

**Democracy Mechanisms – Supplement1 – 6-8-11**

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**\*\*\*Democracy**

## Democracy – Political Democracy

**Democracy needs to be defined in context of aid – therefore political**

**Cornell, University of Gothenburg (Sweden) Department of Political Science, 8**

[Agnes, August 6-9-, 2008, “Does democracy aid promote democracy?”, Paper presented at the XV NOPSA conference in Tromsø, Norway August 6-9, 2008, Workshop: Elections and Democracy in the Third World, <http://uit.no/getfile.php?PageId=1410&FileId=1349>, p. 6, accessed 6-8-11, AFB]

### 2.1 A preliminary stance on the definition of democracy

”I believe in democracy –

No, you don’t, she snapped. You don’t know what the word means.” (Forster 1990, 114)

Lucy, the protagonist of the novel *A room with a view*, first published in 1908, blames her aristocratic fiancé for not knowing what democracy is. **Certainly, there are many different views and perspectives on what democracy is and how it should be defined. What I will do in the following is trying to pinpoint some basic criteria for a democratic political system that could constitute the basis for the definition** of the dependent variable of this study.

**Democracy aid is about political democracy. Hence, it is a definition of political democracy that we are searching for. This means that we do not need to consider including any forms of social or economic democracy in the concept. In addition we should not include too much in the concept as we risk including also the conditions alleged to foster democracy and also the results of democracy** (Alvarez m.fl. 1996; Hadenius and Teorell 2005a).

**Political democracy definition involves important decision-making offices are elected in free and fair elections with universal suffrage and fundamental political freedoms are maintained**

**Cornell, University of Gothenburg (Sweden) Department of Political Science, 8**

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Furthermore **my purpose is not to study ideal forms of political systems but political systems that exist in the world today and that are more or less democratic or not democratic at all.** In the words of Dahl (1989, 117) **it is rather polyarchy than the ideal democracy that I would like to define. What I am searching for is both a minimal definition of political democracy and some criteria for improving democracy, democratisation.**

According to Hadenius and Teorell (2005b) **there exists a consensus upon some basic criteria or core of the concept of democracy:**

“While there is today a fairly broad consensus on the basic criteria of democracy, there is considerable confusion and disagreement, involving deep normative divisions, about the specification of democracy’s qualitative criteria”. (Hadenius and Teorell 2005b, 89)

**Yet, when searching after this minimal definition of political democracy differences are revealed even between authors stipulating a minimal definition of democracy.**

**According to Hadenius’ definition, democracy is a decision-making procedure not to be confused with the outcome or results of democracy.** He sets up a basic criterion which should not be considered the same as an optimal criterion for democracy (Hadenius 1992, 35). **This basic criterion for political democracy is as follows:**

**“Public policy is to be governed by the freely expressed will of the people whereby all individuals are to be treated as equals.”**(Hadenius 1992, 9)

**The definition used by Przeworski** and Limongi (1997) and Alvarez **et al.** (1996) **is:**

**“Democracy is a regime in which some governmental offices are filled as a consequence of contested elections.”** (Przeworski and Limongi 1997, 178)

The offices that must be filled by elections for a country to be defined as democratic are the chief executive office and the seats in the legislative body. Contestation means:

“there exists an opposition that has some chance of winning office as a consequence of elections.”

(Adam. Przeworski and Limongi 1997, 178)

The difference between Hadenius and the other authors mentioned above is mainly that the others do not include political freedoms in the definition per se. Yet, this difference is very subtle as Alvarez et al. (1996) stress that **political liberties is a “sine qua non condition” for contestation.**

As a preliminary definition of my dependent variable **I define democracy in the same vein as the authors above: In a democracy important decision-making offices are elected in free and fair elections with universal suffrage and fundamental political freedoms are maintained** (c.f. Hadenius and Teorell 2005a; Hadenius and Teorell 2005b).

**The criteria presented above can be considered as basic criteria for democracy** but for my aim to study whether democracy aid promotes democracy it is not only important to be able to distinguish between democracies and non-democracies but also to be able to distinguish degrees of democracy. Many countries subject to this study are democracies according to the minimal criteria presented above.

**\*\*\*Democracy Promotion**

## **Democracy Promotion – Spectrum**

**Democracy promotion tools fall across a spectrum ranging from classic diplomacy to military intervention**

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**4Democracy aid should not be confused with the term democracy promotion that encompasses not only the foreign aid component but a broader range of activities** that foreign states or other external actors engage in **to promote democracy** (Burnell 2000b; Schraeder 2002). **Schraeder** (2002, 219-220) **describes democracy promotion in terms of a “spectrum of violence” which ranges from classic diplomacy to military intervention according to its degree of interventionism. Democracy aid is but one component of this spectrum.**

## Democracy Promotion – Multiple Methods

### **Democracy promotion includes multiple contested approaches – including political and developmental**

**Carothers, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace vice-president for studies, 9**

[Thomas, Journal of Democracy, Volume 20, Number 1, January 2009, “Democracy Assistance: Political vs. Developmental?” pp. 5-6, Project Muse, accessed 5-26-11]

As the field of international democracy assistance ages and to some extent matures, it is undergoing a process of diversification—in the actors involved, the range of countries where it operates, and the kinds of activities it comprises. Strategic differentiation is an important element of this diversification—democracy-aid providers are moving away from an early tendency to follow a one-size-fits-all strategy toward exploring varied strategies aimed at the increasingly diverse array of political contexts in the world. A defining feature of this process of differentiation is the emergence of two distinct overall approaches to assisting democracy: the political approach and the developmental approach.

The political approach proceeds from a relatively narrow conception of democracy—focused, above all, on elections and political liberties—and a view of democratization as a process of political struggle in which democrats work to gain the upper hand in society over nondemocrats. It directs aid at core political processes and institutions—especially elections, political parties, and politically oriented civil society groups—often at important conjunctural moments and with the hope of catalytic effects. The developmental approach rests on a broader notion of democracy, one that encompasses concerns about equality and justice and the concept of democratization as a slow, iterative process of change involving an interrelated set of political and socioeconomic developments. It favors democracy aid that pursues incremental, long-term change in a wide range of political and socioeconomic sectors, frequently emphasizing governance and the building of a well-functioning state.

**This basic division between the political and developmental approaches has existed inchoately in the field of democracy support for many years. It has come into sharper relief during this decade, as democracy-aid providers face a world increasingly populated by countries not conforming to clear or coherent political transitional paths. Such a context impels greater attention to choices of strategy and method. Moreover, with the overall enterprise of democracy promotion now coming under stress—as evidenced by the growing backlash against both democracy promotion and democracy more generally—the democracy-aid community is more actively debating the relative merits of different approaches.** Some adherents of the developmental approach criticize the political approach as too easily turning confrontational vis-à-vis “host” governments and producing unhelpful counterreactions. Some adherents of the political approach, meanwhile, fault the developmental approach for being too vague and unassertive in a world where many leaders have learned to play a reform game with the international community, absorbing significant amounts of external political aid while avoiding genuine democratization.

### **US democracy promotion includes multiple methods – including regime change, assistance programs, diplomatic engagements, and economic carrots and sticks**

**Carothers, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace vice-president for studies, 9**

[Thomas, Journal of Democracy, Volume 20, Number 1, January 2009, “Democracy Assistance: Political vs. Developmental?” pp. 13-14, Project Muse, accessed 5-26-11]

**The Bush administration’s emphasis on the Iraq intervention as the leading edge of its efforts to promote democracy caused many people around the world to conclude that forcible regime change had become the main U.S. method of democracy promotion.** The Bush administration did devote an extraordinary amount of resources—military, financial, bureaucratic, and diplomatic—to Iraq. **Yet the overall set of U.S. policies and programs directed at supporting democracy in the world under the Bush administration was in fact a complex amalgam of efforts spanning countries in many regions and encompassing a wide range of assistance programs, diplomatic engagements, and economic carrots and sticks. Within the specific domain of democracy aid, both developmental and political approaches**

continued to operate, as they have since the mid- 1980s, when the United States began seriously engaging in democracy aid. Arriving at a straightforward conclusion about which approach is dominant is difficult.

**Foreign policy establishment considers democracy promotion to be primarily political, but includes tools beyond aid**

**Carothers, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace vice-president for studies, 9**

[Thomas, Journal of Democracy, Volume 20, Number 1, January 2009, "Democracy Assistance: Political vs. Developmental?" pp. 15-6, Project Muse, accessed 5-26-11]

More generally, over the past twenty years, the U.S. foreign-policy establishment (beyond the specific community of democracy-aid providers) has come to view democracy promotion as a fundamentally political rather than developmental challenge. The mainstream U.S. foreign-policy community pays primary attention to those U.S. programs that follow a political approach while largely ignoring the quieter, longer-term democracy-aid efforts that follow the developmental approach. This inclination of the U.S. foreign-policy establishment toward the political approach to democracy aid and democracy promotion generally is not hard to explain. As an assertive superpower for more than sixty years, the United States has a long-established habit, rooted in the belief that political outcomes in countries all around the world will have a direct bearing on U.S. security, of viewing the developing world (in fact, the whole world) as an arena for direct U.S. political engagement. Promoting democracy, through democracy aid and other means, is an important form of such political engagement, one way of trying to shape political outcomes favorable to the United States. Since the 1950s, the United States has taken some interest in supporting development around the world, but that interest has been based less on a concern for development per se than on development as a way to bolster political goals. These goals have included anticommunism during the Cold War and other U.S. security interests since then, from peace to antiterrorism.

**\*\*\*Democracy Aid**

## Democracy Aid – Political

**Democracy aid is distinct from democracy promotion and development aid – it is explicitly aimed at fostering democracy through the political system and/or aims at shaping people’s; masses’ or elites’ attitudes towards democracy.**

**Cornell, University of Gothenburg (Sweden) Department of Political Science, 8**

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Obviously, **one of the most important concepts of this study is democracy aid. Accordingly, we must define both democracy aid and the concept of democracy per se. In the following, the characteristics of democracy aid are outlined and a definition is stipulated.**

### **2. The characteristics of democracy aid**

In this paper it is argued that **democracy aid is a particular form of foreign aid and thus that it can be distinguished substantially from other types of foreign aid.**<sup>3</sup> **Other kinds of foreign aid could certainly also promote democracy in a wider sense. In the realm of foreign aid it might be hard to distinguish between the types that aim at supporting conditions e.g. health, infrastructure, economic development and the types that aim at changing political variables conducive to higher levels of democracy.**

**However, if we want to investigate whether democracy aid could have effect on democratisation, independently from the rest of foreign aid, a substantial distinction is necessary.**<sup>4</sup>

Yet, **in previous research it is not evident that democracy aid is distinguished from other forms of development aid to any substantial degree. Adopted definitions of democracy aid are commonly descriptions of different forms of activities that democracy aid budgets consist of or only defined by donors’ explicit aim to foster democracy** (Crawford 2001; Azpuru and Shaw 2007; Molutsi 2007; Youngs 2001).<sup>5</sup>

**Burnell** (2000b, 12) **restricts the definition of democracy aid to “efforts that are focused directly on democracy’s political variables” hence excluding “democracy’s supporting conditions”.** **However, Burnell himself points out that this definition does not “resolve all of the issues” and that it does not encompass the totality of what democracy aid really consists of.** Thus, we must search for a somewhat different definition.

