

## Including Palestine (Supplement)

*"All our family believe it is our job to bring Palestine back, I gave all my life to Palestine."*

Munib Masri,  
Father of three children who fought with Arafat's PLO during the 1982  
Israeli invasion of Lebanon, June 8, 2011.

Having worked on a Palestine aff a few years ago, the year after Hamas won the election in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, it has been fascinating to watch the recent unification between Fatah and Hamas in relationship to some of the other movements in the Arab Spring. In short, I would reinforce the point in Gordon Stables' Category 3 wording paper that there is a good case for including the Palestinian people in one or more of the lists of countries. There are some very important debates and strong arguments for both the aff and the neg regarding the Palestinian self-determination question, democracy, and the overall relationship the United States has to the "Arab Spring."

**R. Fisk, interviewing Munib Masri**, a 75-year old Palestinian who was part of the recent political reconciliation, **June 7**. ("Revealed: the untold story of the deal that shocked the Middle East" Exclusive by Robert Fisk Tuesday, 7 June 2011, acsd 6-9-11, *The Independent*, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/revealed-the-untold-story-of-the-deal-that-shocked-the-middle-east-2293879.html>).

Q: What were the details of the agreement? In Gaza, dozens took to the streets to celebrate the Egyptian-brokered pact, signed on 4 May, which brought an end to four years of bitter rivalry. Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal said he was ready to "pay any price" to reconcile the factions. The deal envisaged a caretaker government with the task of preparing for parliamentary and presidential elections. Egypt has set up a committee to oversee the deal, but the unity government has a rocky road ahead, with potential pitfalls over how to integrate Hamas's military wing into the security services. For years, Egypt sponsored reconciliatory talks in Cairo – but to no avail. It was the renewed vigour of the Arab Spring that finally led to the historic handshake.

One potential issue that will arise, as noted in the wording paper, is how to refer to the Palestinian people in a given list of countries. On one hand we should just use the phrase used by the U.S. government, but on the other hand even the government changes its label and has built in a number of requirements on aid recipients and means of superseding those exclusions in the status quo. The government is not entirely consistent with its label for Palestine either, and often specifies the distribution of aid beyond that which is implied by the "reference for the place."

Backing up briefly, a quite strong interview (long at 11 minutes but all of it is worth listening to) following the surge of Palestinian refugees at the Syrian-Israeli border introduces the larger context of the debate and can be found here: <http://www.commondreams.org/video/2011/06/09>.<sup>\*</sup> In this interview with Omar Barghouti it becomes quite clear that the Palestinian rights movement and transformation taking place is a major part of the Arab Spring in Egypt, Tunisia and beyond. A few other arguments Barghouti makes of note: the conflict is about civil society and internal movements in the region, the demand for Palestinian rights (like the right of return) transcends the debate involving one-state vs. two-state, and the values of democracy matter to the core concerns involving the right to exist and the best political and social way forward.

\* Interview citation: Omar Barghouti, interview posted June 9, 2011 (“Fatah-Hamas Reconciliation and the Palestinian Struggle: Will this further Palestinian rights or just divide power under occupation?” Barghouti is a human rights activist and founding member of the Palestinian Civil Society Call for BDS, June 9, 2011 by The Real News Network, <http://www.commondreams.org/video/2011/06/09>)

The main point in this supplement, somewhat unlike the other countries under consideration, is that we must take into account the defining debate about the term of reference for the Palestinian people. The Palestinian Authority (PA) has received a majority of assistance from the US over the past few years (see Gootnick ’10 and Zanotti ’10 in the Cat. 3 paper), including democracy assistance, but the PA has only been governing a portion of the territories of Palestine. Until the very recent reconciliation (see the interview), Hamas has been operating independently out of the West Bank as power struggles between the two have continued. As Barghouti notes in the interview, power is not really viable in an occupied territory without the freedom of movement, and arguably the majority of the Palestinians themselves are not in line with either party. Consequently, it would not make sense to use the phrase “increase assistance in/to the Palestinian Authority” even though the U.S. has routed much of its assistance to the Palestinian Authority until recently and the last policy debate resolution used “the PA.” Because of concerns that Hamas does not recognize Israel’s right to exist and maintains the right to use violence, any assistance from the U.S. has to go elsewhere or be exempted from the law by a specific waiver that demonstrates a connection to national security (usually requested by the Executive).

