atlantic Council, [http://www.acus.org/print/6088_Director of the Program on Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding at American U., acsd 5/25/11](http://www.acus.org/print/6088_Director_of_the_Program_on_Conflict_Prevention_and_Peacebuilding_at_American_U.,_acsd_5/25/11))

There is, today, a moment of opportunity. It flows from President Barack Obama's Cairo speech (June 4, 2009), which fundamentally shifted the dynamic between Western and Muslim societies: "I have come here to seek a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world; one based upon mutual interest and mutual respect; and one based upon the truth that America and Islam are not exclusive, and need not be in competition. Instead, they overlap, and share common principles – principles of justice and progress; tolerance and the dignity of all human beings." Without the U.S. to blame for their societal ills, voters in the Arab and Muslim world are increasingly holding their leaders accountable. Soon after Cairo, Lebanese voters balked at a coalition including Hezbollah; Iranians voted overwhelmingly for reform candidates (according to exit polls); and Indonesia returned its secular president to power in the first round.

(). Successful democracy assistance requires broader principles.

Phillips, American U., '09 (By David Phillips Created 12/22/2009, New Frontier In Democracy Assistance , Atlantic Council, [http://www.acus.org/print/6088_Director of the Program on Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding at American U., acsd 5/25/11](http://www.acus.org/print/6088_Director_of_the_Program_on_Conflict_Prevention_and_Peacebuilding_at_American_U.,_acsd_5/25/11))

Reversing negative perceptions of the U.S. will require skillful public diplomacy. But restoring America's credibility requires substance as well as spin. Policies must both advance U.S. national interests and reflect favorably on America's intentions. Successful democracy assistance should be based on broader, value-based principles such as safeguarding rights and enhancing human capital through formal education systems and economic development.

In Cairo, President Obama spoke compellingly about assisting the democratic aspirations of people for democracy, freedom and justice. While his words were welcomed, the U.S. will be judged by what it does and not by what Obama says. First and foremost, restoring U.S. credibility requires more balanced and effective U.S.-led efforts aimed at realizing a viable state of Palestine alongside a secure state of Israel.

(). The US has been at the forefront of democratic assistance, but greater leadership and cooperation is needed to assist the democratization of the Muslim world.

Phillips, American U., '09 (By David Phillips Created 12/22/2009, New Frontier In Democracy Assistance , Atlantic Council, [http://www.acus.org/print/6088_Director of the Program on Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding at American U., acsd 5/25/11](http://www.acus.org/print/6088_Director_of_the_Program_on_Conflict_Prevention_and_Peacebuilding_at_American_U.,_acsd_5/25/11))

Reaching out to those directly affected by democracy assistance is also critical to restoring credibility. Right after President Obama's Cairo speech, 30 U.S. embassies surveyed civil society in countries that are part of the Arab and Muslim world to seek their views on programmatic approaches to implementing the so-called Cairo principles. The White House also launched an inter-agency task force and established a fund to support activities. The Obama administration deserves credit for "walking the talk" and dedicating resources to democracy assistance at a time when budget priorities are constrained by the financial crisis and the costs of engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Democratization of the broader Muslim community is a generational endeavor that requires international cooperation. The U.S. can leverage its democracy assistance by working with other countries and international organizations. European countries, as well as the UN, EU, OSCE and others have important roles to play supporting elections and governance. As was the case during the Cold War, democratizing the broader Muslim community will require vision and U.S. leadership. The Obama administration is off to a good start, but if there is one lesson from the Cold War it is the need for patience and partnership, with both the international community and those on the front-lines of democratic change.

Appendix: Definitions

Substantially

---Substantial means “in the main”

Ballantine’s Law Dictionary (3rd edition, 1969, p. 1232)
substantially. In the main. Essentially.

---Substantially means “without material qualification.”

Blacks Law Dictionary, 1990.

----Substantially means more than 50%.

Dupre, Associate Professor of Law at the University of Georgia Law, 2000 [Anne, Washington Law Review, Jan, Lexis]

In fact, the statute defines "substantial" evidence as "beyond a mere preponderance," or beyond fifty percent. 311 Given that definition of "substantial evidence," it would appear that "substantially likely" means that the school must show that there is a more than fifty-percent likelihood that injury will occur before a violent student can be placed in an alternative setting.

----Substantial means of considerable value or importance.

Words and Phrases, 1990 (Pocket Part, p. 212).

[Substantial] Important, essential, amount or extent.

Considerable in importance, values, degree, amount or extent. Hepple v. State, 358 A.2d 283, 286, 31 Maryland Appeals 525.

