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Overview of Core Countries

We were primarily looking at countries that have gone through recent and significant changes, and were looking for articles written in 2011 which assumed those changes, and offered specific policy prescriptions for United States policies which would advance democracy.

Democracy Assistance meets or exceeds community expectations as a term of art, but the sizeable volume of material written about Arab Spring has not produced many solvency cards appropriate to such a mechanism. Perhaps we have too high of expectations for solvency evidence given the breadth of recent events, and perhaps there are solid solvency advocates that we've failed to locate. We do suspect a stronger literature base will emerge as post-transition situations stabilize, and it may be that starting with a specific plan would yield better material than a sweep for democracy assistance and related terminology and agencies. As this point, concerns expressed on ceda forums about the whether Democracy Assistance overlimits the affirmative appear well grounded.

While Democracy Assistance plays a valuable role, it may be secondary to diplomatic actions when governance is in flux:

States News Service May 9, 2011 Monday LENGTH: 967 words HEADLINE: PRESS CONFERENCE BY UNITED NATIONS DEMOCRACY FUND MAY 9, 2011 BYLINE: States News Service DATELINE: NEW YORK BODY: The following information was released by the United Nations:

Better integration between democracy assistance and diplomatic efforts was needed, correspondents were told today, at a Headquarters press conference on the issue of how the international democracy family can support activists in the field. Many **civic organizations have stated** that what they would most value from the international community was not a little bit more money or slightly more flexible funding, but **the feeling that the money granted by donors was backed up with diplomacy at a high level**, said Richard Youngs, Director General of Fundacin para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Dialogo Exterior, while outlining concerns of civil society members that his organization helped survey in 18 different countries around the world. The press conference was held by the United Nations Democracy Fund (UNDEF), and brought together Mr. Youngs; Roland Rich, Executive Head of UNDEF; Larry Diamond, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University; and Joel Barken, Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The participants were part of an initiative by UNDEF, a voluntary fund that makes grants to support democratization efforts around the world, to analyse and improve the work of democracy activists based on feedback from aid recipients, said Mr. Rich. The genesis of the initiative occurred at the 2008 meeting of the World Democracy Movement in Kyiv, Ukraine, where democracy assistance organizations met to discuss and conduct a peer review of their activities. Mr. Youngs added that **tighter linkages between project funding and diplomatic relations between donor governments and non-democratic regimes were needed, perhaps more than anything else in this area of activity today**. "The argument was put to us that **it makes no sense for donors to be offering a few million in project assistance for democracy-related issues if the concern with political reform doesn't also permeate the full panoply of foreign policy instruments articulated by donor governments, as they cut across issues of trade, energy, and development**." In response to a question about whether the approach from donors would move from being technical in nature towards more political work, Mr. Youngs said that it depended on the individual donor and its geographical area. **Some donors**, such as the United States Agency for International Development, Canadian International Development Agency and the United Kingdom Department for International Development, as well as Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands, **had begun to question the current bias towards a technical approach**, while others were more hesitant and shied away from more innovative, political projects. "Donors are really squeezed quite hard," he said. "On the one hand,

recipients are saying, 'You must get more political. Technical governance is not a panacea.' On the other hand, they're then often saying to donors, 'Stay out of the local politics. Don't make things worse'." He noted the thin line that donors needed to navigate between being perceived as too political and not political enough. **If democracy assistance was contradicted by international diplomacy, then that sent mixed messages and was disheartening for democracy activists**, agreed Mr. Diamond, discussing recent research that evaluated democratic assistance and showed a decline in freedom and civil rights around the world. However, he added, some aid recipients wanted the international community to lean hard on their countries, while some did not, and yet other individuals provided contradictory opinions when interviewed on the topic. He noted that the United Nations could enhance the legitimacy of democracy assistance globally and get involved in areas that bilateral donors often could not, including supporting civil societies, rendering electoral assistance in conflicted situations, conducting mediation during transitions at "great risk of going off the rails completely", and codifying best practices for democracy assistance. Mr. Barken argued, on the other hand, that inadequate political support from the international community did not stand out as an issue in his findings from online surveys of 1,473 aid recipients around the world. For example, only 9.7 per cent of respondents answered that the international community had not provided sufficient political support to the democratic movement in their country when asked about the principal obstacles to the realization of democratization, according to the results compiled in the World Movement for Democracy's "Perceptions of Democracy Assistance" report. "The multilateral donors are, generally speaking, far less eager to get into the political thicket," added Mr. Barken, noting that some international organizations spent millions on governance, but that it was all "supply side", focusing on areas, such as the public sector, management and civil service reform, rather than "demand side" political change. During the question and answer period, the **participants were asked whether they believed that recent world developments, such as the "Arab Spring", which occurred after their surveys were conducted, had removed the "tarnish" from democracy assistance**. Mr. Rich responded that the **Arab Spring had energized the democratic community and provided renewed confidence, while** Mr. Youngs stated that **it had muted the feeling that democracy was "Western specific"**. "Events we have seen over the last two or three months make it clear there is a constituency, that **there is a local demand for some type of assistance in what will be a very difficult transition process**," said Mr. Youngs, "And I think there I would argue **it is more important than ever to listen to what these constituencies want on the ground**."

Bahrain

“democracy assistance” (past year) 10k // 2 (scholar, 2011)

obama democracy (past year) 14m // 99 (scholar, 2011)

usaid democracy (past year) 1m // 33(scholar, 2011)

Like many countries under consideration, Bahrain does not house a USAID Democracy Assistance office. Much of the literature discusses political signaling as a crucial US role, so a narrow interpretation of Democracy Assistance might limit the affirmative considerably. Despite Obama’s direct criticism of Bahrain’s arrests of opposition leaders in his May 19 speech, the policy advocacy literature on the country remains far less developed than in other countries. If that literature remains stagnant, one might assume Bahrain would be a relatively unpopular affair, with the risks of Iranian influence, Saudi relations, and Bahrain overthrow disads everpresent. However, the scope of discontent remains high, and the possibility for significant developments creates the potential for significant development of the literature base as well. Thus, I recommend inclusion, as excluding the emerging crisis in Bahrain from topic discussion would be unseemly, given the intent of the topic paper.

Bahrain’s centrality can be measured by three related metrics – its role in housing the 5th fleet, containing Iran, and its relationship to broader change in the GCC, including Saudi Arabia. These same concerns constrain the advocacy for topical action at present.

http://csis.org/files/publication/110225_Summary_Wehrey_Diwan.pdf **CSIS** Middle East Program | Gulf **Roundtable** Summary March 8, 2011 Frederic Wehrey is a senior policy analyst at RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, CA where he focuses on Persian Gulf security, Iran, and U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. Kristin Smith Diwan is an assistant professor of comparative and regional studies at the American University’s School of International Service.

For the United States, whose Fifth Fleet is in Manama, the unrest in Bahrain poses a difficult predicament: it does not wish to anger its GCC allies by advocating fundamental political change in Bahrain, **yet it opposes the regime’s violent retaliation against the protesters**. In trying to balance these concerns, **U.S. officials have supported** Crown Prince **Salman’s national dialogue strategy** while also denouncing “foreign intervention”—perhaps, Diwan said, in reference to Saudi Arabia. Both scholars judged that the negative impact of this balancing act has so far been minimal; little resentment has materialized against the United States. Diwan noted, however, that a more intense government crackdown could reverse this trend. **Encouraging Shi’a aspirations for reform could help the United States protect its image** in Bahrain, **but the regional costs** of playing a more active role **are likely to be high. U.S. officials should not necessarily fear political liberalization in Bahrain, but it remains to be seen whether or how they help bring it about.**

However, the Obama speech puts us on a long term collision course with the Bahrain government, suggesting this affirmative could open up more in the near term:

<http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2011/05/us-bahrain.html> U.S. Official Responds to 'Double Standard' Charges on Bahrain By: Margaret **Warner** **May 20**, 2011 at 5:30 PM EDT

After last night's speech, Sheikh Ali Salman, leader of the largest opposition party Al Wefaq, told me he was "delighted" to hear the criticism of the detentions of opposition leaders and the destruction of Shia mosques. But Salman remained wary. "I am pleased with the whole speech, and now looking for the speech to be carried out in practice," he said, adding "there shouldn't be a different standard" for how the U.S. responds to uprisings in different countries. Tellingly, the Bahraini government reacted even

more warily. After a post-midnight meeting, the cabinet issued a statement through state media saying it "welcomed the principles contained in the speech," and "highlighted that the Kingdom of Bahrain continued towards more reform in all fields and had responded to the false accusations and wrong information on all occasions. All procedures had always been and will continue within the constitutional and legal framework and in accordance with international standards with regards to the securing and preservation of human rights." Late Friday, a reform-minded Bahraini government official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said President **Obama's speech was a "lesson" for the regime**: "What they're telling us privately, they're now ready to say publicly," he said. **"U.S. friendship does not mean they will stay silent forever." If the round-ups and military trials continue after the state of emergency lifts June 1, Bahrain's democracy activists will be waiting to see how strongly the president and his team are committed to driving that "lesson" home.**

One possible direction the US could push is for Shia governmental involvement, perhaps at the highest levels

http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/95-1013_20110321.pdf Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy
Kenneth **Katzman** Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs **March 21**, 2011

The Obama Administration and **many experts believe that compromise is still likely**, even in light of the GCC intervention. Ideas for a compromise include a change of the constitution **to allow for direct selection of the prime minister by an empowered COR**. Some believe that, short of an alteration of the constitution, **another potential compromise could involve Wefaq leader Shaykh Ali Salman becoming prime minister**, although hardline Al Khalifa members are almost certain to oppose the ousting of Prime Minister Khalifa Al Khalifa. **Another possibility could include the broad reshuffling of the cabinet to give Shiites many more ministerial posts and control of key economic ministries**. Other potential amendments to the constitution could include expanding the elected COR, enhancing its powers relative to the upper house, or abolishing the upper house. Other reforms could include redistricting that would permit Shiites to win a COR majority.

Such present actions might be augmented if use of force becomes immanent.

<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=3309> PolicyWatch #1759 Saudi Arabia's Fears for Bahrain
Simon Henderson is the Baker fellow and director of the Gulf and Energy Policy Program at The Washington Institute. February 17, 2011

Policy Recommendations Bahraini activists have called for more large-scale protests, while the regime has banned all such demonstrations and deployed (U.S.-made) tanks and armored vehicles to crucial intersections and government buildings. Accordingly, **Washington should press King Hamad to ensure that there is no draconian use of force** similar to yesterday's actions in Pearl Square. In addition, Washington should **encourage reform measures, which could offer hope to Bahrainis tired of the paternalistic government that is so at odds with the open and progressive image Manama projects internationally. This includes taking action against corruption**, which has become rampant. At least **one departing U.S. ambassador told the late Sheikh Isa, King Hamad's father, that he should dismiss the country's prime minister, Sheikh Khalifa** (Hamad's uncle). Khalifa's name is synonymous with corruption, and he has held the same title for forty years, making him the world's longest-serving prime minister. Progress or lack thereof in Bahrain could set the trend for the entire Gulf region. And in neighboring Saudi Arabia, the consequences of political instability would be even greater because of the kingdom's growing leadership vacuum. Washington should therefore press Riyadh to help de-escalate the tension in Manama. This is likely to run counter to the instinctive Saudi view on dealing with instability in Bahrain. In the end, the most serious confrontation Washington faces in seeking a peaceful outcome to the Bahraini domestic showdown may not be with its friends in Manama, but with its friends in Riyadh.

A limiting view of democracy assistance that excludes cooperation with the regime would limit Bahrain cases, given evidence such as this:

Bahrain's Kleptocracy in the Crosshairs By Simon Henderson Simon Henderson is the Baker fellow and director of the Gulf and Energy Policy Program at The Washington Institute. Wall Street Journal, March 17, 2011

One assumes that when Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East Jeffrey Feltman caught the first plane to Manama this week after Saudi forces rolled across the causeway, democracy was his main talking point. From the Bahraini side, it was almost certainly Iran. The al-Khalifa, who remember the pre-1970s when Tehran claimed the island, tend to see a bearded mullah under every bed. This week's violence -- especially yesterday's crackdown on protesters camped out in the iconic Pearl Roundabout, in which at least six were killed -- does not auger well for a return to civil political dialogue. Although the U.S.-educated crown prince had offered concessions, like fair voting districts and combating corruption, on March 13, just before Saudi troops arrived, his harder-line kin almost certainly advocate taking them off the table. Indeed, they probably demand the removal of the table itself. **The U.S. has cards to play but is keen to do so discreetly. It needs to press the ruling family for reform while telling the divided opposition not to reject all compromise. Washington is anxious not to be perceived, by either side, as being part of the problem. The headquarters of the U.S. Fifth Fleet, situated adjacent to a suburb of Manama, is a crucial part of the efforts to block Iran's nuclear ambitions and counter any interference with the flow of oil.** Almost worse than the mess in Manama, this crisis reveals that the U.S. and Saudi Arabia are no longer on the same page. Riyadh perceives the White House as demanding universal freedoms from its friends, but not from its adversaries like Iran. The Shiites of Bahrain see themselves as "Baharna," indigenous Bahrainis, rather than putative Iranians. But events are pushing them ever closer to Tehran, where they will surely be greeted with open arms.