In this paper it is argued, that **democracy aid explicitly aims at deepening democracy through different means and measures than other types of foreign aid. Other forms of foreign aid work with modernisation-like strategies through education, health and other aspects of societal development i.e. underlying conditions** (Knack 2004; Finkel, Pérez-Liñán, and Seligson 2007). In turn, **democracy aid aims at shaping masses’ and elites’ attitudes towards democracy and focuses on institutional and actor-oriented strategies rather than changing structural conditions. Thus the mechanisms assumed to promote democracy differs substantially between democracy aid and other forms of foreign aid.** Even if this distinction is not used by Crawford (2001) to define democracy aid he argues along the same lines of reasoning:

“The shift to promoting democratisation represented an increasingly widespread presumption amongst governments and international organisations of a synergistic relationship between democracy and development. This “new orthodoxy” //...// was itself a change from previous prevailing views that democracy was the outcome of socio-economic development //...// or that the successful implementation of economic adjustment required the firm hand of authoritarian rule //...//” (Crawford 2001, 3)

**I define democracy aid as foreign aid that aims at fostering democracy through the political system and/or aims at shaping people’s; masses’ or elites’ attitudes towards democracy.**

Accordingly, **democracy aid could include efforts like, for example, support to legislative assistance programs, election assistance and monitoring, support to civil society and support to political parties but also support to administrative reforms that promotes democratic governance. These efforts may be conducted by different actors. Democracy aid is not only performed by state agencies but also NGOs.**

Some of them are closely connected to and even financed by state agencies. Also regional and international organisations such as the EU and the UN are engaged in democracy aid and should therefore be included in the study. (Burnell 2000a)

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### **Political democracy aid – assistance to groups or institutions to help level the political playing field or help political infrastructure get back on its feet**

**Carothers, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace vice-president for studies, 9**

[Thomas, *Journal of Democracy*, Volume 20, Number 1, January 2009, "Democracy Assistance: Political vs. Developmental?" pp. 7-8, Project Muse, accessed 5-26-11]

**Method of supporting democracy: In this conception of democratization, the central task of democracy aid is to help the democrats in a country (that is, the actors perceived as such by external democracy supporters) in their struggle against the nondemocrats. This can be done directly through assistance (whether training, advice, moral support, or funding) to the political actors themselves—political parties or associations, politicians, or politically oriented nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). It can also be done indirectly through support to key institutions—an independent electoral commission, an independent judiciary, or independent media, for example—that help to level the political playing field by securing and guaranteeing fair procedures for the democratic actors and by checking the power of the nondemocratic actors.**

In some cases, **challenging the "host" government may be a major focus of the political approach. In an authoritarian setting, outside actors may support political dissidents, exiled opposition groups, or offshore political broadcasting that reaches into the country. In semi-authoritarian contexts, the political approach sometimes takes the form of political-campaign training for a coalition of opposition parties** competing against an entrenched strongman in an upcoming election. **Such pro-oppositional support is usually combined with assistance to politically active civic groups working to mobilize citizens to participate in the election, as well as to independent media trying to broaden access to political information.**

**In many other cases, however, the political approach is not prooppositional or otherwise directly challenging to an incumbent regime. Instead, it focuses on helping to strengthen all sides of a nascent or troubled democratic political process. In societies coming out of civil war, for example, democracy-aid actors may facilitate the reconstruction of democratic politics—helping all of the main political parties get back on their feet, aiding the establishment of an electoral commission, sponsoring large-scale civic-education programs, and other related tasks.**

### **Political democracy aid - assistance promoting social and economic development as a way of supporting democracy**

**Carothers, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace vice-president for studies, 9**

[Thomas, *Journal of Democracy*, Volume 20, Number 1, January 2009, "Democracy Assistance: Political vs. Developmental?" pp. 9-10, Project Muse, accessed 5-26-11]

**The political approach has two principal strengths. It leads democracy promoters to give direct attention to the domain of political competition—the institutional framework for competition, the degree of actual political freedom in practice, the capacities and actions of the key political actors involved, and so forth. This domain is key to democratic progress in many settings.** It is a domain from

which powerholders may seek to deflect outside attention by offering up reforms in other arenas, such as the social and economic. In addition, **by encouraging democracy promoters to look for and respond to key political junctures, the political approach sometimes helps democracy-aid providers to find a catalytic role, such as helping to support the organizational base for large-scale civic resistance to the manipulation of an election.**

The main weaknesses of the political approach are the converse of its strengths. In some contexts, a focus on political competition is insufficient and limiting. Some new or struggling democracies have managed to achieve relatively open and fair political competition yet remain stuck in patterns of weak representation and a persistent disconnection of citizens from the political system. A narrow focus on the basic institutions of political competition, especially elections, may not help aid providers to arrive at ways of broadening inclusion, representation, and participation. Similarly, attention to key junctures is sometimes useful but sometimes not. When followed reflexively, the political approach can encourage short-term, episodic interventions that neglect the need in many settings to support long-term, sustainable processes of political change.

More generally, as some critics of the political approach point out, if it is pursued in a confrontational, highly partisan manner it can provoke serious pushback and the loss of access. Not all democracy promoters view this as necessarily bad: Some of the more vigorous practitioners of the political approach believe that a certain amount of pushback from authoritarian or semi-authoritarian governments is inevitable and a sign that democracy aid is finding its mark.

## Democracy Aid – Not Developmental

**Democracy aid does not include modernization efforts – those are aimed at improving material conditions**

**Cornell, University of Gothenburg (Sweden) Department of Political Science, 8**

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**I propose that democracy aid activities could be categorised into three broad categories**, each of which is based on three explanations **taken from theory on democratisation. The three categories**, that will be analysed in the quantitative study’s second part **are mass-oriented activities, elite oriented activities and support oriented towards public administration, political institutions and institutional forms.** **Naturally, the fourth explanation, modernisation, is excluded when analysing the activities of democracy aid as it is to be considered as improving material conditions and as such it does not fall into the definition of democracy aid.**

**Democracy aid is distinct from democracy promotion and development aid – it is explicitly aimed at fostering democracy through the political system and/or aims at shaping people’s; masses’ or elites’ attitudes towards democracy.**

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Some of them are closely connected to and even financed by state agencies. Also regional and international organisations such as the EU and the UN are engaged in democracy aid and should therefore be included in the study. (Burnell 2000a)

## **Democracy Aid – NED & State Actors – Use Political Method**

### **NED & State Department lean toward political approach**

**Carothers, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace vice-president for studies, 9**

[Thomas, Journal of Democracy, Volume 20, Number 1, January 2009, “Democracy Assistance: Political vs. Developmental?” pp. 14-5, Project Muse, accessed 5-26-11]

**The two other principal funders of U.S. democracy aid—the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and the Department of State—generally follow the political approach, as do the most prominent nonprofit democracy-promotion organizations that they (and USAID) support, including the two political-party institutes (the National Democratic Institute [NDI] and the International Republican Institute [IRI]), IFES, and Freedom House. As a private organization, NED operates at a partial remove from U.S. foreign policy, and its political approach is thus largely its own. NED’s core credo is to find and support democrats around the world engaged in the struggle for democracy—the essence of the political approach. Although NDI and IRI do some work on governance issues and give some attention to long-term, incremental institutional change, the thrust of most of their work is on the political process—above all, elections, parties, parliaments, and democratic civic activists, such as election-monitoring groups.**

## **Democracy Aid – Includes Civil Society**

### **Democracy aid includes mass-oriented activities meant to foster political culture**

#### **Cornell, University of Gothenburg (Sweden) Department of Political Science, 8**

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Mass-oriented activities, meant to foster a democratic political culture, are a part of democracy aid. These types of activities are supposed to be most important for consolidation of democracy and on somewhat higher levels of democracy than in the immediate transition to democracy. Examples of these could be aid to civil society and civic education.

## **Democracy Aid – Includes Elite-Oriented Activities**

### **Democracy aid includes elite-oriented activities – for example political parties**

#### **Cornell, University of Gothenburg (Sweden) Department of Political Science, 8**

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#### 4.3 Actor-oriented explanations – Elite culture

Prominent theories on transitions have been centred on the elites, their actions and attitudes when explaining the installation of a democratic regime (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Rustow 1970; Higley and Burton 1989). It is argued that what is needed for a transition is a pro-democratic elite that can take the proper actions, for example a unified elite pact (Higley and Burton 1989).

**One component of democracy aid is elite-oriented activities. Those are endeavours to change elite perceptions of democracy and foster actions in a direction towards democracy. Examples of these activities could be support to political parties and other elite-groups and actors in society.** These activities are assumed to be most important in the immediate transition.

## **Democracy Aid – Includes Administrative & Political Institution Activities**

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Cornell, University of Gothenburg (Sweden) Department of Political Science, 8**

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**Democracy aid activities oriented towards administrative and political institutions are meant to improve the functioning structures for implementation. These are assumed to be most important in the consolidation of democracy and at somewhat higher levels of democracy. In turn, activities oriented towards institutional forms, such as support in writing constitutions are assumed to have effect also in the immediate transition.**

Further, well functioning institutions and public administration is hypothesised to be a positive environmental factor for providing the basis for a successful implementation of democracy aid.

## Democracy Aid – Developmental

**Developmental democracy aid - assistance promoting social and economic development as a way of supporting democracy**

**Carothers, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace vice-president for studies, 9**

[Thomas, Journal of Democracy, Volume 20, Number 1, January 2009, “Democracy Assistance: Political vs. Developmental?” pp. 9, Project Muse, accessed 5-26-11]

**Method of supporting democracy: Given these ideas about democracy and democratization, aid providers who subscribe to the developmental approach incline toward indirect methods of assisting democracy, in two senses of the term. First, out of the belief in a causal relationship between the two domains, they see value in promoting social and economic development as a way of supporting democracy. Second, when they give attention to political institutions, they emphasize building state capacity and good governance (usually in a technocratic, apolitical fashion) rather than strengthening political contestation and openness. The developmental approach to democracy support almost always stresses the importance of partnership with the host government and steers clear of activities that might be seen as politically confrontational or even “too political.” When adherents of this approach support civil society development, for example, they typically concentrate on local-level projects aimed at addressing social and economic problems, not on national-level political advocacy or watchdog work characteristic of civil society support under the political approach.**

Aid providers who follow the developmental approach frequently tie their work on democracy to human rights and sometimes even cast their efforts to promote democracy as a subset of human rights work. **An emphasis on human rights, thought to be more clearly rooted in universal legal principles than is democracy, appeals to supporters of the development approach as being more easily defensible against charges of external interventionism.** They also see human rights as a useful gateway for integrating the political with the socioeconomic through the parallel categories of political and civil rights on the one hand and social and economic rights on the other.