We also need to think about the preposition we use because it would be difficult to have different prepositions for each region/group. If we are leaning toward the preposition “in” for the overall topic wording, the choices change slightly. In other words, a resolution that reads “increase assistance *to* \_\_\_” would include the Palestinians differently than a resolution that reads “increase assistance *in* \_\_\_.” *To* would have U.S. aid go to something like “the Palestinian people” (although it would open some new doors to have one group of people named as people and all the other groups named as places) and *in* would have U.S. aid go to some version of the territories of the Palestinians.

Regardless of the labels, U.S. aid “in” “the West Bank and Gaza Strip” is intended to go “to” the Palestinian people, but is often routed through a particular political organization. The political organizations, sometimes even based in a neighboring country, generally attempt to reach the “Palestinian diaspora” given that a majority of Palestinians do not reside in the Palestinian territories themselves. The P.L.O. or Palestine Liberation Organization has been the umbrella organization representing the people with observer status in the United Nations (a new claim is coming in the U.N. for statehood later this year) but the U.N. has also approved a request from the delegation to refer to the observer as from “Palestine.” Another choice with frequency in the literature and listed by the U.S. Department of State for Near East Asia (<http://www.state.gov/p/nea/ci/pt/>) is the Palestinian territories. Note: there is a debate over whether to capitalize (T)erritories or not with no real consensus or verbalized argument in either direction. If we were to use “Palestinian territories,” the label acknowledges a level of occupation that may be inconsistent with the goals of democracy (independent judiciary, human rights, etc.), even though this phrase is the

one that probably fits the best with U.S. aid organizations. The term “Palestine” by itself may be the best option for the preposition “in,” although it might force a debate about what the boundaries of Palestine should be—an important question and something to consider when selecting a term. If we use the preposition “to” or “for,” the best phrase would be “Palestinian people,” with “Palestinian diaspora” another good option. Increasing assistance “in” the diaspora would be difficult because the term diaspora signifies a refusal to use the boundaries of existing nation-states, a recognition that a group of people is located throughout a number of nations and territories (a “scattering”).

Increasing assistance “in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,” would also work, but might ignore the existence of a large number of Palestinian refugees and other Palestinians outside the territories, many of whom are participating in democracy movements in other countries. Assistance could still help these groups, however, and from the perspective of the USFG, USAID has a West Bank and Gaza program that extends aid to the Palestinian people:

**USAID West Bank/Gaza Home page** (<http://www.usaid.gov/wbg/home.html>, acsd 6/7/11)

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) funds programs that help people living in the West Bank and Gaza lead healthier and more productive lives. Since 1994, Palestinians have received more than \$3.4 billion in U.S. economic assistance via USAID projects - more than from any other donor country.

The Palestinian Territories are referred to by the US State Department’s “Near East Region” as the West Bank and Gaza Strip. (<http://www.state.gov/p/nea/ci/pt/>, acsd 6/7/11). The US Federal Register cites the U.S. Treasury in 1997 as one of the most definitive statements from the United States:

**U.S. Treasury, ‘97** (*Federal Register* / Vol. 62, No. 50 / Friday, March 14, 1997 / Notices 12269, Customs Service [T.D. 97–16], acsded 6/9/11)

Country of Origin Marking of Products

From the West Bank and Gaza

AGENCY: U.S. Customs Service, Department of the Treasury

ACTION: Notice of policy.

SUMMARY: This document clarifies T.D. 95–25 by notifying the public that, with respect to imported goods which are produced in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, acceptable country of origin markings consist of “West Bank/Gaza,” “West Bank/Gaza Strip,” “West Bank and Gaza,” and “West Bank and Gaza Strip” as well as “West Bank,” “Gaza” or “Gaza Strip.”

EFFECTIVE DATE: The position set forth in this document is effective for merchandise entered or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption on or after March 14, 1997.

