

Yemen – Overview

Yemen should probably be included in the topic. But this comes with heavy caveats and rests upon a (possibly dubious) prediction that the quality of solvency evidence between now and September will improve. There are at least four problems with the evidence we've found:

- First, most solvency advocates we've found are outdated. The President of Yemen was wounded in June and is receiving medical attention in Saudi Arabia. He may or may not return, but most solvency evidence assumes creating a path for him to step down, which will probably be a moot issue by September.
- Second, the best recommendations for Yemen involve things that are beyond the scope of the “democracy assistance” mechanism. The most frequent recommendations involve (1) recognizing the opposition formally, which the US may do before September (2) suspending our current military assistance to Yemen because it is being used against protestors, and (3) creating a package of humanitarian and economic assistance because Yemen is very close to being a failed state.
- Third, evidence that comes closest to what we consider “democracy assistance” is not outstanding. There are some advocates – but generally the evidence describes the current problem, recognizes what the US can do is limited, and then proposes a few things, but without much support for why they might actually work.
- Fourth, we have produced little evidence about why the US is the most important actor. Saudi Arabia or the GCC are more credible, although there is significant mistrust of Saudi Arabia since it is seen as opposed to democracy (but fiating a Saudi policy shift may overcome that). An aff that was built around counterterrorism cooperation might have a semblance of a US key warrant, but this is a thin defense against an international counterplan.

However, the literature base for Yemen is fairly large, which provides some confidence that it will adapt fairly quickly to new developments and it would be an error not to include it in the topic because there may be some great Yemen affirmatives over the course of the year.

Current US policy towards Yemen:

- The US gives them several hundred million in economic aid, humanitarian assistance, and security assistance now. The amount of aid has increased substantially in the last 3 years.
- The US conducts drone strikes on their soil, and trains their military to help kill terrorists.
- The US supports a GCC-backed transition plan for Yemen that provides an exit strategy for Saleh to step down, give him immunity, and give power to the vice president. Saleh mostly agreed to this, but he has delayed consideration of it, and he was severely injured recently so there will probably be more delays. Regardless, the Yemeni protestors want him gone immediately and want him punished, so the GCC plan is not satisfactory to them.

Advantages a Yemen affirmative might claim:

- Counterterrorism cooperation. The argument might be that the Yemeni population is hostile to US counterterrorism operations in Yemen now because they think the US values Yemen only for counterterrorism. The plan might be seen as a broader commitment that is more acceptable. Alternatively, an aff could just say that Yemeni instability / civil war is inevitable without democracy assistance, and that creates a safe haven for al Qaeda. Of course, any potential terrorists could just go to Somalia instead.

- Oil shocks. Yemen sits on top of a strategically important choke point for oil shipments. Some people say that is important for the world economy. The argument is fairly silly – the amount of oil that is shipped is a drop in the bucket – but the evidence is better than it should be.
- Regional instability / GCC instability / greater Iranian influence. The only card I found that mentions Iran is in the context of an aff that would provide democracy assistance to the Saleh government itself and prop it up – but the evidence is good enough that I imagine other cards exist. There are many cards that say Yemeni instability would destabilize Saudi Arabia however.

Disadvantages that could be run against Yemen:

- Saudi Arabia relations. I didn't turn out cards on this, but the un-underlined part of the Dorsey evidence in the solvency advocate section pretty explicitly says that Saudi Arabia hates the plan. And the argument makes sense, they don't want Yemeni democracy.
- GCC cohesion. It's not reverse causal (and also mentions Bahrain in addition to Yemen) but there is a good card that says instability in Yemen is transforming the GCC from an ineffective talking shop to a regional security organization.

Yemen – summary of current events

Decent summary of recent events in Yemen

Heydemann, 11 – US Institute of Peace (Steven, “Saleh’s End?”, 6/6,

<http://www.usip.org/publications/saleh-s-end>

On Sunday June 5, two planes carrying Yemeni President Ali Abdallah Saleh and some two dozen members of his family landed in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Two days earlier, Saleh and a number of senior Yemeni officials were wounded in an attack on a mosque in Sana’a’s massive presidential compound. Yemen’s prime minister and deputy prime minister, the governor of Sana’a province, the Speaker of Parliament and the head of the Shura Council were also wounded. Official reports initially downplayed the extent of Saleh’s injuries, yet Saudi sources later indicated that he had extensive second-degree burns and shrapnel wounds that were potentially life-threatening.

In Saleh’s absence, power was transferred to Vice President Abd al-Rab Mansur al-Hadi. Yemeni officials insisted that the transfer was temporary, “until the president returns.” Yet the departure of Saleh and his family has been widely interpreted as a “soft exit” for the leader whose political career spanned almost five decades. Saleh began his political life as a young army officer who participated actively in Yemen’s civil war of the 1960s, rose to power as president of North Yemen in 1978, and, in 1990, became the head of unified Yemen. As president, Saleh acquired a reputation as a ruthless, corrupt, yet also shrewd and effective politician. Governing one of the world’s poorest countries, balancing an historically weak state and the often competing demands of Yemen’s powerful tribes, Saleh thrived by using his control of state resources to dominate and manipulate Yemen’s complex networks of local and regional elites.

In recent years, however, Saleh had come under increasing pressure to embrace significant political reforms. An active insurgency in northwest Saada province, a growing and increasingly militant secessionist movement in the south, an expanding al-Qaida presence, and continuing economic, social, and environmental crises weighed heavily on Saleh’s regime. As pressures mounted, Saleh’s capacity to sustain his ruling coalition eroded. Nonetheless, and despite two years of “National Dialogue” on political reforms with an opposition coalition, the Joint Meeting Parties, Saleh had recently accelerated efforts to ensure either his own continuation in power or the installation of his son, Ahmad Abdullah Saleh, as his successor. In late 2010, and without regard for the National Dialogue process, Saleh pushed constitutional amendments overturning term limits on the presidency through a tame parliament dominated by his ruling party, the General People’s Congress (GPC).

In the end, however, Saleh may become known as the third Arab autocrat to be overthrown in the wave of popular uprisings that are transforming politics across the Middle East and North Africa. As in Egypt and Tunisia, peaceful demands for political reform gradually gained momentum across Yemen in early 2011. Saleh’s regime responded with violence, killing dozens in a failed effort to bring protests to an end. The regime’s repression backfired, however, galvanizing protesters and provoking the defection of key regime allies, including GPC parliamentarians and a leading general, Ali Mohsin. As his coalition teetered, Saleh entered negotiations for an orderly transition of power. Several times, he signaled his willingness to leave office. Yet no fewer than three times he reneged on his commitment to step down and refused to sign a transition agreement that had been secured through the mediation of the Gulf Cooperation Council.

Saleh’s third and final rejection of a negotiated transition in late May transformed what had been a tense political standoff into open warfare between loyalist forces and opposition tribal militias affiliated with Sheikh Sadiq al-Ahmar, the head of one of Yemen’s largest tribal federations, the Hashid. By the time Saleh was wounded, Yemen’s capital had become a battle zone, and the country was sliding rapidly into full-scale civil war.

What Next?

Will the descent into civil war end with Saleh’s departure? Will Saleh return to the presidency? In the city of Taiz, news of Saleh’s departure was greeted with fireworks and public celebrations. Many Yemenis now assume that Saleh has gone for good. Yet Yemeni officials insist that the president will return. Saudi authorities reported that he had successfully been treated for his wounds, and was recovering from surgery in Riyadh. More ominously, loyalist forces including elite units under the control of the president’s son continue to patrol Sana’a and other major cities. Al-Ahmar’s tribal militias are also poised to resume fighting.

Yemen’s future would now seem, literally, to be in Saudi hands. Saudi Arabia has long been the leading external power broker in Yemen, and a major supporter of Saleh. The Kingdom has also been active regionally in support of existing regimes, making ample use of its financial resources to shore up its authoritarian counterparts and undermine popular movements for political reform. These suggest that Saudi Arabia might

not stand in the way of Saleh's return, even if this would almost inevitably trigger a new round of fighting. Yet Saudi intentions are not so straightforward. There are indications that Saudi Arabia cares more about stability in Yemen than they do about Saleh himself. Saudi officials were also involved in Gulf Cooperation Council efforts to secure Saleh's departure from office. It is entirely plausible, therefore, to speculate that the Saudis are now actively engaged in behind the scenes efforts to restructure Yemen's ruling coalition and usher in a post-Saleh political order.

But, such efforts may not succeed. For one, it seems highly unlikely that Saudi Arabia will accept an outcome that includes Yemen's transition to democracy. The al-Ahmar themselves are motivated more by opposition to Saleh than by a commitment to democratic reform. Thus, even at the moment they seem brightest, the prospects of Yemen's opposition may be far less promising than many assume. Yemenis may well find themselves confronted by a set of unpleasant alternatives: a Saudi-brokered return of President Saleh—perhaps having wrested from him a commitment to leave office under some, as yet unknown, conditions; the imposition of a Saudi-brokered ruling coalition that is likely, at least in the near term, to be undemocratic, if perhaps more inclusive of tribes that had been excluded by President Saleh; or, potentially, if less likely, the unfettered return of President Saleh without his commitment to reform, and the near inevitable resumption of violence between his forces and those of the Hashid tribes. None of these options offer much basis for celebration.

Yemen – what we currently do

Current US policy supports the GCC plan

Washington Post, 6/8/11 – editorial board (“Preventing chaos in Yemen,”

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/preventing-chaos-in-yemen/2011/06/07/AG2XUSMH_story.html

THE SITUATION in Yemen is as complex as it is dangerous. With the president in Saudi Arabia for medical treatment, a power vacuum looms, with a bewildering array of forces competing to fill it: the remains of his regime, opposition political parties, youthful pro-democracy protesters, renegade generals, tribal leaders and Islamic extremists. If the Obama administration and European and Arab allies are fumbling for a strategy, they have good reason to be. But there is at least a starting point on which all should be able to agree: Ali Abdullah Saleh should not be allowed to return to Yemen unless he definitively gives up the presidency — and maybe not even then.

Though unfortunate for the 69-year-old Mr. Saleh, the relative good news may be that his medical condition could by itself ensure his indefinite exile. His supporters initially said he was only lightly injured in an apparent bombing in a mosque last Friday, but U.S. officials later reported that he suffered extensive burns and a head injury, and that fragments of wood were embedded in his body.

That may be the only way to restrain a man who, after 33 years in power, has stubbornly clung to office even after appearing to accept, on three occasions, deals for his departure. Mr. Saleh’s last renegeing, on May 22, touched off a low-grade civil war between security forces still loyal to him, some of them commanded by his sons, and tribal fighters. Islamic militants have meanwhile seized control of one town, and Yemen’s branch of al-Qaeda — which has sponsored at least two attempted attacks on the U.S. homeland in the past two years — is believed to be consolidating a base in several mountainous provinces.

Mr. Saleh has been, at best, an inconstant ally of the United States, despite extensive U.S. training and funding of his security forces. But few of the candidates to succeed him look better. The youth groups leading pro-democracy protests are attractive but disorganized; several dissident tribal leaders and generals are Islamists who have been accused of links to al-Qaeda. Saudi Arabia has considerable influence with opposition political parties and tribes. But U.S. and Saudi interests in the Middle East are diverging as the kingdom seeks to prevent the spread of Arab democracy.

The best available policy nevertheless appears to be that being pursued by the Obama administration, which is pressing for acceptance of the deal brokered this spring by the Saudi-led Gulf Cooperation Council. This would grant amnesty to Mr. Saleh and his family in exchange for his resignation and new presidential elections — which even the Saudis prefer to gun battles in determining the country’s next leader. Already dirt poor, Yemen will desperately need economic resuscitation when and if the current crisis can be overcome. That should provide the United States a means of leverage with a new regime.

What we provide now – 305 million in 2010 that is mostly security and humanitarian assistance, and some increases in civil society assistance via embassy contacts

State Department, 11 (U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, “FACT SHEET: Transition And Reform In Yemen,” 5/19, <http://www.humanrights.gov/2011/05/20/fact-sheet-transition-and-reform-in-yemen/>)

The United States seeks to promote democracy, human rights, civil society, and economic development in Yemen through an orderly, peaceful transition that is responsive to the aspirations of the Yemeni people. We call on the Yemeni security forces to refrain from violence and respect the rights of the Yemeni people to demonstrate peacefully. To ensure the security and stability of Yemen, we are also committed to eradicating the threat from al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula and other extremist elements.

Bilateral and Multilateral Assistance: Together with our international partners, the United States provides critical support to bolster Yemen’s economy and security.

The United States has increased its total assistance to Yemen—from \$24 million in FY 2008 to \$128 million in FY 2009 and \$305 million in FY 2010.

We continue to broadly engage Yemen’s regional neighbors to coordinate support for Yemen through multilateral forums such as the Friends of Yemen process. We also support the involvement of international financial institutions and their commitment to a reform agenda for Yemen.

Partnership with the Yemeni People: The United States supports the Yemeni people in their pursuit of a more secure, unified, and prosperous nation. In fact, we have increased our assistance to civilians from \$16 million in FY 2008 to \$50 million in FY 2009 and \$128 million in FY 2010. We are already providing over

400,000 internally displaced and conflict-affected Yemenis with humanitarian assistance including clean water, food vouchers, and medical services.

In response to the current unrest, the United States is:

Providing medical consumables to the Science and Technology Hospital and field clinics treating wounded pro-democracy protestors near Sana'a University;

Providing equipment and supplies to facilities in Aden and Abyan treating victims of clashes between protestors and security forces;

Providing medical equipment and consumables to the Amran General Hospital, amid increasing clashes involving tribal factions and military units;

Repairing roads in order to improve livelihoods and facilitate access to health care facilities; and

Training local government leaders in crisis response and conflict management.

Increased Support for Transition and Reform: As part of the U.S. government's ongoing development efforts in Yemen, the United States is implementing a comprehensive political and economic reform initiative, in addition to the security assistance already underway.

Since protests began in Yemen in mid-January, the U.S. Embassy in Sana'a has expanded its contacts with political, tribal, and civil society actors. U.S. diplomats are reaching out to government leaders, the opposition, and student protesters to promote dialogue and a peaceful and orderly transfer of power.

The U.S. government is partnering with Yemen civil society to promote responsible and representative political parties, effective non-governmental organizations, independent media, full civic participation by women, and a responsive educational system.

500 million in security assistance plus drone strikes that probably gut the credibility of every aff that doesn't ban them

Gude and Sofer, 11 - * Managing Director of the National Security and International Policy Program AND ** Special Assistant with the National Security and International Policy team at American Progress (Ken and Ken, "The Last Best Chance to Save Yemen,"

<http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/06/yemen.html>)

Current U.S. policy toward Yemen

The Obama administration has invested significant time and resources to both broaden and deepen the U.S. relationship with the Yemeni government to help it fight terrorism and deal with other security crises as the terrorist threat from AQAP has grown. Deputy National Security Adviser John Brennan has made at least four trips to meet with President Saleh and flew out to the region just last week to confer on the crisis with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the two key players in the GCC.

The Obama administration has significantly increased counterterrorism and military assistance to Yemen since the failed Christmas Day plot, more than doubling it to \$150 million in 2010 and adding another \$100 on top of that for 2011. The U.S. government has also provided counterterrorism and other military assistance to the Yemenis totaling more than \$500 million since 2009. While this aid package does not compare with those to Egypt or Pakistan, it is a meaningful contribution to Yemen's national security resources and does give the United States some leverage.