**Developmental democracy aid – broader approach includes socio-economic programs, but runs some risk of tangential or grab bag efforts with little relation to democracy**

**Carothers, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace vice-president for studies, 9**

[Thomas, Journal of Democracy, Volume 20, Number 1, January 2009, “Democracy Assistance: Political vs. Developmental?” pp. 10-11, Project Muse, accessed 5-26-11]

**The developmental approach has several potential strengths. First, an emphasis on gradual small-scale change and less politicized sectors may allow democracy-aid providers entry into** tense, restrictive political **situations where a more political approach might provoke a slammed door. Second, at least in contexts where some positive reform dynamic is present, the longer-term orientation intrinsic to the developmental approach encourages the sort of sustained engagement that is necessary** for change in many sectors, such as rule-of-law development, where short-term efforts rarely yield results. **Third, by taking a broader view of democracy, the developmental approach at least opens the door to identifying and nurturing useful links between socioeconomic reform and political reform.** **It is true, as some skeptics contend, that the developmental approach sometimes produces democracy programs that are indirect to the point of being toothless. Such programs allow democracy promoters to claim that they are supporting democracy in a country when all they may be doing is helping to burnish the specious reformist credentials of entrenched strongmen.** Yet **such cases are** at the weakest end of the spectrum of applications of the developmental approach, **not the norm. A softer and more common version of this weakness is that the developmental approach sometimes permits aid providers to justify a grab bag of aid programs— rationalizing that they all contribute to democratization without really assessing whether the various nonassertive activities are producing larger political change.** A further problem is that even very serious attempts to apply a developmental approach confront a lack of knowledge about when and how indirect efforts focused on socioeconomic reforms will cross over to generate political change. To take just one example, some rule-of-law developmentalists believe that

commercial-law reform, which introduces key rule-of-law principles in the economic domain, will bleed over into parts of the legal sector more germane to political reform. This is an attractive idea, but one based more on hope than experience.<sup>2</sup>

## Democracy Aid – US Aid Primarily Developmental

**Democracy aid is primarily developmental, but political aid is higher profile, dominating “branding” of democracy aid**

**Carothers, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace vice-president for studies, 9**

[Thomas, Journal of Democracy, Volume 20, Number 1, January 2009, “Democracy Assistance: Political vs. Developmental?” pp. 15, Project Muse, accessed 5-26-11]

The greater part of U.S. democracy aid, taken together from all sources and simply measured in dollar terms, probably goes to programs that proceed more from the developmental approach than the political one. This reflects USAID’s major role in the field. Yet the perceived profile of U.S. democracy aid, both domestically and internationally, is much more political than developmental. This disjunction reflects several factors. The politically oriented U.S. democracy-promotion organizations, particularly NDI and IRI, are much more visible than the many for-profit consulting firms that carry out most of USAID’s developmentally oriented democracy assistance. Moreover, the activities that these politically oriented organizations carry out tend to be much more visible—support for a high-profile group of student activists challenging a semi-authoritarian ruler, for example, attracts far more attention than a larger, long-term program of technocratic aid to strengthen rural municipal governance. In short, both the organizations that carry out the more political side of U.S. democracy aid as well as the kinds of programs that these organizations sponsor tend to “brand” U.S. democracy aid on the international scene.

Political branding also occurs at another level. As noted above, during this decade the world has come to equate U.S. democracy promotion with the U.S.-led intervention in Iraq, an intervention that might be considered an extreme application of the political approach. Moreover, the U.S. involvement in supporting the color revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan—support that embodied the political approach—also attracted global attention, further branding U.S. democracy support as highly political.

More generally, over the past twenty years, the U.S. foreign-policy establishment (beyond the specific community of democracy-aid providers) has come to view democracy promotion as a fundamentally political rather than developmental challenge. The mainstream U.S. foreign-policy community pays primary attention to those U.S. programs that follow a political approach while largely ignoring the quieter, longer-term democracy-aid efforts that follow the developmental approach.

## Democracy Aid – Includes Exchanges

**Democracy aid can be defined as democracy and civil society assistance, *and* cultural and educational exchanges**

**Aksartova, Center for Global Studies Postdoctoral Research Fellow, 8**

[Sada, Global Studies Review, Vol. 4 No. 2 Summer 2008, “What Does US Assistance for Eurasia Have to Do with Foreign Aid?”, [http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:3fU\\_wZowAUcJ:www.globality-gmu.net/archives/608+%22democracy+aid%22+defined-as&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&source=www.google.com](http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:3fU_wZowAUcJ:www.globality-gmu.net/archives/608+%22democracy+aid%22+defined-as&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&source=www.google.com), accessed 6-8-11, AFB]

Table 2: US Democracy Assistance for Eurasia, 1992-2006		
Country	Per Capita \$	Total \$ million
Armenia	73	234
Georgia	40	175
Kyrgyzstan	27	133
Moldova	20	87
Azerbaijan	15	130
Ukraine	12	600
Tajikistan	12	75
Belarus	12	114
Kazakhstan	11	162
Turkmenistan	9	47
Russia	8	1,124
Uzbekistan	5	144
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>3,024</b>

Data are from the annual reports prepared by the State Department's Office of the Coordinator of US Assistance to Europe and Eurasia.

**The same pattern repeats itself in the distribution of US assistance for democracy promotion** (Table 2). **From 1992-2006, on the per capita basis, the top recipients of Eurasia-bound democracy aid—defined here as (i) democracy and civil society assistance and (ii) funding for cultural and educational exchanges—were Armenia (\$73), Georgia (\$40), Kyrgyzstan (\$27) and Moldova (\$20).** By comparison,

Russia—ostensibly the focus of US democracy promotion in the former Soviet Union—ranked quite low at \$8 per person; only Uzbekistan (\$5) received less per capita democracy assistance. Another relevant fact to know is that despite American policy makers' rhetorical emphasis on Eurasia's democratization, democracy promotion constituted about 11 percent of the overall US aid package during this period. This is consistent with Thomas Carothers's estimate of the share of US democracy aid worldwide and provides another illustration for how US aid policies toward Eurasia have followed the rule, not the exception.

**[Adri Note** – This is particularly confusing, because the author seems to say aid is both assistance *and* exchanges, but to prove this, refers to State Department data in the Table 2, clearly identified as Democracy Assistance].

## Democracy Aid – AT – Aksartova Evidence Distinguishes Aid from Assistance

Throughout the article, including in this conclusion, Aksartova uses “democracy aid” and “democracy assistance” interchangeably, except in the case of the confusing operational definition that references Table 2

**Aksartova, Center for Global Studies Postdoctoral Research Fellow, 8**

[Sada, Global Studies Review, Vol. 4 No. 2 Summer 2008, “What Does US Assistance for Eurasia Have to Do with Foreign Aid?”, [http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:3fU\\_wZowAUcJ:www.globality-gmu.net/archives/608+%22democracy+aid%22+defined-as&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&source=www.google.com](http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:3fU_wZowAUcJ:www.globality-gmu.net/archives/608+%22democracy+aid%22+defined-as&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&source=www.google.com), accessed 6-8-11, AFB]

These findings raise two points for further discussion and study. The first one is that Western attempts to guide the post-Soviet transition need to be analyzed in the broader context of foreign aid and global development, something that has been rarely done in existing studies. The assumption is that because the Soviet Union’s demise was an unprecedented event, US policies responding to it were sui generis. However, this is not the case. Even a brief look at the data provided here shows that several patterns characteristic of Western foreign aid in general—such as the favoring of small countries, the disparity between the amount of aid and the recipient country’s absorptive capacity and the mismatch between the rhetoric and actual size of democracy promotion—have repeated themselves in US public and private assistance for Eurasia. And this is because, unsurprisingly, US assistance for Eurasia has been embedded in and shaped by the larger institutional landscape of foreign aid. Hence, we should study it as such.

By doing so—and this is the second point—we will be better equipped to address the question of why US assistance for Eurasia has not worked nearly as well as US policy makers expected. Existing analyses, with few exceptions, ascribe the failures of Western aid for the post-Soviet transition to either its insufficient size or the legacies of the Soviet era. They are also unaware of the vigorous debate among development experts on foreign aid’s poor record over the last 50 years. This debate implies that US assistance for Eurasia has not performed well because foreign aid rarely does. In other words, the reasons for failure may have as much, if not more, to do with the institutional and operational logic of the assistance itself rather than with the Soviet legacy or the size of the aid package.

## Democracy Aid – Not Distinct from Democracy Assistance

**Democracy aid is often referred to as democracy assistance**

**Cornell, University of Gothenburg (Sweden) Department of Political Science, 8**

[Agnes, August 6-9-, 2008, “Does democracy aid promote democracy?”, Paper presented at the XV NOPSAs conference in Tromsø, Norway August 6-9, 2008, Workshop: Elections and Democracy in the Third World, <http://uit.no/getfile.php?PageId=1410&FileId=1349>, p. 4, accessed 6-8-11, AFB]

**4Democracy aid should not be confused with the term democracy promotion that encompasses not only the foreign aid component but a broader range of activities that foreign states or other external actors engage in to promote democracy** (Burnell 2000b; Schraeder 2002). **Schraeder** (2002, 219-220) **describes democracy promotion in terms of a “spectrum of violence” which ranges from classic diplomacy to military intervention according to its degree of interventionism. Democracy aid is but one component of this spectrum.**

**5The terms used for the type of foreign aid that aims at strengthening democracy differ. Some authors usually use the term democracy assistance or democracy aid** (Burnell 2000b; Carothers 1999) **while other prefers the term democracy support** (Dawidson and Hulterström 2006) or uses political aid and other terms (Crawford 2001; Youngs 2001). Other terms used are democracy-related assistance, democracy promotion, political assistance, political development aid and support for democratic development (Burnell 2000b, 4).

**Democracy assistance is defined as democracy aid**

**Santiso, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, 1**

[Carlos, June 2001, European Journal of Development Research, vol.13, no.1 (June 2001), pp.154-180. “INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION FOR DEMOCRACY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE: MOVING TOWARD A SECOND GENERATION?”, p. 5-6, <http://www.eldis.org/fulltext/secondgeneration.pdf>, accessed 6-8-11, AFB]

THE QUESTION OF STRATEGY

From the outset, **the concept of ‘democracy assistance’ may appear a contradiction in terms. Democratisation is first and foremost a domestic process, which spurs from the internal pressures to democratise. However, when a country has decided to democratise, the international community can assist it in number** of ways. The contentious issues remains to know how this is or should be done. The most contentious debate concerns what Carothers [1997a] refers to as ‘the question of strategy’: can development aid be used to promote political change and, if so, how?

**Aid donors use three general approaches to help promote democracy: direct support; indirect support (via, for instance, encouraging economic development); and pressure to encourage policy reform (including the threat of use of sanctions). The promotion of specific policies and policy changes within aid recipient countries can indeed take many forms, ranging from dialogue, persuasion and support to pressure. The most common and often most significant tool for promoting democracy is democracy aid. Democracy assistance can be defined narrowly as encompassing ‘aid specifically designed to foster opening in a non-democratic country or to further a democratic transition in a country that has experienced a democratic opening’** [Carothers, 1999:6]. **Most democracy aid takes the form of ‘positive measures’, which add a positive dimension (reward of good performance) to the negative one (denial of aid resources resulting from bad performance) often associated with political conditionality.** Indeed, there exists now significant assistance available to transitional countries genuinely committed to and engaged in democratisation, but which lack resources or expertise.

## **Democracy Aid – Not Distinct from Democracy Assistance – Lappin**

### **Lappin uses assistance and aid as equivalents**

**Lappin, University of Leuven (Belgium) Centre for Peace Research and Strategic Studies  
PhD candidate, 10**

[Richard, participant in democracy assistance missions with the UN, EU, OSCE, and Carter Center, University of Belgrade political sciences visiting scholar, Central European Journal of International & Security Studies, Volume 4 Issue 1, “What we talk about when we talk about democracy assistance: the problem of definition in post-conflict approaches to democratization” <http://www.cejiss.org/issue/2010-volume-4-issue-1/lappin>, p.186-7, accessed 5-16-11, TP]

It can therefore be argued that a reverse causation was also occurring with democratic openings challenging established democracies to respond. As Carothers (1999: 44) explains: ‘**the natural tendency to focus on the effects of democracy aid on democratisation in recipient countries overlooks the equally important causal relationship in the other direction – democratisation producing democracy aid.**’

Indeed, in many respects the approach of **democracy assistance can often be described as reactive rather than proactive.** Thus, an understanding of the emergence of democracy assistance requires an appreciation of how **global events cause the democracy assistance community to respond to external stimuli** (Burnell 2008: 428).