No term is perfect, but we should find an alternative that is sufficient given the importance of including these debates in at least one of the lists. There are some strong affirmative cases here. The Swenson ’10 evidence provides inherency for an increase in US democracy assistance that goes to the Palestinian people, perhaps a topical way to work with, around (or just supersede with fiat) US legislation requiring recipients to recognize Israel as a prerequisite. The status quo has found ways to provide aid, but it isn’t enough, it isn’t working, and it isn’t going to

the right places. Overall, the loose recommendation is to use “Palestine” because that is what the prospective state is currently called and that is what the future state will be called. The recommendation is loose because “West Bank and Gaza Strip” or “Palestinian territories” are both reasonable alternatives that are used most often by the US government.

If deciding between “West Bank and Gaza Strip” or “Palestinian territories,” there is a strong argument that East Jerusalem would be the third Palestinian territory even though Israel would disagree. Five main regions were occupied by Israel during the Six Days War in 1967. The Golan Heights was returned to Syria in negotiations and the Sinai Peninsula was returned to Egypt in negotiations. The West Bank and the Gaza Strip were “temporarily” granted a type of protectorate status with no real sovereignty and East Jerusalem was occasionally grouped with the other two, but often even less recognized. The issues confronting Palestinians in East Jerusalem are no less severe than in the West Bank and Gaza Strip:

Moore, '11 (R. L., Rollins College in Winter Park, *The Ledger* Op. Ed.,  
<http://www.theledger.com/article/20110608/COLUMNISTS03/110609366/1001/BUSINESS?p=2&tc=pg,acsd6/8/11>)

Israel's policies have been a source of endless difficulties for the East Jerusalem Palestinians. Certain ultra orthodox Jewish groups, sometimes with government support, have established settlements designed to separate Palestinian communities from each other and have promoted legislation that makes it all but impossible for many Palestinians to live normal lives. Palestinians in East Jerusalem have been thwarted in their efforts to construct new homes, to marry outside of their communities, to access reliable supplies of water and in general to live as self-respecting human beings.

Some uses of “Palestinian territories” are only referring to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, but others will directly address and emphasize claims over East Jerusalem, especially claims to its status as the capital of the prospective state. Thus, “Palestinian territories” would be better than “the West Bank and Gaza Strip” unless it was expanded to “the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem.” The reason this matters is because the preposition “in” could also be controlling to the point of excluding forms of assistance outside the specified country or region.

Finally, there will also be an effect from the way the introduction of the list is formulated, with “in one or more of the following countries: Palestine, etc.” meaning something slightly different from “in one or more of the following states: Palestine, etc.” “Country” works well with all the options. More work needs to be done in some crucial areas, but this should be a start toward an inclusion of the Palestinian people on at least a few of the lists of countries with a label we have contemplated.

### A few additional cards:

The debate over statehood is coming to the U.N. in July. This is a reason to engage the question because it will be central to the U.S. response in the region and the political effects on the Obama regime. The uncertainty over the U.S. position on Palestinian statehood in the U.N. expands the debate, allowing the aff. to either solidify the U.N.'s official recognition of the state of Palestine or to work within an unrecognized region to provide democracy assistance. The U.N. debate could go either way—that's a reason to include "Palestine" in the list.

**Chernus, UC-Boulder, June 8, 2011** (Ira, Prof. Religion at UC-Boulder, Huffington Post, acasd 6/9/11, [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ira-chernus/obama-israel-palestine-\\_b\\_872903.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ira-chernus/obama-israel-palestine-_b_872903.html))