According to *The New York Times*, the United States has intensified its drone and airstrike campaign against AQAP since the latest fighting began and Saleh's forces shifted away from counterterrorism. The report only cites two specific incidents, so it is difficult to ascertain the full extent of this U.S. activity. While this kind of kinetic operation can be useful as part of a broad strategy that seeks to both counter threats emanating from Yemen and assist the country's economic and political development, such action on its own is virtually certain to be counterproductive.

First, such actions are prone to manipulation by local actors or simply bad intelligence information, both endemic in the chaotic environment of Yemen today. Second, even when successful, civilian casualties—or even just the claim of civilian casualties—severely alienates the local population the potential for blowback to erase any tactical benefit from these strikes is very high. If the sum total of U.S. policy in Yemen can be described as "death from above," then the United States will not be popular and we may even engender greater sympathy among the local population for those we target.

Solvency advocates close to the topic

Increasing “civil society and economic assistance” resolves conflicting signals in Obama’s Yemen policy and creates a stable transition to democracy

Dorsey, 11 - senior researcher at the National University of Singapore’s Middle East Institute (James, “Yemen’s Saleh plays cat and mouse with Saudis and US,” 5/22, Al Arabiya News, <http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/05/22/150075.html>)

Yemenis have little to celebrate on the republic’s 21st birthday as President Ali Abdullah Saleh blows hot and cold on a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) agreement that would force him to resign.

Instead of cheering the unification in 1990 of north and south Yemen, Yemenis are protesting what they see as Mr. Saleh’s game of cat and mouse and a possible Saudi-engineered end to the crisis that they fear will stymie political and economic change.

Ironically, distrust of Saudi intentions may be the only thing that Mr. Saleh and his opponents agree on.

To many Yemenis, Mr. Saleh’s “in principle” acceptance of a GCC-mediated end to their country’s three-month old crisis sparked by mass anti-government protests threatens to be a repetition of the dashed hopes in the wake of the 1990 unification.

At the time, Yemen promised to be the odd man out in the Gulf: a full-fledged democracy in which a free press flourished, political parties proliferated, government restrictions were reduced to a minimum and free elections were held with universal suffrage.

Two decades later, Yemen is everything but a democracy.

Its immediate prospects are those of a failed state and a shattered economy. Many question whether Mr. Saleh’s departure, after 33 years in office, if indeed he agrees to go, will end an era of autocracy, corruption and nepotism.

Mr. Saleh’s cat and mouse approach to the GCC deal inspires little confidence. The president initially agreed to sign the deal in private on Sunday after opposition leaders inked it on Saturday. But in a last minute twist designed to at the very least buy time, if not back out of it for a second time, the president’s ruling party said that Mr. Saleh would only sign at a public ceremony in the presidential palace in the presence of hundreds of officials and opposition figures.

If Mr. Saleh’s delaying tactics raise questions about his sincerity, widespread unease with the agreement’s terms raise questions of whether the deal will stick. Under the agreement, Mr. Saleh would resign within 30 days rather than immediately. The agreement also grants him and his family immunity from prosecution, shielding him from being held accountable for alleged crimes committed during his rule.

Mr. Saleh’s delaying tactics as well as what happens if and when he resigns puts US President Barack Obama on the spot. After months of hesitating to call for his departure, Mr. Obama expressed support for the GGC-sponsored resolution. In the wake of his broad-ranging policy speech last week, in which he called for political and economic change across the Middle East and North Africa, Mr. Obama will have to demonstrate to Yemenis that the United States is not just interested in the fight against Al Qaeda but also in supporting their political and economic aspirations.

This is all the more true after he cushioned his demand that Mr. Saleh complies with the terms of the GCC proposal by referring to the president as a friend of the United States. Many Yemenis read Mr. Obama’s statement as saying that in line with their perception of Saudi intentions, Mr. Obama wants to see Mr. Saleh go but not a change of regime that could result in weakened Yemeni resolve to fight Islamist militants.

To counter those perceptions, Mr. Obama will have to demonstrate that he was sincere in his call for a real reform across the region, including Yemen, by helping the country build truly democratic institutions. That could put Mr. Obama at odds with Saudi Arabia if the kingdom indeed is reluctant to see a Western-style democracy flourish in the country.

Fears that Yemenis are about to be deprived again of an opportunity to build a democratic society are reflected in the continuing protests on the streets of Sana’a. Protesters say they have little faith that Saudi Arabia will allow Mr. Saleh’s departure to open the door to real political and economic change. They see Saudi Arabia as positioning itself as a power seeking to salvage the status quo rather than accommodate demands for real change in the region.

In a speech on Saturday, Mr. Saleh played to US fears that his successor would be less inclined to go after Al Qaeda’s Yemeni affiliate, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and may not give the US the leeway it had under his presidency to attack the militants with drones. Mr. Saleh charged that the GCC-sponsored agreement was “a mere coup operation” and that his departure would enable AQAP to gain control of parts of the country. Mr. Saleh has every reason to exaggerate the AQAP threat. Nonetheless, to keep a post-Saleh government

engaged in the fight against the militants, Mr. Obama will have to also focus on the issues that are foremost on the minds of a majority Yemenis. Those issues do not include Islamic militancy. Instead, Yemenis want to see their government moving effectively to guarantee greater freedom, reduce poverty and create jobs and economic opportunity.

To do so, Mr. Obama will have to increase civil society and economic assistance to Yemen and compliment US military, security, intelligence and counterterrorism personnel already in Yemen with experts who can help a new Yemeni government rebuild the country's fractured society and failing economy. With other words, the name of the game in a post-Saleh Yemen will be soft rather than hard power.

The US should call for Saleh's resignation, consult with Saudi Arabia, and actively engage the opposition parties

Green, 11 - Soref fellow at The Washington Institute, focusing on Yemen, al-Qaeda, counterinsurgency, and stability operations. (Daniel, "Yemen May Be Next Regime to Fall," 3/23, http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2011/03/23/yemen_may_be_next_regime_to_fall_99453.html)

U.S. Options

As the crisis in Yemen deepens, Washington should weigh its next steps carefully rather than reflexively sticking with Saleh. Various options have emerged, some of which could be pursued in tandem:

* Support Saleh's departure: Since the protests began in Yemen, U.S. policy has principally focused on promoting peaceful dialogue between Saleh and opposition leaders in order to reform the government along constitutional lines. Additionally, Washington has urged Saleh to resist violence and protect protestors from both government security services and pro-regime groups. Yet given the widespread nature of the protests and the recent military defections, the United States should actively call for Saleh's resignation and support a peaceful political transition. Although Washington has previously had to maintain positive relations with the regime in order to facilitate efforts against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the situation has reached the point where the United States is increasingly perceived as affiliating itself with Saleh at the expense of the Yemeni people.

* Consult with Saudi Arabia: Riyadh has a strategic interest in Yemen's stability, and any U.S. policy changes must take Saudi interests into account. The kingdom has historically used dollar diplomacy to maintain positive relationships with tribal leaders and influence events in Yemen. In the 1980s, Riyadh leveraged those relationships to fight the Marxist government of South Yemen. Given its recent military intervention in Bahrain, Riyadh is clearly interested in taking an active role to stabilize neighboring countries. Although the kingdom has long had a tense relationship with Saleh, they are more likely to support him when the alternative is unclear. Accordingly, Washington should consult with the Saudis on possible steps toward smooth transition, reassuring them that Yemeni stability and U.S. calls for Saleh's resignation are not mutually exclusive.

* Actively engage the political opposition: The United States should increasingly reach out to key opposition groups, including tribal leaders and political parties, in order to develop a greater understanding of their concerns and demands in a post-Saleh Yemen. This includes reaching beyond the capital and meeting with leaders in the governorates, including areas that have an AQAP presence. Washington should continue to press for peaceful evolution versus violent revolution, presenting itself as a guarantor of constitutional changes that would make the government more inclusive. Although Yemenis themselves must determine the leadership of their country if Saleh leaves, the United States should play an active behind-the-scenes role to ensure that the government does not fracture along regional, ethnic, sectarian, or tribal lines. Toward this end, the U.S. embassy should actively reach out to members of the JMP, the Islah Party, and the Southern Movement, as well as the Houthis and tribal leaders.

* Expand the fight against al-Qaeda: The United States has relied heavily on the Yemeni security services in its efforts to defeat AQAP. Many of these units are led by members of Saleh's immediate family or tribe, so his departure could impair their ability to operate or put them out of commission entirely. Accordingly, the United States should prepare to take on a more robust training effort within Yemen. It should also increase its ability to act unilaterally if a power vacuum emerges and Yemeni efforts against AQAP suffer.

In addition, if General al-Ahmar becomes a more important figure, Washington will need a better understanding of his views on pursuing AQAP. Historically, he has adopted a softer line on targeting al-Qaeda and was noticeably unhelpful during U.S. efforts to capture or kill the perpetrators of the 2000 USS Cole

bombing. Yet many of his attitudes likely reflected Saleh's thinking with respect to negotiating with al-Qaeda versus fighting it. With the merging of al-Qaeda elements from Saudi Arabia and Yemen in early 2009, the new AQAP organization has been quite willing to attack the Yemeni state. This change in al-Qaeda strategy may have prompted some members of the regime, including al-Ahmar, to shift from tolerating the group to actively fighting it.

US policy needs to recognize dissident voices

Yemeni Times 5-23-11 http://www.yementimes.com/defaultdet.aspx?SUB_ID=36113

We were shouting at the peak of our voices and the rush of excitement going through us like electricity. When I saw what the pro-president demonstrators were doing I felt sorry for them. They are missing so much, they are not connected to the journey of change and in fact they are challenging it and trying to stop it.

This passion is what the gulf countries and the US administration is missing in regards to Yemen. They think it is about politics and this is why the whole west not just the US were surprised with the Arab Spring. It is beyond politics, it is about the people and what they want.

All we need from the world now is to stop dealing with Yemen only through its president, there is more to Yemen than Ali Abdullah Saleh. There are 25 million people more, who are now speaking up for themselves and wanting to be recognized.

Expanding development assistance and financial assistance to strengthen institutions is vital to stabilizing Yemen – also law enforcement training assistance, and local capacity building

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It is essential that Washington take a holistic approach to Yemen. Although the major U.S. foreign policy concern with regard to Yemen since 2001 has been security and counterterrorism, the country's deteriorating security is a result of problems unrelated to security. As such, in many cases development assistance, education and technical cooperation, capacity building, institution strengthening, and direct financial assistance can better address the interconnected challenges facing Yemen than can military and security aid. Framing the U.S.–Yemeni relationship as based solely on security and counterterrorism issues, to the near exclusion of all other issues, has meant that movement on all other issues has been subject to Washington's perception of progress and cooperation from Sanaa on counterterrorism issues. As a result, a lack of movement of counterterrorism issues has stalled all other interactions (and the fact that Yemen is slated to receive more U.S. military and security assistance funding than development assistance in fiscal 2010 demonstrates a continued misallocation of priorities). The United States has ongoing foreign policy and national security interests with regard to Yemen that extend beyond counterterrorism issues, and so it is in Washington's interests to engage Yemen on other issues that will contribute indirectly to improving domestic security.

Yemen should be viewed as part of the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. While geographically part of the Arabian Peninsula, Yemen in fact has little else in common with the Gulf Cooperation Council states. To be sure, there are many deep connections between Yemeni and Saudi society, but the income disparity and differences in public service provision between Yemen and the Gulf Cooperation Council states clearly point to their differing problems, challenges, and capabilities. In many respects, Yemen's problems more closely approximate those of neighboring East Africa. Yemen's deep ties with the Horn of Africa and role in a greater East Africa smuggling and security complex further underscore the need to view Yemen with a broader lens. Looking forward, there will be a greater need to improve donor coordination and assistance programs—all the more so because the ongoing global financial crisis will further strain international assistance programs. The Yemeni government currently does a poor job of managing international assistance, and international donors need better synchronization to maximize their impact.

Increased financial assistance to Yemen, such as that currently proposed for fiscal 2011, is required. Assistance can be used to support and offset the difficult economic choices that will need to be made in Yemen, such as curbing government subsidies on diesel and introducing agricultural diversification. Local capacity-building efforts, such as English language instruction, teacher training courses, micro-finance enterprises, and exchange programs for judges, members of parliament, journalists, government workers, and academics can help fill voids left by reduced state capacity.

On security issues, strengthening border guard units so that the central government can better secure its own national borders is a first-order priority. This must be done in coordination with other regional neighbors including Saudi Arabia and Oman. Since 2001, the United States has taken steps toward this objective by supporting the establishment of the Yemeni coast guard and conducting needs assessments of the border guard units. However, senior Yemeni officers report that there has been little follow-through, and both the coast guard and border guards are in desperate need of equipment and training— something the bulk of U.S. security assistance for fiscal 2010 is intended to provide. Increased military-to-military training and exchanges with both the United States and other regional partners should also take place.

Yemen's ability to combat terrorism must be bolstered through efforts to build local capacity in law enforcement and in the legal and judicial systems. Enacting counterterrorism legislation and terror finance laws would help build state resilience. Greater policing training and programs to professionalize the prison service can help staunch one of the greatest concerns held by Western counterterrorism officials. In areas where it is not feasible or desirable to partner with the United States, such efforts can utilize the unique assets of European nations and other regional states.

Ultimately, a regional approach is needed to help improve stability in Yemen. The threats posed to Yemeni security and stability will jeopardize interests well beyond Yemen's borders, and as such there is not solely a U.S., European, or regional solution to Yemen's many challenges. The only way to mitigate the impact of these problems is through the active involvement of all stakeholders. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council states need to be encouraged to take greater action because failure to address Yemen's looming challenges would hit the regional states first and hardest. Washington should encourage the Gulf states to hold out membership in the Gulf Cooperation Council for Yemen in exchange for tough steps, including progress on curbing government subsidies, addressing corruption, and enacting measures to curtail security concerns. The council should also open trade with Yemen and formalize labor movements to help create a viable and durable future for the country. Yemen should establish high coordination commissions (like the one that exists with Saudi Arabia) with other Gulf states. The international community will also need to help mediate the southern secessionist issue, support a ceasefire in Saada, and begin reconstruction and development assistance to these regions.

Increasing democracy aid is vital to preventing terrorism in Yemen

Christian Science Monitor, 11 ("Yemen will be the big test for democracy vs. Al Qaeda," 3/21, <http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/the-monitors-view/2011/0321/Yemen-will-be-the-big-test-for-democracy-vs.-Al-Qaeda>)

Is democracy the best repellent against Al Qaeda in Muslim countries?

That question, which Americans have debated since the invasion of Iraq, may finally get its ultimate test in Yemen, the Arab world's poorest country.

Yemen's longtime ruler, President Ali Abdullah Saleh, is losing power quickly. Thousands of young people have kept peaceful street vigils for democracy since Feb. 21, inspired by Egypt's ouster of Hosni Mubarak. Last Friday, Mr. Saleh's legitimacy fell dramatically after security forces killed nearly 50 protesters near Sanaa University and Taghyir (Change) Square.

That slaughter of civilians has now triggered high-level defections of top generals and tribal leaders, who finally recognize the ideals of the disaffected youth and the hollow promises of reform by Saleh.