## Democracy Aid – Not Distinct from Democracy Assistance – Carothers

### Carothers uses democracy aid and assistance interchangeably

#### Carothers '09

[Thomas, vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, overseer of the Democracy and Rule of Law Program, Middle East Program, and Carnegie Europe, and founder and director of the Democracy and Rule of Law Program, “Revitalizing U.S. Democracy Assistance the challenge of USAID,”

<http://www.scribd.com/doc/21802142/Revitalizing-U-S-Democracy-Assistance-The-Challenge-of-USAID>]

Over the past 25 years, **the United States has built up a substantial body of democracy assistance and now devotes approximately \$2.5 billion a year to it (with about half of the assistance directed at Iraq and Afghanistan). Three organizations serve as the main funders of such aid:** the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of State, and the private, nonprofit National Endowment for Democracy (NED). Beyond USAID and the State Department, several other parts of the government also sponsor assistance programs that include efforts to support democratic institutions and practices abroad, including the Department of Defense, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), and the Department of Justice. □ **U.S. democracy aid is only one part of a much larger pool of democracy-related assistance emanating from many governments, international organizations, and private foundations.** Nevertheless, the weight of the United States as a geopolitical actor and the substantial amount of U.S. funding committed to this area ensure that the United States remains to many people around the world the single most important player in the democracy aid domain.

### Carothers is clearly using aid and assistance interchangeably when referring to the funding agencies

#### Carothers- vice-president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace-9

democracy assistance: political vs. developmental?

Journal of Democracy Volume 20, Number 1 January 2009

[http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/01\\_20\\_1\\_carothers.pdf](http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/01_20_1_carothers.pdf)

The United States: Mixed Approach, Political Profile The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which is by far the largest funding source for U.S. **democracy assistance**, often follows the developmental approach. **USAID is primarily a development organization, and the story of USAID's taking up democracy support over the last twenty years is one of the often hesitant, awkward inclusion of democracy work into an organizational culture dominated by the goal of promoting socioeconomic development. Many USAID democracy programs are cautious, technocratic efforts to support incremental political change, often in the governance domain, with a studious avoidance of the political,** even when political institutions and processes are being reached. **At the same time, however, USAID does sometimes take a more political approach—supporting relatively assertive elections-related work, assisting political parties campaigning for an upcoming election, bolstering civil society through support for politically oriented advocacy groups, and providing aid to outspoken independent media outlets. Whether USAID tilts in a particular country toward a developmental or a political approach depends considerably on the overall U.S. relationship with the government of that country. Roughly speaking, the more positive the overall relationship, the more developmental the approach usually is; the more negative the relationship, the more political the approach. USAID's very large but highly indirect, nonconfrontational approach to democracy aid in Egypt in the 1990s is an example of the former, and its political aid in Serbia and Belarus in the 1990s are examples of the latter. The basic orientation of USAID's **democracy assistance** also depends on the outlook of the USAID mission director in a particular country. Many mission directors are traditional developmentalists who are wary of political aid and strongly inclined to the developmental approach.** Only a minority bring a more political orientation to their work. With the greater centralization of control over USAID's work as a result of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's reorganization of U.S. foreign assistance over the past two years, this

variability may diminish some- what.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, **with the Department of State playing a greater role in overseeing USAID's work, the agency's efforts may shift more toward the political approach.** **The two other principal funders of U.S. democracy aid—the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and the Department of State—generally follow the political approach, as do the most prominent nonprofit democracy-promotion organizations that they (and USAID) support,** including the two political-party institutes (the National Democratic Institute [NDI] and the International Republican Institute [IRI]), IFES, and Freedom House. As a private organization, NED operates at a partial remove from U.S. foreign policy, and its political approach is thus largely its own. NED's core credo is to find and support democrats around the world engaged in the struggle for democracy—the essence of the political approach. Although NDI and IRI do some work on governance issues and give some attention to long-term, incremental institutional change, the thrust of most of their work is on the political process—above all, elections, parties, parliaments, and democratic civic activists, such as election-monitoring groups. **The greater part of U.S. democracy aid, taken together from all sources and simply measured in dollar terms, probably goes to programs that proceed more from the developmental approach than the political one.** This reflects USAID's major role in the field. Yet the perceived profile of U.S. **democracy aid,** both domestically and internationally, is much more political than developmental. This disjunction reflects several factors. The politically oriented U.S. democracy-promotion organizations, particularly NDI and IRI, are much more visible than the many for-profit consulting firms that carry out most of USAID's developmentally oriented **democracy assistance.** Moreover, the activities that these politically oriented organizations carry out tend to be much more visible—support for a high-profile group of student activists challenging a semi-authoritarian ruler, for example, attracts far more attention than a larger, long-term program of technocratic aid to strengthen rural municipal governance. In short, both the organizations that carry out the more political side of U.S. **democracy aid** as well as the kinds of programs that these organizations sponsor tend to “brand” U.S. **democracy aid** on the international scene. Political branding also occurs at another level. As noted above, during this decade the world has come to equate U.S. democracy promotion with the U.S.-led intervention in Iraq, an intervention that might be considered an extreme application of the political approach. Moreover, the U.S. involvement in supporting the color revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan—support that embodied the political approach—also attracted global attention, further branding U.S. democracy support as highly political. More generally, over the past twenty years, the U.S. foreign-policy establishment (beyond the specific community of **democracy-aid** providers) has come to view democracy promotion as a fundamentally political rather than developmental challenge. The mainstream U.S. foreign-policy community pays primary attention to those U.S. programs that follow a political approach while largely ignoring the quieter, longer-term democracy-aid efforts that follow the developmental approach. <sup>16</sup> *Journal of Democracy* This inclination of the U.S. foreign-policy establishment toward the political approach to **democracy aid** and democracy promotion generally is not hard to explain. As an assertive superpower for more than sixty years, the United States has a long-established habit, rooted in the belief that political outcomes in countries all around the world will have a direct bearing on U.S. security, of viewing the developing world (in fact, the whole world) as an arena for direct U.S. political engagement. Promoting democracy, through **democracy aid** and other means, is an important form of such political engagement, one way of trying to shape political outcomes favorable to the United States. Since the 1950s, the United States has taken some interest in supporting development around the world, but that interest has been based less on a concern for development per se than on development as a way to bolster political goals. These goals have included anticommunism during the Cold War and other U.S. security interests since then, from peace to antiterrorism.

## Democracy Aid – Not Distinct from Democracy Assistance – Huber

### **Huber, citing Carothers, also doesn't distinguish between assistance and democracy Huber, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Department of International Relations, 8**

[Daniela, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 13, No. 1, 43–62, March 2008, “Democracy Assistance in the Middle East and North Africa: A Comparison of US and EU Policies”, p. 45-6,  
[http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/69109\\_790479070.pdf](http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/69109_790479070.pdf), accessed 6-3-11]

#### What is Democracy Assistance?

The term democracy assistance is used in academic literature, as well as in the programmes of the US and the EU, without comprehensive clarifications. This section will therefore outline the actor's comprehensions of the term and the (however insufficient) academic literature on it. On this basis it will develop a definition of the term democracy assistance, which will be followed by the elaboration of a methodological framework.

The US and EU have quite similar concepts of DA. USAID defines it as

**technical assistance and other support to strengthen capacity of reform-minded governments, nongovernmental actors, and/or citizens in order to develop and support democratic states and institutions that are responsive and accountable to citizens. These efforts also include promoting democratic transitions in countries that are not reform minded. Democracy programs promote the rule of law and human rights, transparent and fair elections coupled with a competitive political process, a free and independent media, stronger civil society and greater citizen participation in government, and governance structures that are efficient, responsive, and accountable.** (USAID, 2005: 4)

Similarly, the EU specifies the following categories of DA:

These can include questions of democratic participation (including universal suffrage, free election, multiparty structure, equality of access to political activity, participatory decision making); human rights (including adherence to, and implementation of, commitments under international human rights Treaties and Conventions, protection of civil liberties, including freedom of speech and of assembly, effective operation of human rights monitoring); and the rule of law (including an independent and effective judiciary, transparent legal framework, equality of all citizens before the law, police and public administration subject to the law, enforcement of contractual obligations). (EC 2003a: 10)

The American researcher Thomas Carothers gives a definition of DA which is closest to the understanding of this article: ‘Democracy aid is all aid, for which the primary purpose, not the secondary or indirect purpose, is to foster democracy in the recipient countries. It does not therefore include economic and social aid programs’ (Carothers, 2000: 188). **In addition, two further characteristics of democracy assistance are introduced in order to differentiate it from other efforts at democracy promotion: first, it is not only an explicit or direct, but also a positive measure of foreign policy as opposed to negative measures such as sanctions or even military means.<sup>4</sup> Second, it represents an active instrument, as the democracy promoter takes measures itself, whereas a passive instrument such as positive political conditionality implies that the democracy promoter rewards internal democracy promotion efforts.** Table 1 visualizes the different democracy promotion instruments.

Table 1. Democracy promotion instruments

	Explicit instruments	Implicit instruments
Positive instruments	Democracy assistance (active instrument), positive political conditionality (passive instrument)	Classical development aid
Negative instruments	Negative political conditionality, naming and shaming, military action	Military action

**Democracy assistance is the type of foreign policy that aims explicitly at positively and actively initiating democratization, supporting democratization or strengthening democracy, as well as human rights in foreign countries. This definition accounts for differing DA policies depending on the level of democratization in a recipient country ranging from non-democracies to countries in transition to**

**consolidating or delegative democracies.** Democratization is the process of transition from a non-democratic to a democratic political system. **The term human rights is included in the definition, as the actors understand it as an important part of their democracy assistance.** Democracy is understood according to Robert Dahl's concept of Polyarchy (Dahl, 1982) with its dimensions of competition and participation. This concept is narrow enough to exclude only liberalizing countries and it is wide enough for different understandings of democracy by the US and the EU. It also implies that **DA is more than electoral assistance.**

## **Democracy Aid – Not Distinct from Democracy Assistance – Youngs**

**Youngs – one of the architects of European democracy assistance – also uses aid and assistance interchangeably**

**Youngs-director of the democratization program at FRIDE in Madrid-8**

Trends in Democracy Assistance What has Europe BEEN Doing? Journal of Democracy Volume 19, Number 2  
April 2008

[http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/FRIDE\\_JOD\\_trendsindemoasst\\_whatHasEuropebeendoing.pdf](http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/FRIDE_JOD_trendsindemoasst_whatHasEuropebeendoing.pdf)

**Making a direct comparison between European and U.S. levels of democracy assistance is nearly impossible. European donors—the EU itself as well as individual member states—actively work on political- reform issues and administer numerous democracy-related budgets. These initiatives are often defined in a variety of ways and combine democracy assistance with governance, human rights, and civil society support** (see Table 1 on p. 162). **European donors generally resist the notion that democracy aid can be separated from these related issues.** In most cases, assistance to political reform, broadly defined, has increased incrementally, if unspectacularly, during the last decade.

## **Democracy Aid – Not Distinct from Democracy Assistance – Santiso**

### **Democracy assistance and aid are used interchangeably – Santiso proves**

#### **Santiso, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, 1**

[Carlos, June 2001, European Journal of Development Research, vol.13, no.1 (June 2001), pp.154-180. “INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION FOR DEMOCRACY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE: MOVING TOWARD A SECOND GENERATION?”, p. 2, <http://www.eldis.org/fulltext/secondgeneration.pdf>, accessed 6-8-11, AFB]

**This article will attempt to untie the Gordian knot of the largely uncharted territory of international assistance to democracy. As emerging democracies battle through their unfinished transitions and progressively move towards consolidation, democracy assistance needs to experience a qualitative leap forward** and enter a second stage. Similarly, as the international donor community learns from its experience and questions its traditional approaches, new policies and strategies will progressively be devised. **Second generation democracy aid requires moving away from traditional technical assistance**, often fragmented and mechanistic, **to more comprehensive assistance and political modes of intervention**. In that respect, the concept of political pacts for democratic governance could prove useful in establishing genuine partnerships for development.