Finally, given the role of the Saudis and the rest of the GCC in supporting Bahrain, a broad definition of democracy assistance might include diplomatic pushback on external actors who are preventing democracy:

<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC06.php?CID=1617> Washington and the UAE Discuss Iran By Simon Henderson Policy Alert, April 25, 2011 Simon Henderson is the Baker fellow and director of the Gulf and Energy Policy Program at The Washington Institute.

Differences over Bahrain led to the delay in the UAE providing twelve F-16 fighters to the international forces patrolling the Libya no-fly zone. Along with Qatar, which has provided four fighters, these units provide the NATO-led operation in Libya with important international and Arab political cover. Last week, Sheikh Muhammad flew to Riyadh for a meeting with King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, who is thought to share UAE views on the Iranian threat. Both countries were disappointed at the speed with which the White House dropped support for former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak and are concerned about the reliability of their alliances with the United States. Sheikh Muhammad's visit is an opportunity for the White House to clarify its views on Iran, which the Gulf Arab countries do not see as being subject to the standards of universal political freedoms otherwise espoused by Washington. **The Obama administration should also tell Abu Dhabi that its military support for Bahrain's government makes Iranian mischief an almost self-fulfilling prophecy. The administration should also demand that the UAE release political activists who have recently been detained for demanding greater freedom.**

Egypt

“democracy assistance” (past year) 23k // 28

obama democracy (past year) 51m // 578

usaid democracy (past year) 338k // 159

Egypt is probably the single largest case area for this topic, and should clearly be included. Among the mechanisms discussed the literature: the pace and credibility of forthcoming presidential elections, offering Dem Asst to NGO's that were not recognized as legit under the Mubarak regime, expanding contacts within the Muslim Brotherhood, providing support for transparency during interim governance, and perhaps measures that might be broader economic measures, such as a FTA or providing advances on frozen assets. There is little doubt that the literature base on managing the post-Mubarak transition will continue to expand.

Here's some cards on the core concepts:

Pace of transition

<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pubPDFs/PolicyFocus110.pdf> Egypt's Enduring Challenges Shaping the Post-Mubarak Environment David **Schenker** Aufzien fellow and **director** of the Program on **Arab Politics** at **Washington Institute** for Near East Policy Policy Focus #110 | April 2011

■ Support liberal democracy. The **Obama** administration **should make clear that the United States seeks to promote democracy and liberal democrats**. Indeed, the gains of the revolution will only be consolidated if those committed to lasting democracy win. There is little doubt that Washington will be branded hypocritical for expressing a preferred flavor of opposition, but the message is coherent: Egyptians will be ill served by a new government with autocratic tendencies, be it the Islamists or the military. **Although support for the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt is significant, the organization hardly qualifies** as a proponent of liberal secular democracy. First, there is the MB view of minorities, which does not promote the notion of Egypt as a state of all its citizens. To wit, historically, not only did the organization advocate the imposition of a jizya tax on Christian and Jewish residents of Egypt, the MB Supreme Guide argued that the top officials in the army “should be Muslims since we are a Muslim country.”¹⁷⁷ More recently, a senior MB official stated that the organization's platform did not accept Copts—or women—serving as president.¹⁷⁸ The MB's own March 2004 reform initiative document provides perhaps the best representation of the group's view of a “civil state.” This paper lays out the organization's proposed policies on a broad range of issues, including women, education, culture, and politics. ¹⁷⁹ Among other things, the MB proposes reinstating the Islamic system of hisba, which entrusts the state with ensuring the observance of sharia (Islamic law). Consistent with this framework, the MB reform document also bans the practice of ribh (or usury), advocates censorship of the cinema and theater “in accordance with the principles and values of Islam,” and stipulates that women should only hold positions that “preserve [their] chastity and dignity.” Most problematic for democratic societies, perhaps, the MB suggests that, if in power, it would censor media content to ensure its consistency with “the provisions of Islam.” Taken as a whole, the 2004 MB document lays out a vision more consistent with an Islamic state than a vital democratic society. Since 2004, the policies advocated by the MB have changed little. In its 2007 platform published in the Egyptian daily al-Masry al-Youm, the organization stated that “the principles of Islamic Sharia law....represent the governing policy in determining the priorities of goals, policies, and strategies [of the government].”¹⁸⁰ The MB has not yet had a chance to implement this vision. But with Mubarak gone and the domestic security apparatus seemingly adrift, Egypt's Islamists are experiencing a renaissance. Yusuf al-Qaradawi—perhaps the most popular Muslim preacher in the region and a detractor of the Camp David treaty—returned briefly from his longtime exile to Egypt, and will surely gain a following during subsequent trips. More ominously,

according to al-Masry al-Youm, al-Gamaa al-Islamiyah (Egyptian Islamic Group)—responsible for dozens of terrorist attacks in Egypt in the 1990s—met publicly on February 14 for the first time in decades.¹⁸¹ The Gamaa may even attempt to establish a political party. The hysteria surrounding the potential that Islamists could immediately “take power” in Egypt is unwarranted. **But the MB’s impressive infrastructure, provision of services, funding networks, and longstanding informal associations give it a clear leg up in a state previously ruled by a single party.** Recognizing Washington’s limited influence in determining the rules of this transition, the **Obama** administration **can help level the political playing field**, for example, by **advocating a longer period of transition**. Such an extension would allow more time for new, liberal political parties to be established. Opposition leader Mohamed ElBaradei has articulated support for an extended transitional phase, and so should the United States.¹⁸² Of course, absent Egyptian consensus behind an extension of the transition period, U.S. support for continued martial law in Egypt would come across as problematic. Still, **a longer transition period would seem to favor the prospects of the liberals.**

Broadening the scope of NGO’s receiving assistance

<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pubPDFs/PolicyFocus110.pdf> Egypt’s Enduring Challenges Shaping the Post-Mubarak Environment David **Schenker** Aufzien fellow and **director** of the Program on **Arab Politics** at **Washington Institute** for Near East Policy Policy Focus #110 | April 2011

■ Reallocate financing for civil society. After the Papyrus Revolution, it might be tempting for a cashstrapped Washington to declare victory and reallocate or remove funds for democracy- and governance-related activities. Given Egypt’s 7,000-year history of authoritarian government, however, guarding against the retrenchment of authoritarianism in the state will be particularly important. The U.S. trend in recent years has been to reduce funding for democracy- and governance-related activities in Egypt. In 2008—at the end of the Bush administration— democracy and governance accounted for nearly \$55 million; in 2009 only \$20 million was provided for these activities. At the same time, funding for the grants administration program was reduced dramatically from \$32 million in 2008 to \$7 million in 2010.¹⁷¹ More problematic still, **in 2009 the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) obliged Cairo’s demand that only NGOs registered with the Egyptian Ministry of Social Solidarity— i.e., non-opposition-affiliated NGOs—be eligible for grants.**¹⁷² While in 2009 the State Department’s Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) also administered civil society grants in Egypt worth \$1.3 million, it is unclear whether these under-the-radar projects met even the low level of achievement of their higher-profile predecessors. ¹⁷³ **This present period of transition presents an opportunity for Washington to shift funding aggressively away from former regime/government NGOs (GONGOs) to local organizations not hand-selected by the former regime.** In addition to funding civil society organizations dedicated to promoting democratic development, Washington should focus on supporting other noncontroversial endeavors such as fighting corruption, a scourge estimated to have cost Egypt nearly \$58 billion between 2000 and 2008.¹⁷⁴ Other productive avenues for U.S. support include organizations concentrating on poverty alleviation and vocational education. It will also be increasingly important for Washington to support youth organizations in an effort to channel in a positive direction what almost certainly will be continued frustrations with the new government. Some NGOs in post-Mubarak Egypt might be hesitant to accept U.S. funding. More than likely, however, the freer environment will result in a proliferation of organizations looking to partner with Western donors. Despite the obvious popular appeal of some of the causes just outlined, it may be difficult, given the military’s sensitivities, to marshal and deliver support for these emerging NGOs. In particular, as the military seeks to reestablish law and order and shepherd a return to economic normalcy in the state, it will likely remain preoccupied with possible Islamist inroads. The last thing the military wants is for Iran—or Saudi Arabia—to start funding Egyptian Islamist NGOs. As a result, the NGO funding climate

may remain somewhat constrained. Nevertheless, **if Egypt is to move in the right direction, timely U.S. support for civil society will be pivotal. U.S. assistance to NGOs committed to reform can help prepare the Egyptian people, who have lived for more than a half century under military rule, for a transition to a democratic system.**

Providing mechanisms for citizen transitional input, including polling

<http://hir.harvard.edu/on-egypt-what-should-america-do-now?page=0,0> On Egypt: What Should America Do Now? by Steven Kull director of the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of Maryland, and WorldPublicOpinion.org, an international research project involving public opinion research centers in 25 nations around the world . A political psychologist, he conducts focus groups as well as polls around the world, specializing in Muslim countries. **March 9, 2011**

Promoting the development of political parties in a truly even-handed fashion would be a better approach. But it may be awkward for the United States to provide assistance to Islamist parties.

Furthermore, **the development of political parties should not be seen as the highest priority. If the political discourse shapes itself into a battle between secular liberal parties on one hand and Islamist parties on the other, the Islamist forces are more likely to gain the upper hand.** They are better

organized and they have stronger claims to legitimacy. Liberal ideas are strong, but identification with Islam is stronger. But most important, most Egyptians do not want to be forced to choose between liberal and Islamist ideas. Most want to find a way to integrate them, preserving a sense of connection to their cultural roots, while also incorporating liberal ideas. But finding a way to do this requires a process of collective deliberation, something ill-afforded in the repressive political environment that Egyptians have lived in for decades now. Nevertheless, such a process may well lead to the emergence of ideas and ultimately political parties that bridge the gap within Egyptian society. **What then can the United States do? Clearly America has little to offer conceptually in helping Egyptians sort through their questions about the role of Islam in Egyptian governance.** There is **something America can provide that can help facilitate this process and reduce the likelihood that one or another faction will gain ascendance.** This **is to provide the resources to promote the development of a voice of the majority public.**

A critical aspect of democratic society is for people to gain some sense of the public as a whole. Equally important, because the majority of Egyptians have both liberal and Islamist views, **helping to give voice to the majority will help build a political center, consolidate a common ground in Egyptian society and reduce the probability that either Islamist or secular parties will become dominant.** So how can this be done? For starters, **Egyptians should have greater capacity to conduct public opinion polls on public policy issues.** While there are some nascent polling capacities in Egypt, these have been constrained by government censorship and limited expertise. **The United States can help provide resources to strengthen these capacities in universities, media outlets, and NGOs. It would also be quite useful to provide resources to improve polling capacities within the government**—on the condition that findings are made public. This would give officials in the legislative and executive branches the capacity to consult the people. Interestingly, such an agency already exists within the Egyptian Cabinet, though its functions have been limited. Egyptians were asked in a WPO poll whether the government should have such a polling capacity or if it should not be involved in this kind of thing, and three in four said that it should. Journalists—both reporters and columnists—should also be given more training in understanding and reporting on polls. Not all of the questions and issues Egyptians face are ones that can be dealt with in the context of standard polls. Many require providing respondents with more information than they already have, as well as the chance to deliberate, as individuals or in group discussions. Broad questions about the structure of governance in Egypt or the role of Islam in government would certainly be examples requiring such greater deliberation, but there would surely be others. Such methods have been developed in a number of countries under the rubric

of public consultation. Like standard polls, these involve surveying representative samples. However, in this case respondents are presented key information and are also asked to evaluate a wide range of arguments on a topic, before coming to conclusions. In some cases such consultations can be conducted on-line, but in other cases it is necessary for people to gather in citizen assemblies to be briefed and to discuss these issues with others, sometimes even over a period of several days. Here too, **the idea of such assemblies was presented to Egyptians, and they favored the idea by a two to one margin --and by a similar margin said they would have more confidence in the conclusions of such an assembly than they would in the decisions of the Parliament. Finally there is the possibility of establishing a standing citizen advisory panel or a 'citizen shura' that could become an ongoing voice of the people. A representative sample of Egyptians would be scientifically selected and invited to be a member for a limited period.** Members would be provided internet access if they lacked it. They would regularly receive briefings on the issues that the government faces and be asked for their views, which would be aggregated and presented to the government and reported in the press. For some issues they could also meet in clusters around the country to be briefed on issues and the range of arguments, and to discuss with others. Such processes would address a wide range of issues and help stimulate the civic discourse that the Egyptian people need to come out of the mind-numbing repression they have lived under for decades. Fully engaging the range of views within, as well as among, the Egyptian people, would likely facilitate the integration of liberal and Islamist views in Egyptian society and reduce the likelihood that Islamists would gain the upper hand and suppress freedom. Naturally all of these processes would need to have the oversight of a wide range of trusted Egyptian leaders and social scientists. **Even if support comes from the United States, Egyptians would need to have confidence that the US government is not manipulating the process and is truly giving voice to the Egyptian people.** Egyptians, like many Muslims, are drawn to the values that America symbolizes, even as they complain that the US government does not live up to those values. Were the United States to support such processes, it would very likely help counter the widely held view that the United States is not serious about furthering democracy in Egypt. The bitter feelings of betrayal in American support for a regime that oppressed them will not evaporate immediately. To heal this wound, there really is no better path than to show genuine respect for, and seek to help empower, the will of the Egyptian people.