Except **Gabriela Shalev**, who may have more claim to expertise than most. She was Israel's ambassador to the UN from 2008 to 2010. A few weeks ago she **told a committee of the Knesset, Israel's parliament, that "the United States is not interested in vetoing the UN's recognition of a Palestinian state."** According to Akiva Eldar, one of Israel's leading foreign policy analysts, Shalev said she "would not be surprised if Obama instructs ... America's Ambassador to the UN, Susan Rice, to hold back on the veto weapon this time. **By Shalev's count, the Palestinians have already succeeded in recruiting nine members of the Security Council -- the number necessary for recommending to the General Assembly to accept a new member state to the UN.** The Americans, adds Shalev, are not eager to use their veto and to take comfort from the isolation in Israel's arms." That isolation must surely be on Obama's mind. Why else would he run the risk of publicly committing the U.S. to a peace based on the 1967 borders (with minor, mutually agreed adjustments) -- a blazing red flag for right-wing Israelis, as their prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, made clear at the White House. It's the strongest sign yet that Obama wants desperately to move the peace process along so he can avoid having to cast a vote at the UN, because he faces serious consequences whether he vetoes or not. **With the political tide moving so swiftly in support of a Palestinian state, there's no guarantee that even the closest U.S. allies will oppose it. If Obama moves with that tide and supports Palestinian statehood at the UN, he'll pay an unpredictable but no doubt heavy political price at home, with an election looming. Yet if he resists the tide, his veto would leave the U.S. supporting, more visibly than ever, an Israel that has become a pariah state, in much the same way that South Africa once was.** For a president whose foreign policy is based on restoring American moral leadership and multilateral cooperation, that would be a heavy blow -- one he might choose to avoid whatever the domestic political price. So Gabriela Shalev's prediction that the U.S. will avoid the veto makes sense, even though it's been thoroughly ignored by the U.S. media, both corporate and progressive, who assume that Obama will order that veto. After her two years at the UN, where Israelis and Americans work closely together, she just may know something the rest of us don't know. On the other hand Shalev may only have been spinning a trial balloon meant to influence Israeli domestic politics. At that same Knesset meeting former Mossad chief Efraim Halevy warned that Israel ought to be actively pursuing peace rather than "hiding its head in the sand" and waiting for the UN vote in September. Shalev and Halevy are part of a growing chorus of Israelis who once held top government and security posts and are now calling on Netanyahu to get serious about peace. Even the current defense minister, Ehud Barak, wants his government to "seriously consider" a French plan for peace talks based on the '67 borders. **If Shalev's words were political spin, they are still a useful reminder of that powerful and growing contingent among the Israeli political elite who support Obama's call for immediate talks to set the border of a new Palestinian state (which would also give Israel a legally declared border for the first time).** They want Obama to keep pressing Netanyahu to move in that direction. The more Obama pushes, the more support he garners among Israeli centrists as well as liberals. The centrists worry that if Palestinians gain recognition from the UN without any settlement with Israel, it will trigger unpredictable conflict. Halevy calls it "the September events, which could come in waves against Israel's population." But it's far more likely that the events will come in waves against the Palestinians, who always suffer far more than the Israelis when the two sides come to blows. That's the crucial point that most Americans so easily forget. Spurred on by their president's promise to guarantee Israel's security, without ever mentioning the Palestinians' security, they assume that the Israelis are the ones at risk. As Israel's world-fame expert on military strategy Martin Van Creveld has pointed out, Netanyahu's claim that the pre-'67 borders are "indefensible" makes no sense. He's just touting the widely-believed but wholly inaccurate myth of Israel's insecurity. Israel would be perfectly secure within its pre-'67 borders, alongside a new Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. In fact, Israelis would be much more secure as long as those borders were mutually agreed on, because the motive for Palestinian attacks would vanish. **If enough Americans come to realize that a two-state solution along the '67 borders (with minor adjustments) will make Israel as well as the Palestinians and the U.S. more secure, Obama just might feel politically safe enough to tell the Israelis he will not give them that UN veto. Then Netanyahu will show up at the negotiating table, ready to make serious compromise, so fast it will make our heads spin.** As Gabriela Shalev reminds us, it's foolish to assume that Obama is merely a puppet with Netanyahu pulling the strings. Her two years at the UN surely taught her that the real power is in Washington, not Jerusalem. But it's only U.S. political opinion holding Obama back. So even more power lies with the American people. Progressives who care about justice for Palestine should be in the thick of the political battle, fighting to make their voices heard in the Oval Office.

( ). Fatah-Hamas unity initiated to avoid constraints on foreign assistance built into US law.