It may also have ended President Obama's strong support of Saleh, who has received millions in US aid for his fight against Islamic militants.

Unlike Tunisia, Egypt, or Libya, Yemen is home to a branch of Al Qaeda that American officials say is "probably the most significant risk to the US homeland" – even more dangerous than Osama bin Laden in Pakistan. Both the attempted bombing of a Detroit-bound airliner on Christmas Day 2009 and the discovery of parcel bombs on an aircraft bound for the US last year originated from the group, which is known as Al Qaeda on

the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). In addition, the 2009 shooting rampage at Fort Hood was linked to a radical Yemeni-American cleric, Anwar Aulaqi, who operates from the country.

If the “youth revolution” in Yemen leads to democracy – a big unknown for such a tribal, violent, and poor nation – Al Qaeda could be the big loser, as it is so far in other Arab revolts that have been largely secular in nature.

The terrorist group has thrived in opposition to US-backed autocrats like Saleh. But after Egyptians won their struggle for democracy, Al Qaeda’s deputy leader, Ayman Zawahiri, warned them that they were deviating from Islam, saying democracy “can only be nonreligious.”

Democracy would not be easy in Yemen. Two-thirds of its 23 million people are under 25. The educated students protesting in the capital know there are few jobs for them. The nation is running out of oil and its water sources are few.

Fortunately, AQAP has not found fertile ground in Yemen, even though it has struck at many military and government targets. Its vision of an Islamic caliphate ruling over Muslim lands has little appeal. The ideals of liberty and a modern economy hold more sway.

That struggle over competing visions won’t end when Saleh leaves. Still, many of the young protesters in Yemen, like those in Cairo last month, have been astonished at their sense of unity despite strong tribal differences. They have redefined themselves by their ideals of freedom based on peaceful protest, finding common ground that can be a strong defense against the kind of terrorism based on a false notion of Islam. The US must be ready to divert its aid to Yemen toward helping build up the democracy and a budding economy, as it is doing in Egypt. Al Qaeda could well lose ground in Yemen simply by the emptiness of its promise.

US needs to work with oppositional forces, solves for AQAP

Democracy Digest March 23, 2011, <http://www.demdigest.net/blog/2011/03/embrace-opposition-to-prepare-for-post-saleh-yemen/>

In Cairo this week, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates conceded that Washington had not prepared for a Yemen without Saleh.

“I think things are obviously, or evidently, very unsettled in Yemen. I think it’s too soon to call an outcome,” he said. “But clearly there’s a lot of unhappiness inside Yemen. And I think we will basically just continue to watch the situation. We haven’t done any post-Saleh planning,” he said.

But the Obama administration still has a chance to atone if “serious, concerted American and Western diplomatic pressure could be brought to bear,” writes Sheila Carapico, author of Civil Society in Yemen and the forthcoming Political Aid: Democracy Promotion and the Paradoxes of Empowerment in the Arab World. “It is time for Yemen’s president to know the US wants him to relinquish power to a civilian transitional government,” she contends.

Unlike Libya, where Col. Muammar Gaddafi suffocated all political space, Yemen has an assertive and politically pluralist civil society.

Some elements of the opposition, including the senior military defector Maj. Gen. Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, have previously shown a disturbing reluctance to confront al-Qaeda, writes Daniel Green, a Soref fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, focusing on Yemen, al-Qaeda, counterinsurgency, and stability operations. But that may have changed:

With the merging of al-Qaeda elements from Saudi Arabia and Yemen in early 2009, the new AQAP organization has been quite willing to attack the Yemeni state. This change in al-Qaeda strategy may have prompted some members of the regime, including al-Ahmar, to shift from tolerating the group to actively fighting it.

The administration should actively engage the political opposition, he argues.

“The United States should increasingly reach out to key opposition groups, including tribal leaders and political parties, in order to develop a greater understanding of their concerns and demands in a post-Saleh Yemen,” he writes. “This includes reaching beyond the capital and meeting with leaders in the governorates, including areas that have an AQAP presence.”

“Chaos is possible. But it is not inevitable,” writes George Mason University professor Mark N. Katz.

Saleh’s departure might substantially generate fresh momentum to resolve the grievances of the Houthi rebels and southern secessionists, and lead to a more effective approach to confronting Al Qaeda in the Arabian

Peninsula.

“This is not a group with a strong following in Yemen. It is a group that takes advantage of the weakness of the Yemeni government,” Katz argues. “A democratic Yemeni government may actually be in a better position to crack down on it than Saleh, who has been increasingly preoccupied by the rise of other internal opponents. Whoever is left in charge of one of the world’s most fragile failing states, will inherit a tough agenda and serious security threats.

“Yet this Middle Eastern spring of revolt has made the chances of AQAP being capable of filling a power vacuum seem remote,” writes Clark. “There is a more popular movement that has the momentum now. The west can but embrace it.”

Support of broad based democracy can increase stability in the region

CHARLES SCHMITZ | JUNE 8, 2011

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/08/yemen_without_saleh?page=0,2

The Ahmar sons' best bet is that the Saudis back them in some form. Here they have one thing going for them: Unlike the Americans, the Saudis are not particularly keen on Yemen's republican constitution, multiparty system, and elections. The Saudis would just as likely support a stable strongman if the Ahmars can convince the Saudis that they can deliver. It will be a hard sell, given that they did not deliver for the Saudis in the war on the Houthis. With the Americans now seemingly convinced that broad-based democracy in Yemen is the best way forward, the Saudis will at least have to wait for another time to prop up a strongman.

What of the Salehs? After all, they are still in command of the elite military and security forces, and Ahmed Saleh has reportedly locked himself in the presidential palace, refusing to let the interim president in. But President Saleh is gone, and he is probably not coming back without signing an agreement to step aside. That means the Saleh clan is in a more tenuous situation than before.

And the formal opposition? Empowered by the street demonstrations, it has successfully brought the Houthis from the north and the secessionist movement from the south into a broad anti-Saleh coalition. But both are independent powers that deeply distrust Islah, which dominates the JMP. They have a veto, a veto stronger than that of the street protesters. Islah's maneuvering room is thus also limited by the need to include these two key political actors.

With everybody politically hemmed in and nobody dominant, Yemen finally has a chance for real political change. The potential spoilers are Hamid al-Ahmar and Ahmed Saleh, who well may resort to renewed chaos and fighting to make a grab at power themselves. Hopefully, both men are rational enough to see that they cannot succeed, but we will likely see some tense moments and small flare-ups of fighting.

Pulling Yemen's diverse political actors into dialogue and forming a transitional government is going to be a very difficult process that will break down, start up, break down, and start up again. This instability is necessary and good. Many diverse former enemies are trying to work out a political compromise. Let's hope they succeed and that spoiled children can grow up.

Specifics on what can be done to provide election support to Yemen (though the article does not reference the US as uniquely key)

IFES, June 7, 2011 <http://www.ifes.org/Content/Publications/White-Papers/2011/Transition-in-Yemen-An-Overview-of-Constitutional-and-Electoral-Provisions.aspx>

The situation in Yemen escalated from confrontations between protestors and the security forces to fighting between military units loyal to President Saleh and those that sided with the opposition. The more recent fighting between government forces and those of the Hashed tribal federation has moved the conflict to a new level and added further uncertainties to the likely outcomes.¹¹

Before President Saleh’s departure for Saudi Arabia, the prospects for agreement on the GCC-sponsored transitional plan seemed more remote than before the recent escalation. If President Saleh does not return to Yemen, thus creating a vacancy in the presidency, the Constitution would require a presidential election within 60 days. It is possible that the steps foreshadowed in the GCC-sponsored agreement could be followed.

There would, however, be major risks inherent in holding presidential elections so soon after the internal conflicts Yemen has endured. Chief among these risks is the probability of further violent conflicts between supporters of the former president and opposition forces. The unknown state of readiness of the SCER to conduct an election in such a short time increases the risk. A full voter registration update (including the period for challenges and appeals) cannot be completed in 60 days. International electoral assistance programs could help the SCER carry out its responsibilities. For example, an assistance program can provide procurement and logistical support. However, a reasonably free and fair presidential election requires a stable security environment and there are real questions at this point whether that could be achieved to a sufficient level within the 60 days time frame required by the Constitution.

The GCC-sponsored transitional plan proposes that a newly-elected President would form a constitutional committee to prepare a new Constitution to be put to the people in a referendum. No timetable is set for this process but it could be lengthy if there are disagreements over important matters such as: whether the form of government should be presidential or parliamentary; whether the parliamentary electoral system should be changed; and whether a women's quota should be adopted. The time needed to prepare for a parliamentary election, after the adoption of a new Constitution, will be affected by decisions on consequential amendments to the electoral law; new constituency boundaries; and development of new electoral procedures and training programs.

In the medium to long term, there are several potential areas of improvement in Yemen's electoral framework that could lead to more open and transparent elections in Yemen, such as:

- Steps to increase the independence and transparency of the SCER, including: promoting consultations with political parties and stakeholders and improving access to electoral information
- Technical advice to the SCER, including: a review of election laws, regulations and practices; recommending changes to the law; and proposing changes to current regulations and procedures
- Steps to increase the confidence of the electorate in the voter register, including: redesigning the SCER's voter register (VR) database; rewriting the VR software applications; cleaning up the existing VR data; and investigating the systemic reasons for non-matches found in IFES' 2009 survey report between voters' details recorded on their voter identification cards and the details recorded in the VR database
- Improved technical aspects of the electoral process, including: the appointment and training of election committees and training of security forces on their electoral responsibilities
- More effective and timely resolution of electoral disputes and contests, including: improved procedures for receiving and determining electoral complaints; improved enforcement of the election law; training for prosecutors and the judiciary on election contests; and election law enforcement
- Increased electoral stakeholder awareness, particularly among women, youth, the disabled, and those in rural areas
- Conflict mapping and mitigation

(this is probably too old given recent events, but this is an example of a fairly common solvency advocate – largely vague on the exact details, but generally recommends that the US support a transition plan away from Saleh. The US has recently backed the GCC transition plan for Yemen, however)

The US should pressure Saleh to step down and draw up a transition plan

Boucek, 11 – associate in the Carnegie Middle East Program where his research focuses on security challenges in the Arabian Peninsula and Northern Africa. He is a leading authority on disengagement and rehabilitation programs for Islamist militants and extremists and a recognized expert on terrorism, security, and stability issues in Saudi Arabia and Yemen (Christopher, The National Interest, “Al-Qaeda Grows in Yemen,” 3/18, <http://carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=43289>)

In a region where demonstrations are spreading like wildfire, the United States should pay special attention to the protests escalating in Yemen. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula—arguably the most immediate threat to U.S. interests of all the al-Qaeda affiliates—takes sanctuary in this fragile country. A downward spiral following the collapse of Yemen's government would only make matters worse for the United States.

President Saleh is now facing the greatest challenge to his 32-year rule with tribal, government, and military defections away from the regime and several violent episodes that have left nearly 100 protesters dead. The real

question is not whether he leaves or who succeeds him, but whether the transition can be managed to prevent a violent outbreak and ensure that al-Qaeda doesn't have more space to play.

Yemen is no stranger to instability. Before protests kicked off on January 20, Yemen already was grappling with a daunting array of security, economic, and governance challenges. Essentially, everything that could go wrong has—there is an increasingly violent secessionist movement in the south, the seven-year Houthi rebellion in northern Sa'ada, and significant activity by a resurgent al-Qaeda.

But the greatest challenge to Yemen's stability is the rapid deterioration of the economy, which exacerbates every other problem. In the Arab world's poorest country, endemic poverty and chronically high levels of unemployment are aggravated by rampant corruption and explosive population growth. The country is facing a 27 percent budget deficit this year and oil—Yemen's most important source of income—is expected to run out in the next decade. Moreover, in 2010 foreign currency reserves fell by over \$500 million (approximately 10 percent) and the national currency, the riyal, is losing its value.

It's clear that the current conditions cannot hold for long. Saleh will not be able to stay in power until 2013, and the regime has acknowledged as much. They have claimed that Saleh has agreed to step down, but that it must be done in an orderly manner. What the transition process or mechanism will be has yet to be determined—and figuring out who comes next looms large.

When the country's most powerful military commander, General Ali Mohsin al-Ahmar, announced he was siding with the protesters it appeared as if the country was headed for a civil war. Ali Mohsin looks like he is positioning himself to have a role in guiding post-Saleh Yemen and is seeking to align himself and the military forces loyal to him with the interests of the country—and not the Saleh regime.

Before the current crisis, Ali Mohsin was frequently named as a potential successor to Saleh and some analysts have now suggested that he has presidential aspirations. Much more likely it seems is that Ali Mohsin would like to play the role of kingmaker.

The possibility for a managed, negotiated transition in Yemen still exists. In spite of the ever present fears of civil war, this remains perhaps the most likely outcome in Yemen. Much of what has happened in Yemen over the past two months has involved the country's elites working to maximize their positions ahead of any negotiations. Rarely, it seems, does anyone in Yemen take a public stand on an issue without first securing one's position in private. Saleh has repeatedly tried to appease the protestors, first by saying he wouldn't run for office again, then by offering major economic incentives. There are now rumors he is negotiating his exit—and very likely the terms of his departure.

But it won't take much for the country to tip toward violence. The military is not geared toward deescalating protests and avoiding open confrontation and the population is heavily armed—there are reportedly 60 million guns in a country of 23 million people. This is a recipe for disaster.

Al-Qaeda is already taking advantage of the unstable situation. Its fighters have increased attacks on Yemeni security forces and checkpoints. With the regime looking increasingly fragile, the fear is that the frequency and the magnitude of these attacks will escalate. And as the regime is more distracted with this political crisis, al-Qaeda has more space to plan and launch operations.

Regardless of one's opinion of the regime, Saleh has been a valuable counterterrorism partner for the United States, and officials are right to worry over whether the next leader will be as accommodating. The next government will likely be more responsive to the Yemeni people. There is already a significant dislike of American policy in Yemen and US counter-terrorism operations are deeply unpopular.

The time has come for someone new to take the lead. Yemen needs a government in order to address its internal struggles. It is now in Washington's best interest to work to keep violence from engulfing the country during the transition. Working with the EU and Saudi Arabia—who is Yemen's strong neighbor, primary partner, and largest donor—the United States should work to ensure that Saleh steps down and a transfer of power is handled peacefully.

US support for the opposition is vital to a smooth transition

Democracy Digest, 11 - edited by Michael Allen, Special Assistant for Government Relations and Public Affairs at the National Endowment for Democracy. ("Yemen finely poised between transition and regression," 6/6,

<http://www.demdigest.net/blog/2011/06/yemen-finely-poised-between-transition-and-regression/>

Yemen's pro-democracy and civil society activists are celebrating President Ali Abdullah Saleh's departure for medical treatment in Saudi Arabia as a fresh chance to halt a descent into civil war and initiate a peaceful transition of power.

But is the rejoicing premature?

Vice-President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, the country's acting leader, was quoted by the state news agency today as saying Saleh would return within days after recovering from wounds sustained in Friday's rocket attack on his presidential compound. Yet analysts question whether his hosts will allow him to return to office. "The Saudis will seize the opportunity ... to extend his medical recovery into a political rest," said Yemen expert Khaled Fattah. The prospect of the country deteriorating into Somalia-style anarchy was "a nightmare for Saudi national security".