---- The term “substantial” is designed to give flexibility in contextual interpretations.

David **Mellinkoff**, Law Professor UCLA, 1992 (Mellinkoff’s Dictionary of American Legal Usage, p. 626).

Substantial is as flexible in the law as in ordinary English. That is its reason for continued existence in the law. Long use of substantial in combinations, e.g., substantial evidence, can produce an impression of prevision, which is lacking. The word is an alert! What substantial fastens itself to becomes infected with substantial’s flexibility. A place for discretion.

Increase

Increase implies pre-existence.

Webster’s Dictionary 1998

[Increase: to make greater, argument, implies to what is already well grown, or well developed]

Increase means ...

Wordnet, 2006 (wordnet.princeton.edu/perl/webwn)

1. addition: a quantity that is added; "there was an addition to property taxes this year"; "they recorded the cattle's gain in weight over a period ...

2. a change resulting in an increase; "the increase is scheduled for next month"

3. a process of becoming larger or longer or more numerous or more important; "the increase in unemployment"; "the growth of population"

4. become bigger or greater in amount; "The amount of work increased"

5. the amount by which something increases; "they proposed an increase of 15 percent in the fare"

6. the act of increasing something: "he gave me an increase in salary"

7. make bigger or more: "The boss finally increased her salary"; "The university increased the number of students it admitted"

Increase is to accumulate

Encarta, 2007 (encarta.msn.com/dictionary_/accretion.html)

an increase in size as a result of accumulation or the growing together of separate things

Increase means to augment

Webster's Dictionary, 1913 ("Increase." <<http://machaut.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/WEBSTER.sh?WORD=increase>>.)

"Increase" (?), v. i. To become greater or more in size, quantity, number, degree, value, intensity, power, authority, reputation, wealth; to grow; to augment; to advance; -- opposed to decrease.

Increase means to reproduce

American Heritage 2k [The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language: Fourth Edition, accessed June 12, <http://www.bartleby.com/61/21/10092100.html>]

1. To become greater or larger.

2. To multiply; reproduce.

Increase means to become greater.

American Heritage Dictionary 2000

<http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/increase>

To become greater or larger. To multiply; reproduce.

Increase means to multiply.

Webster's Dictionary 1996

To multiply by the production of young; to be fertile, fruitful, or prolific

Increase means net increase.

Words and Phrases Vol 20 A 2004

I.A.App.2 Cir. 1972 Within insurance company's superintendent's employment contract, "increase" meant net increase in premiums generated by agent calculated by subtracting "lapses" or premiums lost on policies previously issued from gross premiums added by new policies sold and "one time" meant payment made as salary or bonus to agent on dollar for dollar or "one for one" basis measured by net increase. – Lanier v Trans-World Life Ins. Co. 258 So.2d 103 –Insurance 1652(1)

Increase means "to become greater or larger"

Wordnet, 2003. (2.0 edition, Downloaded at Dictionary.com, Downloaded: 3-19-06)

a process of becoming larger or longer or more numerous or more important; "the increase in unemployment"; "the growth of population" [syn: increment, growth] [ant: decrease]

Expand

Expand means to grow in size.

Random House Dictionary, "expand." (04 Nov. 2010.) <<http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/expand>>.

"expand"–verb (used with object)

1. to increase in extent, size, volume, scope, etc.: Heat expands most metals. He hopes to expand his company.

2. to spread or stretch out; unfold: A bird expands its wings.

3. to express in fuller form or greater detail; develop: to expand a short story into a novel.

4. Mathematics

a. to write (a mathematical expression) so as to show the products of its factors. Compare factor (def. 10).

b. to rewrite (a mathematical expression) as a sum, product, etc., of terms of a particular kind: to expand a function in a power series.

Expand indicates a quantitative growth.

Collins English Dictionary, "expand." The Complete & Unabridged 10th Edition (04 Nov 2009).

expand (ɪkˈspænd)

— vb (often followed by on)

1. to make or become greater in extent, volume, size, or scope; increase

2. to spread out or be spread out; unfold; stretch out
3. to enlarge or expatiate on (a story, topic, etc) in detail
4. (intr) to become increasingly relaxed, friendly, or talkative
5. maths to express (a function or expression) as the sum or product of terms

Legal interpretation means to extend or enlarge

Words & Phrases 2004 Volume 15B, 2004, p. 61

Ill. 1947. "Expand" means to extend; to enlarge.-Federal Elec. Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Village of Mt. Prospect, 75 N.E.2d 359, 398 Ill. 42. III.App. 1 Dist. 1955.