Expanding MB contacts

<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pubPDFs/PolicyFocus110.pdf> Egypt's Enduring Challenges Shaping the Post-Mubarak Environment David **Schenker** Aufzien fellow and **director** of the Program on **Arab Politics** at **Washington Institute** for Near East Policy Policy Focus #110 | April 2011

Ongoing Concerns with Islamists Now that Mubarak is gone, the administration is clearly rooting for a new Egyptian government led by liberals. An ultimate victory by the Islamists, however, would present severe complications for Washington's Middle East policy. The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) constitutes the most potent and coherent opposition group in Egypt, and has long boasted that it implements democratic practices in its internal matters. Brotherhood leaders, in fact, point to the 2009 decision by Supreme Guide Muhammad Mahdi Akef to step down—instead of remaining for a second term—as proof of the organization's respect for democratic traditions, in sharp contrast to NDP practices. Notably, these claims were refuted post-revolution by the MB's youth contingent, who publicly criticized opaque decisionmaking within the organization. For Washington, though, the idea of yet another Islamist party assuming power in the region—particularly one that is on record as supporting the “resistance” in Palestine, rejecting a negotiated settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,¹⁵¹ and advocating the destruction of the Jewish state¹⁵²—obviously holds little appeal. **Recognizing the significance of the MB, the Obama administration, like its predecessors, has maintained midlevel**

contacts with the group through the U.S. embassy in Cairo, contacts largely confined to Islamist members of the now defunct parliament. As such, Washington invited eleven members of the MB parliamentary bloc to attend President Obama's Cairo speech. The Islamists were not invited to participate in the private meeting with the president, though. According to then Islamic bloc leader Muhammad al-Katatny, this compromise solution indicated that the United States could not avoid the Islamists when meeting with the "influential opposition" in Egypt.¹⁵³ **Back in Washington, the debate continues about the official U.S. policy toward the Egyptian MB** While the group rejects violence—and has an antagonistic relationship with al-Qaeda—the concern is that the MB is employing liberal means (i.e., the ballot box) to achieve illiberal ends (i.e., the establishment of an Islamic state). While the proscription on religiously based political parties remains enshrined in the Egyptian constitution, **the MB has declared its intent to establish the Freedom and Justice Party**, enabling the Islamists for the first time to not stand as "independents" in parliamentary and presidential elections.¹⁵⁴ **And they will likely perform well, making it increasingly urgent that the administration develop a clear policy on U.S. contacts with this Islamist organization— and its more moderate cousin, the Wasat Party.**

Expanded transparency

<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pubPDFs/PolicyFocus110.pdf> Egypt's Enduring Challenges Shaping the Post-Mubarak Environment David **Schenker** Aufzien fellow and **director** of the Program on **Arab Politics** at **Washington Institute** for Near East Policy Policy Focus #110 | April 2011

Nevertheless, Washington can help stabilize the new regime while simultaneously encouraging positive change for the Egyptian people. As Egypt approaches this crossroads, **Washington must take steps to nudge Egypt toward a better future in tandem with its U.S. partner**. Among other things, an effective U.S. policy for this transition period in Egypt would: ■ Encourage a transparent transition. In the coming months, **Egypt will begin to dismantle the NDP's political monopoly**. This process will require extensive **constitutional and legal changes** that **will almost certainly be opposed by former regime remnants and perhaps even the military**. If these important changes are to be effected, then, **it will be important for the process to be transparent**. The Obama administration has already weighed in publicly on the importance of transparency in Egypt's political transition. In a December 2010 Washington Post op-ed, Michael Posner, assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights, and labor, argued that credible presidential elections—then slated for September 2011—would "bolster citizens' confidence" in their government.¹⁶⁷ More recently, in February 2011, Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg said that the administration was working to ensure that political transitions were "deliberate, inclusive, and transparent."¹⁶⁸ Although widely respected, the Higher Military Commission, which is managing the political transition from the Mubarak era, has not thus far proved a particularly transparent body. For example, weeks after the military takeover, names of all the officers and civilians sitting on the commission had still not been published. Moreover, Egyptian civilians did not themselves determine who would be involved in the tending process of redrafting articles of the constitution. Worse, Field Marshal Muhammad Hussein Tantawi, who leads the military and oversees the transition, is not considered to be a supporter of economic or political reform.¹⁶⁹ While the Egyptian army remains the most respected institution in the state, there are indications that the top brass may be resistant to a shift to civilian control over the military. In fact, the military has a lot to lose in this period of transition, and may try to preserve its privileged position in society by presiding over only modest changes to the political system. The skeptical opposition is watching closely, hoping to keep the military honest. To sustain the pressure and its sole point of leverage, the opposition—as of late February—had not yet demobilized. In March and April, however, state security forcibly removed persistent demonstrators from Tahrir Square. During a large demonstration on April 1, held under the banner "Friday to Save the Revolution," growing frustration with the military was palpable. As with the revolution, Egyptians will be

responsible for doing the heavy lifting to ensure the transition goes in a democratic direction. But Washington can play a role in making the process transparent. **One way to engage in this effort would be to provide funding to the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute, as well as to the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, to work with Egyptian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) during the complex period ahead.** These U.S. entities have experience in providing much-needed technical expertise and can share critical lessons learned from similar transitions for which achieving maximum public buy-in was a priority. Given Egyptians' long experience with authoritarian government and dirty tricks, **any experience that Washington can provide could go a long way toward building confidence among Egyptians** that a credible process of reform is under way. On February 17, Secretary of State Hillary **Clinton announced** that \$150 million in foreign assistance **funding had been "reprogramm[ed]**...to put ourselves in a position to support our transition [in Egypt] and assist with their economic recovery."¹⁷⁰ While **this assistance** offers a good start, it **falls woefully short in both economic and humanitarian terms** for a country of 83 million people.

Jordan

“democracy assistance” (past year) 10k // 5

obama democracy (past year) 12m // 402

usaid democracy (past year) 128k // 101

The place of the country of Jordan in the context of the “Arab Spring” seems less clear. While the country shares similarities with those that have played a significant role, protests and calls for democracy have not surfaced within Jordan in nearly as dramatic of a way.

Perhaps this is because Jordan could be said to have been more “free” from the beginning. The country held parliamentary elections on November 9, 2010 that have been widely hailed as “free” and transparent (with the assistance of international monitors).

That said, protests of conditions in Jordan have been much smaller scale, and some would argue, focused on global economic concerns rather than political concerns.

<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=3298> David **Schenker** is the Aufzien fellow and director of the Program on Arab Politics at The Washington Institute. And David **Pollock** is a senior fellow at the Institute, specializing in Middle Eastern and broader Muslim public opinion, media analysis, and related issues. PolicyWatch #1748 Jordan: Heightened Instability, But Not Yet a Major Crisis

February 1, 2011

Like other states in the region, Jordan has been hit hard by the global financial crisis in recent years. The current situation is the tail end of an economic downturn that began with the fall of Saddam Hussein and the end of highly discounted oil sales from Baghdad to Amman. According to the International Monetary Fund, the kingdom's gross domestic product growth slowed from nearly 8 percent in 2008 to 2.3 percent in 2009. That year, Jordan ran a deficit of nearly \$2 billion. Facing growing budgetary pressures, the state has taken steps to reduce subsidies on food and fuel staples, passing off sometimes-dramatic price increases to the public. Three years ago, for example, the price of gasoline increased up to 33 percent. At the same time, like Egyptians and Tunisians, Jordanians have been subject to price increases in commodities, effectively lowering their standard of living, especially among the most vulnerable. To a great extent, the kingdom has attempted to ameliorate the situation by granting pay increases to government employees and cancelling taxes, but these measures apparently proved insufficient. Developments in Tunisia and Egypt appear to have encouraged the protesters in Jordan. Unlike those countries, however, the demonstrations in Jordan have focused on primarily economic rather than political demands.

The protests in Jordan are less likely to call into question the legitimacy of their political system.

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As in Egypt and Tunisia, Jordan's protests are apparently not being driven by Islamists. Indeed, according to reports from individuals who have attended the demonstrations, the majority of the protesters are actually East Bankers rather than Palestinians. More recently, though, Jordan's Islamists have been looking to capitalize on the demonstrations. So far, none of the protesters have explicitly targeted the monarchy, and Islamic Action Front secretary-general Hamza Mansur even announced earlier this week that the Islamists "recognize and acknowledge the legitimacy of the Hashemites." Yet other Islamist leaders have been more circumspect in their support. Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood chief Hamam Said, for example, recently opined that unrest in Egypt would spread across the region, "toppling repressive leaders and regimes allied with the United States." New prime minister Bakhit -- who held the post previously, in addition to serving as head of military intelligence and ambassador to Israel and Turkey -- hails from the prominent Abbadi tribe in central Jordan and is a palace loyalist with little record of promoting political reform or democratic change. His reputation for "cleanliness" will help silence

accusations of corruption at high levels, but if history is any guide, the main message of his appointment is to remind Jordanians of the vital role the largely Transjordanian army still plays in domestic politics. This message is aimed at both the country's large and potentially restive Palestinian population (the regime's traditional bugbear) as well as malcontented Transjordanian tribal elements.

A potential reason for this is that structurally Jordan is populated by many who are extremely loyal to the current system of government. While some might desire a few reforms, a more developed call for democracy might never occur.

Ray Hanania 5-26-11<http://www.creators.com/opinion/ray-hanania/why-haven-t-pro-democracy-protests-exploded-on-the-streets-of-jordan.html> Why Haven't Pro-democracy Protests Exploded on the Streets of Jordan?

As citizens across the Arab world have risen in protest against years of dictatorship in Libya, Egypt, Tunisia and Syria, one might ask why the same has not happened in Jordan. In all of the countries, the protests seem to share one major characteristic. The governments reflect a segment of the population's religious or tribal minorities, while the protesting populations have been left out of the power. Libya's troubles are more tribal, Syria's are more tribal and religious, and Egypt's troubles are more of a combination of religious and secular power rivalries. In Libya, dictator Col. Moammar Gadhafi comes from one of the country's 140 tribes, which carries his name. The war in Libya is a civil war fueled in a large part by the interference of Western powers including NATO and the United States. The NATO-American alliance was not hesitant to arm and protect the protestors in Libya, while the same Western powers sat back and watched with apprehension as Egypt's dictator Hosni Mubarak was slowly pushed from power. Egypt's future remains uncertain. It is a nation made up of several power bases, the largest include the secular Muslims, the Orthodox Coptic Christians and the religious Muslims under the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood was not behind the protests there and neither were the Coptic Christians. But once Mubarak was removed from office and a military junta took control, the divisions were quickly highlighted by friction. Today, the Coptic Christians are under siege and their future in Egypt remains uncertain. In Syria, the ruling regime is controlled by the Alawis or Alawites, a more mystical minority branch of Islam that is closer to the Shiites than to the Sunnis. Sunni Muslims are the more dominant in the Arab world. The Shiite Muslims in the region are predominantly Persian and are closer to Iran. The majority of the Syrian population is Sunni, although there is a substantial Christian community there. There is a large statue of St. Paul in the entrance to Damascus, for example. But the religious sects are more tribal in Syria, making Bashar al-Assad and his Alawite minority that controls the government an easier target of public anger. Bashar's father, Hafez al-Assad, took control of Syria in a coup in 1970, following rising protests from the Alawite community against the Sunni Muslim and Christian governments. Jordan is unlike any of the others. The Jordanian people are mainly Bedouin Arabs. Jordan was created from the Fertile Crescent lands occupied by the Allies after World War I — Syria and Palestine. Palestine was divided into two areas, Trans-Jordan to the east of the Jordan River and Palestine to the west. It was based on the British decision to limit Jewish settlement to Palestine. The 1948 war in Palestine pushed more than 750,000 Palestinian refugees into Lebanon, Syria, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Gaza came under Egyptian control, and the West Bank came under Jordanian control. The 1967 war pushed more Palestinians, including 1948 refugees, into Jordan. Today, Jordan has about 2 million Palestinians. Most of the Palestinians have become Jordanian "citizens," with only 167,000 remaining in refugee camps. That explains Jordan's dilemma. The relationship between the Jordanian Arabs and the Palestinian Arabs has always been tenuous. While the rest of the Arab world opposed the partition of Palestine, Jordan's King Abdullah I favored it. In fact, King Abdullah had grand visions for a Greater Arabia to include Iraq, Palestine and Syria, where his brother Faisal had once served as king but was ousted by the French. Faisal later became king of Iraq. King Abdullah I was assassinated by a Palestinian when he visited the al-Aqsa Mosque in East Jerusalem in 1951. The Jordanian-Palestinian populations live in a forced political detente in Jordan. Jordanian Arabs are deathly loyal to the monarchy. The vast majority will not rebel against King Abdullah II, fearing that the country will come under Palestinian control. Jordan's monarchs have also been more Western and have allowed a greater sense of democracy to exist, even though the government is controlled by the king himself and ruled by a parliament subject to the king's whims. There have been some protests, but they are inhibited by this population balance. And Jordan's King has the strongest Western backing of any Arab regime. Democracy will never become a significant part of Jordan's population — at least not before a Palestine state is created and most Palestinians in Jordan have the choice to live there. That's why there are no pro-democracy protests in Jordan.