### **Democracy assistance and aid are used interchangeably – Santiso proves – more evidence**

#### **Santiso, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, 1**

[Carlos, June 2001, European Journal of Development Research, vol.13, no.1 (June 2001), pp.154-180. “INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION FOR DEMOCRACY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE: MOVING TOWARD A SECOND GENERATION?”, p. 4, <http://www.eldis.org/fulltext/secondgeneration.pdf>, accessed 6-8-11, AFB]

Consequently, the end of the 1990s has given rise to greater caution and modesty regarding the extent to which external actors can promote sustainable democratic reforms in developing and transitional countries – especially in Sub-Saharan Africa [Lawson, 1999; Riddell, 1999; Gwin and Nelson, 1997; Ottaway, 1997]. The initial enthusiasm within the international donor community is thus giving way to increasing scepticism and even frustration with the pace and depth of democratic transitions. ‘There is less pressure for political liberalization, more scepticism about its prospects and greater concern with maintaining stability than promoting positive change’ [Lawson, 1999:23]. Carothers [1997b] has captured the international community’s fading enthusiasm which he coined ‘democracy without illusions’. **After a decade of democracy assistance and considerable resources expended, the strategies pursued by international donors appear to have fallen short of their intended impact and effectiveness. The widespread disappointment with the effectiveness of democracy aid in a period of declining aid commitments and multiple pressure on aid budgets generated an increasing ‘donor fatigue’ significantly affecting the capacity of international organizations to assume their responsibilities** [Lancaster, 2000 and 1999; Riddell, 1999; van de Walle, 1999; Mosley, 1996; Hewitt, 1994]. If they persist, these developments could have disastrous consequences for the prospects of democracy in the new century.

### **Santiso uses assistance and aid interchangeably when describing the 3 main types**

#### **Santiso, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, 1**

[Carlos, June 2001, European Journal of Development Research, vol.13, no.1 (June 2001), pp.154-180. “INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION FOR DEMOCRACY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE: MOVING TOWARD A SECOND GENERATION?”, p. 7, <http://www.eldis.org/fulltext/secondgeneration.pdf>, accessed 6-8-11, AFB]

Electoral Assistance and Support to Political Parties

**Democracy assistance is constituted of three main types of interventions targeting electoral processes, governing institutions and civil society<sup>7</sup>. The first pillar of democracy aid focuses on elections and political parties. Electoral assistance is among the most sophisticated and developed types of democracy aid and the one that has most evolved in recent years.** Over the last decade, electoral assistance has progressively shifted from the international observation of elections to more refined operations over longer periods of time such as support to the domestic observation of elections, technical assistance in terms of electoral system design and assistance to the administration of elections. Political parties, especially those in the opposition, remain among the weakest components of the democratisation process and the least assisted from abroad. The reasons for such reluctance are to be found in the donors' resistance to intrude in core dimensions of national sovereignty and thus upset the Westphalian principles of the equal sovereignty of states and noninterference in domestic affairs. Political foundations, however, especially in Germany (the Stiftung) and in the United States, have been particularly active in political party assistance but their strategies and effectiveness have been only marginally analysed [Pinto-Duschinsky, 1991; Sogge, 1996; Burnell and Ware, 1998; Scott, 1999; Phillips, 1999; Mair, 2000].

## **Democracy Aid – Not Distinct from Democracy Assistance – Azpuru et al.**

### **Democracy aid used interchangeably with democracy assistance – Azpuru proves Azpuru, Finkel, Perez-Linan, and Seligson, Vandy, Pitt, Pitt, Vandy, '08**

("What has the United States Been Doing?" Journal of Democracy Volume 19, Number 2, April 2008 pp. 150-159)

The increases in USAID Democracy and Governance expenditures since 1990 reflect a clear shift in U.S. priorities regarding democracy assistance, one that pre-dated the controversial military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Democracy assistance had already risen by 2001 to become one of the largest categories of USAID outlays worldwide, with a particular focus on regions such as Eastern Europe. Furthermore, the data show that electoral assistance per se has been only one area in which democracy funds have been invested, and clearly not the major one.

In fact, civil society has been the key area of intervention—a sign that USAID democracy funding aims to promote more than the merely procedural dimensions of democracy. Moreover, the distribution of democracy assistance within each subsector varies by region—in other words, there is no "one-size-fits-all" model. Finally, **the data show that democracy assistance is typically not short-term. Rather, at the country level USAID on average has provided democracy aid for about a decade.**

### **Even when distinguishing assistance from promotion, authors don't distinguish it from aid Azpuru, Finkel, Perez-Linan, and Seligson, Vandy, Pitt, Pitt, Vandy, '08**

("What has the United States Been Doing?" Journal of Democracy Volume 19, Number 2, April 2008 pp. 150-159)

In the post-Cold War era, U.S. foreign-policy discourse has consistently underscored the importance of aid designed to foster democracy and economic development. Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush both have emphasized that supporting the growth of democracy in the world is an essential task. President Clinton in his 1994 State of the Union address called the promotion of democracy and human rights the "third pillar" of his foreign-policy agenda,<sup>1</sup> and President Bush has time and again highlighted the prominence that democracy building around the world takes among his foreign-policy goals. Before beginning, it is vital to make a conceptual distinction between democracy promotion and democracy assistance, as this essay focuses exclusively on the latter. **Democracy promotion refers to an array of measures aimed at establishing, strengthening, or defending democracy in a given country. Such measures may range from diplomatic pressure to conditionality on development aid to economic sanctions, and even to military intervention. Democracy assistance is a form of democracy promotion. It provides funds or direct assistance to governments, institutions, or civil society actors that are working either to strengthen an emerging democracy or to foster conditions that could lead to democracy's rise where a nondemocratic regime holds power. This analysis examines democracy assistance only—what Thomas Carothers has called "the quiet side" of U.S. democracy promotion.**<sup>2</sup> Until now, the absence of comprehensive and systematic data on the magnitude and distribution of U.S. democracy assistance—where, on what, and in which quantities these funds have been spent—has prevented analysts from identifying patterns of assistance and has frustrated rigorous empirical research into democracy aid's impact. Earlier studies rest on data regarding foreign assistance that fail to distinguish democracy assistance from other types of development aid. Our use here of a newly assembled dataset showing all U.S. foreign-assistance through USAID over a sixteen-year period (1990 through 2005) allows us to clarify some of those questions and to identify patterns in the data. Our major aim is to describe where U.S. democracy assistance went during those years and in what amounts, using the most comprehensive multiyear data currently available, so as to provide a solid point of departure for future studies.<sup>3</sup> This analysis will clear up at least some of the confusion and ambiguities that currently muddy the topic of U.S. democracy aid. The database we use tracks USAID democracy-assistance funds from 1990 to 2005 and comprises 44,958 records that capture the composition of USAID budgets for specific activities in all sectors for that period.<sup>4</sup> The dataset contains the most extensive and finely grained information on USAID expenditures in the democracy and governance sector (hereafter DG) currently available for scholarly analysis.<sup>5</sup>

1. James Meernik, Eric L. Krueger, and Steve C. Poe, "Testing Models of U.S. Foreign Policy: Foreign Aid During and After the Cold War," *Journal of Politics* 60 (February 1998): 63–85. 2. Thomas Carothers, *U.S. Democracy Promotion During and After Bush* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007), 10; available at [www.carnegieendowment.org/files/democracy\\_promotion\\_after\\_bush\\_final.pdf](http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/democracy_promotion_after_bush_final.pdf). 3. See Steven E. Finkel, Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, and Mitchell A. Seligson, "The Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2003," *World Politics* 59 (April 2007): 404–39. 4. The database is available at [www.pitt.edu/~politics/democracy/democracy.html](http://www.pitt.edu/~politics/democracy/democracy.html). Part of the data was initially compiled by John Richter at USAID and the database was later expanded by Andrew Green, a USAID Democracy Fellow, in 2004–2005. The database includes the funds allocated to democracy assistance by USAID. In consultation with Andrew Green, we developed a series of aggregation routines to generate yearly totals for: a) DG spending at the country level; b) DG subsectors [Elections, Rule of Law, Civil Society, and Governance] at the country level; c) non-DG sectors [Agriculture and Economic Growth, Education, Environment, Health, Humanitarian Assistance, Human Rights, and Conflict Management and Mitigation] at the country level; d) programs that operate at the regional level [in any of the fields just described]; and e) programs that operate at the subregional level [in any of the fields]. 5. Although USAID is the main channel for U.S. democracy assistance, it should be noted that not all DG money goes through USAID. We do not include funding from other institutions such as the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). According to the data presented by the annual report on U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, funds allocated internationally by NED between 1990 and 2004 represented on average 5.1 percent of the annual USAID Democracy and Governance budget during the same period. See James Scott and Carrie Steele, "Assisting Democrats or Resisting Dictators: The Nature and Impact of Democracy Support by the United States National Endowment for Democracy, 1990–1999," *Democratization* 12 (August 2005): 439–60.

## **Democracy Aid – Not Distinct from Democracy Assistance – Savun & Tirone**

**Savun & Tirone use “democracy assistance aid”**

**Savun, University of Pittsburgh Political Science assistant professor and Tirone, University of Pittsburgh political science Ph.D. Candidate, 11**

[Burcu & Daniel C., April 2011, American Journal of Political Science, "Foreign Aid, Democratization, and Civil Conflict: How Does Democracy Aid Affect Civil Conflict?," Vol 55 Issue 2, p233-246, Wiley Online Library, accessed 5-16-11]

The critics of foreign aid efficacy also assume that foreign aid always goes to the government of the recipient country. **Although most of the development aid goes to the governments of the recipient countries, democracy assistance aid is usually disbursed to a variety of sectors in the recipient country** (Crawford 2001; Scott and Steele 2005). For example, Crawford (2001) shows that in 1994 and 1995 an average of 54% of the European Union's political aid programs were implemented by the recipient governments, and this percentage was only 5.1% for Swedish political aid (124). Similarly, Crawford reports that **between 1992 and 1995, central and local governments were the main beneficiaries of 54% of the EU political aid. This number was 35.4% for Sweden and 55.7% for the United States, and 92.9% for the United Kingdom. On the other hand, civil society organizations, such as prodemocracy groups and human right groups, were the main beneficiaries of 46% of the EU political aid, 64.6% of the Swedish aid, 44.3% of the U.S. aid, and 7.1% of the U.K. democracy aid programs** (138). **These figures indicate that, unlike development aid, the majority of democracy aid goes to nonstate actors.**

[Posted on Forums by Struth, 5-24-11,

<http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php?topic=2422.msg4882#msg4882>,

## **Democracy Aid – Subset of Democracy Promotion**

**Democracy aid is a subset of democracy promotion**

**Cornell, University of Gothenburg (Sweden) Department of Political Science, 8**

[Agnes, August 6-9-, 2008, “Does democracy aid promote democracy?”, Paper presented at the XV NOPSA conference in Tromsø, Norway August 6-9, 2008, Workshop: Elections and Democracy in the Third World, <http://uit.no/getfile.php?PageId=1410&FileId=1349>, p. 4, accessed 6-8-11, AFB]

**4Democracy aid should not be confused with the term democracy promotion that encompasses not only the foreign aid component but a broader range of activities that foreign states or other external actors engage in to promote democracy (Burnell 2000b; Schraeder 2002). Schraeder (2002, 219-220) describes democracy promotion in terms of a “spectrum of violence” which ranges from classic diplomacy to military intervention according to its degree of interventionism. Democracy aid is but one component of this spectrum.**

**Democracy aid is distinct from totality of democracy promotion and development aid – it is explicitly aimed at fostering democracy through the political system and/or aims at shaping people’s; masses’ or elites’ attitudes towards democracy.**

**Cornell, University of Gothenburg (Sweden) Department of Political Science, 8**

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**Obviously, one of the most important concepts of this study is democracy aid. Accordingly, we must define both democracy aid and the concept of democracy per se. In the following, the characteristics of democracy aid are outlined and a definition is stipulated.**

### **2. The characteristics of democracy aid**

In this paper it is argued that **democracy aid is a particular form of foreign aid and thus that it can be distinguished substantially from other types of foreign aid.**<sup>3</sup> **Other kinds of foreign aid could certainly also promote democracy in a wider sense. In the realm of foreign aid it might be hard to distinguish between the types that aim at supporting conditions e.g. health, infrastructure, economic development and the types that aim at changing political variables conducive to higher levels of democracy. However, if we want to investigate whether democracy aid could have effect on democratisation, independently from the rest of foreign aid, a substantial distinction is necessary.**<sup>4</sup>

Yet, **in previous research it is not evident that democracy aid is distinguished from other forms of development aid to any substantial degree. Adopted definitions of democracy aid are commonly descriptions of different forms of activities that democracy aid budgets consist of or only defined by donors’ explicit aim to foster democracy (Crawford 2001; Azpuru and Shaw 2007; Molutsi 2007; Youngs 2001).**<sup>5</sup>

**Burnell (2000b, 12) restricts the definition of democracy aid to “efforts that are focused directly on democracy’s political variables” hence excluding “democracy’s supporting conditions”. However, Burnell himself points out that this definition does not “resolve all of the issues” and that it does not encompass the totality of what democracy aid really consists of.** Thus, we must search for a somewhat different definition.