Words & Phrases 2004 Volume 15B, 2004, pp. 61-62

Utah App. 1995. State Tax Commission improperly restricted availability of sales tax exemptions for expanding businesses by enacting rule requiring that manufacturing, processing, or assembling activities must be substantially different in nature, character, or purpose from prior activities in order to qualify for expansion exemption; nothing in statute granting such exemption required business to participate in activities differing from prior activities, and rule was contrary to plain meaning of term "expand."

Expand has multiple meanings

Google Dictionary 10 define: expand Accessed July 29, 2010

<http://www.google.com/search?client=safari&rls=en&q=define:+expand&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8>

extend in one or more directions; "The dough expands" become larger in size or volume or quantity; "his business expanded rapidly" make bigger or wider in size, volume, or quantity; "expand the house by adding another wing" boom: grow vigorously; "The deer

population in this town is thriving"; "business is booming" inflate: exaggerate or make bigger; "The charges were inflated" elaborate: add details, as to an account or idea; clarify the meaning of and discourse in a learned way, usually in writing; "She elaborated on the main ideas in her dissertation"

extend; expand the influence of; "The King extended his rule to the Eastern part of the continent"

wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn

expand is a command in the UNIX Operating System. It is used to convert groups of tabs into space characters.

[en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Expand_\(Unix\)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Expand_(Unix))

To change (something) from a smaller form and/or size to a larger one; To increase the extent, number, volume or scope of (something); To express (something) at length and/or in detail; (algebra) To rewrite (an expression) as a longer, yet equivalent sum of terms; To (be) change(d) from a ...

en.wiktionary.org/wiki/expand

expansion-a function expressed as a sum or product of terms;"the expansion of $(a+b)^2$ is $a^2 + 2ab + b^2$ "

wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn

expanded - increased in extent or size or bulk or scope

wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn

expansion - a discussion that provides additional information

expansion - adding information or detail

wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn

Expansión is a Spanish economic newspaper published by Unidad Editorial.

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Expansión

Expansion - In universal algebra and in model theory, a reduct of an algebraic structure is obtained by omitting some of the operations and relations of that structure. The converse of "reduct" is "expansion."

[en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Expansion_\(model_theory\)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Expansion_(model_theory))

Its

'Its' is possessive.

Dictionary.com Unabridged, based on the Random House Dictionary, Random House, Inc. 2009.

its [its] Show IPA

—pronoun

the possessive form of it (used as an attributive adjective): The book has lost its jacket. I'm sorry about its being so late.

American Heritage Dictionary 2000

[Usage Note: Its is the possessive form of the pronoun it and is correctly written without an apostrophe. It should not be confused with the contraction it's (for it is or it has), which should always have an apostrophe.]

'It' has multiple definitions...

Dictionary.com Unabridged, based on the Random House Dictionary, Random House, Inc. 2009.

it - pronoun, nominative it, possessive its or (Obsolete or Dialect) it, objective it; plural nominative they, possessive their or theirs, objective them; noun

—pronoun

1. (used to represent an inanimate thing understood, previously mentioned, about to be mentioned, or present in the immediate context): It has whitewall tires and red upholstery. You can't tell a book by its cover.
2. (used to represent a person or animal understood, previously mentioned, or about to be mentioned whose gender is unknown or disregarded): It was the largest ever caught off the Florida coast. Who was it? It was John. The horse had its saddle on.
3. (used to represent a group understood or previously mentioned): The judge told the jury it must decide two issues.
4. (used to represent a concept or abstract idea understood or previously stated): It all started with Adam and Eve. He has been taught to believe it all his life.
5. (used to represent an action or activity understood, previously mentioned, or about to be mentioned): Since you don't like it, you don't have to go skiing.
6. (used as the impersonal subject of the verb to be, esp. to refer to time, distance, or the weather): It is six o'clock. It is five miles to town. It was foggy.
7. (used in statements expressing an action, condition, fact, circumstance, or situation without reference to an agent): If it weren't for Edna, I wouldn't go.

_____ **"Its" implies possession**

Corpus Juris Secundum, 1981 (Volume 48A, p. 247)

Its. The possessive case of the neuter pronoun "it." Also, as an adjective, meaning of or belonging to it. Sometimes referred to as the possessive word, but it does not necessarily imply ownership in fee, but may indicate merely a right to use.