The implication of this discussion is that it seems that clear solvency literature for the country of Jordan seems more elusive than many of the "core countries". While the position and government of

Jordan will continue to be important to the United States given the alliance between the two countries, it is less clear what the United States should or must do to ensure the progression of democracy within Jordan.

Some literature argues that democratic revolution in the “core countries” is basically inevitable. There are those that believe that protests in Jordan will increase over time, and that the government will have to respond to their demands in a more positive way or face continued decline. It seems like then clearer literature might develop arguing for an increase in democracy related assistance to Jordan. Support for the direction of these protests can be seen in articles such as....

(**Dp-News – Arabnews**) 5-31-11 Jordan opposition calls for government’s resignation
<http://www.dp-news.com/en/detail.aspx?articleid=85647>

Jordan’s main opposition party, the Islamic Action Front (IAF), and the country’s strongest pro-democracy coalition on Monday urged the resignation of Prime Minister Marouf Bakhit’s government for its failure to adopt the needed reforms. “The way out of the deep crisis we experience lies in the formation of a national reform government, to be led by a national personality which believes in reforms and adopts a program with clear objectives, including the adoption of real, political and constitutional reforms,” the IAF said in a statement. The IAF, the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, considered last week’s resignation of two Cabinet ministers indicative of Bakhit’s failure to fight corruption and “the unprecedented political, economic and social crisis Jordan is grappling with.” Bakhit said that the Justice Minister Hussein Megalli and Health Minister Yassin Hosban resigned on Thursday to concede responsibility for the “mistakes” committed in their ministries that enabled the convicted businessman Khalid Shahin to flee from the country on Feb. 25. In his resignation letter to the prime minister, Megalli said that he had decided to resign because he found the “path of reforms deadlocked.” Local media on Monday expected more cabinet ministers to quit in connection with Shahin’s affair that dominated the thinking of the Jordanian public opinion over the past three months. Shahin was serving a three-year jail term after the State Security Court found him guilty of bribery in his bid to obtain a 1.2-billion-dollar contract for the expansion of the country’s sole refinery. The call for Bakhit’s resignation also came on Monday from the March 24 Youth group, which has set July 14 a date for a marathon rally to protest the failure to adopt the required political and constitutional reforms in the country, including an independent judiciary. “We hereby promise our people that we will not back down in our struggle to accomplish radical reforms and disclose all corruption files and ensure punishment of those involved,” the gathering said in a strongly-worded statement.

This evidence cites the need for judicial and constitutional reforms, which the United States may be able to assist with, but obviously does not go as far as to be solvency evidence for those reforms via assistance from the USFG.

A recent article by Larry Diamond also speaks to how the situation in Jordan may develop over the course of the debate season/near future

A Fourth Wave or False Start? **Larry Diamond May 22 2011**

<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67862/larry-diamond/a-fourth-wave-or-false-start?page=show>

Of course, not every country in the region has been affected by the apparent freeze and some could still avoid it. Jordan and Morocco are not yet in crisis but could be soon. Both countries face the same conditions that brought down seemingly secure autocracies in Tunisia and Egypt -- mounting frustration with corruption, joblessness, social injustice, and closed political systems. Not yet facing mass protests, Jordan’s King Abdullah is in a position to lead a measured process of democratic reform from above to revise electoral laws, rein in corruption, and grant considerably more freedom. Yet there is little sign that he has the vision or political self-confidence to modernize his country in this way. Morocco’s King Mohammed VI is still domestically revered and internationally cited as a reformer, but he is even weaker and more feckless than Abdullah. He has been unwilling to rein in the deeply venal interests that surround the monarchy, or ease the country’s extraordinary concentration of wealth and business ownership. Instead, his security forces, narrow circle of royal friends, and oligopolistic business cronies fend off demands for accountability and reform, further isolate the king, and aggravate the political storm that is

gathering beneath a comparatively calm surface. For now, both monarchies are treading familiar water: launching committees to study political reform but never moving toward real political change. This game cannot last forever. As a former Jordanian official recently commented to me privately: "Everyone is expecting serious changes to the way the king rules the country, and if these changes don't happen, the system will be in trouble. The king can't keep talking about reform without implementing it."

Obama has recently stated that:

"The United States is committed to our long-standing partnership with Jordan – a regional leader on political and economic reform. We recognize the government's efforts to respond to the legitimate demands of citizens through the National Dialogue Committee, and urge Jordan's leadership to seize this opportunity to advance meaningful reforms. U.S economic assistance supports Jordan's economic growth and development and promotes political, economic, and social reforms through programs in judicial reform, education, public health, job creation, and youth empowerment. We are also working with non-governmental partners in Jordan to cultivate a vibrant civil society. The United States also remains committed to Jordan's security and continues to provide security assistance aimed at, among other things, modernizing the Jordanian military and enhancing border security."

(*“A Moment of Opportunity” in Middle East and North Africa 19 May 2011 THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary FACT SHEET Read more:

<http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2011/05/20110519133748su0.4037396.html#ixzz1OR64MYTQ>)

This shows the scope of our current relationship and assistance to Jordan, and perhaps gives some areas that could be developed in terms of solvency literature if the calls for democratic reform or protests in Jordan become more of a crisis.

Bottom line: The advantage areas and ability of Jordan to serve as a dynamic model for democracy in the Middle East seem clear. There are areas in which the United States could serve as a guide in the process, particularly as it relates to economic development and constitutional reform, but the significance of Jordan to the “Arab Spring” revolutions has yet to produce substantial solvency literature for the increase role of the United States in the process. There is a chance this will develop throughout the year.

Libya

“democracy assistance” (past year) 10k // 14

obama democracy (past year) 47m // 397

usaid democracy (past year) 227k // 58

Libya is definitely mid-transition, and when and whether Qaddafi is removed impacts the realm of policy proposals. It may be that the concerns about whether the question is timely explain the dearth of Democracy Assistance literature here.

http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2011C09_lac_ks.pdf Libya after Qaddafi State Formation or State Collapse? Wolfram **Lacher** Researcher at SI/V/P's Middle East and Africa Division SX/VP Comments **9 March** 2011

Under pressure from a rebellion, an international intervention, and comprehensive sanctions, Muammar **al-Qaddafi's regime is on the verge of collapse**. As of late March 2011, regime forces are focussed on retaining control of north-western Libya, raising the prospect of protracted civil war and partition. Qaddafi's demise is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for Libya's renewed stabilisation. **The post-Qaddafi state will essentially have to be built from scratch. However, political players will likely be more focussed on the redistribution of wealth than on building state institutions**. Scenarios for the post-Qaddafi era include a new deal among former regime elites that would lead to renewed instability in the medium-term, or a more protracted, but ultimately more sustainable, state-building process. Hastening **Qaddafi's fall should be the main priority** of Germany and other EU member states now. **External actors** should also support the Interim National Council as the nucleus of a post-Qaddafi government. However, they **should refrain from playing an active role in the state-building process that will follow Qaddafi's demise, as this would risk discrediting the process**.

That said, there are concerns about whether the Libya resistance, under the auspices of the Transitional National Council, is sufficiently democratic. Such concerns are secondary to ousting Qaddafi in many circles, but are still present.

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/may/25/libya-opposition-transitional-national-council-tnc> How democratic is Libya's opposition? Libya's Transitional National Council is an unelected necessity, but it must start to address its accountability deficit soon **Ranj Alaaldin** guardian.co.uk, Wednesday **25 May** 2011 10.00 BST Article history The head of Libya's opposition Transitional National Council, Mustafa Abdul Jalil. Photograph: Adem Altan/AFP/Getty Images

Three weeks ago I was in eastern Libya to assess the conflict and get an understanding of how things were likely to turn out. More than three months since the uprising began, there are still many questions unanswered. Chief among these is the question of who the opposition actually is, how it governs and what shape it will take in the near future. **Libya's official opposition movement is the Transitional National Council (TNC). It was established a week after the initial uprising began** in Benghazi and is headed by Mustafa Abdul Jalil, the Libyan regime's former justice minister. Its underlying purpose is to give the armed uprising in Libya an organisational structure that allows it to effectively end more than 40 years of brutal dictatorship. The formation of the TNC was a necessity. Perhaps unlike others in the region, the Libyan revolution needed leadership and organisation. By that same measure, however, the creation of the TNC provides for a number of uncertainties that must be addressed. Libyans maintain they have shed too much blood to find themselves confronted with another dictatorship. When I asked what they thought of the TNC and Jalil in Benghazi's shisha cafes, the average Libyan would praise them both before adding: "but we don't want dictatorship". Similarly, when probed about the future, they would express their desire to see elections and political parties. When I spoke to **TNC officials** in

Benghazi, they **were adamant that elections would be held once the country is liberated**. Yet, **the conundrum** for them **is what if the current status quo**, whereby you have a self-governing autonomous region in the east and a Gaddafi-controlled west, **continues for another five or even 10 years**. When I put this question to a TNC delegation that came to London two weeks ago to see David Cameron, their answer was that this scenario was not an ideal one. In other words, it is yet to be prepared for. The dilemma is two-fold. First, **to hold elections in the east without the participation of western Libya essentially equates with partitioning the country**. At the same time, however, Libyans will not allow a so-far unaccountable TNC to continue making decisions for the future and managing extensive funds that are coming its way. The Libyan population still worry about corruption. Other opposition groups, based in both the west and Libya, recognise the TNC and welcome its creation but remind that no one has elected them and that there is still no transparency. **So far, the TNC has released the names of only 13 of its 30-member leadership council, out of security concerns since some members represent areas under regime control**. Five seats have been reserved for the young, February 17 revolutionary committee that instigated the protests against Gaddafi. TNC members have been co-opted on the basis of their expertise and the extent to which they were linked with the regime. Along with Jalil, who in the past gained prominence by outspokenly criticising Gaddafi, other defectors include former interior minister Abdul Fatah Younes (now defence) and Mahmoud Jibril, the current foreign minister who used to head Gaddafi's National Economic Development Board (closed down in recent years because of corruption). Perhaps as influential as Jalil is Mahmoud Shammam, head of media and a former editor of Foreign Policy magazine's Arabic edition. Shammam, who used to sit on the board of al-Jazeera, is the link between the TNC and the Qatari government, which has invested heavily in the TNC through money and arms. The existence of influential and prominent figures, such as Shammam and Jalil, means that power struggles are not unlikely in the near future. Prominent officials have already started to appoint their own personal associates and allies on to the council. The danger is that such potential power struggles, combined with generally unaccountable leadership, provide an environment conducive to violent instability. Rumours of assassinations in Benghazi of regime loyalists or anyone "perceived" to be a loyalist have increased. Further, **as a more efficient and organised TNC military emerges, there is nothing to stop military circles from becoming personal militia groups answering only to powerful TNC officials. This renders it imperative for the TNC to begin addressing its democratic and accountability deficit – sooner rather than later**. While elections are not feasible right now, this does not mean there can be no consultative process with the broader Libyan society. Ambitious and older politicians, for example, have been criticised for sidelining the young revolutionaries of the February 17 committee, who are also disfranchised as a result of the vast influx of former Gaddafi men into the TNC. Nevertheless, it is important to maintain perspective. No matter how unseemly it may be to outsiders, nepotism and other forms of personalised appointments may be the only real guarantee of loyalty at a point when the uprising is still sensitive to penetration by the regime and individuals still vulnerable to being compromised or, at worst, being killed by regime loyalists. **The road to freedom will be long and rocky. But it does not mean Libyans, and their western backers, cannot start thinking ahead** and ensuring another war in the east does not erupt before the current one is ended or, alternatively, ensuring another dictatorship does not emerge before the current one is defeated.