**International Development, '11** (<http://www.devex.com/en/blogs/development-assistance-under-obama/29-senators-urge-obama-to-suspend-aid-to-palestinian-territories?g=1>, 27 Senators Call for the Suspension of Aid to Palestinian Territories”, Ivy Mungcal 9 May 2011)

The United States should withhold financial aid to a Palestinian unity government unless all of its members, including the Islamist faction Hamas, publicly recognize Israel and renounce violence. 27 U.S. senators told President Barack Obama in a letter dated May 6. “We urge you to conduct a review of the current situation and suspend aid should Hamas refuse to comply with Quartet conditions,” says the senators, led by Sens. Robert Menendez (D-N.J.), a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Robert Casey (D-Penn.), who heads the SFRC’s Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs subcommittee. The Quartet on the Middle East, which comprises the United Nations, Russia, European Union and the United States, set three requirements for the recognition of a Palestinian government: recognition of Israel, compliance with previous diplomatic agreements and the rejection of violence. Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen also called for the suspension of aid to the Palestinian Authority, arguing that “assistance to the Palestinian Authority will end up benefiting Hamas.” The House Foreign Affairs Committee chairwoman said in a press release that funding the Palestinian Authority will mean “bankrolling a pro-militant, anti-Israel entity.” The Obama administration said it is still waiting for further details about the reconciliation deal between Hamas and the Abbas-led Fatah political party, but several officials have repeatedly stressed in recent days that a Palestinian unity government should reject Hamas’ current policies, according to Foreign Policy’s “The Cable.” The U.S. Department of State classifies Hamas as a foreign terrorist organization and U.S. laws prohibit the provision of aid to such groups. Meantime, Abbas urged a group of American Jews who visited West Bank on Sunday (May 8) to urge the U.S. Congress not to cut financial aid as a result of Fatah’s deal with Hamas. Abbas stressed that the new government “will comply with my policies, and I am against terror and violence,” The New York Times reports. Fatah and Hamas signed May 3 a deal that ends their four-year rift and paves the way for the creation of a unity government in the Palestinian territories. Palestinian Authority spokesperson Ghassan Khatib said that the agreement was formulated in a way that would avoid conditions that could prevent the new unity government from receiving foreign aid.

( ). Recent reconciliation hopeful. Fatah-Hamas unity key to statehood and the changes brought by an Arab Spring make unity possible.

Marc Gopin, Director, CRDC, George Mason, **June 6** ("Fatah, Hamas and the Future of Palestine," 06/ 6/11, acsd 6/7/11, [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/marc-gopin/fatah-hamas-and-the-futur\\_b\\_871544.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/marc-gopin/fatah-hamas-and-the-futur_b_871544.html))

Ever since the disastrous split in Palestinian leadership of several years ago into Fatah and Hamas, it has become clear that disunity has been a critical factor standing in the way of Palestinian statehood. Many reconciliation efforts, with several third parties, were attempted and aborted. **This time it seems that things are different, despite the enormous ideological divisions and outstanding grievances between Fatah and Hamas. Why is this happening now? Clearly, the historic impact of the "Arab Spring" on Egypt and Syria, and across the region, is an enormous game changer.** The increasing instability of Syria suggests that there is a strong possibility that A) Hamas may no longer have a stable home in Syria, but, on the other hand, Palestinians now have a much more sympathetic ear in Egypt which has been critical as a peace broker. B) Syria has long prevented its own Palestinian population from any kind of political activism, preferring to keep them as a bargaining chip to get back the Golan. But events of Naqba Day 2011 suggest that there are elements in Syria who are ready to unleash the power of the Palestinian masses against Israel if they see their internal situation increasingly destabilized by what they say are "outside agitators." In other words, if the spirit of the Arab Spring brings them down then these elements are threatening to take Israel with them. All of this is new and is due to the unprecedented power and effects of Arab nonviolent resistance.

( ). Gopin cites Aziz Abu Sarah for the argument that Hamas will work for unity to maintain recognition. The Gazan people will demand changes in their lives.