Yemen's government should proceed towards a democratic transition, the Obama administration said today. But observers believe alternative scenarios are feasible.

"Now we might have a small opportunity of trying to move things in the right direction – at this stage nobody has won," a western diplomat said. "[But] there are elements on both sides who would still like to go for a fight."

Rebel tribesmen today confirmed their commitment to a ceasefire with government forces, after the truce was jeopardized when two fighters loyal to Sadiq al-Ahmar, chief of the Hashid tribe, were killed by pro-Saleh snipers. Sadiq does not seek to succeed Saleh, a spokesman said.

"We support a power transfer to the vice president because this is the only constitutional solution that guarantees a peaceful transition and saves the country from destruction and bloodshed," he said.

Nevertheless, with Saleh's son and nephew in control of elite special forces, "the danger is not yet over," *The Economist* warns:

Close relatives of Mr Saleh are still in charge of the best-armed military units, and he still has many passionate supporters in Sana'a. Moreover, even if they agree to terms for a transition of political power, Yemen's other troubles persist, worsened by the economic crisis brought on by the unrest.

"The complexity of Yemen's political dynamic almost makes Lebanon seem straightforward," said an editorial in the Beirut-based Daily Star.

Whatever its political orientation, a post-Saleh government will need to maintain close links with Washington, said Christopher Boucek, an analyst with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

"There are mutual interests," he said. "My guess is that there is no money left in the bank, that the economic collapse is even worse than we think. The U.S. can help with economic development, resource depletion, all the things that cause instability. And it can say you also need to help us do something about AQAP."

The U.S. will find credible interlocutors amongst Yemen's vibrant and cohesive opposition, says Les Campbell, Middle East and North Africa director for the National Democratic Institute.

"The U.S. still has obviously many interests, particularly the terrorist angle, but the interest of the U.S. is to clear this up as quickly as possible to avoid further uncertainty, and to encourage all the political forces to come together and discuss," he says.

But any transition is unlikely to be either short or smooth, said Ginny Hill, a Yemen analyst at Chatham House, the London-based foreign policy think-tank.

"One scenario is that there is no formal or stable transition in the short term," she said. "We're looking at a contested process over a period of several years."

Post Saleh Yemen will still be chaotic, in need of some assistance (article concludes it may not be enough) but without a stable transition prolonged civil war will result

Jonathan Ruhe June 9, 2011 <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-horror-post-saleh-yemen-5435>

Though he is likely on his way out, a post-Saleh Yemen will only look worse. The country has been chronically fragile for years and would likely slide toward total state failure—with all the violence, dislocation and regional instability that accompany such collapses. Any successor(s) must contend with even more drastic resource shortages than those facing Saleh. Dwindling energy exports simply will not create enough revenue to provide basic necessities like water, food and fuel for a rapidly growing population, especially as the ongoing upheaval stokes inflation and disrupts vital exports and imports. Foreign assistance can fill some of these gaps, but what trickles down to ordinary Yemenis often goes through nonofficial channels, primarily direct Saudi stipends to selected tribal sheikhs. Much of the rest is grafted directly into the Yemeni regime, and thus most citizens never see a dime from their government.

Assuming a stable successor emerges, whether from Saleh's family, tribal and parliamentary opposition groups or even street protestors, the country's back to square one. Increasingly lacking money to ensure key tribal

loyalties, import basic necessities, and pay the civil service and military, a post-Saleh regime would have to perpetuate his corruption and reliance on aid merely to hope to survive. At best, the new government would be plagued by the same abysmal governance and rock-bottom legitimacy that triggered the current backlash. It is hard to imagine anything like a smooth transition of power, given the competing factions interspersed throughout the country. Despite defections from government and military ranks, and the loss of U.S. trainers, Saleh's family still commands the biggest, best-trained weapons for repression: the Republican Guard, air force, and Central Security Forces. Moreover, the lack of guaranteed immunity from prosecution in a post-Saleh world creates a dangerous situation where the most lethal group feels the most cornered. Arrayed against these itchy trigger fingers is a growing constellation of tribal, political and mutinous military forces. Many hail from Saleh's Hashid tribal confederation—Yemen's largest—but they are united only by desire for regime change. These well-armed groups' post-Saleh agendas, ranging from regime replacement to revolution, are too numerous and divergent—and their leaders too ambitious—to offer much hope for a stable transition of power, let alone a unity government. This reinforces loyalists' incentives to mimic Saleh's own methods: exploit differences among the opposition to defeat them. The struggle for the regime's future has shifted attention from Yemen's preexisting chaos. Sectarian insurgents and secessionists rebelled against poor governance for years, and Saleh responded relentlessly until forced to deal with unrest in Sanaa. For years al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has been exploiting this turmoil to insinuate itself into numerous tribes and thus develop a base of operations. Because all these groups want to weaken Yemen, not take it over, chaos at the heart of the regime serves their purposes by deepening security vacuums along the periphery. This is already being exploited: insurgents in the north have expanded into neighboring governorates, while AQAP-affiliated militants have overrun key cities and outposts in the south. A post-Saleh Yemen would likely be even less stable, thus increasing the potential for a byzantine civil war stretching from Sanaa to the hinterlands.

US needs to strengthen civil society assistance to Yemen – US should meet with the opposition / distance itself from the regime

International Crisis Group, 11 (“POPULAR PROTEST IN NORTH AFRICAN AND THE MIDDLE EAST (II):

YEMEN BETWEEN REFORM AND REVOLUTION ,” 3/10,

http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iran%20Gulf/Yemen/102%20Popular%20Protest%20in%20North%20Africa%20and%20the%20Middle%20East%20_II_%20Yemen%20between%20Reform%20and%20Revolution.ashx

Finally, the U.S. and others must to reach out more to civil society and opposition groups. So far, engagement has been deeply weighted in favour of the regime; international and notably U.S. military and security assistance inevitably is interpreted as support for the status quo. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's 11 January visit was a first, positive step that helped build relations with activists and opposition leaders. At this point in particular, it is critical for members of the international community to meet opposition leaders, including those in the Hiraak, who are organising peaceful protests. They must also continue to make clear and repeated public statements condemning the use of violence against civilian protesters.

The US should press for Saleh to step down, engage the opposition, and increase military contacts – key to counterterrorism cooperation

Phillips, 11 – Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs at the Heritage Foundation (James, “Yemen: U.S. Policy Implications of President Saleh's Resignation Offer,” 4/25,

<http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2011/04/Yemen-US-Policy-Implications-of-President-Salehs-Resignation-Offer>)

Yemen's embattled President Ali Abdullah Saleh has conditionally agreed to step down from power 30 days after a tentative agreement is signed with a coalition of opposition parties. But this face-saving political deal, brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council, has already been rejected by tens of thousands of protesters who adamantly demand an end to Saleh's 32-year rule.

If Saleh steps down, none of his likely successors is likely to cooperate as closely with the United States on counter-terrorism issues. But if he continues to cling to power, his increasingly weak and isolated regime will be in no position to contribute effectively to containing and defeating the Yemen-based Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), a major terrorist threat to the United States. The U.S. has a major stake in averting a civil war that would enable AQAP to improve its position within remote sanctuaries in Yemen's tribal badlands.

Crumbling State Power

Saleh is a ruthless political survivor who has dominated the tumultuous politics of the Arab world's poorest country for more than three decades. Although he cannily exploited factional and tribal cleavages to maintain power, his ruling coalition has suffered important defections in the face of two months of protests in which the regime's violent response has claimed more than 130 lives. The accelerating erosion of Saleh's narrow base of support has left the unpopular president unable to sustain himself in power without harshly repressing the swelling opposition.

Saleh's faltering regime, which has increasingly lost control over events outside the capital of Sanaa, has mobilized thousands of supporters to demonstrate in favor of the government. But the defections of key military officers—including Major General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, Yemen's top military leader—has severely undermined the regime's long-term staying power. General Mohsen has deployed his forces around key facilities in Sanaa to reach an uneasy standoff with Saleh's loyalists, and he looms large as a key leader in the loose opposition coalition that has coalesced to drive Saleh from power.

Saleh had already offered to step down at the end of the year after new parliamentary elections are held, but the opposition insisted that he do so immediately. Opposition leaders acquiesced to a proposed political deal brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council that calls for Saleh to resign and relinquish power to his vice president in exchange for a guarantee of immunity for Saleh and his sons. But this proposed deal has been loudly rejected by protesters who distrust Saleh's promises and want to see him punished for his repressive rule.

Prevent Yemen from Becoming a Failed State

Washington's highest priority in Yemen is to contain and eventually defeat AQAP, which has emerged as the most urgent threat to homeland security since the al-Qaeda high command was forced to hunker down in Pakistan's remote tribal areas. AQAP's Anwar al-Aulaqi, an American-born Yemeni cleric, has emerged as a key al-Qaeda leader. He is believed to have inspired Major Nidal Hasan, who perpetrated the 2009 Fort Hood shootings, and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the failed suicide bomber who sought to destroy an airliner bound for Detroit on Christmas Day 2009. Aulaqi is also suspected of playing a role in the November 2010 AQAP plot to dispatch parcel bombs to the U.S. in cargo planes.

The U.S. entered an awkward alliance of convenience with Saleh to ratchet up pressure on AQAP. Although preventing AQAP from carving out a secure sanctuary in Yemen is Washington's most urgent priority, Saleh's regime was always more concerned with the threats posed by the seven-year-old Houthi rebellion in the north and the simmering secessionist movement in southern Yemen. Yemen's weak government will be even less inclined and less able to assist U.S. efforts to fight AQAP now that Saleh is fighting for his political life.

To help stabilize Yemen and maintain pressure on AQAP, the Obama Administration should:

Push for a peaceful transition of power as soon as possible. The longer Yemen remains convulsed by growing political violence, the stronger AQAP is likely to become. Washington should publicly press Saleh to step down to defuse rising tensions and enable the formation of another government. Continued political paralysis would rapidly increase the risk that Yemen will become a failed state in which AQAP could flourish.

Maintain close contacts with Yemen's military leaders. The backbone of any successor government is likely to be comprised of military or former military leaders. General Mohsen is likely to emerge as the enforcer of any new regime, and he should be approached discreetly to determine whether he has modified his troubling past support for Islamist extremists.

Engage the opposition. American diplomats and intelligence officers should discreetly contact and sound out key leaders of political groups and tribes within the loose opposition coalition to ascertain which ones would be potential allies against AQAP and help them to become integral parts of the next government.

Coordinate policy with Saudi Arabia. Riyadh has a strategic interest in Yemeni stability and defeating AQAP, which narrowly missed assassinating the Saudi prince who leads counter-terrorism efforts in a suicide bombing in August 2009. Saudi Arabia wields the strongest foreign influence in Yemen by disbursing subsidies to tribal leaders and financial aid to the government.

Prevent Iran from fishing in troubled waters. There is a growing danger that the chronic Houthi rebellion could become a full-blown proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The Houthi tribesmen are Zaidi Shiites who do not share Iran's brand of Shiism, but they remain open to Iranian support in their conflict with

the predominantly Sunni Yemeni army and Saudi Arabia. The best solution would be to broker a political settlement that would permanently end the Houthi rebellion. But in the meantime, the U.S. should cooperate with the Saudi and Yemeni governments to contain Iranian influence and intercept any arms shipments.

Time for a Change

President Saleh has been a half-hearted ally against AQAP, which he perceived to be much less of a threat to his power than a southern secessionist movement or the Houthi rebellion in northern Yemen. Now that he is on the ropes, Saleh will be even less effective as an ally against terrorism and increasingly problematic as a political partner. If he stubbornly ignores the widespread popular demands for his resignation, there is a growing chance that Yemen will succumb to anarchy, to the great benefit of AQAP.

Washington should work to prevent that from happening by encouraging a peaceful transfer of political power to a government that enjoys enough popular support to halt Yemen's slide into chaos.

Support for electoral reform is necessary

International Foundation for Electoral Systems, June 7, 2011, IFES Briefing Paper, "Transition in Yemen: An overview of constitution" p. 11 <http://www.ifes.org/Content/Publications/White-Papers/2011/~//media/92100C6DDEC64E7F9C1B41747A0A1AB9.pdf>

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Yemeni elections are coming, the question of how they will be run looms

CHARLES SCHMITZ | JUNE 8, 2011

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/08/yemen_without_saleh?page=0,2

Yemen is headed for elections at some point, but the key question is: Who will oversee them? Although he promised to step down in 2013, Saleh planned to remain as head of the ruling party in any future elections. Since February he has said that he and his son Ahmed would be ineligible for the presidency, but remaining head of the ruling party would guarantee him a leading role in Yemeni politics and ensure that his sons and nephews would remain in top positions in the military and security forces.

The Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), the coalition of political parties negotiating for the opposition, wants Saleh and his extended family that runs the security forces out of the country, and it wanted total control of the transitional government that would carry out elections. Islah, which dominates the JMP, is a broad party that includes the top leadership of the Hashid tribal confederation represented by Ahmar's sons, various religiously oriented groups including the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafis, and finally large merchants who are against socialists (though the Yemeni Socialist Party is the second most important party in the JMP).

US is the most flexible donor, has the best relationship with civil society networks

Burke 10, "Assessing Democracy Assistance: Yemen" www.fride.org/download/IP_WMD_Yemen_ENG_jul10.pdf

Reflecting international optimism, USAID introduced a new 'Special Objective' in 2004, amending their Yemen Strategy from 2003–2006 to provide a programme entitled 'Expanded Democracy and Governance in Yemen'. In 2006 USAID provided over USD 3.5 million for democracy promotion in Yemen in addition to other capacity building initiatives; a significant increase from the USD 8.1 million spent by the US from 1990–2005.¹¹ Meanwhile the State Department's Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) made Yemen a priority, greatly stimulating the growth of civil society through the granting of flexible small funds of less than USD 100,000, which over 200 NGOs have received in recent years. The US government also funded technical missions to review prospects for legislative reform, including several projects undertaken by the Washington DC-based International Center for Non-Profit Law (ICNL).

Overall US aid to Yemen was remarkably limited during the Bush administration, lagging behind the development

assistance provided by European donors. US support for governance and development assistance were gravely affected by deepening concerns that the government was unwilling to tackle corruption. Relations reached a nadir in 2007 when an al-Qaeda operative convicted of the USS Cole bombing was released by Yemen despite US protests. In a remarkable piece of bungled timing, the Yemeni government announced his release hours before the US Ambassador to Sana'a was due to unveil a large aid package for Yemen under the Millennium Challenge Account, to which Yemen's candidacy was once again suspended.¹²

However, given the threat of a resurgent al-Qaeda in Yemen, the US government has recently begun to prioritise its relations with Yemen, labelling its new strategy as one of 'stabilisation' and in late 2009 announced two 'flagship' programmes, the Community Livelihood Project and the Responsive Governance Project which have been allocated USD \$121 million from 2010 to 2013 and will be implemented by USAID. It is envisaged that both of these programmes will not only involve capacity building at the national and local levels but will also be underpinned by a democratisation approach that will aim to improve oversight of development by Yemen's democratic institutions and civil society. USAID has also been allocated funding of just over USD \$1.2 million over two years to undertake 'conflict mitigation' projects to address mounting protests and violence directed against the Yemeni government. Such an approach goes some way towards addressing local concerns that the US government is committed to strengthening Yemen's security forces without consideration of the consequences for democratic reform. The US will also continue to provide core support to NDI activities in Yemen.