In this paper it is argued, that **democracy aid explicitly aims at deepening democracy through different means and measures than other types of foreign aid. Other forms of foreign aid work with modernisation-like strategies through education, health and other aspects of societal development i.e. underlying conditions (Knack 2004; Finkel, Pérez-Liñán, and Seligson 2007). In turn, democracy aid aims at shaping masses’ and elites’ attitudes towards democracy and focuses on institutional and actor-oriented strategies rather than changing structural conditions. Thus the mechanisms assumed to promote democracy differs substantially between democracy aid and other forms of foreign aid.** Even

if this distinction is not used by Crawford (2001) to define democracy aid he argues along the same lines of reasoning:

“The shift to promoting democratisation represented an increasingly widespread presumption amongst governments and international organisations of a synergistic relationship between democracy and development. This "new orthodoxy" //...// was itself a change from previous prevailing views that democracy was the outcome of socio-economic development //...// or that the successful implementation of economic adjustment required the firm hand of authoritarian rule //...//.” (Crawford 2001, 3)

**I define democracy aid as foreign aid that aims at fostering democracy through the political system and/or aims at shaping people's; masses' or elites' attitudes towards democracy.**

Accordingly, **democracy aid could include efforts like, for example, support to legislative assistance programs, election assistance and monitoring, support to civil society and support to political parties but also support to administrative reforms that promotes democratic governance. These efforts may be conducted by different actors. Democracy aid is not only performed by state agencies but also NGOs.**

Some of them are closely connected to and even financed by state agencies. Also regional and international organisations such as the EU and the UN are engaged in democracy aid and should therefore be included in the study. (Burnell 2000a)

**\*\*\*Democratic Consolidation**

## Democratic Consolidation – Only Game in Town

**Democratic consolidation requires broad and deep legitimation of democratic regime as the only imaginable system – “the only game in town”**

**Diamond, Hoover Institute senior research fellow and National Endowment for Democracy’s International Forum for Democratic Studies co-director, 97**

[Larry, The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science, March, 1997, 550 Annals 12, “NAFTA REVISITED: EXPECTATIONS AND REALITIES: Consolidating Democracy in the Americas”, Lexis]

As with the term "democracy," there are many conceptual approaches to democratic "consolidation" in the literature. If we are to avoid tautology, consolidation must rest on conceptual foundations other than what we hypothesize to be its principal consequence: the stability and persistence of democracy. Consolidation is most usefully construed as the process of achieving broad and deep legitimation, such that all significant political actors, at both the elite and mass levels, believe that the democratic regime is the most right and appropriate for their society, better than any other realistic alternative they can imagine. n6 As Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, along with others, have stressed, this legitimacy must be more than a commitment to democracy in the abstract; it must also involve a shared normative and behavioral commitment to the specific rules and practices of the country's constitutional system--what Linz earlier called "loyalty" to the democratic regime. n7 At the elite level, all significant political competitors or potential competitors (not only parties but also interest groups and movements) must come to regard democracy--and the laws, procedures, and institutions it specifies--as the only game in town, the only viable framework for governing the society and advancing their own interests. At the mass level, there must be a broad normative and behavioral consensus--cutting across class, ethnic, nationality, [\*15] and other cleavages--on the legitimacy of the constitutional system, however poor or unsatisfying its performance may be at any point in time. n8 It is the deep, unquestioned, routinized commitment to democracy and its procedures at the elite and mass levels that produces a crucial element of consolidation, a reduction in the uncertainty of democracy, regarding not so much the outcomes as the rules and methods of political competition.

**Democratic consolidation requires establishing and routinizing democracy and removing institutional impediments to electoral accountability of government**

**Diamond, Hoover Institute senior research fellow and National Endowment for Democracy’s International Forum for Democratic Studies co-director, 97**

[Larry, The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science, March, 1997, 550 Annals 12, “NAFTA REVISITED: EXPECTATIONS AND REALITIES: Consolidating Democracy in the Americas”, Lexis]

Democratic consolidation confronts a number of characteristic challenges in new and insecure democracies. The salience of these different challenges varies across countries (and over time), however, and it would be an overstatement to characterize the complete resolution of any one of them as necessary for democratic consolidation. Beyond (by definition) establishing and routinizing broad commitment to the rules of the democratic game, there are probably no strictly necessary conditions for democratic consolidation, except (again, by definition) removing the military (or other institutions) as a reserved domain of power that limits the electoral accountability of government to citizens. However, the more these challenges persist in acute form, and the more they cumulate, unresolved, the less likely democratic consolidation will be.

**Democratic consolidation is a discernible process in which democracy becomes the only legitimate power structure**

**Scheppele, Princeton University Woodrow Wilson School and the University Center for Human Values Professor of Sociology and Public Affairs, 2009**

[Kim Lane, Boston University Law Review, April, 2009, 89 B.U.L. Rev. 795, SYMPOSIUM THE MOST DISPARAGED BRANCH: THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: PANEL VII: CONGRESS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: PARLIAMENTARY SUPPLEMENTS (OR WHY DEMOCRACIES NEED MORE THAN PARLIAMENTS), Lexis]

n35. See, e.g., Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation* 3-18 (1999) (proposing a model democracy and assessing various nations' governments in light of that standard); Linz & Stepan, *supra* note 27, at 6 (defining consolidated democracy as including an attitudinal piece, a behavioral piece, and a constitutional piece); Larry Diamond, Introduction: In Search of Consolidation, in *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Themes and Perspectives*, at xiii, xvi-xvii (Larry Diamond, Marc Plattner, Yun-Han Chu & Hung-Mao Tien eds., 1997) ("**The bulk of our contributors have converged on an understanding of democratic consolidation as a discernible process by which the rules, institutions, and constraints of democracy come to constitute 'the only game in town,' the one legitimate framework for seeking and exercising political power.**"); Klaus von Beyme, Institutional Engineering and Transition to Democracy, in *1 Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe: Institutional Engineering* 3, 6-14, 17-22 (Jan Zielonka ed., 2001) (discussing constitutional design and the development of electoral law as steps in the transition from authoritarianism to democracy).

## **Democratic Consolidation – No Backsliding**

**Democratic consolidation assumes consistent maintenance or expansion of democracy  
Scheppele, Princeton University Woodrow Wilson School and the University Center for  
Human Values Professor of Sociology and Public Affairs, 2009**

[Kim Lane, Boston University Law Review, April, 2009, 89 B.U.L. Rev. 795, SYMPOSIUM THE MOST  
DISPARAGED BRANCH: THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: PANEL VII:  
CONGRESS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: PARLIAMENTARY SUPPLEMENTS (OR WHY  
DEMOCRACIES NEED MORE THAN PARLIAMENTS), Lexis]

n43. See id. at 67 ("**Democracy can be consolidated only when no significant collective actors challenge the legitimacy of democratic institutions or regularly violate its constitutional norms, procedures, and laws.**"); Di Palma, supra note 37, at 15-16 (1990) (pronouncing an objective definition of democracy with "emphasis ... on free and universal suffrage in a context of civil liberties, on competitive parties, on the selection of alternative candidates for office, and on the presence of political institutions that regulate and guarantee the roles of government opposition"); Stephen **Hansen, Defining Democratic Consolidation, in Postcommunism and the Theory of Democracy** 126-51 (Richard D. Anderson, Jr. et al. eds., 2001) (**defining "democratic consolidation" as occurring "when the staff of governing political parties, state bureaucracies, coercive apparatuses, and the judiciary consistently act to maintain or expand the functioning of electoral competition and legally defined citizenship rights"**).

## Democratic Consolidation – Includes Civil Society & Media

### Democratic consolidation includes civil society and media

**Diamond, Hoover Institute senior research fellow and National Endowment for Democracy's International Forum for Democratic Studies co-director, 97**

[Larry, The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science, March, 1997, 550 Annals 12, "NAFTA REVISITED: EXPECTATIONS AND REALITIES: Consolidating Democracy in the Americas", Lexis]

10. **Civil society: Vertical accountability and democratic deepening. Civil society organizations do more for the consolidation of democracy than merely represent a wide range of diverse interests. They (along with the mass media) monitor the state, [\*38] expose its potential wrongdoings, and hold it accountable. They give citizens experience in the art of political association, increase their civic competence, stimulate participation in electoral politics, recruit and train new political leaders, generate democratic norms and values, and accumulate social capital. n61 Not least, particular civil society organizations, such as election-monitoring and human rights groups, policy think tanks, and anticorruption organizations, press explicitly for reforms to improve and deepen the quality of democracy.** In Mexico, the nonpartisan Civic Alliance serves as an example of a civil society group contributing to democracy. In the 1994 elections, "Civic Alliance coordinated the activities of three hundred [nongovernmental organizations] and civic groups, placed observers at polls throughout the country, conducted quick counts of the results, and produced a postelectoral report that highlighted the persistence of electoral irregularities, particularly in the Mexican countryside." n62 **Certainly, not all civil society organizations perform all of these functions for democratic consolidation, and some groups may be so militant or intolerant that their net contribution to consolidation is negative. But increasingly, scholars are recognizing the symbiotic nature of the relationship between state and civil society, in the process of democratic consolidation and more generally. By enhancing the accountability, responsiveness, inclusiveness, and hence legitimacy of the regime, a vigorous, pluralistic civil society strengthens a democratic state and moves it toward consolidation.**

## **Democratic Consolidation – Includes Managing Ethnic Conflict**

### **Democracy consolidation includes managing ethnic conflict**

**Diamond, Hoover Institute senior research fellow and National Endowment for Democracy's International Forum for Democratic Studies co-director, 97**