One specific direction would be to enhance TNC transparency

Leslie **Campbell** is the **National Democratic Institute's regional director** for the Middle East and North Africa. **May 6, 2011** in Civil Society, Democracy Assistance, Democracy Promotion, Guest Post, Libya, Middle East and North Africa, National Endowment for Democracy, NGOs and Civil Society 0 Libyans' 'insatiable' appetite for democracy Print This Post

Libya's democratic opposition is developing a more streamlined and effective organization, while trying to shrug off the old regime's legacy of endless but decision-free deliberation, writes Les Campbell in his latest report from Benghazi. Low-key support for the country's dissidents over recent years has paid dividends in confirming the credibility and integrity of democracy assistance groups and providing access to the country's next generation of leaders. The incredibly enthusiastic reception from Libyans carried on into the second full day of the National Democratic Institute's visit to Benghazi. The day started with meetings with the Secretariat of the Interim Transitional National Council and ended in a discussion with six former political prisoners. The TNC Secretariat is housed in a modest former government building that resembles a large villa. Although it has a nice view of the Benghazi harbor, the building is bare bones and workmanlike. **A leading figure in the TNC made time for the NDI delegation** as assistants busily collated policy papers and stuffed binders for an upcoming meeting of the council. It is difficult to compete against Gaddafi's well oiled propaganda machine, he said, detailing the TNC's challenges in communicating with the public. (Speaking of propaganda, I have yet to find a Libyan who believes Gaddafi's son was killed in the attack in Tripoli. Most find it amusing that we even ask about it.) Better decision making and communications are expected from the formation of a new "crisis management committee" which will act as the TNC's executive body, while the council as a whole acts as a type of legislative branch. The TNC's elaborate committee structure is difficult to decode, with official advisory committees across a range of functions and unofficial consultative committees which grow in membership by the day. While a few conspiracy theorists argue that the TNC is using this dense structure to insulate itself from the public others believe the **TNC is unintentionally mimicking the old regime's version of direct democracy**. Under Gaddafi's system, people's committees labored for days, sometimes weeks, debating and discussing initiatives sent down through government channels. These deliberations, often circular and unending, allowed Gaddafi and his closest cronies to make the real decisions. Simply put, when everyone is in charge, no one is in charge and the system can be easily manipulated. While the TNC's motives in encouraging consultation and participation seem to be absolutely above board, **the Libyan habit of public discussion while a small group makes the real decisions is an idiosyncrasy that has to be addressed in a transition to democracy. Representative democracy will require transparent structures, clearly delineated lines of authority and accountability mechanisms**. The experience of such systems simply doesn't exist in Libya. Even those who have lived abroad – including our TNC colleague – have little experience of government or public administration. **It would be difficult to overstate the value of NDI's preexisting relationships established through programs funded by the Middle East Partnership Initiative and the National Endowment for Democracy**, including two previous trips to Libya in 2006 and 2008, Libyans' participation in NDI-organized events in Morocco, Istanbul, Malta and Hungary, coordination meetings with Libyan exiles in Washington and consistent email and phone contact since. These relationships have paid incredible dividends in terms of access to the inner circles of the TNC, and introductions to nascent parties and civil society groups. Joining us in the meeting were several alumni of MEPI- and NED-funded NDI programs who have ascended to key positions in Benghazi, including prominent political activists, civil society leaders, and senior advisors to the TNC. **A member of the TNC's political and transition advisory committees who previously attended NDI training events is now drawing 500-plus crowds to lectures on constitutionalism, tribalism and democracy**. Their friendship and support has been invaluable. Vouching for us and organizing meetings and introductions, these **Libyans have allowed the NDI team**

to meet dozens of political and civic activists, including a half day seminar for youth groups. Spared the burden of defending our motives or establishing bona fides, meetings are frank from the beginning and requests for support are coming thick and fast. A colleague even managed to arrange a meeting with the leader of the Benghazi Scouts – quite a coup since the Scouts are widely considered Libya’s biggest and most effective civil society group, even if they are avowedly non-political. We discussed a civic education and youth leadership program, modeled along the lines of a similar NDI program with the Algerian Scouts, and they were clearly intrigued. While not really seeking out parties, we did meet with the founder of the Democratic Libya Gathering. Many Libyans argue that it is premature to start political movements as they will inevitably be seen as eastern Libyan initiatives and could encourage a fracturing of the country. Still others argue that parties are inherently divisive and solidarity is needed during the fight against Gaddafi. But our DLG interlocutor sees it differently. Arguing that **the Muslim Brotherhood already has a huge head start**, he has started what he describes as a modern Islamic party dedicated to an open society, respecting the beliefs of all but reflecting an Islamic ‘reference.’ Explaining the party’s Islamic orientation, he argues that Libyan society is family oriented and conservative but he wants to establish a clear alternative to the “extremists” he believes exist in the Brotherhood’s ranks. An interesting theme that cropped up several times revolved around the expected fate of regime supporters should Gaddafi fall. Most Libyans argue against what they see as the excesses of Iraq’s de-Baathification, but they clearly expect justice for the regime’s many victims. Libyans have a clear idea who the most egregious offenders are, a knowledgeable international observer noted, and our meeting discussed the possibility of a South African-style truth and reconciliation committee as possible solution. Meeting with six former political prisoners, we found an almost insatiable appetite for discussions about democracy. We excused ourselves after two hours but not until after multiple invitations to dinner, to visit home villages and to address other gatherings. We asked this group about NATO’s role in Libya and, while unanimously grateful, all would prefer a more robust engagement. “We’ll pay the costs with oil money” said one man; while another mused that there should be “boots on the ground.” In the end, they indicated that they will be patient, but hoped the end of the Gaddafi regime would come in weeks, not months.

Expanding the scope beyond traditional DemAsst, there is some interest in military training to gain leverage with the TNC

<http://www.demdigest.net/2011/03/libyas-opposition-outlines-democratic-vision-as-west-calls-for-transition-planning/> **Democracy Digest March 29**, 2011 in Democratic transitions, Islam and Politics, Libya, Middle East and North Africa, NGOs and Civil Society, Rule of Law 0 Libya’s opposition outlines ‘democratic vision,’ as West calls for transition planning

Yet a post-Gadhafi government will not seek indiscriminate retribution, the ITNC insists. “We are going to establish law and order and we are going to try everybody who is responsible for any crime,” said Mahmoud Shammam, the council’s Washington-based head of media. “We are not going to take the revenge on the streets of Tripoli or Benghazi.” The opposition has asked for better weapons to confront Gadhafi’s well-armed special forces and mercenaries. **The “train and equip” program in Bosnia is an encouraging precedent for arming Libya’s democratic forces, argues RAND analyst Angel Rabasa.**

Funded by several hundred million dollars in donations from Muslim states, **the initiative helped level the military playing field, diminish Iranian influence and facilitate the departure of foreign fighters.**

“Involvement on the side of the democracy movement in Libya would enable the United States to exercise a positive influence on Libya’s evolution and prevent destabilizing outcomes,” he contends, at relatively little risk: As in all revolutions, a few of Libya’s opposition leaders have emerged from the rank and file of protesters. Some may be Islamists, but this was also true in Bosnia during that war. If the U.S. were to simply stand aside, extremists could fill the gap, as occurred in the early days of the Bosnian

war....The U.S. decision to support victims of aggression paid off in Bosnia and advanced America's interests and values.

Oman

“democracy assistance” (past year) 326 // 1

obama democracy (past year) 682k // 73

usaid democracy (past year) 1m // 37

Oman has been one of the closest US allies in the Middle East. The stability of Oman is critical for oil markets and transportation through the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. It is also a key bridge between the United States and Iran. Despite its importance as an ally, I personally recommend against its inclusion in the topic.

As is evident from the statistics above, Oman is the country that received the fewest number of hits in the list of “core” countries. This helps to demonstrate the lack of relevant solvency literature for future United States’ actions to assist the development of democracy in Oman.

The nature of the current protest are described here – the piece of evidence also suggests that the US had at least a symbolic role to play in quelling protests in Oman

Stephen Zunes, Professor of Politics and Chair of Mid-Eastern Studies at the University of San Francisco
Pro-Democracy Protests Spread to Oman http://www.huffingtonpost.com/stephen-zunes/prodemocracy-protests-spr_b_833498.html 3-9-11

Protests began in the capital of Muscat on February 19 but soon spread to other cities across the country. Similar to the other largely nonviolent insurrections taking place elsewhere in the Arab world, the protests have been centered on demands for democracy, human rights, economic justice, and curbing official corruption. As in Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, and other monarchies that have witnessed protests in recent weeks, most protesters are not demanding the abolition of the monarchy. They're seeking an elected parliament with real power, essentially transforming the current absolute monarchy into a constitutional monarchy. On February 26, protests in Oman spread to the northeastern industrial city of Sohar. Although starting out exclusively nonviolent, a forcible response by government security forces the following day resulted in some stone-throwing by the crowd. A police station and government building were reportedly torched. Security forces killed two protesters and wounded several others. On Monday, protesters temporarily blocked roads leading to the country's second largest port and new protests broke out in the capital. Meanwhile, in the southern city of Salalah, demonstrators began a sit-in near the office of a provincial governor. In response, the sultan replaced nine cabinet members, raised the minimum wage by 40 percent, and announced his intention to create 50,000 new civil service jobs. These measures did not satisfy the pro-democracy protesters. On March 3, demonstrators set up a tent city in the center of Sohar. Two days later, protests hit Oman's oil producing region. Workers at the main oil field at Haima began an ongoing sit-in. The Obama administration has thus far refused to support the protesters demands or call for a democratic opening. But State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley said that U.S. officials had contacted the Omani government and encouraged them "to undertake reforms that include economic opportunity and move towards greater inclusion and participation in a peaceful political process."

In response to these protests the Gulf Arab oil producers launched an aid package and the Sultan of Oman made efforts to reform lawmaking power and also increase access to jobs.

AEED EL-NAHDY 3-13-11 <http://www.news72.com/business/63535/oman-sultan-shifts-lawmaking-powers-amid-unrest/1/>

Oman sultan shifts lawmaking powers to councils amid protests Oman's ruler granted lawmaking powers Sunday to officials outside the royal family in the boldest reforms yet aimed at quelling protests for jobs and a greater public role in politics. The decree by Sultan Qaboos bin Said reflects the scramble to appease demonstrators and head off possible wider unrest in the strategically important nation, which shares control of the Gulf waterway that carries 40 percent of the world's oil tanker traffic. Just hours before the announcement, suspected arsonists burned a government office and the home of a clan leader in Ebri, about 210 miles (350 kilometers) northwest of the capital Muscat. No injuries were reported, but military units boosted their presence in the area. The sultan has made sweeping Cabinet shake-ups and promises for thousands of new civil service posts since demonstrations began late last month. But the latest plan introduces the most fundamental changes about how the country is governed. Two current advisory councils — one elected and another appointed by the sultan — will receive powers to make laws and regulations within 30 days after a special commission decides how to amend the state statutes. But it was not immediately clear if the sultan would retain full veto power. Oman's protests are limited compared with the unrest in Gulf ally Bahrain, where demonstrators have increasingly called for toppling the monarchy. But Oman and Bahrain have been promised \$10 billion each in aid from the Gulf Cooperation Council in attempts to answer demands for more job opportunities and more state aid.

The situation in Oman can be argued to be different than many of the other core countries and this might explain why there is less literature discussing the role the United States should play in assisting the growth of democracy in Oman. The protests in Oman have actually been less in scale and more likely to be resolved by smaller reforms made by the Sultan. Demands here have also focused on economic issues primarily rather than political issues — such as the nature of democracy in the country. Other core countries (such as Yemen, Egypt, and Tunisia) have smaller economic bases and are less able to individually take actions to quell protests within the countries.

Martina Fuchs Gulf states boost spending in hope of calming unrest **June 5 2011**

<http://ca.reuters.com/article/topNews/idCATRE7541SX20110605?pageNumber=1&virtualBrandChannel=0>

DUBAI (Reuters) - Oil-rich Oman and Bahrain are planning massive boosts in state spending aimed at calming popular unrest, officials said on Sunday. But analysts said measures intended to buy public support may fail because grievances are deeper than financial worries among their relatively affluent citizens. Oman expects spending in 2011 to be about 20 percent higher than previously planned, a finance ministry source said, as robust oil prices would help the country pay for its extra social spending. The official, who asked not be named, said: "We are spending to satisfy protesters' demands." A Bahraini finance ministry spokesman said the king had approved a budget of \$16.44 billion over the next two years, a 44 percent rise in a state hit by unrest this year. Worries in the oil-rich Arab Gulf, started by the uprisings that toppled the long serving rulers of Tunisia and Egypt, have been stoked by protests in Yemen, which look likely to end President Ali Abdullah Saleh's three-decade reign. "The measures that all of the Gulf states have been announcing are directly due to the concerns they have about the Arab Spring," said John Sfakianakis, chief economist at Banque Saudi Fransi in Riyadh. "Handouts have a certain timeframe and limitations... but that does not mean you will eliminate the possibility from society to demand wider political and economic reforms." A striking difference between Oman and Bahrain with Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen is their wealth, which has changed the nature of the protests in the streets. Per capita GDP in Oman and Bahrain is at least four times higher than Tunisia's, seven times higher than Egypt's and 15 times higher than Yemen's. In

Oman, where protests have been relatively small, demands have focused on higher wages, jobs and an end to graft.

Protests in Oman have been less violent, and more demands more easily satisfied by money the Sultan of Oman has available to spend on social, job, and other programs. They can independently deal with political grievances. Also, this provides the basis for an argument that US assistance is not necessary in Oman at this time, making it not that viable of an area for great affirmative debates on this topic.

Emirates24-7.com, By StaffPublished Tuesday, **May 31, 2011** Oman poised for financial boom GDP to grow 4.6%, fiscal surpluses will surge and debt will plunge
<http://www.emirates247.com/business/economy-finance/oman-poised-for-financial-boom-2011-05-31-1.399413>

Higher oil prices and production will plunge Oman into a financial boom in 2011, with its real GDP expected to swell by around 4.6 per cent and the surplus in its budget and current account rising to new highs, according to a Western report. Oman, which is not an OPEC member, will also see its nominal GDP soar by nearly \$17 billion through 2011 while its debt will dip below five per cent of GDP and foreign reserves climbing to nearly \$16 billion, said the report by the Washington-based Institute for International Finance (IIF). Despite recent protests in the Gulf country, they have been less intense than in other troubled Arab nations, while political grievances have been addressed swiftly and more comprehensively, IIF said. Referring to economic measures undertaken by Oman to address social issues, the report said the government has committed to creating 50,000 jobs (35,000 in the public sector and 15,000 in the private sector). The minimum wage was raised to RO 200 (\$520) per month, and anyone out of work but looking for a job (and registered with the Manpower Ministry) is to receive unemployment benefits of RO 150 per month. "The unrest is not likely to have had a significant impact on growth, which is forecast to be similar to last year at about 4.6 per cent...with no OPEC restrictions, crude oil output is projected to rise by about 3.9 per cent in 2011, and gas production by nearly 12 per cent as past investments in enhanced oil recovery continue to bear fruit." In current prices, Oman's GDP is projected to soar from around \$57.2 billion in 2010 to nearly \$74.8 billion in 2011 and a record high of \$77 billion in 2012. IIF, which groups many major Western banks, also expected the non-hydrocarbon sector to continue to recovery from a downturn in 2009, with new capacity coming online in downstream gas industries. The tourism sector has been largely unaffected by the social unrest and looks set to perform well this year, it said, adding that the construction sector will be boosted by ongoing development and infrastructure projects. "High oil prices should ensure sizable budget and current account surpluses in 2011. Although extra spending has been authorized, which will boost both current and capital expenditures, the fiscal position remains strong and the budget surplus may exceed 10 per cent of GDP this year," it said.