Among NGOs, the US is regarded as the most flexible external donor, unafraid of working with or funding NGOs that have frequently incurred the wrath of the government through their persistence in arguing against government policies. Contrary to their European counterparts, the US MEPI programme established good working relations with Islamist civil society networks, including those firmly opposed to broader US foreign policy in the region. Generally, despite widespread criticism of other aspects of US foreign policy in the region, US democracy assistance has won the respect of most political parties and NGOs in Yemen. The US has also been praised for taking a more unequivocal stance on human rights violations against political and civil society activists in Yemen than European donors.

Solvency – GCC plan

The GCC has the only realistic transition plan for Yemen

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<http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/06/yemen.html>)

The Gulf Cooperation Council Transition Plan

The most recent iteration of the GCC treaty granted President Saleh immunity from prosecution in exchange for transferring executive power to the vice president within a week and formally resigning as president within a month of signing the treaty. Opposition leaders would immediately halt all protests and stay off the streets throughout the transition process. A unity government composed of both ruling and opposition leaders would be formed, and both parliamentary and presidential elections would occur two months after Saleh’s resignation.

The GCC deal is currently the only plan for a peaceful political resolution to the conflict on the table, and while realities on the ground have changed since Saleh’s last rejection, it provides a decent framework for an end to the crisis. The first step of the agreement, the nominal transfer of executive authority to Vice President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi has already occurred, albeit under different circumstances than envisioned in the deal. Opposition leaders have stated they will accept Hadi as a transition leader, and he has the potential to play a very positive role in Yemen’s move to a post-Saleh government, yet the true power of the Yemeni state in Saleh’s absence remains with the leadership of the security services.

US pushing for GCC

Boston Globe 6-1-11

http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2011/06/11/huge_protest_gathers_in_yemen_to_demand_salehs_ouster/

The United States and Saudi Arabia are pressing Saleh’s ruling party to move ahead with a Gulf Arab-mediated agreement under which he would formally leave power in exchange for immunity; a new unity government would be formed between the ruling party and opposition parties; and new elections would be held within two months.

But youth activists leading the street protests reject the deal, saying it would allow elements of Saleh’s regime to remain in power. They demand the creation of a transitional government made up of technocrats.

In Abu Dhabi on Thursday, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton called on all sides to honor a cease-fire. The upheaval of the past months has left Saleh too preoccupied to focus on the fight against Al Qaeda, and the United States has stepped up its covert operations in Yemen.

US need to push GCC to improve democracy in the country

CSM 6/8/2011 <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/terrorism-security/2011/0608/Yemen-s-Saleh-could-be-away-for-months-complicating-transition-plans>

An extended absence from the country will likely speed up the political transition, The Washington Post reports. The US and Saudi Arabia will have more time to persuade him to resign and not return, and it may drive home to his supporters that his rule is over, mitigating their defiance. That may leave a window for the approval of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) proposal, which lays out a plan for a transitional government and new elections within 60 days of Saleh’s resignation.

The US hope is that the longer Saleh is out of the country, the more likely his supporters will be to realize that the GCC proposal is their best option. The political opposition has pushed acceptance of the proposal and said it will take it upon itself to appoint a transitional government and hold elections if Mr. Hadi does not take over the transition process, Bloomberg reports.

In Sanaa, the youth protesters who started the uprising in February see Saleh's departure from Yemen as an opportunity to push democratic reforms. "We have to take advantage of this moment," Sanaa University student Riyadh Zindani told The Washington Post. "A chance has been given to us on a plate of gold." Meanwhile, violence continues in Yemen's south, highlighting the precarious state that Saleh left the country in and the consequences if the power vacuum is not filled soon.

Obama seeking acceptance of GCC proposal, Yemen will need US aid post conflict
Washington Post, June 8, 2011 http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/preventing-chaos-in-yemen/2011/06/07/AG2XUSMH_story.html

Mr. Saleh has been, at best, an inconstant ally of the United States, despite extensive U.S. training and funding of his security forces. But few of the candidates to succeed him look better. The youth groups leading pro-democracy protests are attractive but disorganized; several dissident tribal leaders and generals are Islamists who have been accused of links to al-Qaeda. Saudi Arabia has considerable influence with opposition political parties and tribes. But U.S. and Saudi interests in the Middle East are diverging as the kingdom seeks to prevent the spread of Arab democracy.

The best available policy nevertheless appears to be that being pursued by the Obama administration, which is pressing for acceptance of the deal brokered this spring by the Saudi-led Gulf Cooperation Council. This would grant amnesty to Mr. Saleh and his family in exchange for his resignation and new presidential elections — which even the Saudis prefer to gun battles in determining the country's next leader. Already dirt poor, Yemen will desperately need economic resuscitation when and if the current crisis can be overcome. That should provide the United States a means of leverage with a new regime.

Broader advocates / Possible CPs

US needs a broad combination of carrots and sticks to prevent civil war – engage all parties, propose a transition plan, suspend military assistance, impose targeted sanctions on Saleh, announce an increase in humanitarian relief and development assistance

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<http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/06/yemen.html>)

The United States must move beyond mere calls for Saleh to relinquish power and put in place a package of punitive actions and incentives to use what little leverage it has to try and head off more violence and genuinely improve the conditions in Yemen after Saleh goes. This package should include:

- Urging all parties to abide by the cease-fire while Saleh is out of the country and pressing Saudi Arabia to delay or prevent him from returning to Yemen
- Proposing a revised transition plan based on Gulf Cooperation Council framework but transferring authority over security services away from the Saleh family and maintaining right of peaceful protest
- Suspending military assistance and weapons transfers while the Yemeni government shoots its own people
- Imposing targeted travel, financial, and other economic sanctions on Saleh, his family, and other senior figures that remain in his government in an effort to further isolate them
- Capitalize on the lull in fighting to announce an immediate humanitarian relief effort to help the Yemeni people, who were already suffering from a dire humanitarian situation before the recent crisis has accelerated Yemen’s economic spiral
- Announcing a package of economic and development assistance for a post-Saleh Yemen

The United States should be under no illusions that these or other actions would magically end the current crisis or transform Yemen into Switzerland. Given the stakes, however, general frustration and limited capacity to bring about a complete solution is no excuse to stop pushing the parties towards a resolution, and importantly, to help shape the post-Saleh Yemen and the standing of the United States with Yemenis.

US and Saudi cooperation to support the Yemeni opposition prevents a civil war – this requires an unequivocal US rejection of Saleh

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The conflict in Yemen has reached new levels of tension, and violent confrontation, along the lines of that in Libya, seems increasingly likely. No matter the level of provocation by President Saleh and his loyalist forces, protesters will be poorly served by resorting to violence. Civil war is but a step away. And this will unleash forces of extremism. The international community, the United States and Saudi Arabia in particular, need to prevent the country from devolving into anarchy.

Since protests began in Yemen in February, over 120 have been killed, and 5,000 wounded. The government has already lost control of three areas (al-Jouf, Abyan, and Saada), and large-scale demonstrations continue in fifteen of the country’s eighteen governorates. This week, the most alarming indication of direct confrontation between opposition and government forces has been the protesters’ march to take over offices of the governorate and presidential palace in the city of Ta’ez. The Republican Guard, security units lead by the president’s son—Ahmed Saleh—responded swiftly to stop their march.

President Saleh clearly believes it is critical for him show strength on the ground to position himself more favorably for negotiations with opposition parties. Mobilizing military and security forces, particularly the Republican Guard, now remains one of President Saleh’s only ways to assert his strength and demonstrate his ability to resist popular pressure. In fact, the president has repeatedly warned of the dangers of civil war in an attempt to justify his use of force.

Recent events have increased the president’s willingness to violently clamp down on the protestors. Saleh has now lost key tribal support and rival tribes are casting aside decades-long feuds to demonstrate their opposition to the president. In addition, important religious figures in conservative Yemeni society, such as Sheikh Zindani, have echoed the call for Saleh to step down. Further, the departure of General Ali Mohsen from

the army and his support of the protesters' demands have contributed to Saleh's isolation in a country over which he has only ever had tenuous control in any case. This collapse of Saleh's traditional allies has therefore left him with very few options.

If they hope to succeed in overthrowing Saleh, Yemen's protesters should avoid challenging Saleh's security apparatus, since this will only give him the excuse to escalate violence further. If civil war does break out, Saleh will not have to control the entire country to defeat protesters as his security units will give him the ability to control parts of the capital most critical to his survival. The military will also be able to draw out any negotiations for surrender or compromise over months—if not years. In this scenario, it is the opposition's Joint Meeting Parties (JMPs) and the young protestors of al-Tagheer Square that will be the losers—neither is equipped to engage in a civil war.

In addition to the opposition, the international community will lose tremendously if violence escalates. Indeed, al-Qaeda has traditionally thrived in situations of chaos and instability. A civil war could transform Yemen into the next Afghanistan. Aside from al-Qaeda, Saudi Arabia would have to manage a considerable influx of refugees along its 1800km border with Yemen.

The major players in this debacle are an aging dictator, JMPs' opposition composed of Islamists, Baa'thists, and Socialists, and al-Qaeda. With all these dangers to consider, it is not surprising that it has taken the Obama administration months to etch out a clear position on the crisis while trying to arrange for a transition to a post-Saleh Yemen. As the situation continues to escalate, however, the United States can no longer delay. Saudi Arabia's call to host negotiations between Saleh's government and the opposition parties is being viewed with high levels of suspicion. Ali al-Jaradi, a spokesperson of the al-Tagheer Square protesters, sharply criticized the Saudi role in the crisis. He mentioned in particular Riyadh's part in installing President Saleh in power in the first place, back in 1978.

The United States and Saudi Arabia must take immediate steps to support the opposition's non-violent approach. This is the only way to prevent the country from sliding into a civil war. To do so, Washington must take a clear and unequivocal position, publicly announced, that the time has come for Saleh to step down. The current U.S. position falls significantly short. Most American official statements have focused on the need for President Saleh to allow his people to protest peacefully, rather than calling for Saleh to leave office. The most aggressive statement came from Pentagon Press Secretary George Morell, who called for "a negotiated transition as quickly as possible." This is not enough.

Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, will have to define publicly and very specifically the terms of negotiations. These negotiations should focus on the whens, whys and wherefores of Saleh's departure, rather than on making compromises.

More broadly, the United States needs to stop worrying about who will replace aging dictators in the region as they are overthrown. Micromanaging political change in the Middle East has, in the past, proven to be destructive. By allowing citizens to choose their political representatives, the United States remains loyal to its democratic principles while also establishing the grounds for future partnerships. The Yemeni opposition has already made a commitment to democratic change and reform, thus providing a sound foundation for future collaboration. At this point, President Saleh is part of the past.

The US should prevent Saleh from returning to Yemen by pressuring Saudi Arabia

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Package of punitive actions, humanitarian relief, and economic incentives

The default expectation for far too many in the United States and around the world is for America to fix this problem or resolve that crisis. The reality is that even a country as powerful as the United States has limited capacity to affect change and that is especially true in a country facing as many problems as Yemen. The ultimate resolution of the crisis in Yemen is the responsibility of the Yemenis. But the United States must not be consigned to a policy of saying to President Saleh, "Go, or we'll say go again," and should use what leverage it has in an attempt to steer the parties towards a peaceful resolution of this latest crisis.

Call for explicit cease-fire and urge Saudis to delay or prevent Saleh from returning to Yemen President Saleh's departure to Saudi Arabia is the only reason for the current breathing space in the political crisis in Yemen. Jubilation erupted in the streets of Sana'a as it looked like Saleh had transferred power to his

deputy. The vice president has assumed the powers of the presidency but it is clear that the remaining elements of the Saleh regime believe that he will return to power. It seems nothing is ever easy in Yemen. Fighting has significantly died down since Saleh's departure when Saudi King Abdullah quickly negotiated a fragile cease-fire, but sporadic clashes persist. The cease-fire could unravel at any moment, especially if expectations build on any side regarding Saleh's prospects for return. It is vital to consolidate this breathing space with an explicit cease-fire while Saleh is in Saudi Arabia. This does not need to be a formal agreement, merely a public pledge by the major fighting factions—the Hashed tribe, the breakaway military units, and the government—to cease attacks.

AQAP is unlikely to abide by any cease-fire and is a major complicating factor that could make any genuine cease-fire elusive. It is not hard to imagine a scenario when one party cites an alleged AQAP attack as justification for retaliation or other action. But a cessation of attacks by the main fighting parties to this latest phase of the conflict would be an unequivocal positive and allow for a return to negotiations to resolve the political crisis.

It is vital that this window made possible by Saleh's departure be extended as long as possible to ensure the maximum leverage can be used for the United States and the GCC to peel off enough of the Saleh government so that his return to power becomes impossible. The United States should urge the Saudis to delay Saleh's return for as long as possible.

Suspending military aid and implementing targeted sanctions is vital to the Yemen transition

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Suspend military aid

While it appears that that U.S. military assistance has either slowed significantly or stopped during the current crisis, there has been no formal announcement that the United States has suspended military assistance to the Yemeni government. Concerns that a suspension of such assistance may benefit AQAP during the current crisis are understandable but incorrect. It is clear that AQAP is taking advantage of the crisis, but the best way to stop that is to end the current crisis. The bottom line is that the Yemeni government is spending its time fighting off a major challenge from powerful tribes and massive popular protests, not targeting AQAP. A suspension of assistance would not impact the fight against terrorism.

One serious potential drawback is that a suspension of military assistance could, although it is unclear, require the United States to withdraw the Joint Special Operations Command unit currently coordinating counterterrorism operations from Sana'a or result in the Yemeni government asking them to leave. This of course has its downsides, but counterterrorism operations absent a broader engagement strategy are just as likely to be counterproductive. Coordination with Yemeni government forces seems extremely minimal at this juncture given the focus of Yemeni forces and nothing would prevent continued cooperation with the military units under the command of General Ali Mushin al-Hamar, who defected to the protesters in March.

Additionally, it is important for Americans to realize that U.S. counterterrorism operations and our military support for President Saleh are deeply unpopular with Yemenis. While terrorism is our number one concern about Yemen, it ranks far down most Yemenis' list of concerns given all the troubles in their country.

A U.S. military aid suspension would certainly not mean that Saleh's guns fall silent, but the United States simply cannot continue to provide weapons to a country that uses them to kill peaceful pro-democracy protesters.

Targeted sanctions will end Saleh's grip on power

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Implement targeted sanctions

While the reach of targeted sanctions may not be deep, the precarious nature of Saleh's current political position, his extensive use of a patronage system that requires constant funding, and his increasing reliance on the United States for security assistance show that an international sanctions regime could fatally weaken Saleh's grip on power. Unlike Syria, where the United States sanctioned itself out of influence prior to the

current crisis, the Yemeni security apparatus' increasingly close relationship with the United States makes it much more vulnerable to a cessation of assistance and equipment.

A unilateral decision by the U.S. government to freeze assets and halt wire transfers to Saleh and his family members—including his sons and nephews who control the country's security services—would have a far reaching impact on the way foreign nations view and address requests by the Saleh family to use their financial institutions. While large foreign banks often informally abide by U.S. sanctions against individuals, the participation of the Gulf nations in targeted sanctions will be crucial given the amount of Yemeni money that is likely held in foreign financial centers such as Dubai. Though these sanctions may not be decisive, they will send a clear message that actions do have real consequences and could help change the calculations of those around Saleh about the value of staying by his side or bringing about an end to this political crisis.