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**8. Managing ethnic conflict. Most new democracies in Asia, Africa, and the former Soviet bloc face serious challenges of managing ethnic and regional diversity,** to a degree far beyond what the typical Latin American country faces. Nevertheless, many Latin American countries, such as Peru, Bolivia, and Guatemala, have large indigenous populations, which are regionally concentrated and severely marginalized from economic opportunity and political power. This ethnic exclusion and inequality have contributed significantly to violent insurgency and have formed the central concern of the Zapatista rebellion in Chiapas. **Democracy may in the long run provide the most reliable and humane means for enabling diverse cultural groups to coexist in peace, security, and mutual dignity, but it does not do so inevitably. More perhaps than for any other challenge, institutional design matters greatly in the management of ethnic conflict. Accommodating leaders may help to foster political accommodation among their respective ethnic groups and parties, but they cannot be relied upon to do so for long unless institutions generate incentives and assurances that "make moderation pay," in Donald Horowitz's phrase. n57 Power must be sufficiently decentralized, whether through federalism or other arrangements, so that different groups have some autonomous control over their own affairs. In addition, majoritarian, "winner-take-all" outcomes must be avoided at the center as well through electoral systems that induce different ethnic groups to pool votes or form coalitions. Above [\*37] all, no one ethnic group, and particularly no minority, should be allowed indefinitely to monopolize power at the center.**

In addition, **the broad legitimation undergirding democratic consolidation requires that no one be denied equal rights of citizenship because of their ethnicity. "In a multi-national, multi-cultural setting, the chances to consolidate democracy are increased by state policies which grant inclusive and equal citizenship, and which give all citizens a common 'roof' of state-mandated, and enforced, constitutional rights." n58 These include the rights of ethnic minorities to use their own culture, religion, and language, as well as to participate in the political and economic life of the country, free from discrimination.**

## Democratic Consolidation – Includes Government Services

**Improving state apparatus – including government provision of services – contributes to democratic consolidation**

**Walker, Law Clerk to Judge Alex Kozinski, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 6**  
 [Christopher J., Florida Journal of International Law, December, 2006, 18 Fla. J. Int'l L. 745, "TOWARD DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION? THE ARGENTINE SUPREME COURT, JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, AND THE RULE OF LAW", Lexis]

B. Emergence of Linz and Stepan's Democratic Consolidation Framework

Unlike Huntington or Diamond, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan divide democratization into two phases: transition and consolidation. Linz and Stepan incorporate aspects of Dahl, Diamond, and Huntington's definitions of democracy. For instance, they utilize Huntington's minimalist definition for democratic transition of basically FFR elections. n32 Furthermore, they claim that democratization entails Diamond's liberalization, but it is a much broader and more political concept. However, they also warn against Huntington's procedural definition of democracy, the "electoralist fallacy," because it constitutes a necessary but not sufficient condition. n33 Democratic practices must be further developed and cultivated in order to ensure that democracy persists and evolves into the only game in town. After democratic transition takes place, Linz and Stepan argue that "there are still many tasks that need to be accomplished, conditions that must be established, and attitudes and habits that must be cultivated before democracy could be considered consolidated." n34 In other words, democratic transition does not ensure that democracy will remain; it must be further nurtured. Linz and Stepan label this developmental process "democratic consolidation," claiming that consolidation is achieved when democracy has become "the only game in town." n35

For Linz and Stepan, this process involves three separate but interrelated developments-behavioral, attitudinal, and constitutional [\*755] consolidation. n36 Behavioral consolidation refers to the condition that there are no significant anti-democratic movements. Political actors are willing to play by the rules of the game. Attitudinal consolidation requires public support for, and confidence in, democracy as the most legitimate form of government. Not only must the political actors be invested in democracy, but the public must also trust the system. Constitutional consolidation entails that governmental and nongovernmental forces are subject to and work within a specific set of laws, procedures, and institutions of the democratic process. In other words, the rule of law must replace rule by law.

In addition to identifying three types of consolidation, Linz and Stepan further categorize the necessary democratic consolidation tasks into five interactive arenas: (1) the civil society, which entails freedom of association and communication; (2) the political society, which encompasses free and inclusive electoral contestation; (3) the rule of law or constitutionalism, which involves judicial review and autonomy and the consistent application of the law; (4) the state apparatus or bureaucracy, which requires rational-legal bureaucratic norms and adequate public services; and (5) the economic society, which includes the formation of an institutionalized market. n37 These five arenas, along with the guiding principles and evidence of consolidation in each arena, are presented in Table 1.

Linz and Stepan argue that three of these arenas-the civil society, the political society, and the rule of law-are requisite for consolidation, whereas the economic society and state apparatus play an important but not necessary role in democratic consolidation:

The above three conditions-a lively and independent civil society, a political society with sufficient autonomy and a working consensus about procedures of governance, and constitutionalism and the rule of law-are virtually definitional prerequisites of a consolidated democracy. However, these conditions are much more likely to be satisfied if a bureaucracy usable by democratic leaders and an institutionalized economic society exist. n38

[Note – FFR = free, fair, and regular (FFR)]

## Democratic Consolidation – Includes Judicial Reforms

**Improving judiciary – including reducing court clog – contributes to democratic consolidation**

**Walker, Law Clerk to Judge Alex Kozinski, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 6**

[Christopher J., Florida Journal of International Law, December, 2006, 18 Fla. J. Int'l L. 745, "TOWARD DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION? THE ARGENTINE SUPREME COURT, JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, AND THE RULE OF LAW", Lexis]

Regardless of its origin, Latin American countries-and Argentina in particular- have historically provided less than adequate horizontal checks on ultrapresidentialism, which has left the region vulnerable to delegative democracy and authoritarian reversals. n56 Consequently, understanding how [\*761] the courts can serve as a horizontal check on executive power is particularly important for democratic consolidation in Latin America. One potential solution, which this Article explores with respect to democracy in Argentina, is to provide for and protect independent and autonomous judiciaries.

Because courts are arguably "the primary guardians of the rule of law" and a key ingredient "to the protection of individual rights and to the consolidation of the region's new democracies," n57 judicial reform has emerged as a hot topic in recent scholarship on law and policy in Latin America. The breadth of policy reforms proposed in the literature is impressive-ranging from calls for wider access to courts, decreased delays and backlogs, and judicial education to demands for less corruption, more efficient administration, increased use of alternative dispute resolution initiatives, and updated procedural codes. n58 Studies also span from focusing on local and regional courts, to the high or supreme court in a particular country, and from evaluating public attitudes and perceptions of court functioning to analyzing substantive and procedural laws within a particular country or comparatively across various countries in the region.

To some degree, all these reform proposals would undoubtedly influence democratic consolidation and the development of the rule of law in Latin America. This Article, however, limits its scope to the role of the high or supreme court in strengthening the rule of law-specifically focusing on judicial independence and autonomy and public perception of the Argentine Supreme Court. The judiciary's perceived and actual independence appears to be a major, if not the predominant, factor in whether courts serve as an effective horizontal check on the executive and legislative branches, as well as on other governmental and [\*762] nongovernmental actors, thus ensuring the rule of law. Before turning to the Argentine case study, relevant definitions of judicial independence must first be explored.

## **Democratic Consolidation – Includes Trade Promotion**

**Democracy consolidation includes civil society and media**

**Diamond, Hoover Institute senior research fellow and National Endowment for Democracy's International Forum for Democratic Studies co-director, 97**

[Larry, The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science, March, 1997, 550 Annals 12, "NAFTA REVISITED: EXPECTATIONS AND REALITIES: Consolidating Democracy in the Americas", Lexis]

**Ultimately, the greatest regional force for democratic consolidation in the Americas may well be the movement to-ward regional free trade. In Western Europe, and now increasingly all of Europe, membership in the European Union (and its Common Market predecessors), or the prospect of such membership, has promoted democratic consolidation in three respects. First, it sets as an explicit condition that member states manifest "truly democratic practices and respect for fundamental rights and freedoms." n65 Second, it encourages denser exchanges across countries not only of goods but of people and ideas. Third, as a result of the first two, it has helped to foster normative change toward the values and expectations that prevail within the established democracies of the community. In all likelihood, economic integration will have similar effects in the [\*40] Americas, although these will prob-ably be slower to manifest themselves in the absence of a single, hemispheric economic community and of an explicit framework conditioning country membership on democracy and "respect for fundamental rights." Certainly, scrutiny of Mexico's internal politics, and pressure and assistance for democratization in Mexico, has increased in the United States and Canada since the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The firm and rapid response of Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay to the insubordination of the Paraguayan military in February 1996 no doubt derived in part from the linkage of the four countries in MERCOSUR (Southern Cone Common Market). By promoting the rapid growth of trade, greater economic competitiveness, and freer flows of capital and infor-mation, free trade agreements are undermining socially regressive vested interests in the Americas and stimulating eco-nomic growth and further economic liberalization. These factors press in the direction of greater political openness and competitiveness as well.**

## Democratic Consolidation – Includes Economic

### **Improving economic society – including institutionalizing market reforms – contributes to democratic consolidation**

**Walker, Law Clerk to Judge Alex Kozinski, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 6**  
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B. Emergence of Linz and Stepan's Democratic Consolidation Framework

Unlike Huntington or Diamond, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan divide democratization into two phases: transition and consolidation. Linz and Stepan incorporate aspects of Dahl, Diamond, and Huntington's definitions of democracy. For instance, they utilize Huntington's minimalist definition for democratic transition of basically FFR elections. n32 Furthermore, they claim that democratization entails Diamond's liberalization, but it is a much broader and more political concept. However, they also warn against Huntington's procedural definition of democracy, the "electoralist fallacy," because it constitutes a necessary but not sufficient condition. n33 Democratic practices must be further developed and cultivated in order to ensure that democracy persists and evolves into the only game in town. After democratic transition takes place, Linz and Stepan argue that "there are still many tasks that need to be accomplished, conditions that must be established, and attitudes and habits that must be cultivated before democracy could be considered consolidated." n34 In other words, democratic transition does not ensure that democracy will remain; it must be further nurtured. Linz and Stepan label this developmental process "democratic consolidation," claiming that consolidation is achieved when democracy has become "the only game in town." n35

For Linz and Stepan, this process involves three separate but interrelated developments-behavioral, attitudinal, and constitutional [\*755] consolidation. n36 Behavioral consolidation refers to the condition that there are no significant anti-democratic movements. Political actors are willing to play by the rules of the game. Attitudinal consolidation requires public support for, and confidence in, democracy as the most legitimate form of government. Not only must the political actors be invested in democracy, but the public must also trust the system. Constitutional consolidation entails that governmental and nongovernmental forces are subject to and work within a specific set of laws, procedures, and institutions of the democratic process. In other words, the rule of law must replace rule by law.

In addition to identifying three types of consolidation, Linz and Stepan further categorize the necessary democratic consolidation tasks into five interactive arenas: (1) the civil society, which entails freedom of association and communication; (2) the political society, which encompasses free and inclusive electoral contestation; (3) the rule of law or constitutionalism, which involves judicial review and autonomy and the consistent application of the law; (4) the state apparatus or bureaucracy, which requires rational-legal bureaucratic norms and adequate public services; and (5) the economic society, which includes the formation of an institutionalized market. n37 These five arenas, along with the guiding principles and evidence of consolidation in each arena, are presented in Table 1.

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The above three conditions-a lively and independent civil society, a political society with sufficient autonomy and a working consensus about procedures of governance, and constitutionalism and the rule of law-are virtually definitional prerequisites of a consolidated democracy. However, these conditions are much more likely to be satisfied if a bureaucracy usable by democratic leaders and an institutionalized economic society exist. n38

[Note – FFR = free, fair, and regular (FFR)]

## Democratic Consolidation – Includes Military Accountability

### **Democracy consolidation includes military accountability**

**Diamond, Hoover Institute senior research fellow and National Endowment for Democracy's International Forum for Democratic Studies co-director, 97**

[Larry, The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science, March, 1997, 550 Annals 12, "NAFTA REVISITED: EXPECTATIONS AND REALITIES: Consolidating Democracy in the Americas", Lexis]

There is thus an intimate connection between democratic consolidation and democratic deepening and improve-ment. The less respectful of political rights, civil liberties, and constitutional constraints on state power are the behaviors of key state, incumbent party, and other political actors, the weaker will be the procedural consensus underpinning democracy. [\*19] Consolidation is then obstructed, by definition. Furthermore, the more shallow, exclusive, unac-countable, and abusive of individual and group rights is the electoral regime, the more difficult it will be for that regime to become deeply legitimated at the mass level (or to retain such legitimacy), and thus the lower will be the perceived costs for the elected president or the military to overthrow the system (as Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori did with his 1992 autogolpe). Consolidation is then obstructed or destroyed causally, by the effects of institutional shallowness and decay. To become consolidated, therefore, electoral democracies must become deeper and more liberal. Even as Mexico seeks to cross the threshold to true electoral democracy, it must deal with human rights abuses and an extreme, delegative concentration of power in the presidency. Consolidation requires greater executive (and military) accounta-bility to both the law and the scrutiny of other branches of the government, as well as the public; reduction of barriers to political participation and mobilization by marginalized groups; and more effective protection for the political and civil rights of all citizens.