_____ **"Its" is an adjective attributing US possession**

Random House Dictionary, 1966 (p. 758)

Its (pronoun). The possessive form of it (used as an attributive adjective: *The book has lost its jacket. I'm sorry about its being so late.*

_____ **"Its" has geographical applications**

Words and Phrases, 2008 (Volume 22A, p. 338).

In constitutional provision authorizing Legislature to exceed debt limitations if necessary, expedient or advisable for protection and preservation of any of its property or natural resources, the term "its" has geographical rather than proprietary connotation. Const. art. 9, §3—Marlette Lake Col v. Sawyer, 383 P.2d 369, 79 Nev. 334—States 115.

_____ **"Its" means belonging to it or that thing**

Oxford English Dictionary, 1989 (second edition, online)

Its

A. As adj. poss. pron. Of or belonging to it, or that thing (L. ejus); also refl., Of or belonging to itself, its own (L. suus).
The reflexive is often more fully its own, for which in earlier times the own, it own, were used: see OWN.

Assistance

Assistance is a quantifiable amount of resources.

Answers.com Dictionary (access 6/22/07) <http://www.answers.com/topic/welfare>

public assistance

n. Aid, such as money or food, given to homeless and other financially needy people, the aged, or the inhabitants of a disaster-stricken area; relief.

Houghton-Mifflin: (access 6/22/07 <http://education.yahoo.com/reference/dictionary/entry/assistance>)

Assistance is "Aid; help: *financial assistance.*"

Assistance must fulfill a need.

Word Net 2005

[<http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/assistance>]

[Assistance noun1. the activity of contributing to the fulfillment of a need or furtherance of an effort or purpose; "he gave me an assist with the housework"; "could not walk without assistance"; "rescue party went to their aid"; "offered his help in unloading" [syn: aid] 2. a resource; "visual aids in teaching"; "economic assistance to depressed areas" [syn: aid]]

To

To is in the direction of.

American Heritage Dictionary 2000

[to (tō; tə when unstressed) Pronunciation Key prep. In a direction toward so as to reach: went to the city.]

To must be direct contact with.

American Heritage Dictionary 2000

[In contact with; against: their faces pressed to the windows.]

To means towards.

Kernerman Dictionary 2006

[<http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/to>]

[To 1 [tə,tu] preposition

towards; in the direction of]

In

In means 'in the bounds of.'

American Heritage Dictionary, 2006.

prep. Within the limits, bounds, or area of: was hit in the face; born in the spring; a chair in the garden.

In means 'throughout a certain medium.'

American Heritage Dictionary, 2006.

prep. Made with or through the medium of: a statue in bronze; a note written in German.

In means 'inside.'

American Heritage Dictionary, 2006.

adj. Located inside; inner.

In means 'in reference to.'

American Heritage Dictionary, 2006.

adj. Relating to, understandable to, or coming from an exclusive group

In means 'inward.'

WordNet, 2006. Princeton University.

adj. directed or bound inward; "took the in bus"; "the in basket"

In assumes particular circumstances.

Kernerman English Multilingual Dictionary, 2006.

prep. expressing circumstances, state, manner etc of an event, person, etc. Example: dressed in a brown coat; walking in the rain; in a hurry; written in English; He is in the army; books tied up in bundles; She is in her sixties.

In means 'based upon the law of.'

Merriam Webster's Legal Dictionary, 1996.

prep. under the law of : based on

In has multiple meanings.

Webster's Revised, Unabridged Dictionary

1. A relation of proximity to, or of presence in or on, something; as, at the door; at your shop; at home; at school; at hand; at sea and on land.
2. The relation of some state or condition; as, at war; at peace; at ease; at your service; at fault; at liberty; at risk; at disadvantage.
3. The relation of some employment or action; occupied with; as, at engraving; at husbandry; at play; at work; at meat (eating); except at puns.
4. The relation of a point or position in a series, or of degree, rate, or value; as, with the thermometer at 80[deg]; goods sold at a cheap price; a country estimated at 10,000 square miles; life is short at the longest.
5. The relations of time, age, or order; as, at ten o'clock; at twenty-one; at once; at first.
6. The relations of source, occasion, reason, consequence, or effect; as, at the sight; at this news; merry at anything; at this declaration; at his command; to demand, require, receive, deserve, endure at your hands.

7. Relation of direction toward an object or end; as, look at it; to point at one; to aim at a mark; to throw, strike, shoot, wink, mock, laugh at any one.

in / for

Sharp 07. CRS Report for Congress. U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East: Historical Background, Recent Trends, and the FY2008 Request. July 2007. Jeremy M. Sharp Middle East Policy Analyst Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL32260.pdf>.