Marc Gopin, Director, CRDC, George Mason, **June 6** ("Fatah, Hamas and the Future of Palestine," 06/ 6/11, acsd 6/7/11, [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/marc-gopin/fatah-hamas-and-the-futur\\_b\\_871544.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/marc-gopin/fatah-hamas-and-the-futur_b_871544.html))

Aziz Abu Sarah is Co-Executive Director of the Center for World Religions, Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution, a leading Palestinian peacebuilder, architect of CRDC citizen diplomacy interventions in Palestine and Israel, and an important analyst featured in numerous Middle Eastern outlets. He explains Hamas' and Fatah's evolving strategies this way:

"Hamas has been following the changes in the Middle East with growing interest and anxiety. **The centers of power are changing**, and some of their allies in the region are facing internal challenges and uprisings that they might not survive. They learned from watching the Arab revolutions that there is the potential for unrest in Gaza due to frustration with the status quo. **At one point Gazans will ask Hamas' leaders what are they doing to make a difference, and the people will not be satisfied with just blaming Israel. They want to see a difference in their lives and they expect their leaders to have a strategy that would lead them to freedom, dignity and security. A unity government will legitimize Hamas, especially in the Arab world.** Both Khaled Mashal and Ismail Hanniyeh have spoken publicly about accepting a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders. Many believe that Hamas was waiting for President Abbas to negotiate an agreement before jumping onboard."

**In other words, the Arab Spring of the young has already come to Gaza, and it is re-structuring the strategy of Hamas. The same can be said of Fatah, who were facing a restive youthful population in recent months, ready and eager to join the Arab Spring.** Aziz explains:

"**The Palestinian leadership decided that they must choose a different avenue if they want to shake the political stalemate. This new path includes the internationalization of the Palestinian case** and putting Israel under pressure by countries sympathetic to the Palestinian cause. "

## USAID purposefully excludes East Jerusalem from its Policies

**Nasser, '10** ("Jewish Settlement Expansion in the Occupied Territories" Nicola,  
*Global Research*, July 22, 2010, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=20220>, acsd 6/8/11)

It is also interesting to observe that the policies of USAID, an instrument that the State Department uses to pursue the US's objectives overseas, also conflict with Washington's official stances. USAID programmes for the Palestinians effectively exclude East Jerusalem. Its green papers and other official reports and statements make frequent mention of "the West Bank and Gaza" as headings for its activities, but rare are references to East Jerusalem. It is as though, for USAID, East Jerusalem is not an indivisible part of the occupied territories, in spite of Washington's official acknowledgement that it is and in spite of the inclusion of East Jerusalem among the final status issues in the US- brokered negotiating process between the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Israel, the occupying power. One cannot help but suspect USAID -- and by extension the State Department -- of perpetrating a certain calculated deception through its deliberate and systematic omission of East Jerusalem in its programmes and documents.

( ). Recent history of the term “Palestine” refers to the British Mandate—Israel, the West Bank and Gaza. Modern usage refers to the prospective Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza.

**Wikipedia entry for “Palestine”** (en.wikipedia.org/.../Definitions\_of\_Palestine\_and\_Palestinian, acsd 6/7/11).

Between 1922 and 1948, the term *Palestine* referred to the portion of the British Mandate of Palestine lying to the west of the Jordan River; that is, all of what is now Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip. During the period of the British Mandate of Palestine, the term "Palestinian" referred to all people residing there, regardless of religion, and those granted citizenship by the Mandatory authorities were granted "Palestinian citizenship". The term was used without any ethnic connotations. For example, the *The Jerusalem Post*, an Israeli newspaper, was called *The Palestine Post* from its founding in 1932 until 1950....**Modern usage of the term Palestine usually refers to a prospective Palestinian state, incorporating both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.** Some who oppose the existence of a Jewish state in the region regard all the land west of the Jordan River as the territory of a Palestinian state "from the river to the sea," in denial of Israel's existence or right to exist in the future. The term is also used to convey the sense that Palestine is *already* a state, either (a) consisting only of Gaza & West Bank or (b) including as well all land held by Israel. Since the 1988 Palestinian Declaration of Independence, the UN General Assembly has recognized the PLO mission there under the name "Palestine."

( ). Palestinian Territories a disputed phrase, came into use after the 1967 War

**Wikipedia entry for “Palestinian Territories”** (en.wikipedia.org/.../Definitions\_of\_Palestine\_and\_Palestinian, acsd 6/7/11).