### **Democratic consolidation includes reducing military influence and increasing civilian oversight**

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Democratic consolidation typically requires a strategy by which military influence over nonmilitary issues and functions is gradually reduced, and civilian oversight and control are eventually established over matters of broad mili-tary and national security policy as well (including strategy, force structure, deployment, expenditures, and--should armed conflict come to pass--rules of engagement). The armed forces must be removed from control over economic institutions (including banks, corporations, and mass media) and surveillance or control over any aspect of domestic politics and society. Their formal participation in the cabinet or other branches of government must also be [\*36] terminated, and their authority even over military affairs must be clearly subordinated to a civilian minister of defense. Depoliticizing the military also requires reforming the curriculum of military academies and other officer-training pro-grams. Unless the military has somehow been defeated or shattered, as in the transition in Argentina and the U.S. inva-sions of Panama and Haiti (facilitating outright elimination of the army in the latter two cases), or unless there is a his-tory of civilian control over the military as in Mexico, this strategy will usually have to pursue reforms incrementally, through bargaining, dialogue, and consensus building rather than blunt confrontation. The risks of military reaction can be reduced in the process if civilians always accord the military a position of high status, honor, and income; never use the military as a power resource in political competition; and avoid political interference in routine promotions. n56

### **Democratic consolidation requires establishing and routinizing democracy and removing institutional impediments – like supreme military power – to electoral accountability of government**

**Diamond, Hoover Institute senior research fellow and National Endowment for Democracy's International Forum for Democratic Studies co-director, 97**

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Democratic consolidation confronts a number of characteristic challenges in new and insecure democracies. The salience of these different challenges varies across countries (and over time), however, and it would be an overstatement to characterize the complete resolution of any one of them as necessary for democratic consolidation. **Beyond (by definition) establishing and routinizing broad commitment to the rules of the democratic game, there are probably no strictly necessary conditions for democratic consolidation, except (again, by definition) removing the military (or other institutions) as a reserved domain of power that limits the electoral accountability of government to citizens.** However, the more these challenges persist in acute form, and the more they cumulate, unresolved, the less likely democratic consolidation will be.

## **Democratic Consolidation – Includes Political Conditioning**

**Political conditionality can be used to promote democratic consolidation**

**Diamond, Hoover Institute senior research fellow and National Endowment for Democracy's International Forum for Democratic Studies co-director, 97**

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**The challenge now is to build aggressively on these promising foundations. Free trade in the Americas now rests on a patchwork of limited agreements: NAFTA, MERCOSUR, the Andean Pact, the Central American Common Market. If these separate groupings could be gradually integrated into a free trade area for the entire Western Hemisphere (ideally by building on the NAFTA model), and if that economic union adopted explicit democratic conditionality, more would probably be done for the consolidation of democracy in the region than by any other regional or international development imaginable. Political conditionality should require civilian, constitutional rule with free and fair elections and a rule of law. This would still leave plenty of room for troubled electoral democracies to join and for integration to help deepen democracy over time. But it would at least demand, in countries like Mexico, greater electoral integrity, while legitimating more extensive regional observation of the electoral process. At the same time, such conditionality would rule out overt dictatorships and require the automatic suspension from the free trade community of countries taken over by military establishments or civilian autocrats. This would enormously strengthen the growing structure of regional deterrence against military and executive coups.**

## Democratic Consolidation – Post-Transition

### Consolidation assumes post-transition

#### Walker, Law Clerk to Judge Alex Kozinski, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 6

[Christopher J., Florida Journal of International Law, December, 2006, 18 Fla. J. Int'l L. 745, "TOWARD DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION? THE ARGENTINE SUPREME COURT, JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, AND THE RULE OF LAW", Lexis]

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**\*\*\*Democracy Assistance**

## **Democracy Assistance – Country Context Determines Method**

**Democracy assistance is more likely to take political approach in countries with more negative relationships with the US**

**Carothers, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace vice-president for studies, 9**

[Thomas, Journal of Democracy, Volume 20, Number 1, January 2009, “Democracy Assistance: Political vs. Developmental?” pp. 14, Project Muse, accessed 5-26-11]

The U.S. Agency for International Development (**USAID**), which is by far the largest funding source for U.S. democracy assistance, **often follows the developmental approach. USAID is primarily a development organization, and the story of USAID’s taking up democracy support over the last twenty years is one of the often hesitant, awkward inclusion of democracy work into an organizational culture dominated by the goal of promoting socioeconomic development. Many USAID democracy programs are cautious, technocratic efforts to support incremental political change, often in the governance domain, with a studious avoidance of the political, even when political institutions and processes are being reached.**

**At the same time, however, USAID does sometimes take a more political approach—supporting relatively assertive elections-related work, assisting political parties campaigning for an upcoming election, bolstering civil society through support for politically oriented advocacy groups, and providing aid to outspoken independent media outlets. Whether USAID tilts in a particular country toward a developmental or a political approach depends considerably on the overall U.S. relationship with the government of that country. Roughly speaking, the more positive the overall relationship, the more developmental the approach usually is; the more negative the relationship, the more political the approach.** USAID’s very large but highly indirect, nonconfrontational approach to democracy aid in Egypt in the 1990s is an example of the former, and its political aid in Serbia and Belarus in the 1990s are examples of the latter.

## Democracy Assistance – Direct and Positive

### Democracy assistance is distinct from indirect support and pressure

#### Santiso, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, 1

[Carlos, June 2001, European Journal of Development Research, vol.13, no.1 (June 2001), pp.154-180.

“INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION FOR DEMOCRACY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE: MOVING TOWARD A SECOND GENERATION?”, p. 5-6, <http://www.eldis.org/fulltext/secondgeneration.pdf>, accessed 6-8-11, AFB]

#### THE QUESTION OF STRATEGY

From the outset, **the concept of ‘democracy assistance’ may appear a contradiction in terms.**

**Democratisation is first and foremost a domestic process, which spurs from the internal pressures to democratise. However, when a country has decided to democratise, the international community can assist it in number** of ways. The contentious issues remains to know how this is or should be done. The most contentious debate concerns what Carothers [1997a] refers to as ‘the question of strategy’: can development aid be used to promote political change and, if so, how?

**Aid donors use three general approaches to help promote democracy: direct support; indirect support (via, for instance, encouraging economic development); and pressure to encourage policy reform (including the threat of use of sanctions). The promotion of specific policies and policy changes within aid recipient countries can indeed take many forms, ranging from dialogue, persuasion and support to pressure. The most common and often most significant tool for promoting democracy is democracy aid. Democracy assistance can be defined narrowly as encompassing ‘aid specifically designed to foster opening in a non-democratic country or to further a democratic transition in a country that has experienced a democratic opening?’ [Carothers, 1999:6]. Most democracy aid takes the form of ‘positive measures’, which add a positive dimension (reward of good performance) to the negative one (denial of aid resources resulting from bad performance) often associated with political conditionality.** Indeed, there exists now significant assistance available to transitional countries genuinely committed to and engaged in democratisation, but which lack resources or expertise.

**Sanctions and the broad range of ‘negative measures’ are increasingly seen as ineffective** to redress violations of human rights and stagnation or reversals of democratic processes. **Traditional conditionality - setting overt political conditions for economic and development assistance - has been progressively modified to integrate a more positive approach to the promotion of democracy and the consolidation of good governance. The ‘failure of conditionality’ to attain its desired objectives and bring about sustained economic and political development has been widely recognised** [Nelson and Eglington, 1992 and 1993; Burnell, 1994; Stokke, 1995]. Gwin and Nelson [1997:10] argue that ‘aid is only effective in promoting growth in a good policy environment, and on the whole, it has not succeeded in leveraging good policies’. More recently, Burnside and Dollar [1997] have found that there is no direct relationship between aid flows and policy reform and Collier [1997:57] asserts that ‘aid has simply not brought reform’. This realisation has led to a refinement of donors’ approaches to political conditionality and the incorporation of a stronger emphasis on ‘positive measures’ of support and inducement.

**Most bilateral donors are increasingly relying on incentive strategies and what Nelson and Eglington [1993] term ‘allocative conditionality’. This strategy encompasses both the selection of aid recipients according to a predetermined set of criteria, and the concentration of aid to a limited number of recipients according to the nature of their political system. As such, it is intended to provide an incentive to further democratise.** Regime features have been increasingly used as criteria for selecting the main recipients of bilateral aid as well as the scope and amount of the aid provided. Indeed, a discernible trend in the policies of bilateral donors has been the introduction of ‘selectivity’, ‘concentration’ and phased programming in their strategies. These policies base aid allocation not only on objective criteria measuring the level of poverty (needs-based approach) but also on a subjective assessment of the country’s performance. They also indicate an increasing willingness to base co-operation on a certain number of political dimensions and the nature of recipient countries’ political regimes. International development finance institutions such as the World Bank also appear to be moving towards a more selective approach in their lending operations. The recent report of the World Bank, *Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn’t and Why* [1998], suggests that foreign aid would be more effective if it were either more systematically targeted to poor countries with sound economic reform programs or used to promote ‘good policies’.<sup>5</sup>



## **Democracy Assistance – Diverse Methods Good**

**Diverse democracy assistance approaches are good – more flexibly adapt to challenging and changing international contexts**

**Carothers, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace vice-president for studies, 9**

[Thomas, Journal of Democracy, Volume 20, Number 1, January 2009, “Democracy Assistance: Political vs. Developmental?” pp. 18-9, Project Muse, accessed 5-26-11]

A Division, Not a Rift

**The divide between the political and developmental approaches to assisting democracy is quite basic. It starts from contrasting ideas about both democracy and democratization and leads to very different configurations of assistance programs. Yet this division need not represent a rift in the world of democracy aid. There is more than enough room for both approaches. Both have a significant place in U.S. and European efforts in supporting democracy around the world. In fact, given the ever more challenging international context for democracy assistance, the need for diverse approaches is only growing. The division between the political and developmental approaches should be understood as part of a larger process of strategic diversification** that has been somewhat slow to develop in the field of democracy aid. From here, further strategic refinements should follow.

**In this vein, it would be useful, through further examination of the record of practical experience, to learn more about how these two approaches can be honed to deal more effectively with the three major challenges currently facing international democracy aid providers: 1) newly self-confident authoritarian regimes pushing back against Western democracy promotion; 2) increasingly sophisticated semi-authoritarian regimes adept at imitating the forms of democracy while undermining the substance of it; and 3) weak democracies that follow basic democratic practices but experience protracted problems in building state capacity and delivering socioeconomic progress. Although such an examination will not uncover any immutable truths that dictate the effectiveness of different types of assistance, **important patterns and tendencies will almost certainly come to light. Given that the difficulties of democracy support are only growing as democracy is buffeted by a host of rising challenges around the world, such insights are needed more urgently than ever.****