Syria

“democracy assistance” (past year) 846 // 13

obama democracy (past year) 26m // 263

usaid democracy (past year) 1m // 59

Potential aff’s addressing the situation in Syria will depend on the state of the Syrian government. It is difficult to predict if al-Assad will still be in control of the Syrian government by the start of the debate season, but the situation in Syria, as of right now is one of active repression of democracy protests. Even today, there are new allegation of regime oppression and protestor deaths <http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/268961/desperate-moves-assads-dying-regime-benjamin-weinthal>. In this environment DA may be less relevant than democracy promotion and acts of US pressure such as sanctions are what is currently being discussed in the literature

Miami Herald, 11

<http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/05/11/2212639/rubio-urges-more-us-action-against.html#ixzz1OXP7MCB2>

Florida Sen. Marco Rubio Wednesday called for the Obama administration to ratchet up the pressure on Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, whose regime has attacked anti-government protestors.

The freshman senator joined fellow Sens. Joe Lieberman, I-Conn., John McCain, R-Ariz., and Ben Cardin, D-Maryland, at a Capitol Hill press conference, to unveil a resolution that urges President Obama to expand sanctions against the Syrian government and speak out on the situation “directly, and personally.”

“We ask you to lead us now in making the cause of the Syrian people America’s cause as well,” Rubio, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said in remarks directed at Obama. “In our words and actions, it should be clear that America is on the side of the Syrian people and that we support their right to peacefully pursue a better future for their country. We must also send an important message to the Syrian regime that we condemn its crimes and that Bashar al Assad should no longer be treated as the legitimate ruler.”

The press conference marks the Miami Republican’s first major appearance on the foreign policy stage and he bookended it with appearances on CBS and CNN.

“Any time a government has to use government forces and army forces to kill unarmed citizens in order to hold onto power, that makes them illegitimate and that’s what’s happening in Syria,” he said on CBS. “I hope the United States will be a clear voice saying that.”

The resolution declares that al-Assad’s government – “through its campaign of violence and gross human rights abuses, has lost its legitimacy” – an assertion the White House has not made, as it has with Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi.

“I know that there are some who had hoped when these protests first broke out that Bashar al- Assad would pursue the path of reform rather than the path of violence and brutality,” Lieberman said. “But

that's clearly not been his choice... He is not a reformer. He is a thug and a murderer, a totalitarian leader who is pursuing the Qaddafi model, and hopes to get away with it."

McCain said that three officials with the Syrian regime face sanctions, "but not the guy that's giving the orders. It's time we indicted the guy that's giving the orders. And it's time for the president of the United States to speak up forcefully and frequently."

McCain said the senators aren't pushing for air strikes like those launched in Libya – noting the uprisings are occurring "all over Syria.

"As a matter of practicality it's almost impossible to intervene in any way but the ways we are advocating," McCain said.

State Department spokesman Mark Toner called the treatment of protestors "barbaric measures" and suggested "there's a window here for the Syrian government to address those concerns and that's closing rapidly."

White House spokesman Jay Carney said the White House has increased pressure against Syria and is working with its allies "to urge the government of Syria to cease the violence, to engage in political dialogue."

He said the situations in Libya and Syria were unique, but that "it has been made abundantly clear to the Syrian government that its security crackdown will not restore stability and will not stop the demands for change in Syria.

"As it is in all these countries, it's up to the people of the region to decide who its leader should be," Carney said. "But we believe that the government ought to listen to its people, refrain from violence, and engage in political dialogue.

Sanctions are still on the table, but the door may also be open for aid/Dem Assist, the scope and tenor of US engagement with Syria is likely to be in flux as long as the instability lasts

CRS 11, Congressional Research Service, The Middle East: Selected Key Issues and Options for the 112th Congress http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R41556_20110103.pdf

U.S. policy toward Syria may be of interest to some lawmakers in the 112th Congress as they consider how best to peel Syria away from Iran. Upon taking office in 2009, the Obama Administration slightly altered the previous Bush Administration approach toward Syria by appearing more willing to engage the Syrian government in a diplomatic dialogue in the hope of securing its cooperation on Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, and the peace process. The Obama Administration made some gestures toward the Asad government, such as sending several high level delegations to Damascus for discussions and allowing sanctions-exempted materials to be exported to Syria. Overall, U.S. sanctions against Syria have remained in force since President Obama took office in January 2009, leading critics to assert that the change in U.S. tone toward Syria two years ago was superficial.

Now, after two years of attempting to engage Syria diplomatically, the Obama Administration appears to be shifting its tactics to applying more pressure on the Syrian government to play a more constructive role

in stabilizing Lebanon and advancing the Arab-Israeli peace process. This shift has coincided with renewed international concern about Lebanon. Hezbollah has threatened to destabilize the country should, as anticipated, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon issue indictments against Hezbollah members for the murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. The Administration's shift also comes after nearly two years of unsuccessfully attempting to restart Israeli-Syrian peace talks due to resistance by both Israel and Syria.

Legislative Options

With U.S.-Syrian relations possibly becoming more tense, Congress may choose to impose new sanctions against the Asad regime. Other lawmakers may seek to continue U.S. engagement, as several congressional delegations visited Syria during the 111th Congress. Also during the 111th Congress, lawmakers introduced H.R. 1206, the Syria Accountability and Liberation Act, which would have placed new sanctions on countries and individuals who help Syria gain access to weapons of mass destruction. It also called for sanctions against those who invest \$5 million or more in Syria's energy sector. Appropriators may also choose to fund democracy and governance programs for opposition members and human rights activists repressed by the Asad government.

Congress also may choose to act on the nomination of Robert S. Ford as Ambassador-Designate to Syria. The appointment remains on hold, and there is no vote planned on confirmation scheduled in the Senate. Supporters of sending an ambassador to Syria (there has been no U.S. Ambassador in Damascus since 2005) assert that the lack of a high-level U.S. presence there only hurts U.S. interests. Opponents charge that it is a concession to a rogue Syrian regime.

Tunisia

“democracy assistance” (past year) 20k // 15

obama democracy (past year) 16m //160

usaid democracy (past year) 161k // 60

Targeted expenditures in DA will help to spur long term change

Young 11 <http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/better-targeting-of-aid-will-ensure-a-lasting-arab-spring?pageCount=0>

Transitions from authoritarianism and state-centred markets are expensive, economically and socially. Since their revolutions, Tunisia and Egypt have sought outside funding to pay for much anticipated, if not yet clearly defined reforms.

But how effective can aid be to a country that is emerging from years of authoritarian control? Aid alone is not enough. Cash handouts and loans must be targeted to encourage democratisation and, most importantly, an open economy.

While we have seen successful simultaneous political and economic transitions elsewhere in the world, **the majority of democratisation aid has tended to focus too heavily on short-term solutions - like funding an election - rather than long-term development goals.**

Egypt and Tunisia can reverse this trend, but only if donors target and condition their money correctly. At the same time, these nascent governments must find ways to attract foreign investment while making good on promises to create jobs and encourage political participation.

International assistance for governments in both Cairo and Tunis has been forthcoming. The World Bank, for instance, has promised US\$6 billion (Dh22billion) in loans, and the American Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) has promised \$1 billion to Egypt in investment.

The US has also forgiven \$1 billion of outstanding Egyptian foreign debt (though Egypt's outstanding foreign debt is about \$30 billion, and only \$3 billion of that is owed to the US.) **The recent Group of 8 summit produced aid and loan commitments of an additional \$20 billion for Egypt and Tunisia.**

These soft loans, forgiven debt and aid are welcome now, but will they make a difference in the long-term?

Aid does not always promote democracy or improve governance. Since 1945, there has been a total of over \$2.3 trillion in development finance (aid and infrastructure loans) extended to states worldwide. Since 1975, Egypt has received a total of \$28 billion in aid from the US alone, averaging \$1.3 billion per year.

Yet Egypt scores 101 on the UN Human Development Index, between Mongolia and Uzbekistan, and frequently ranks well below the top 50 countries in the World Bank survey on ease of doing business.

Financial aid in a political transition from authoritarianism is especially precarious. Many scholars argue that foreign aid can decrease the effectiveness of political institutions, and is often used as a tool for autocratic leaders to buy support during a transition and stall its movement towards a more open, participatory system.

In a study by a prominent World Bank economist of nearly 100 aid recipients between 1975 and 2000, the resounding conclusion was that there was no evidence that aid promotes democracy.

So how can new governments ensure the money is better spent? And how might western donors ensure that their funds foster an open political system and help to build a healthy economy rather than a corrupt one?

New political science research on the question of aid effectiveness suggests that targeted, high levels of "democracy assistance" - focusing less on holding an election and more on strengthening political institutions, judicial reform, anti-corruption measures, citizen advocacy programmes and strengthening civil society and civilian rule - can contribute to democratisation.

From 40 years of political science research, we know three basic things about democratic transitions. One, transitions tend to cluster in time and space. That is, there can be a real cascade effect of one revolution or transition influencing the domestic politics of a neighbouring country.

Two, we know that democratisation aid can have some positive effects in limited areas like encouraging low-level political participation or civil society building. Aid in Poland, the Dominican Republic and South Africa all demonstrate this positive effect. But democratisation aid is not a cure-all for what is essentially a domestically-driven reconciliation process. Political actors must agree to play by the same rules.

And third, transnational networks, or simply, the power of shared ideas across national boundaries, can create avenues for political change. The activation of these networks with aid money can be a powerful tool for citizens seeking participation in their political systems.

In 1990, the symbol of the Polish Solidarity movement (a political party formed on the backs of union workers in the port of Gdansk) inspired people throughout Eastern Europe. In 2011, perhaps media and social network tools are more important.

In short, simply giving money away doesn't seem to work. Indeed, we are in the midst of this Arab revolution in part because of the failure of international aid efforts, and because of the failure of the authoritarian state.

The answer, it seems, will be more of a question of domestic politics and the speed at which nascent political orders can demand accountability from their leaders and be patient for the results.

Donors must demand nothing less and target aid to citizens involved in the transition, rather than the governments overseeing it. That means foreign investment, loans and aid first to people, businesses, and civil society, and government last.

Obama has recently pledged 20 million in DA to Tunisia, additionally it seems difficult to establish US key, indeed some feel EU participation is at least as key as the US

Doran 11 http://www.cepa.org/ced/view.aspx?record_id=306

One way to avoid this pitfall is to consciously link the two regions by identifying joint “proving grounds” where U.S.-Central European cooperation on democracy-building could produce near-term success. Two of the leading candidates for this approach are Tunisia and Moldova.

Relative to their neighbors in terms of population and economy, Tunisia and Moldova are small enough so that limited expenditures of political, financial and human capital could yield substantial democratic dividends. Both countries have undergone government transitions — Moldova’s “Twitter revolution” in 2009 and this year’s “Jasmine revolution” in Tunisia — and both countries have stressed their desire for heightened engagement and technical expertise from Europe and the United States. By demonstrating that transatlantic coordination on Europe’s flanks can help entrench friendly, democratic states over the short-term, the United States and Central Europe can establish best practices for overcoming longer-term obstacles in places like Egypt, Ukraine, Syria and Belarus.

What Next?

Many of the mechanisms for the “proving ground” approach are either in place or are rapidly being established. In Tunisia, Washington has pledged \$20 million in democracy assistance to aid the new government. Likewise, President Obama has announced plans to create “Enterprise Funds” aimed at spurring private sector investment in post-revolution countries across North Africa. In a similar fashion, the EU’s new East-Invest Program seeks to achieve a comparable goal in Eastern Partnership countries such as Moldova. Brussels has also earmarked \$58 million to strengthen democratic governance and state capacity in Chisinau.

In all cases, the injection of Central Europe’s experience and assistance will be a crucial factor for success. (Indeed, early signs of progress are already apparent in Moldova.) And even if there are some differences regarding the details of the Jasmine, Twitter and Velvet revolutions, many of the lessons learned from Central Europe’s post-communist past are immediately relevant for the present. These include the need for transition governments to lock in reforms during the brief window of opportunity following a seismic political shift and the imperative of establishing rules-based, transparent governance in tandem with regular democratic elections.

Ultimately, Central Europe’s greatest contribution to the wider EU neighborhood may come from the fact that America’s allies had to learn these lessons the hard way. Some made mistakes. Others were a quick study. But the skills acquired during this process can now serve as a valuable resource, especially when the revolutionary excitement of the Arab Spring gives way to the long, hot summer of building sustainable democracies along Europe’s periphery.