The US should expand humanitarian relief to Yemen

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Provide immediate humanitarian relief

This latest crisis is just one among many that the people of Yemen have been forced to endure in recent years. With more than 40 percent of the population living on less than two dollars a day, their humanitarian situation was already precarious. Now the multisided clashes between Saleh, former military commanders, major tribes, and AQAP threatens a full-scale humanitarian disaster.

Clearly, the ongoing fighting makes the delivery of relief supplies difficult, but during the cease-fire while Saleh is out of the country it is possible for the nongovernmental organizations, with U.S. and GCC support, to deliver immediate critical aid to the Yemeni people. Additionally, Saleh's absence from the country provides an opportunity to call for a temporary cease-fire to allow humanitarian relief to come in. The most important issue of concern is the growing water shortage throughout the nation. Yemen already faced water supply issues as the most water poor nation in the Middle East, but the loss of domestic oil, which powers the drills that pump water, has cut off large sections of the population to water supplies.

Disaster relief organizations should immediately start supplying the population with water supplies, while the United States simultaneously works with Saudi Arabia to divert nearby diesel fuel to get the water pumps up and running again. The next priority will be to reconnect the country's electrical grid, which has largely been shut down by rebel tribes, and give the population access to electricity again. Coming to the direct aid of the Yemeni people during this crisis is not only morally the right thing to do, but it would improve the standing of the United States with the population on the verge of a major political transition.

Expanding economic assistance is vital to a sustainable transition – the US should pressure other GCC countries to do it

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Introduce a package of economic incentives for a post-Saleh Yemen

The violence and political turmoil in Yemen has cost the country \$5 billion—17 percent of its GDP—and put the poorest country in the Middle East on the verge of economic collapse. Whoever leads the next Yemeni government will need significant support far beyond military assistance to fight terrorism.

As President Obama highlighted during his speech on the Middle East two weeks ago, the unrest across the region largely reflects a frustration with limited economic opportunity. The United States should make clear that it is prepared to assist a post-Saleh Yemen with a package of economic aid and development programs.

Economic assistance in a post-Saleh Yemen should center around three key issues: establishing a postoil economy, developing the country's agricultural sector, and implementing a smarter water strategy.

The economic challenges of Yemen are not ones that the United States could or should help solve on its own, as the other Arab Gulf nations have significant interest in seeing a stable Yemen on its borders. President Obama should call on Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar to use their oil and natural gas wealth to develop a debt relief and investment program similar to what the president proposed for Egypt and Tunisia. At the very least, the money for tribal patronage paid for by Saudi Arabia should be diverted to strategic

investment in the Yemeni economy. The details of what role the United States and regional partners will play in Yemen's economic future will need to be addressed in close cooperation with the leaders of Yemen's next government to ensure that economic policies and assistance are coordinated for effectiveness.

There are genuine tradeoffs by promoting such active involvement by the Gulf nations, who have proven reluctant to allow an open, democratic nation to grow on their borders. Given our domestic fiscal restraints and limited ties to the future leaders of Yemen, however, coordinating our priorities for Yemen's future with the capabilities of our regional partners will be essential to putting Yemen on the path toward stability.

Conclusion

The latest bout of political violence in Yemen threatens to push an already fractured country into a genuine failed state. While it is true we have limited capacity to end the violence and political unrest, the United States must take advantage of the last remaining window of opportunity—Saleh's forced departure to Saudi Arabia for medical treatment—to help bring about a peaceful resolution to the crisis.

The US should end arms sales to Yemen

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Short of the wars that have periodically broken out in the region, the United States has never faced a more urgent set of opportunities and challenges there: real prospects for democratic development exist alongside the very real risks of Islamist ascension, political chaos, and humanitarian disaster. Countries across the Arab world differ widely in their political structures and social conditions, and the United States cannot pursue a one-size-fits-all strategy. But there are a few basic principles that it should apply everywhere. As it has generally and in a number of specific cases, the Obama administration must explicitly and consistently denounce all violent repression of peaceful protest. And it should enhance the credibility of those words by tying them to consequences. For example, in Libya, the United States identified and froze the overseas assets of top officials who were responsible for brutality. Additionally, it imposed travel bans on them and their family members, and asked Europe to do the same. In the past few days, the Obama administration has also moved to freeze the personal assets of Assad and other top Syrian officials. In extreme cases -- Libya is one, and Syria has now become another -- the United States can press the United Nations Security Council to refer individuals to the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity.

When Arab governments turn arms against peaceful protesters, the United States and Europe should stop supplying them with weapons. Western countries have been selling (or giving) regimes, such as Saleh's in Yemen, the tools of repression, including tear gas, ammunition, sniper rifles, close-assault weapons, and rockets and tanks. Although Saleh may have been a valuable asset in the fight against terrorism at one time, he has become a liability. By ending such trade, the United States would firmly send the message to the leaders of Bahrain (another recipient) and Yemen that if they are going to violently assault and arbitrarily arrest peaceful demonstrators for democracy, they are at least not going to continue doing so with U.S. guns.

Advantage internal links

(This card advocates keeping Saleh in power and I guess could be a topical aff if Saleh returns to Yemen. I doubt he will, but this is a pretty good internal link from Yemen instability to bigger impacts, so if Saleh returns, this is a good card to have. An aff that provided assistance to the opposition, however, should not use this evidence to support it since it concludes the opposite of what that aff would do)

The US should give assistance to Saleh to prevent the violent breakup of Yemen – risks oil price shock, Iranian destabilization of the entire GCC and expanding global terrorism

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Yemen is neither Tunisia nor Egypt. In fact and as it stands today, President Ali Abdullah Saleh can claim, and rightly so, to be the only person able to hold Yemen together against all odds. With all of his shortcomings and the meager record of his government, Saleh should reform and stay in power until the end of his term in 2013. The United States should actively assist and support Saleh in his quest to implement the necessary steps to create favorable conditions for an orderly and democratic transfer of powers in 2013. The United States, the Arab peninsula and the world economy cannot afford chaos and violence in Yemen. If Yemen collapses, it will be the job of the United States to pick up the pieces. President Saleh largely depends on Saudi Arabia to survive and thus the Saudi influence and the American expertise will be required to keep Yemen together and maintain the enemies of the Yemeni people and American interests at bay. The situation in Yemen is an American "crisis".

Some observers argue that the American margin of maneuver in Yemen is limited; others think that there is little America can do to prevent the collapse of Saleh regime. Regardless of the odds of keeping Saleh in power, the US and its allies must be proactive and aggressive in addressing the current crisis in Yemen. The alternative would be catastrophic, more expensive, unpredictable and volatile. A US involvement in Yemen is not a case of American adventurism but rather an instance of a good use of American power and influence.

Yemen of today, the union of a prosper North and an impoverished South, never grew as a unified nation. Yemenis outside the capital Sana'a never developed a sense of nationhood with most of them identifying with their tribes primarily. In short, their lack of allegiance to the central government will make it near impossible to control the tribes in the case of collapse of the current leadership. Under these circumstances, a power vacuum in Sana'a will be a security nightmare for the United States and Saudi Arabia with a significant impact on oil prices and the world economy.

American security concerns in Yemen can be summarized in two words: Iran and Al-Qaeda. In the North West of the country, the Iran backed Zaidi Shiites, who revolted against the central government and declared war on the national army, will be the first entity to benefit from a collapse of the central government. Even though Tehran has repeatedly denied involvements in Yemeni affairs during last year's Zaidi insurgency, Iran is waiting around the corner to gain hold of a military strategic area and thus threatening the security of Saudi Arabia and the United states. An Iranian presence in the Ziadi region will have far-reaching consequences on the stability of the Arab Gulf Kingdoms.

A collapse of law and order in Sana'a will be a bonanza for Al-Qaeda and its affiliates around the world. Yemen with its tribal culture is a fertile land for extremists groups. The potential creation of Al-Qaeda safe heavens in Yemen will be a clear and present danger to the American national security with grave consequences on the security of the homeland.

Most of the protests in Yemen were in Sana'a in the North where mostly students went out to claim economic and political reform and in Eden in the South where protesters were demanding secession from the North. Unlike in Tunis and Egypt, most -and not all- protesters are demanding reforms or other political pleas more than an immediate departure of Saleh. Washington, Riyadh and other friendly government must draw a clear transition map for Saleh to follow with all of the political and monetary help needed.

Saleh's departure will cause total state failure, escalating al Qaeda attacks against the US and causing an oil shock

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Though he is likely on his way out, a post-Saleh Yemen will only look worse. The country has been chronically fragile for years and would likely slide toward total state failure—with all the violence, dislocation and regional instability that accompany such collapses. Any successor(s) must contend with even more drastic resource shortages than those facing Saleh. Dwindling energy exports simply will not create enough revenue to provide basic necessities like water, food and fuel for a rapidly growing population, especially as the ongoing upheaval stokes inflation and disrupts vital exports and imports. Foreign assistance can fill some of these gaps, but what trickles down to ordinary Yemenis often goes through nonofficial channels, primarily direct Saudi stipends to selected tribal sheikhs. Much of the rest is grafted directly into the Yemeni regime, and thus most citizens never see a dime from their government.

Assuming a stable successor emerges, whether from Saleh's family, tribal and parliamentary opposition groups or even street protestors, the country's back to square one. Increasingly lacking money to ensure key tribal loyalties, import basic necessities, and pay the civil service and military, a post-Saleh regime would have to perpetuate his corruption and reliance on aid merely to hope to survive. At best, the new government would be plagued by the same abysmal governance and rock-bottom legitimacy that triggered the current backlash. It is hard to imagine anything like a smooth transition of power, given the competing factions interspersed throughout the country. Despite defections from government and military ranks, and the loss of U.S. trainers, Saleh's family still commands the biggest, best-trained weapons for repression: the Republican Guard, air force, and Central Security Forces. Moreover, the lack of guaranteed immunity from prosecution in a post-Saleh world creates a dangerous situation where the most lethal group feels the most cornered.

Arrayed against these itchy trigger fingers is a growing constellation of tribal, political and mutinous military forces. Many hail from Saleh's Hashid tribal confederation—Yemen's largest—but they are united only by desire for regime change. These well-armed groups' post-Saleh agendas, ranging from regime replacement to revolution, are too numerous and divergent—and their leaders too ambitious—to offer much hope for a stable transition of power, let alone a unity government. This reinforces loyalists' incentives to mimic Saleh's own methods: exploit differences among the opposition to defeat them.

The struggle for the regime's future has shifted attention from Yemen's preexisting chaos. Sectarian insurgents and secessionists rebelled against poor governance for years, and Saleh responded relentlessly until forced to deal with unrest in Sanaa. For years al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has been exploiting this turmoil to insinuate itself into numerous tribes and thus develop a base of operations. Because all these groups want to weaken Yemen, not take it over, chaos at the heart of the regime serves their purposes by deepening security vacuums along the periphery. This is already being exploited: insurgents in the north have expanded into neighboring governorates, while AQAP-affiliated militants have overrun key cities and outposts in the south. A post-Saleh Yemen would likely be even less stable, thus increasing the potential for a byzantine civil war stretching from Sanaa to the hinterlands.

Yemeni history indeed paraphrases itself, and 2011 dangerously resembles 1962 and the outbreak of the North Yemen Civil War. Then as now, years of corrupt and repressive government alienated the regime's base and impoverished the country. Once the ruler died, a succession crisis arose as sheikhs and generals cast their lots with the ruling family or the reformists. Civil war broke out within months, which outside powers fueled with money, weapons and troops. Regime change finally came eight years and 100,000 deaths later. The parallels should give the United States pause. Post-Saleh pandemonium would likely increase AQAP's freedom of maneuver to plan and stage attacks against targets in the Middle East and America; it could threaten regional stability by drawing in Saudi Arabia, as it did in the 1930s, 1960s, 1994 and 2009, and raising the specter of a Riyadh-Tehran proxy war; and, at a time when oil prices hover at \$100 per barrel, anarchy along the Bab el-Mandeb (or Mandab Strait) could threaten the security of vital energy shipping lanes. The post-Saleh world may be close at hand. The United States had best prepare itself.

Yemen instability risks destabilizing Saudi Arabia, undermining global shipping lanes and increasing global terrorism

Lister, 11 - CNN (Tim, "Why we should care about Yemen," CNN, 6/3, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-06-03/world/yemen.matters_1_houthis-president-ali-abdullah-saleh-aden?_s=PM:WORLD)

Yemen's oil potential has turned out (so far) to be less exciting than was once thought, but its strategic location still matters. To the north and west it has a long porous border with Saudi Arabia, which is very concerned that

instability in Yemen -- and the growing al Qaeda presence there -- could spill over. Saudi Arabia has begun a multibillion-dollar project to make its 1,100-mile border with Yemen more secure, including fences and barbed wire in areas most vulnerable.

Since 9/11 the Saudis have invested heavily in stamping out the threat at home from al Qaeda, and the last thing they want is contagion seeping in from next door. The same applies to Oman, Yemen's other neighbor in the south.

Saudi Arabia has also been concerned by what it sees as Iranian meddling in Yemen in support of the rebellion by the Houthis (a Shiite minority in the north). Already apprehensive about unrest among their own Shiite minority, the Saudis last year used air power to help the Saleh government subdue the Houthi rebellion. Iran has denied that it has helped the Houthis, but criticized the Saudi intervention.

Sea ports

The city of Aden in southern Yemen has long been an important port at the crossroads of some of the world's busiest sea lanes. It was built up as a coal station for British merchant ships traveling to India, and its large natural harbor should make it a regional hub. But a lack of investment and political instability has hampered its development.

The Gulf of Aden, off Yemen's coast, sees huge tonnage in merchant shipping: every day some 3 million barrels of oil pass through these waters. To the north is the Suez Canal and refineries at the Saudi port of Yanbu; to the south are the Indian Ocean and shipping lanes to energy-hungry Asian markets.

These are the sea lanes already prowled by Somali pirates, and the Yemeni coast guard has been part of an international operation to protect shipping. More instability in Yemen, and the possibility that pirates could begin to use its long and sparsely populated coastline, could make shipping in the region even more vulnerable. Yemen also overlooks a maritime "choke-point" -- a narrow passage like the Strait of Hormuz at the tip of the Persian Gulf. At its narrowest, the Bab el Mandeb strait is just 12 miles wide -- Yemen on one side and Djibouti on the other. Little wonder Djibouti has become an important outpost for the U.S. and French military.

Somalia

Somalia's chaos is just across the Gulf of Aden from Yemen, which is why thousands of Somalis have fled in recent years to seek sanctuary in Yemen, risking piracy and shipwreck in the process. They leave Bosaso on the northern Somali coast and hope to arrive somewhere along the Yemeni coast. An estimated 70,000 Somalis arrived in 2009 alone, and there are now an estimated one million Somalis living in Yemen, many of them almost destitute.

Yemen has very openly expressed concerns that Islamists in Somalia (in the Shabaab movement that is affiliated with al Qaeda) may be exploiting this exodus. At least currently there is some monitoring and control of the Somalis arriving in Yemen; but many of them live in wretched refugee camps that could be recruiting grounds for Islamist movements. In addition, intelligence sources fear growing collaboration between Al Shabaab and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

Growing instability in Yemen could lead to the nightmare scenario: a failing state and a failed state either side of important shipping lanes, and close to the world's most important oil-producing region.