The Administration requested \$150 million in assistance to the Palestinians for FY2007. However, this request was soon suspended following the Hamas victory. H.R. 5522, the FY2007 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill (passed on June 9, 2006), included no appropriation for Economic Support Fund (ESF) programs in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The Senate version of H.R. 5522 (not enacted) recommended appropriating \$25 million for ESF programs in the West Bank and Gaza and rescinded \$75 million in prior year appropriated funds. P.L. 110-5, the FY2007 Revised Continuing Appropriations Resolution, provides up to \$50 million for USAID's West Bank and Gaza program. However, specific allocations are still to be determined. FY2008 Appropriations. H.R.2764, the FY2008 State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Appropriations bill (passed by the House on June 22, 2007), provides the full \$63.5 million Administration ESF request for the Palestinians, but does not include the requested \$10 million in Child Survival and Health Program Funds.

in / into

The White House, Dec. 2000

["A National Security Strategy for a Global Age," p. o/l:access 6/20/07 <http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/strategy/nss-0012.pdf>]

While maintaining its program focus in the original AFSI countries -- Ethiopia, Mali, Mozambique, Malawi, and Uganda -- the initiative is now being expanded into countries where food security is declining, such as Tanzania and Zambia, as well as Ghana and Kenya, where we can build on other USAID programs to accelerate our goals of improved child nutrition and increased agricultural incomes.

Country

(). "Country" is a state or nation, the territory of a nation, or the people of a nation.

Dictionary.com entry for 'Country' (accessed 5/22/11) :

"Country:" [kuhn-tree]
noun, plural -tries, adjective
-noun

1. a state or nation: What European countries have you visited?

2. the territory of a nation.

3. the people of a district, state, or nation: The whole country backed the president in his decision.

(). "Country" is connected with "state", but there is a rigorous debate there that we should welcome.

Wikipedia "Country" entry (<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Country>, accessed 5/22/11)

A country is a geographical region. A country may be the territory of a sovereign state, the territory of a non-sovereign (or formerly sovereign) political division, or a region associated with a certain people or certain characteristics. Sometimes it is used to refer both to sovereign states and to other political entities,[1][2][3] while other times it refers only to states.[4] It is not

uncommon for general information or statistical publications to adopt the wider definition for purposes such as illustration and comparison.[5][6][7][8][9][10]

1. ^ "Acts Interpretation Act 1901 - Sect 22: Meaning of certain words". Australasian Legal Information Institute. http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/aia1901230/s22.html. Retrieved 2008-11-12.
2. ^ "The Kwet Koe v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs & Ors [1997] FCA 912 (8 September 1997)". Australasian Legal Information Institute. <http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/disp.pl/au/cases/cth/federal%5fct/1997/912.html>. Retrieved 2008-11-12.
3. ^ "U.S. Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual Volume 2—General" (PDF). United States Department of State. <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/84411.pdf>. Retrieved 2008-11-12.
4. ^ Rosenberg, Matt. "Geography: Country, State, and Nation". <http://geography.about.com/cs/politicalgeog/a/statenation.htm>. Retrieved 2008-11-12.

The degree of autonomy of non-sovereign countries varies widely....In English the word has increasingly become associated with political divisions, so that one sense, associated with the indefinite article – "a country" – is now a synonym for state, or a former sovereign state, in the sense of sovereign territory. (Oxford English Dictionary, "Country")

(). State vs. Nation vs. Country

Rosenberg, no date ("Country, State, and Nation: Defining an Independent Country" By Matt Rosenberg , About.com Guide, <http://geography.about.com/cs/politicalgeog/a/statenation.htm>, acsd 5/21/11)

While the terms country, state, and nation are often used interchangeably, there is a difference. A State (note the capital "S") is a self-governing political entity. The term State can be used interchangeably with country. A nation, however, is a tightly-knit group of people which share a common culture. A nation-state is a nation which has the same borders as a State. Let's start with what defines a State or an independent country. An independent State:

- Has space or territory which has internationally recognized boundaries (boundary disputes are OK).
- Has people who live there on an ongoing basis.
- Has economic activity and an organized economy. A country regulates foreign and domestic trade and issues money.
- Has the power of social engineering, such as education.
- Has a transportation system for moving goods and people.
- Has a government which provides public services and police power.
- Has sovereignty. No other State should have power over the country's territory.
- Has external recognition. A country has been "voted into the club" by other countries.