Additionally, the US has already committed to a joint democracy program with Poland to encourage democracy in Tunisia

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/28/fact-sheet-us-polish-efforts-advance-democracy-worldwide>

In Warsaw, President Obama and President Komorowski met with Polish democracy activists to discuss strengthening U.S.-Polish cooperation in democracy promotion. President Obama was briefed on their recent efforts in Tunisia, and Foreign Minister Sikorski described Polish actions to promote democracy

and civil society in Eastern Europe and North Africa. President Obama welcomed Polish support for political transition in Libya and for the Libyan opposition's Transitional National Council, which is seen as a legitimate and credible interlocutor for the Libyan people. President Obama and Prime Minister Tusk recommitted their governments to continue these essential endeavors, with a specific focus on the following actions:

Tunisia Joint Mentorship Initiative – helping Tunisia learn from Central Europe □ The United States and Poland plan to send additional Polish democracy activists and transition experts to Tunisia to support political reform, party building, civil society, and elections.

Indeed the recent G-8 plan focuses on the role of Europe, international organizations, and ME countries, however it is true that the US needs to play a role (this article suggests reducing tariffs is key)

Traub, James, Foreign Policy Magazine, 11, <http://www.sanfranciscosentinel.com/?p=131736>

A marshal plan is being readied for the new Arab democracies. It's not, of course, a Marshall Plan; the era when the United States had the capacity or the willingness to pump billions of dollars into the economies of vulnerable allies is long behind us. Instead, **U.S. officials have marshaled the resources of multilateral bodies** that did not even exist in 1947, when President Harry Truman came to Europe's rescue. **It's the latest example of "leading from behind."**

It was U.S. officials, and above all David Lipton, senior director for international economic affairs at the National Security Council, **who coordinated the package of assistance announced last week at the G-8 meeting** in Deauville, France. **The International Monetary Fund will make available up to \$35 billion in new loans to the oil-importing — i.e., poor — countries of the Middle East; the World Bank will offer \$6 billion in budget support and project aid to Egypt and Tunisia, with some additional funding from the African Development Bank; the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development hopes to begin investing up to \$3.5 billion a year in the region;** Qatar has promised \$10 billion in aid to Egypt, and Saudi Arabia has promised \$4 billion. And the United States? In his May 19 speech on the Middle East, President Barack Obama pledged to give Egypt just \$2 billion in debt relief and loan guarantees, but Congress is unlikely to authorize any new funds at all.

In the short term, the goal of the package, known as the Deauville Partnership — an aptly non-America-centric name — **is**, as the G-8 countries declared, **"to ensure that instability does not undermine the process of political reform, and that social cohesion and macroeconomic stability are both sustained."** Popular outrage over the failure of economic growth to touch the lives of ordinary people helped provoke the protests across the region. And those protests only made things worse by scaring away tourists and foreign investors: **In Egypt and Tunisia, the two countries that have overthrown their dictators and begun the transition to democracy, economic growth is expected to be 2.5 to 4 points lower this year than last year, while increasing costs for food and fuel have forced both countries to increase spending, raising deficits to dangerous levels.**

Thus the need for swift intervention. Egyptian officials have calculated their balance of payments deficit at \$9 billion to \$12 billion. Masood Ahmed, director of the IMF's Middle East and Central Asia department, says that he has already dispatched a team to Egypt to calculate the exact magnitude of the gap, as well as how much of that need can be met by Egypt's wealthy neighbors (at least half, Ahmed guesses).

This is all to the good. So far the citizens of Egypt and Tunisia have suffered for their beliefs; they may change their mind about democracy if they don't see any benefits to it beyond the spiritual. But the deeper question is not whether outside help can stave off a reversal, but whether it can encourage reform. This is the professed goal of the Deauville Partnership, and it is what Obama had in mind when he said, "Just as EU membership served as an incentive for reform in Europe, so should the vision of a modern and prosperous economy create a powerful force for reform in the Middle East and North Africa." The aid package, that is, is intended not only to fortify Egypt and Tunisia but to bolster the forces of reform in places like Morocco, Jordan, and Algeria, where promises of change remain unfulfilled.

The analogy Obama made was not to the postwar act of reconstruction but to the help given 40 years later to post-communist Eastern Europe and Russia — a far more relevant, if more rarely invoked, precedent than the Marshall Plan. Arab countries, like those freed from the Iron Curtain, have been paralyzed by decades of authoritarianism rather than wrecked by war. Lipton cut his teeth working on the "shock therapy" in Russia and economic reform in Poland in the early 1990s, and he is careful not to overdraw the connection; but he points out that "Both regions need to change their economic structures to become more competitive." Egypt and Tunisia, like Poland and Russia, need to deregulate state-run economies and open up protected markets. Both have powerful stakeholder classes who will resist reform: "It was the nomenklatura in Eastern Europe," Lipton says, "and in Egypt it's people connected to the political leadership and the military." And so the question is: Will what worked in Eastern Europe work in the Middle East?

Lipton observes that even Poland took almost 15 years to join the European Union, but the prospect of membership meant that any political party that proposed to deviate from the path to European integration lost in the polls. He concedes that "in the case of North Africa, we will find nothing that is as compelling as EU membership," but says that policymakers hope to build a "staircase" toward reform starting with the quick infusion of IMF money, then moving on to increased trade and investment, and help with legal changes to unshackle the private sector and improve revenue collection. The plan requires U.S. compliance as well: Obama's proposed Trade and Investment Partnership won't amount to much unless legislators prove more willing than they have so far to reduce tariffs on apparel and the other manufactured goods that would come from the region.

The funding will be conditioned on reforms developed in each country. The IMF will work with Egypt and Tunisia over the next year or so to put together a comprehensive plan to spur growth, create jobs, and establish a safety net other than the one endemic in the region: dead-end jobs in the bloated public sector. The World Bank has begun working out such conditions in both target countries. In Tunisia, says a bank official, the interim government has embraced the plan: "They've tried to identify changes that would be difficult to reverse and that would give clear signals that policymaking will be different," she says. These include freedom-of-information rules and public access to government data. Egypt, she concedes, has been "harder."

Indeed, Egypt's interim military government may put up serious resistance to the Deauville Partnership. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, as the ruling clique calls itself, has proved increasingly hostile to the citizens movement that ousted President Hosni Mubarak from office in February. Even if the military agrees to surrender political power to a new civilian government, which seems less and less

certain, it may do so only on the condition that it retain its vast — and disabling — web of economic privileges. “We must not allow the Egyptian military to control the economy or to retain power through privatization,” says Anders Åslund, a former Swedish diplomat who worked with Lipton in the early 1990s. The “a priori answer” to whether the military will agree to surrender its economic role, Åslund says, is “no.”

The premise of the plan is that the combination of political change and economic opening will produce a dynamic that ultimately forces Egypt’s own nomenklatura to abandon its privileged position. Aslund notes that policymakers in the early 1990s rightly focused on one new democracy — Poland — with the hope that others would follow later. Egypt is the Poland of the Arab Spring; but Egypt is much poorer, much more conservative, and much more mired in the past than Poland was in 1989. The country’s vast hinterland largely sat out the revolution and is available for mobilization by a range of anti-democratic forces. Democratic consolidation is going to be a lot harder in the Middle East than it was in post-communist Europe. And in any case, success in one place may not have the hydraulic effect it had two decades ago. All the international financing in the world won’t make a difference until autocrats fall in Libya, Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere.

Nevertheless, it is a sign of progress that institutions now exist with the resources, experience, and expertise to rally behind nascent and would-be democracies, and to help counteract the internal and external pressures that endanger them. It’s mortifying that the United States can offer so little to this international effort, but it’s heartening to see the care with which the Obama administration has marshaled this plan.

Yemen

“democracy assistance” (past year) 12k // 8

obama democracy (past year) 22m // 208

usaid democracy (past year) 190k // 62

It is clear from the literature that Yemen is in need of continued monetary democratic assistance, however, while this card demonstrates some specific options for increasing the effectiveness of DA to Yemen it also illustrates a potential problem for the aff in that the EU also donates money to Yemen and I'm not confident the Aff would be able to generate an internal reason why US money is superior to EU money.

Burke 10 “Assessing Democracy Assistance:

Yemen” www.fride.org/download/IP_WMD_Yemen_ENG_jul10.pdf

Yemen's contradictions and complexities have jaded the optimism of Western donors whose policies are now more informed by damage limitation. Western governments are unwilling to put pressure on President Saleh to adhere to his reform commitments during a time of a rising al-Qaeda threat. Such a short-termist approach risks ignoring the obvious irony that Yemen's woes are the fruit of a reform process that did not go far enough, that limited itself to cosmetic reform without actually ushering in the era of accountability and transparency necessary to lift Yemen out of its cycle of violence and poverty. Stagnant levels of poor governance have bred mistrust among many Yemenis citizens, precipitating violent protest and the retreat of the state behind tribal networks. Corruption and military involvement in the economy are seen as key conflict drivers that have led to the emergence of a mass protest movement in the south of the country.

Until the emergence of a more accountable state, Yemen will continue to be highly dependent upon external assistance indefinitely. Despite the indefinite postponement of parliamentary elections and increasing human rights abuses, it would be foolish to prematurely announce the death of prospects for democratic reform in Yemen. For all its structural and resource problems, Yemeni civil society is extremely active – the courage and resourcefulness of its best NGOs are a constant reminder of the potential of the country and its best defence against encroachments against civil liberties. These organisations are heavily reliant upon the support they receive from Western democracy assistance. Donor exasperation with regards to a lack of political will on behalf of the Yemeni government does not mean that Yemeni NGOs should be blamed for these shortcomings. Rather there has been a lack of coherent pressure from donors to push the government to address the root causes of its many regional conflicts. If Yemen is to have a brighter future, its civil society will be a critical asset. To permit its demise due to the withdrawal of already limited funding would be highly counter-productive. However, this does not mean that donor practices should not be reformed. In considering the future of democracy assistance to Yemen the following recommendations by local activists might be taken into account:

Democracy promotion must be undertaken not by template but by programmes that recognise the strength of the tribal system of governance within Yemen and work within this local context.

The capacity of political parties is extremely weak. There are MPs from all the main the parties who wish to hold the government to account. Capacity building with the Yemeni parliament is urgently required.

A high level dialogue with the Yemeni government is necessary in order to defuse increasing tensions in Yemen and the perceived further loss of legitimacy of the government. Civil society should be consulted during this process.

Democracy projects need to reach out more to the youth at the grass-roots level and be integrated within wider reform of Yemen's educational system.

Many democracy projects include too many conferences and not enough skills training. This needs to be reversed. The money spent on sending Yemeni activists to attend short events in Europe, North America or the Middle East should instead be used to build long-term training commitments in Yemen.

'Train the trainer' has its limitations as knowledge is frequently not passed on. It is seen as too much of a commodity. Training should be only the start of the process, not its end point. Donors should design follow-up activities to help its trainees maximise the benefit of their new skills. NGOs need to be able to apply for grants in Arabic. They also need more training and information on how to apply. Greater donor transparency is required during the bidding process.

Small grants are much more effective than large amounts of money. Donors should recognise the limitations of Yemeni NGOs to spend large sums which can have a corrupting effect on their activities.

Donors need to be more responsive to the needs of Yemeni NGOs and not the political trends of domestic capitals. Explicitly focusing on activities such as 'de-radicalisation' may be counterproductive if handled in the wrong way. Donors also need to be more flexible, realising that sometimes basic assistance such as building maintenance is also vital as well as programme funding.

Donors need to ensure that they do not simply follow the government's guidance on which organisations they should fund but rather appeal to the government to stop harassing organisations who are defending human rights and democratic norms.

The donor representatives need to go out into the field more to differentiate from 'real' and 'shell' NGOs. Donors need to put assistance where the population is – mostly in the rural areas.

There is an obvious lack of donor coordination in Yemen. Donors should agree to harmonise their efforts under the auspices of the senior UN representative of the country, establishing a formal mechanism to share experiences on working with Yemeni partners.

It is evident that coordination among EU member states is generally on an ad hoc basis. Post Lisbon Treaty, the EU delegation in Sana'a should take a more robust role in harmonising European assistance. Meanwhile, Yemen Consultative Group meetings yield lofty communiqués on cooperation but these do not translate into improved coordination on the ground, most obviously between the GCC member states but also even among OECD DAC countries.

Donors need to be aware of the consequences of a vast increase in funding and training for the military. The Yemeni security forces are widely believed to be a source, rather than a solution, to the problem of weak governance in the country, being heavily involved in human rights abuses and the misappropriation of economic assets. Democratic control of the armed forces by a civilian government should be a self-interested goal of donor policies in Yemen.

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Increasing assistance to Yemen is an issue for consideration in the next congressional session

CRS 11, Congressional Research Service, The Middle East: Selected Key Issues and Options for the 112th Congress http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R41556_20110103.pdf

Due to the ever-increasing threat of Yemen-based terrorists carrying out an attack against the U.S. homeland, it is likely that the 112th Congress may focus on U.S. counterterrorism policy in Yemen. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) unsuccessfully attempted to bomb Northwest Airlines Flight 253 on Christmas Day 2009 and, more recently, destroy two air cargo flights using explosives hidden inside printer cartridges destined for Chicago in October 2010. American citizen Anwar al Awlaki, AQAP's radical ideologue, also has attempted to indoctrinate U.S. citizens and motivate them to carry out terrorist bombings on U.S. soil. Awlaki has been either directly or indirectly linked to radicalizing, among others, Major Nidal M. Hasan (committed the November 2009 mass shooting at Fort Hood Army Base in Texas), Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab (the Nigerian accused of trying to ignite explosive chemicals to destroy Northwest/Delta Airlines Flight 253 on Christmas Day 2009), and Faisal Shahzad (alleged Times Square failed car bomber).