Oil and gas -- and a crumbling economy

Yemen is a minor player among oil and natural gas producers, but at a time when Libya and Iraq are producing less than their potential, and supply is tightening worldwide, its contribution should not be dismissed.

Yemen is the world's 32nd biggest oil exporter and 16th biggest seller of liquefied natural gas, and there may be greater potential to unlock. But Yemeni production is currently headed south -- from more than 400,000 barrels per day in 2003 to less than 300,000 in 2009. Unrest, a lack of foreign investment and sabotage of pipelines have all contributed to a dire outlook for Yemen's oil industry, which is essential to the government's revenues.

The unrest in Yemen has affected many basic services -- including power and water -- and brought an already feeble economy close to collapse. That matters beyond Yemen: It could prompt an exodus of desperate people and help feed an insurgency that thrives in a vacuum. Already, hundreds of people try to get into Saudi Arabia illegally every day. And if outside powers want to prevent a total collapse of the Yemeni economy, they will need deep pockets.

A homeland for al Qaeda

You only have to look at the list of detainees at Guantanamo Bay to know that Yemen has been a fruitful recruiting ground for al Qaeda. The great majority of the 800 prisoners listed in recently published detainee assessments were Yemenis.

Back in the 1990s, most of Osama bin Laden's bodyguards were recruited from Yemen. Radical imams and other recruiters in Yemen provided money and made travel arrangements for would-be jihadists. Some of the al Qaeda sympathizers arrested in Yemen (and many were not) escaped in a spectacular jail break in 2006

In recent years, Yemen has become a haven for a variety of jihadists who have gravitated to a growing al Qaeda affiliate with a flair for self-publicity and innovative bomb plots. They have included several U.S. citizens and a number of Europeans.

U.S. counterterrorism officials regard al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula as the most active operational franchise of the terror group, and it certainly has international ambitions. Among recent terror plots hatched in Yemen:

- The attempted bombing of a U.S. airliner, in which a young Nigerian who spent time in Yemen has been charged, and for which al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has claimed responsibility;
- An assassination attempt against the Saudi intelligence chief by a Saudi national who was supposedly going to give himself up. He hid high explosives in his underwear.
- The shipping of two printers containing the almost untraceable explosive PETN on board cargo planes bound for the United States. The devices appeared designed to explode as the planes approached or arrived at their U.S. destinations. Neither exploded but forensic investigators and counterterrorism sources have told CNN that their assembly was sophisticated; and despite intelligence supplied by the Saudis they were difficult to locate among the thousands of packages carried by air every day. The plot set off a massive hunt for packages that might have originated in Yemen.

Yemen is also home to one of the most charismatic of al Qaeda's new generation, the English-speaking cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, and several other American jihadists accomplished in relating the terrorists' goals to a global audience through the Internet, using glossy online publications such as Inspire.

There are signs that the current unrest, with government forces now focused on combating Saleh's opponents, is allowing al Qaeda and other militant groups greater latitude, especially in the south. Earlier this week several hundred militants took over the southern coastal city of Zinjibar. Should the elite Central Security Force be dragged into what is virtually a civil war, and away from its counterterrorism role, al Qaeda's breathing space in Yemen will be all the greater.

The view from Washington

U.S. aid to Yemen has fluctuated over the years, depending on how grave the terror threat is perceived to be. Recently it has been substantially increased, both in terms of military training and equipment and economic assistance. US Agency for International Development funding increased from a meager \$9.3 million in 2008 to \$24 million in 2009.

Today, policy-makers in Washington recognize that should Yemen descend into chaos, or should Saleh be succeeded by a regime hostile to the United States, the problems would be manifold.

A former U.S. ambassador in Sanaa, Edmund Hull, wrote this week in Foreign Policy: "Left to its own devices, Yemen is unlikely to muddle through, with consequences that range far beyond the Arabian Peninsula. A concerted, multilayered diplomatic effort can succeed. Even a skilled political dancer like Ali Abdullah Saleh can't defy gravity forever."

But time is now of the essence as casualties mount, divisions deepen, and a revolt verges on becoming civil war. Comparing Libya to Yemen, former CIA Director Michael Hayden told CNN's "State of the Union" a few weeks back: "In geo-political terms, it (Libya) is somewhat self-limiting. That's not the case with Yemen. We have a thriving al Qaeda affiliate in Yemen. We have more than a million Yemeni expatriates, guest workers, throughout the Gulf region. What happens in Yemen bleeds out much more quickly than what happens in Libya."

In February, the director of the National Counterterrorism Center, Michael Leiter, was more specific about the risk posed to the United States. "I actually consider al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula with al-Awlaki as a leader within that organization probably the most significant risk to the U.S. homeland," he said.

Like markets, policy-makers dislike uncertainty. As Hayden put it: "This is fundamentally a tribal society, so what comes after (Saleh) is very unpredictable, and it's hard for me to imagine that it's going to be good news for us, at least in the short term, in the global war on terror."

In the wake of the Christmas Day 2009 attempt to blow up a U.S. airliner as it approached Detroit, Deputy National Security Advisor John Brennan said: "What we need to do is continue to work very closely with our Yemeni partners and other international partners to make sure that we're able to drive al Qaeda down within Yemen, because they do present a serious threat there, but also abroad."

Brennan, the president's chief counterterrorism advisor, is currently in the region exploring ways to end Yemen's ever-deepening crisis and Saleh's rule. Just who "our Yemeni partners" will be a year, or even a month, from now is an open question.

Yemen is the main base for al Qaeda attacks on the US

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Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula benefiting from unrest and violence

The threat from AQAP is real. They have been implicated in at least three attacks on the U.S. homeland—the successful shooting by Major Nidal Hassan at Ft. Hood; the unsuccessful bombing of a Detroit-bound airliner on Christmas Day 2009; and the foiled bombing of cargo aircraft with explosives placed in toner cartridges in 2010. It is likely the terrorist group’s intent on attacking the United States will not wane given the prominence within AQAP of Anwar al-Alawki, the U.S. born recruiter who is considered one of the most important inspirational figures within the al-Qaeda network.

There have been conflicting accounts of AQAP advances during the most recent phase of the fighting. Some reports claim Islamists—identifying themselves by a name AQAP has used— took over the town of Zinjibar, but others indicate that this could be merely a ploy by Saleh to demonstrate the perils of forcing him out. It is impossible for outside observers to know the veracity of these reports, but it does seem clear that AQAP is taking advantage of the political unrest and violence to either consolidate its position or gain territory. The proximity—just 160 miles across the Gulf of Aden—to Somalia and the potential for alliance or coordination with the al Shabaab terrorist movement there increases the need to target and disrupt AQAP activities.

But it would be a mistake to view the challenge of Yemen exclusively through the lens of terrorism or hard security threats. Simply put, there is no U.S. or other outside military solution to the multiple ongoing crises in Yemen. Yemen is not Afghanistan in the 1990s, there is no radical Islamist movement that can take over Yemen and allow AQAP sanctuary similar to the Taliban and al Qaeda central. The best way to blunt AQAP’s advance is to put Yemen on a more stable political and economic path, not rely on kinetic military operations.

Yemen is on the brink of an all-out civil war and will become a staging ground for global terrorism and piracy and could spill into Saudi Arabia

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Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s forced departure to Saudi Arabia to receive urgent medical care provides the United States and its allies an unexpected opportunity to end the violent, multisided fighting gripping the poorest Arab nation.

Even though Saleh is out of the country, his family and supporters remain in control of what is left of his government and Saleh has pledged to return in a matter of days. The window will soon close on preventing an all-out civil war in a country that has been plagued by violence, economic decline, and humanitarian distress even before this latest crisis.

Of all the countries gripped with unrest during the Arab Spring, Yemen poses the most direct concerns to the security of the United States and the region. The fighting between powerful tribes and the remaining elements of President Saleh’s government has created an opening for al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP, to gain territory and safe areas to train and plan attacks on Saudi Arabia, the United States, and other countries. Yemen’s geographic location near major shipping lanes and close to Somalia also raises the potential for a new base of operations for pirates should Yemen collapse entirely. Fighting in Yemen in 2010 unrelated to the current crisis briefly crossed the Saudi border and any new conflict poses significant risks for regional stability.

Yemen collapse will destabilize the entire region

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Chairman Berman, Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for inviting me here today. Yemen is beset by a host of challenges that endanger both its domestic stability and

regional security. The United States and the international community must act now, before conditions deteriorate further, to help Yemen meet these challenges. While Yemen has survived crises in the past, they have tended to be singular events, while the many problems it now faces are unprecedented in range and scope. The problems include international terrorism, violent extremism, religious and tribal conflict, separatism, and transnational smuggling. Attempts to build effective national governance are frustrated by porous borders, a heavily armed population, and a historical absence of much central government control. Yemen is strategically located between Saudi Arabia and Somalia—part of two different yet interconnected regions, the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa. This fact often frustrates policy analyses; Yemen is excluded from the wealthy Gulf Cooperation Council, but is in many ways more resilient than its East African neighbors. More than 3 million barrels of oil pass the country's coast every day, through treacherous waters where Islamist terrorists and Somali pirates have staged several successful maritime attacks, threatening to disrupt international commerce and the flow of vital hydrocarbons.

Interrelated economic, demographic, and domestic security challenges are converging to threaten the stability of Yemen. At the heart of the country's problems is a looming economic crisis. Yemen's oil reserves are fast running out, with few viable options for a sustainable post-oil economy. Moreover, the country's limited water resources are being consumed much faster than they are being replenished. A rapidly expanding and increasingly poorer population places unbearable pressure on the government's ability to provide basic services. Domestic security is endangered by Islamist terrorism, magnified by a resurgent alQaeda organization, an armed insurrection in the North, and an increasingly active secessionist movement in the South. These challenges are compounded by corruption and an absence of central government control in much of the country, as well as by the pending transition in political leadership. President Ali Abdullah Saleh has ruled the Republic of Yemen since the unification of the Yemen Arab Republic in the North and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen in the South in 1990. The next presidential election is scheduled for 2013. It is unclear whether Saleh will be eligible to stand for reelection for what would be a third term, and he has no obvious successor. The post-Saleh government will be severely strained by a combination of reduced revenue and diminished state capacity.

Yemen is the poorest country in the Arab world, and its population growth rate, which exceeds 3 percent per year, is among the world's highest. The government has been unable to provide adequate educational or other public services for the rapidly expanding population, more than two-thirds of which is under the age of 24, and illiteracy stands at over 50 percent. The faltering economy and poorly prepared workforce have pushed unemployment to 35 percent, on par with the Great Depression in the United States. The country's dire economic circumstances will soon limit the government's ability to deliver the funds needed to hold the country together. The population is expected to double to 40 million over the next two decades, by which time Yemen will no longer be an oil producer, and its water resources will be severely diminished.

Yemen is frequently discussed by observers as a failing state, and with good reason. Owing to the central government's weak control, the country has often been on the brink of chaos, yet it has always managed to muddle through. One of its crises was precipitated by the Saleh regime's failure to support United Nations Security Council resolutions calling for the use of force to evict Iraqi troops from Kuwait in 1990. U.S., Western, and Gulf Arab aid was cut dramatically in retaliation, and nearly 1 million Yemeni workers were expelled from Saudi Arabia. The unification of North and South Yemen earlier in 1990 and the 1994 civil war in which the South attempted to secede have also presented major challenges for the central government. However, unlike these individual challenges, the problems facing the country today are multiple and interconnected, each one posing serious threats to the future of Yemen, and together potentially overwhelming the state's limited capacity.

Any single event—or more likely a confluence of worst-case events beyond the ability of the Yemeni government to control—could lead to a further erosion of central government authority in Yemen and destabilization of the region. A major humanitarian crisis, triggered perhaps by severe famine or crop failure, could, for instance, result in a large refugee emergency in which the government would be unable to provide even rudimentary relief services. A balance-of-payment crisis in which the regime could no longer afford to placate the urban areas that receive government services would be disastrous. An inability of a postSaleh president to balance Yemen's competing interests and stakeholders could create a power vacuum, with separate regions possibly growing more autonomous and independent from the central government in Sanaa. Still, Yemen boasts a relatively resilient society that has already endured much, with little assistance from Sanaa. In some regards, in fact, low expectations for the Yemeni government to deal with future crises may help lessen their potential impact. Because rural muhafazat, or governorates, the administrative divisions in Yemen, do not currently rely on Sanaa for goods and services, what happens at the national level in the future may make little difference to much of the population.

If, however, the central government's authority and legitimacy continue to deteriorate, Yemen may slowly devolve into semiautonomous regions and cities. This trajectory has occurred in other countries, such as Somalia and Afghanistan, with disastrous consequences. Such a slow, emerging state of semi-lawlessness in Yemen would provide opportunities for extremists directed or inspired by al-Qaeda to regroup, organize, train, and launch operations against U.S. and allied targets throughout the Gulf region.

Saleh is being pushed out – a new regime is inevitable and will destroy US counterterrorism cooperation – a failed transition will create a global terrorist safe haven

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The wounding of Yemeni president Ali Saleh during a June 3 attack on his Sana palace compound will likely lead to regime change in his troubled country. Although reports from Riyadh, where he is being treated for his injuries, suggest he wants to return home soon, Saudi Arabia, other Gulf Arab countries, the United States, and Britain all want him to give up power. From Washington's perspective, Yemen has emerged as al-Qaeda central and a concern that rivals Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Saleh has essentially been pushed out by members of his tribal confederation. Acting president Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi, Saleh's vice-president, has only a small power base, though the main coalition of opposition groups, the Joint Meeting Parties, has recognized his status. The JMP has also called for early elections, and Mansour Hadi is reportedly consulting with a wide variety of actors to gauge his next steps. For the time being, a fragile ceasefire has emerged in Sana, where the demonstrators' street power and weapons are balanced by the firepower of the (U.S.-trained) military and security units controlled by Saleh's relatives.

Whoever emerges as new leader is likely to spend his initial months, even years, maneuvering to solidify his power. This does not bode well for U.S.-Yemeni counterterrorism cooperation. Like Saleh, a weak president might see the local al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) as both an enemy and an ally. Another concern is Anwar al-Awlaki, the U.S.-Yemeni dual national whose radical sermons inspired the November 2009 Fort Hood shooter and the December 2009 attempted airline bomber in Detroit. In addition to al-Qaeda, Washington is worried about the security of the Bab al-Mandab Strait between the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, a piracy-afflicted waterway through which 3 million barrels of oil pass daily.

Going forward, Saudi Arabia will be a crucial diplomatic player. For years, Riyadh has selectively backed Yemeni groups, often with large donations of cash. Such involvement has often been ham-fisted: in 1994, for example, Riyadh backed a rebellion in the former South Yemen, an episode that saw Mansour Hadi, then a military commander, defect to the north. And last year, Saudi military units were given a bloody nose in confrontations with rebels from Yemen's Houthi tribe in the northwest border region.

Even under the best circumstances, the new Yemen would look rather like the old one: despite its violent and unstable history, the country has hung together in various forms for some time, though Saleh's own authority often did not extend far outside of Sana. Yet in the absence of political reform and reconciliation, an apocalyptic scenario could emerge under which Yemen collapses into four parts: Sana and its immediate environs; a Houthi-controlled pocket in the northwestern mountains; the former South Yemen around the port city of Aden; and an al-Qaeda region in the center, perhaps with access to the coast linking it to the already-failed state of Somalia. In light of such scenarios, successfully managing a post-Saleh transition is a vital U.S. interest.