The Palestinian territories comprise the West Bank and the Gaza Strip—territories that were occupied, respectively, by Jordan and Egypt from the 1948 Arab–Israeli War until the 1967 Six Day War and are currently occupied by Israel according to the international community (Gaza Strip being occupied has been disputed by Israel).[1][2][3] The Palestinian National Authority regards East Jerusalem as part of the West Bank, and consequently a part of the Palestinian territories, while Israel regards it as part of Israel as a result of its annexation in 1980. 'Palestinian territories' is one of a number of designations for these areas (the UN and international legal bodies often refer to them as the Occupied Palestinian Territories). The territories were part of the territory west of the Jordan River of Mandate Palestine, formed in 1922. In March 1946, the territory east of the Jordan River, which had been ruled as a separate province of Mandate Palestine, became the independent kingdom of Transjordan, though general international recognition took a bit longer. The Palestinian territories were captured and occupied by Transjordan (the West Bank) and by Egypt (the Gaza strip) in 1948, and acquired their current boundaries at the cessation of fighting in the 1948 Arab–Israeli War, which was confirmed in the 1949 Armistice Agreements.[4] Israel captured and occupied the territories in the 1967 Six-Day War. In 1980 Israel annexed East Jerusalem, but United Nations Security Council Resolution 478 declared it "null and void" and required that it be rescinded, stating that it was a violation of international law. The annexation lacks international recognition.[2] There are disagreements over what the Palestinian territories should be called. The United Nations, the International Court of Justice, the European Union, International Committee of the Red Cross and the government of the United Kingdom all refer to the "Occupied Palestinian Territories".[9][10][11] Journalists also use the description to indicate lands outside the Green Line.[citation needed] The term is often used interchangeably with the term occupied territories, although this term is also applied to the Golan Heights, which is internationally recognized as part of Syria and not claimed by the Palestinians. The confusion stems from the fact that all these territories were captured by Israel during the 1967 Six-Day War and are treated by the UN as territory occupied by Israel. Other terms used to describe these areas collectively include 'the disputed territories', 'Israeli-occupied territories', and 'the occupied territories'. Further terms include "Yesha" (Judea-Samaria-Gaza), Yosh (Judea and Samaria), the Katif Strip (Gaza Strip), "liberated territories", "administered territories", "territories of undetermined permanent status", "1967 territories", and simply "the territories". Many Arab and Islamic leaders,[who?] including some Palestinians,[who?] use the designation 'Palestine' and 'occupied Palestine' to imply a Palestinian political or religious claim to sovereignty over the whole former territory of the British Mandate west of the Jordan River, including all of Israel.[12] Many[who?] of them view the land of Palestine as an Islamic Waqf (trust) for future Muslim generations. A parallel exists in the aspirations of David Ben-Gurion,[13] Menachem Begin,[14][15] and other Zionists and Jewish religious leaders[who?] to establish Jewish sovereignty over all of Greater Israel in trust for the Jewish people.[16][17] Many Israelis[who?] object to the term "occupied Palestinian territories", and similar descriptions, because they maintain such designations disregard legitimate Israeli claims to the West Bank and Gaza, or prejudice negotiations involving possible border changes, arguing that the armistice line agreed to after the 1948 Arab-Israeli War was not intended as a permanent border. Dore Gold wrote, "It would be far more accurate to describe the West Bank and Gaza Strip as "disputed territories" to which both Israelis and Palestinians have claims." [18] The Palestinian territories consist of two (or perhaps three) distinct areas: the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Israel regards East Jerusalem not to be a part of the West Bank, but regards it as part of a unified Jerusalem, which it unilaterally considers the Capital of the state. The eastern limit of the West Bank is the border with Jordan. The Israel–Jordan peace treaty defined that border as the international border, and Jordan renounced all claims to territory west of it. The border segment between Jordan and the West Bank was left undefined pending a definitive agreement on the status of the territory.[19] The southern limit of the Gaza Strip is the border with Egypt. Egypt renounced all claims to land north of the international border, including the Gaza Strip, in the Israel-Egypt peace treaty. The Palestinians were not parties to either agreement. In any event, the natural geographic boundaries for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea, respectively.