For the past several months, numerous reports have indicated the **Obama Administration is contemplating how to increase assistance and intelligence cooperation with Yemen without overly militarizing the U.S. presence there.**

In the short term, some reports suggest that the CIA may increase its use of drones inside Yemen or place U.S. military units overseen by the Defense Department Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) under its control.¹³ The U.S. military historically has had only a limited presence in Yemen, and as such, U.S. intelligence agencies may have limited knowledge of the local terrain and may need time before they are able to employ all assets to their maximum capacity.

Legislative Options

As Yemen becomes a more prominent battlefield against Al Qaeda-affiliated terrorist groups, Congress may assess whether the Administration is able to balance the short-term need to counter terrorism against the long-term goal of stabilizing Yemen. Other lawmakers may demand more U.S. military involvement in Yemen, particularly if AQAP is able to carry out an attack inside the United States. Some members may demand more forcefully that Yemen cooperate with the United States by apprehending wanted AQAP operatives such as Awlaki.

The 112th Congress may choose to consider new appropriations for Yemen. In FY2010, the United States provided an estimated \$290 million in total aid (including economic and development aid) and that figure is expected to increase in FY2011. The Defense Department also has proposed increasing Section 1206 security assistance to Yemen to \$1.2 billion over a five- or six-year period. In the past, the Yemeni government has cautioned the United States against overreacting to the terrorist threat there, though in recent months, Yemeni forces have launched several large-scale campaigns against suspected AQAP strongholds in the Abyan and Shabwah governorates. Whether U.S.-Yemeni security cooperation can be sustained over the long term is the key question for U.S. lawmakers and policymakers. Inevitably, at some point, disagreements arise over Yemen's policy of releasing alleged terrorists from prison in order to placate tribal leaders and domestic Islamist politicians who oppose U.S. "interference" in Yemen and U.S. policy in the region in general.

Increasing money is a popular and likely response to the problem of Yemen
Sharp 11 <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL34170.pdf>

As the country's population rapidly rises, resources dwindle, terrorist groups take root in the outlying provinces, and a southern secessionist movement grows, the Obama Administration and the 112th Congress are left to grapple with the consequences of Yemeni instability. Over the past several fiscal years, Congress has appropriated an average of \$20 million to \$25 million annually for Yemen in total U.S. foreign aid. In FY2010, Yemen is receiving \$58.4 million in aid. The Defense Department also is providing Yemen's security forces with \$150 million worth of training and equipment for FY2010. For FY2011, the Obama Administration requested \$106 million in U.S. economic and military assistance to Yemen. For FY2012, the Administration has requested \$115.6 million in State Department/USAID-administered economic and military aid. As President Obama and the 112th Congress reassess U.S. policy toward the Arab world, the opportunity for improved U.S.-Yemeni ties exists, though tensions persist over counterterrorism cooperation and the political uncertainty prevailing in Yemen may raise questions about the nature and intentions of Yemen's government if serious political change occurs. In recent years, the broader U.S. foreign policy community has not adequately focused on Yemen, its challenges, and their potential consequences for U.S. foreign policy interests beyond the realm of counterterrorism.

USAID is currently involved in a country stabilization strategy which includes support for democracy
Sharp 11 <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL34170.pdf>

Yemen receives U.S. economic aid from three primary sources, the Economic Support Fund (ESF), the Development Assistance (DA) account, and the Global Health Child Survival account (GHCS). In September 2009, the United States and Yemen signed a new bilateral assistance agreement to fund essential development projects in the fields of health, education, democracy and governance, agriculture and economic development. The agreement, subject to congressional appropriations, provides a total of \$121 million from FY2009 through FY2011. USAID's new country stabilization strategy for Yemen for 2010-2012 features, among other activities, two main programs, the Community Livelihoods Project (CLP) and the Responsive Governance Project (RGP). The CLP seeks to work with NGOs in local communities in Yemen's rural governorates in order to expand access to freshwater, healthcare, and education. Its estimated budget is \$80 million for three years, plus up to \$45 million for each of two additional option years, for a total of \$125 million over five years. The RGP seeks to work with, according to USAID, "key Yemeni ministries, including Health, Education, Agriculture, Planning, Industry & Trade, among others, to address related but broader government policy, institutional, and capacity issues that will help the Government of Yemen be more responsive to the needs of its citizens."⁹³ Its estimated budget is \$27 million for three years, plus up to \$16 million for both additional option years, for a total of up to \$43 million over five years. The governance

program was awarded to Counterpart International. In FY2010, USAID obligated an additional \$12.8 million to support a containment and stabilization program for northern Yemen. According to USAID, funds will “provide immediate community-based assistance in the governorates surrounding Sa’ada (Hajjah, Amran, northern districts of Al Jawf) in order to contain the Sa’ada conflict from spilling into these areas, support the current ceasefire, mitigate the possibility for a renewed outbreak of violence, and position USAID to enter Sa’ada to deliver similar assistance as the basis for future reconstruction should access open up.”

Some things DA has been used for in Yemen

Sharp 11 <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL34170.pdf>

U.S. economic aid to Yemen also supports democracy and governance programming. For several years, U.S. democracy promotion organizations have run programs in Yemen’s outlying provinces to support conflict resolution strategies designed to end revenge killings among tribes. Some NGOs receive U.S. funding to facilitate discussions between tribal leaders in Mareb province and government officials, donors, and the private sector. U.S. assistance also works to monitor voter registration issues in anticipation of parliamentary elections scheduled for April 2011, enhance the electoral competitiveness of Yemen’s main political opposition parties, train members of parliament, and provide technical assistance to parliamentary oversight and budget committees. The State Department’s Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) also provides small grants to a number of local Yemeni NGOs.⁹⁵

Prominent policy options to deal with Yemen (Not DA)

Sharp 11 <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL34170.pdf>

In essence, Yemen requires external aid, both political and financial, to improve its capacity to provide security, governance, and economic development, but donors are hesitant to commit to Yemen, fearing that its government’s lack of capacity to absorb aid will inevitably lead to their funds being squandered. Furthermore, though the United States has taken a leading role in marshalling international support for Yemen in recent years, Western countries are constantly pushing for Yemen’s Arab neighbors to take a more active and positive role in the country’s development. However, many Gulf countries themselves lack the human expertise or desire to implement aid projects on the ground in Yemen, preferring to donate cash to Yemen’s coffers or outsource development work to Western aid agencies. According to one report,

The GCC states do not discuss common developmental approaches. In part this reflects a lack of national capacity, highlighted by a leading GCC official’s suggestion at the February 2010 Riyadh meeting of paying “outside experts” (Western aid agencies) to meet Yemen’s developmental needs. No individual GCC state has an aid office in Sana’a, nor is there a collective GCC one, despite Yemeni encouragement of on-the-ground Arab support. At present this is limited to a few Saudi and Egyptian experts advising on economic management in Aden.⁹⁸

Overall, though it is not nearly at the level desired by the Yemeni government, foreign countries have increased their aid to Yemen out of growing fear of state failure. In December 2009, the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development (ADFD) made a \$650 million commitment to fund over a dozen projects inside Yemen. The World Bank has disbursed several hundred million dollars for dozens of projects inside the country for its five-year program. Yemen’s Social Fund for Development is a primary recipient of foreign aid and is well regarded by the international community for its transparency and wide reach outside the capital. It spent \$218 million on projects inside Yemen in 2009.

Reform in Yemen

Many observers believe that the international community is willing to assist Yemen in boosting its internal capacity to take necessary political and economic reforms that would somewhat alleviate the country’s woeful state of development; however, it is unclear whether or not the Yemeni government itself is seriously committed to tackling difficult challenges.

At present, Yemen is negotiating with the International Monetary Fund in order to launch an economic reform plan. After Yemen's latest Article IV Consultation with the IMF that concluded in January 2010, the IMF recommended that:

Given the sizable increase in domestic debt to finance the 2009 budget deficit, including use of central bank financing, Directors encouraged ambitious fiscal consolidation, focusing on aligning expenditures with revenues, reducing structural rigidities in expenditures and boosting non-oil revenue. Key priorities in this regard include full implementation of the General Sales Tax and reducing fuel subsidies. At the same time, Directors stressed the need for larger and better-targeted direct transfers to protect the poor. Continued efforts to reform the income tax regime, eliminate exemptions and strengthen public financial management are also crucial.⁹⁹

President Saleh himself has initiated his own 10-point reform plan that includes, among other things, fuel subsidy reductions, land reform, civil service reform, and enhanced water-use efficiency. In response, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton remarked that:

President Salih has a 10-point economic plan, and we have made clear that we have expectations and we have the right to work with the Government of Yemen as we do provide development [aid] because we want it to go for the benefit of the people of Yemen. We want to see results on the ground. We're seeing results in the counterterrorism efforts and we want to see similar results when it comes to development. But I believe that the foreign minister and other high officials in Yemen understand that. They're committed to this new course and we want to assist them in being successful.¹⁰⁰

The government of Yemen insists that is committed to making difficult choices. As mentioned earlier, fuel subsidies have been modestly reduced in 2010. According to Yemen's Deputy Minister of Planning and International Cooperation Hisham Sharaf, "Our emergency and urgent program includes such reforms. The brother president considers that the reforms will emerge before the world, and that this developing country which is said to have corruption and problems should follow a course of reform that would attract the others as investors, donors, and also as countries to deal with us. These reforms will not be mere ink on paper, or postponed from one year to another."¹⁰¹

There are a number of challenges to expanded U.S. military and non-military action in Yemen, including limited local political support, limited local capacity to absorb or effectively administer U.S. assistance, a strong public antipathy to U.S. security cooperation, a local government that does not identify Al Qaeda as its primary domestic problem, limited U.S. government knowledge of Yemen's internal political dynamics, and a precarious security situation on the ground that prohibits direct U.S. support in outlying areas. Given these challenges, many observers have suggested that the range of options before Congress and the Obama Administration for dealing with AQAP and Yemen's long-term viability as a nation-state is limited. The following summaries describe some options that have been proffered; the selection is not exhaustive:

□ **Condition U.S. Assistance.** There is some concern that just like after the 2000 USS *Cole* bombing in Aden harbor, the United States might repeat a familiar pattern—an attack occurs, the United States scrambles to react, and then gradually the U.S. government loses focus, as the Yemeni government reduces the capabilities of Al Qaeda-inspired militants to an internationally tolerable level without eliminating them. In this regard, some argue that, in crafting his government's response, President Saleh is likely to seek to avoid exacerbating political opposition at home while meeting the demands of the United States or other potential donors. This time, some suggest that the United States condition additional U.S. aid, either overtly or behind closed doors, on political and economic reform in order to improve Yemen's long-term prospects and stabilize existing political crises. Based on other cases, it is likely that the Administration would seek waiver authority for any congressionally mandated conditions or certification requirements on U.S. assistance.

□ **Internationalize Assistance.** For years, the United States has advocated for more development assistance for Yemen at the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. However, some analysts suggest that due to the political sensitivities of greater U.S. involvement in Yemen, the United States should work multilaterally with Saudi Arabia, the EU, and other countries in both expanding military and economic cooperation there. The potentially competing short-term priorities of regional, international,

and multilateral parties may make it less likely that external assistance would affect Yemen's long-term prognosis in a decisive way.

□ **The Minimalist Approach.** Despite the flurry of recent media attention since the Flight 253 incident, some observers anticipate that the AQAP threat to the U.S. homeland is not nearly as dire as advertised and that the United States risks exacerbating the problem by becoming too involved in Yemen. While doing nothing may not be an option, these same observers suggest that a quiet, sustained, and deliberate approach focused on minimizing short-term threats and addressing long-term systemic challenges may be best.

Conclusions

The last Middle East topic experienced a major re-stacking with the leaking of a National Intelligence Estimate downplaying the immediacy of any threat from Iran. Although many teams simply made due with older evidence, it was easy to get judges to downplay or dismiss such evidence given the scope of change (symbolically) that the NIE entailed. Yet, the NIE did not change Iran itself in the way that the Arab Spring has – and is – changing the Middle East this year. A Middle East topic selected in summer 2010 would have probably served us poorly in January; we should be concerned about tying down affirmatives in ways that don't allow them to adapt to policy proposals forthcoming over the next 10 months.

If the literature located for this paper is representative, affirmatives will have some challenges with "United States key" warrants for affirmatives that occur below top level diplomacy.

Such evidence usually emerges in time, but the Arab Spring events are simply too recent to have generated strong solvency evidence for traditional DemAsst actors which are also recent enough to assume the transition. Thus, it may be that solvency evidence is inversely proportional to the magnitude of change in spring 2011. The community will generate adapt its standards to make sure affirmatives win a fair number of rounds, but we should be looking for ways to assure that affirmative actions are somewhat predictable without constraining affirmatives to approaches which are tangential to emerging situations.