Yemen on the brink – risks US counterterrorism strategy

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The wave of popular uprisings sweeping across the Arab world has caught the region's most entrenched authoritarian regimes off guard. Yet unlike Tunisia, Egypt, and other custodians of an undemocratic status quo, Yemen is no stranger to instability. Long before protesters took to the streets of Sana`a on January 20, 2011 to

demand political reforms, the 32-year-old regime of President Ali Abdullah Salih was already struggling to contain a daunting array of security, economic, and governance challenges.¹

In the south, Yemen faces a rising secessionist movement, while a separate rebellion by Zaydi Huthis rages in the northern province of Sa`da. Meanwhile, al-Qa`ida has made Yemen its most active operational node, finding sanctuary in the Arab world's poorest state. The resurgent al-Qa`ida organization based in Yemen—al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)—is arguably the most dangerous and immediate terrorist challenge threatening U.S. interests today. Compounding these destabilizing forces is a wide range of systemic problems, including a failing economy, rampant corruption, endemic unemployment, widespread governance deficiencies and abuses, rapid resource depletion, and one of the highest population growth rates in the world. This is exacerbated by the extraordinary abundance of small arms in Yemen, where guns reportedly outnumber people by a ratio of three to one.

Whereas neighboring Saudi Arabia and Bahrain are confronted by limited and relatively one-dimensional opposition movements, Yemen's current political crisis has been heightened by the convergence of numerous security threats, the cumulative effect of which may soon overwhelm the government in Sana`a. With government security forces already overextended by the challenge of containing mass demonstrations, AQAP is taking advantage of the opportunity to consolidate its position in Yemen by proclaiming solidarity with anti-government protesters and intensifying its attacks on security targets.² Preventing imminent state failure in a country that is already viewed as an incubator for extremism will require policy solutions as multifaceted as the problems currently facing Yemen's government.

If the current political system is to survive, the regime will have to engage with opposition and civil society actors to reach a negotiated resolution to the country's paralyzing political crisis. Resuscitating stalled negotiations will not be easy, and Yemen's major opposition bloc—known as the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP)—has explicitly sworn off dialogue with the regime and the ruling General People's Congress (GPC) party in response to the government's recent violent crackdown on protesters. President Salih has already promised that he will not seek reelection in 2013, but additional concessions will be needed. The Yemeni regime is clearly on the ropes, and Salih's downfall could be imminent. The question now is how, and when, Salih leaves office.

The Downfall of a Regime

Economic and political grievances have been festering for years in Yemen, where approximately 43% of the population subsists on less than two dollars a day and residents of the formerly independent south accuse the central government of monopolizing the country's oil revenues.³ By January 2011, rising frustration with government corruption and ineptitude—and exacerbated by events in Tunisia and Egypt—brought Yemen's simmering political crisis to a boil.

Shortly after the fall of the Ben Ali government in Tunisia on January 14, 2011, the Salih regime attempted to pacify the discontent with economic concessions. It sought to maintain the allegiance of the military and security forces by announcing pay raises and providing free food and gas. It addressed the concerns of civil servants by putting immediately into effect salary increases for the lowest paid civil servants originally scheduled for October 2011. It cut the national income tax by half, waived university tuition fees for currently enrolled students, and announced a scheme to help new university graduates find employment. It also reportedly increased some subsidies and introduced new price controls. Finally, it extended social welfare assistance to an additional half million families. Left unsaid, however, was how Sana`a would fund these programs.

When economic measures failed to quell the discontent, President Salih turned to political concessions on February 2. In a speech to the parliament and shura council—likely encouraged by the United States—he announced that he would not stand for reelection in 2013 and that his son and presumed heir, General Ahmed Ali Abdullah Salih, commander of the Republican Guard, would also not run for president. He “froze” the implementation of a recent controversial constitutional amendment eliminating term limits on the presidency. Salih also stated that regional governors would henceforth be directly elected—while little noticed, this change is important because the future of Yemeni stability will depend on greater local autonomy and a de-evolution of control from the capital to the provinces. Finally, he called for the formation of a national unity government, the re-launching of the stalled National Dialogue process, and the postponement of the parliamentary elections scheduled for April to allow proper preparations.

Although the regime nominally met almost all its demands, the opposition promptly rejected the concessions, not trusting the president to keep his promises. Salih had previously pledged not to seek reelection, but had backtracked on that promise. Moreover, the 2013 date was too distant for the faction of protesters seeking immediate change. Initial protests were modest in size, but as Yemenis began to mimic the tactics and slogans of protesters in Cairo's Tahrir Square, crowds swelled dramatically and quickly spread from their focal point at

Sana`a University to the cities of Aden, Ibb, Taiz, and remote northern provinces. Crowds that gathered in Sana`a in mid-March have been estimated to exceed 100,000 people.

While protesters explicitly demanded regime change from the earliest days of the uprising, Yemen's formal opposition—represented by the JMP parliamentary bloc—was initially hesitant to call for Salih's resignation. The JMP's demands focused on reforming the existing political process through dialogue and consultation, rather than overhauling the system altogether. The regime's reluctance to yield substantive concessions coupled with its increasingly violent crackdown on peaceful protesters eventually pushed the opposition away from the negotiating table. On February 28, the JMP flatly rejected Salih's invitation to form a national unity government. For the first time, the JMP endorsed the street protests and called for an immediate end to Salih's 32-year rule.⁴ The JMP hardened its stance against Salih's government on March 20, when it announced that the opposition parties would officially participate in the demonstrations.⁵

Violence Against Protestors Brings Regime to the Precipice

Despite Salih's explicit assurances that his government would not use violence against protesters, as demonstrations escalated throughout the month of February police and security forces fired rubber bullets, tear gas, and eventually live ammunition at massive crowds in Sana`a and other cities. On February 25, protesters in Aden were outraged after a 17-year-old was fatally shot by police.⁶ In a separate incident on March 8, uniformed security forces attacked protesters with guns and bats as they were setting up tents in front of Sana`a University, killing at least one person and wounding 80 more.⁷ In addition to this sustained, state-sanctioned crackdown on civilian protesters, bands of armed regime loyalists—apparently acting with the tacit consent and complicity of state security forces—have attempted to suppress demonstrations with unrestrained thuggery and lethal force.

Violence escalated to unprecedented levels on March 18, when government supporters in plainclothes took up positions on rooftops near Sana`a University and began firing at tens of thousands of protesters following Friday prayers. Not only did state security forces refuse to intervene to prevent bloodshed, but they allegedly joined government loyalists in firing directly at protesters, killing at least 30 people.⁸ The use of lethal force galvanized the resolve of protesters and solidified the opposition's refusal to resume negotiations with the regime. The violence on March 18 changed the situation for many protesters. By late March, the opposition publicly stated that it had definitively ruled out the possibility of dialogue, accusing Salih's government of perpetrating crimes against humanity.⁹

Dozens of government officials and members of the ruling party's parliamentary bloc have resigned their posts in part in protest of Salih's heavy-handed response to the uprising.¹⁰ When prominent members of Yemen's two largest tribal federations, the Bakil and Hashid, publicly endorsed the anti-government demonstrations, it appeared that some of Salih's most reliable allies were turning against him.¹¹ Indeed, on March 21, Yemen's most powerful military commander, General Ali Mohsin al-Ahmar, announced that he was siding with the protesters. Ali Mohsen is commander of the 1st Armored Division and head of the North West Military Region.¹² Additionally, roughly 20 MPs have resigned and approximately half the country's ambassadors abroad have also resigned. Protests continued on March 25, although a planned march on the presidential palace in Sana`a did not materialize.

For years, Salih skillfully exploited divisions among key constituencies to neutralize potential threats to his rule. The current unrest is destabilizing this delicate balance of power, and Salih's regime faces a serious crisis as key constituencies withdraw their support.

AQAP Capitalizes on Discontent

In addition to alienating the opposition, the violent crackdown may exert a radicalizing effect on protesters, particularly in areas of the north and south where there is strong historical precedent for violent rebellions. At present, AQAP is seeking to capitalize on the growing unrest and is attempting to consolidate its influence in Yemen. Saudi national and former Guantanamo Bay detainee Ibrahim al-Rubaysh endorsed anti-government protests across the Arab world in an AQAP audio release on February 26.¹³

One day after al-Rubaysh's recording appeared on several militant websites, the radical cleric Abdul Majid al-Zindani explicitly urged Yemenis to overthrow Salih's regime and establish an Islamic state in its place.¹⁴ Taking advantage of the unstable security situation, AQAP fighters have staged a flurry of attacks on Yemeni security forces and checkpoints in the provinces of Marib, Abyan, and Hadramawt, killing well over a dozen security personnel.¹⁵ It is feared that the frequency and magnitude of these attacks will only escalate as AQAP exploits the current unrest to further challenge the Yemeni government. During the weekend of March 25-27, there were signs of increased AQAP activity in the south, including reports that the group seized an arms factory in Jaar.

U.S. Counterterrorism Operations in Yemen at Risk?

President Salih's government, however flawed, has been a vital partner in U.S. counterterrorism operations in the Arabian Peninsula, and U.S. officials are understandably apprehensive about the possibility of regime change. A post-Salih government would likely be more responsive to Yemeni public opinion, including anti-American sentiment, which was substantially inflamed by a U.S. airstrike in 2009 that reportedly resulted in more than 80 civilian casualties.¹⁶

The chaos of a post-Salih Yemen in which there is no managed transition may lead to conditions that could allow AQAP and other extremist elements to flourish. It is not known who would come to power after Salih were he to leave office. Moreover, it is doubtful that in such a scenario a new Yemeni government would be as accommodating to the United States and its allies on terrorism and security cooperation as the current government. While imperfect, Yemen under Salih has worked closely with Washington on counterterrorism issues, and a number of important relationships have been established.

Conclusion

There is no certainty about how events in Yemen will transpire. Salih cannot rule Yemen until 2013, and the regime has acknowledged that they are seeking an orderly way to transfer power. Even though Salih's most recent position appears to backtrack on earlier pledges to step down, sources close to the regime maintain that negotiations are ongoing.

Yemen's security situation will continue to deteriorate unless a campaign of sweeping political reforms is initiated immediately. One likely scenario is a negotiated settlement by Yemen's power elites resulting in a political transition, perhaps overseen by an informal association of senior Yemeni figures. There is always the potential for conditions to deteriorate into violence, although it appears that most parties want to avoid this. The question then becomes what mechanism will be created to oversee this process—an answer that will be revealed in the coming weeks.

Disad links

Yemen instability could drive greater GCC cohesion

Lippman, 11 - Adjunct Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (Thomas, "Yemen Crisis Spurs Regional Activism," <http://www.cfr.org/yemen/yemen-crisis-spurs-regional-activism/p24766>)

If this stalemate continues, the violence in Yemen is also likely to continue. The longer-term significance of this episode may turn out to be not the fate of Yemen but the new era of regional activism that seems to be developing in the GCC, which until very recently was a negligible actor in regional security matters.

The GCC was created in 1981 as an economic and cultural grouping of the six Sunni Muslim monarchies on the Arab side of the Persian Gulf: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates. The organization's effectiveness has long been undermined by internal rivalries—in particular, the small sheikhdoms' fear of being overpowered by Saudi Arabia—and despite token efforts has never achieved a common security strategy or built an effective joint defense force. [In his last months as chief of the U.S. Central Command, which includes the GCC countries in its area of responsibility, Gen. David Petraeus declared publicly that he had given up on trying to forge the six countries into a coherent joint force.]

But fear is a powerful motivator, and two large fears have galvanized the GCC into joint actions, under the leadership of a new secretary general, Abdul Latif al-Zayyani, a Bahraini who took office during the height of the turmoil in his country.

Alarmed by what GCC members saw as Iranian troublemaking on their side of the Gulf, the GCC endorsed and expedited the decision by Saudi Arabia and the UAE to send security forces into Bahrain. It torpedoed a planned Arab summit conference in Baghdad because Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, whom they regard as an ally of Tehran, criticized GCC leaders for their crackdowns on dissidents. And it crafted a plan for Saleh to step aside.

Yemen is not a member of the GCC; [not being a monarchy, it was automatically excluded from membership.] But it has long, porous borders with Saudi Arabia and Oman, is a center of strength for al-Qaeda, and presents a long-term threat to GCC stability if state failure and a looming water shortage spark large-scale cross-border migration.

Whatever the outcome in Yemen, those in Washington and in friendly GCC governments who are concerned about regional stability may welcome the potential emergence of the group as an active player, in their own interests.

GCC CP

Achy, 11 (Lachen, Los Angeles Times, "Economic Roots of Social Unrest in Yemen," 3/10, <http://carnegie-mec.org/publications/?fa=42987>)

Social unrest is growing in Yemen as prominent tribal leaders and members of parliament join protesters in urging President Ali Abdullah Saleh to leave office. In response, Saleh — who has held office for 33 years — promised not to seek reelection in 2013 or hand over power to his son.

The government also passed a series of economic measures to improve Yemenis' livelihood. The package — expected to raise the 2011 budget deficit to \$3.75 billion — includes a 25% increase in civil and military servants' wages, a 50% cut in the national income tax and additional food subsidies. However, these measures fall short of expectations and fail to address the key structural issues behind the turmoil.

Yemen remains the poorest country in the Arab world, with a per-capita income of \$1,300; almost half of the population lives on less than \$2 a day. The country also holds the region's worst human development records: a 54% literacy rate, a 62-year life expectancy, and high levels of maternal mortality and child malnutrition.

In addition, only four in 10 people have access to electricity and one in four people have clean drinking water.

The situation may grow worse as Yemen's population is expected to double to 40 million people by 2030.

A weak and oil-dependent economy aggravates the country's poverty and demographic challenges. Petroleum accounts for roughly 25% of GDP, 70% of government revenue, and more than 90% of Yemen's exports. While the government has implemented reforms recently to improve the investment climate — especially in the non-oil sector — Yemen represents a risky business environment given its political instability, weak rule of law, ineffective government and widespread corruption. The country ranked 146 of 178 on Transparency International's 2010 corruption index.

Yemen's high unemployment rate, which stands officially at 16.5% but is estimated to be much higher, is another challenge; almost half of youth are unemployed. Even those few people with university degrees lack the right skills to meet market demand. And leading job sectors — such as agriculture, the public sector and tourism — suffer from factors such as scarce water resources and political turmoil.

As a result, it's not surprising that Yemen has failed to achieve political legitimacy and establish a productive economy. That's why Yemen must begin developing a roadmap for the future now.

First, Yemenis must ensure a smooth political transition when Saleh leaves office and build strong institutions to enforce the law and fight corruption. Second, they must create sound economic policies to address poverty, unemployment, and mismanagement of public resources that are backed by institutions accountable to Yemenis. Otherwise, Yemen's future may be severely constrained by reduced government revenue, weak state capacity and internal conflicts.

Finally, the regional Gulf Cooperation Council must identify ways to improve economic and employment prospects for Yemenis, including opening labor market access to job seekers and investing in Yemen. Each of these steps will help resolve the issues feeding Yemen's unrest and ensure the country is more secure in the future.