There are currently 195 independent countries or States around the world. Territories of countries or individual parts of a country are not countries in their own right. Examples of entities that are not countries include: Hong Kong, Bermuda, Greenland, Puerto Rico, and most notably the constituent parts of the United Kingdom. (Northern Ireland, Wales, Scotland, and England are not countries.)

A "state" (with a lower-case "s") is usually a division of a federal State (such as the states of the United States of America).

Nations and Nation-States

Nations are culturally homogeneous groups of people, larger than a single tribe or community, which share a common language, institutions, religion, and historical experience. When a nation of people have a State or country of their own, it is called a nation-state. Places like France, Egypt, Germany, and Japan are excellent examples of nation-states. There are some States which have two nations, such as Canada and Belgium. Even with its multicultural society, the United States is also referred to as a nation-state because of the shared American "culture." There are nations without States. For example, the Kurds are stateless people.

Nation

Getting deep into the meaning of "nation" is not difficult, especially for all the political science majors. Pick up a copy of Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities* to get started:

Anderson, '83 (Benedict. [Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism](#). Revised Edition ed. London and New York: Verso, 1991, pp. 5-7.)

"In an anthropological spirit, then, I propose the following definition of the nation: it is an imagined political community - - and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign." <http://www.nationalismproject.org/what/anderson.htm>

(). "Nation" can refer to a state or government, but most often refers to a more abstract sense of "the people."

Wikipedia, "nation." (<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nation>, acsed 5/20/11)

Nation is derived from *natio* (Latin: to be born) (*nātīō*, stem *nātīōn-*) and is related to *gnasci* (Old Latin; see *genus*).^[1] *Nation* stands in contrast to the obligations of citizenship suggested by the *civitas*.^[1] The English word "nation" comes from the French word "nation".^{[2][3]}

- The action of being born; birth; or and
- The goddess personifying birth; or
- A breed (like a dog), stock, kind, species, race; or
- A tribe, or (rhetorically, any) set of people (contemptuous); or
- A nation or people.

^{1 a b} <http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?search=genus&searchmode=none>

² Charlton T. Lewis, Charles Short, (1879). A Latin Dictionary. Entry for *natio*. Online at [Tufts.edu](http://tufts.edu)

³ Harper, Douglas (November 2001). "[Nation](#)". *Online Etymology Dictionary*. <http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=nation>. Retrieved 2007-11-08..

Google entry for "nation" (acsd 5/21/11, <http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=nation&tbs=dfn:>)

1. A large aggregate of people united by common descent, history, culture, or language, inhabiting a particular country or territory
 - - leading industrialized **nations**
2. A North American Indian people or confederation of peoples

Web definitions "nation"

--state: a politically organized body of people under a single government; "the state has elected a new president"; "African nations"; "students who had come to the nation's capitol"; "the country's largest manufacturer"; "an industrialized land"

--the people who live in a nation or country; "a statement that sums up the nation's mood"; "the news was announced to the nation"; "the whole country worshipped him"

wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn

--A nation is a grouping of people who share real or imagined common history, culture, language or ethnic origin, often possessing or seeking its own government. ...

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nation

Past Topic Wordings for Similar Topics

That topic in 1988-9 was R: “That United States foreign policy toward one or more African nations should be substantially changed.” and the debates were exciting, well-balanced and very diverse. That is a broad topic and everything worked out fine. Since that topic, we have had a number of other wordings that inform this year’s area, all with their benefits and downsides:

1992-1993 –R: That the United States should substantially change its development and assistance policies toward one or more of the following nations: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burma, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka.”

1995-1996—R: That the United States government should substantially increase its security assistance to one or more of the following: Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Palestinian National Authority, Syria.”

2000-2001: “That the United States Federal Government should substantially increase its development assistance, including increasing government to government assistance, within the Greater Horn of Africa.”

1999-2000 “That the United States Federal Government should adopt a policy of constructive engagement, including the immediate removal of all or nearly all economic sanctions, with the government(s) of one or more of the following nation-states: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Syria, North Korea”

2003-4: R “The United States federal government should enact one or more of the following:
A substantial increase in its government-to-government economic and/or conflict prevention assistance to Turkey and/or...

2007-8: R: The United States Federal Government should increase its constructive engagement with the government of one or more of the following countries: Afghanistan, Iran, Lebanon, the Palestinian Authority, and Syria, and it should include offering them a security guarantee(s) and/or a substantial increase in foreign assistance.

The USFG should (substantially) increase (its) democracy assistance to “some construction of a list of countries in the Middle East and North Africa.”