

Algeria

Included are cards found that support both sides of the question as to whether Algeria is near overthrowing the current government structure. Based on our research, it is unlikely that even with democratic assistance anything of unique educational value for the debate community would theoretically occur. We did not come across solvency evidence for a plan to give any form of democracy assistance to Algeria from the United States.

Included in this report are the results pertaining to aid supplied to Algeria by the United States currently. The categories of aid that they receive seemed to entirely fall under the Positive Political Conditionality or development assistance standards that as of the end of our first day seemed to be unlikely in their inclusion in any of the proposed resolution wordings. (anti-terrorism, drug control, military training, development assistance)

No Risk of Upheaval

No democratic revolution in Algeria—Buying off the public, splintered opposition, tired of violence, no protesters, etc.

WaPo 4-8-11

In Algeria, a chill in the Arab spring By Anthony Faiola, Published: April 8
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/in-algeria-a-chill-in-the-arab-spring/2011/04/07/AFdA9E4C_story.html

ALGIERS — **Only a few weeks ago, Algeria seemed on the brink of revolution**, with thousands taking to the streets to demand the ouster of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika. But much like the crowd gawking at the few lonely activists who recently showed up for a political protest at a busy roundabout here, **this North African country is now watching from the sidelines as the Arab spring tries to bloom**. Popular revolts are upending authoritarian systems across the region, spreading deeper into Arab countries with some of the harshest regimes, including Syria. But while there are democracy-fervent nations such as Tunisia, where the uprisings started and where sustained protests rapidly ousted President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, there are many others, such as neighboring **Algeria, where change is a moving target. Instead of a clamor for democracy, doctors and teachers, auxiliary police officers and transportation workers are taking to the streets of this energy-rich nation with demands for higher wages, while pointedly sidestepping calls for political change**. Much as Saudi Arabia did to quell protests there, **the Algerian government is literally trying to buy time, doling out economic concessions that include promises to double salaries for everyone** from police officers to court clerks **and pledges to give millions of Algerians free land and cheap loans. In the face of gilded promises, the Algerian public, weary after a long history of violence, seems to be weighing the cost of change. Lacking broad support and crippled by infighting, those directly calling for Bouteflika to step down have diminished in number, with the pool of die-hard protesters still rallying every Saturday outnumbered by riot police nearly 50 to 1. “Why am I not protesting?” laughed Nouider Bakhi, 45, a school administrator gazing at the small pro-democracy rally last Saturday from the cooling shade of a cigarette stand. “Because what works in Tunisia and Egypt may not work in Algeria. . . . Of course we want change, but what will it take to reach that goal? Look at Libya. It is tearing apart and people are dying. You think we don’t watch that violence and wonder which way it would happen here?”** Algeria’s retreat from full-scale revolt is key to calculations of just how **broadly the historic uprisings sweeping the Arab world might ultimately transform the region**. In many ways, Algeria and its far smaller neighbor, Tunisia, present a tale of two countries. **This nation**, sprawling from the blistering Sahara to the Mediterranean Sea, became **the region’s first after Tunisia to see the outbreak of unrest, with riots over high food prices erupting in January** inside the dense French colonial slums towering above the glistening Bay of Algiers. In Tunisia, similar riots triggered a movement soon joined by unions, opposition leaders and members of the middle class to drive out Ben Ali, who fled the country Jan. 14. But here, **the Algerian government has managed to check public rage through a combination of measured tolerance for social protests, food subsidies and pay raises, as well as minor political concessions**.

No democratic Rev in Algeria—Past violence

The National (UAE), 5-12-11

No Arab Spring for Algeria, only scars of the past Ferry Biedermann May 12, 2011
<http://www.thenational.ae/news/worldwide/africa/no-arab-spring-for-algeria-only-scars-of-the-past?pageCount=0>

LIDA // Mohammed Zermane remembers one night in 1997 when he and his squad of militia volunteers "hunted terrorists" among the now blossoming orange groves between the village of Soumaa and the town of Blida, about 45 kilometres south of Algeria's capital. "We were called in from Soumaa because the terrorists had taken a family hostage in a house nearby," recalled Mr Zermane. "We killed three terrorists, two right away and one the next day after we tracked the blood through the grove. That is what we did, the Patriots." Algerian Spotlight Ferry Biedermann delivers a series of exclusive reports: Wednesday As the opposition demands reform, the Algerian government resists with the claim that the country is already free and that any change could reopen the door to fundamentalism and renewed violence. Tuesday Algeria's young poor sing of a better life in Europe – the government has tackled

protests with its usual mixture of repression and buying off the demonstrators, but in the impoverished district of Bab el Oued the only hope for improvement is seen to be illegal emigration. **The violence of Algeria's recent past, which is continuing at a lower level today, is offered up most often as the explanation for why the country has remained relatively calm at a time when unrest is rocking the Arab world. From 1991 to 2001 a vicious fight between the state and several militant fundamentalist groups tore apart society. Often called a civil war but, in reality, more like a series of tit-for-tat massacres, assassinations and bombings, the violence cost the lives of up to 200,000 people and left deep scars** in the memories of Mr Zermane and other Algerians. **It has bequeathed to the country a stark warning of where renewed unrest could lead** but it also left a lingering resentment. "We are glad that the fighting is over but we want peace with justice," said Mr Zermane. The loosely organised militia that he served in, the Patriots, claims to have played an important role in the eventual defeat of the fundamentalists, providing local knowledge and support to the army and police. Recently the Patriots as well as another militia, the Communal Guards, have been demanding benefits and pensions that they consider due them from the state. In March and early April they were among the most vocal and numerous of the many social groups that were out in the street clamouring for handouts. In Algeria, the Arab spring has translated itself mostly into a push for economic and social demands. Those waiting for government housing are demonstrating at the ministry of housing, teaching assistants demanding contracts are herded together on a corner opposite the president's office and the Patriots used to mass in downtown's Martyr's Square, until it was fenced off mid-April, ostensibly for renovations. "Many social groups think the state is weak and will give in easily," acknowledges Seddik Chihheb, vice-president of the lower house of parliament and a senior official in the prime minister's RND party. "Thank God that we can afford to meet the demands at the moment, thanks to our comfortable economic position and the high petrol prices. We say social peace knows no price." The Communal Guards, who mainly protested against their sacking by the ministry of interior, suspended their demonstrations mid-April after a secret deal with the government. But the Patriots, who were a much less regulated militia and who only received intermittent compensation, are keeping up their protests. **The government is caught in a somewhat awkward bind in dealing with the former militias. It still uses the memories of the violence and the fear of another fundamentalist attempt at power to justify its rule.** But it can hardly claim that the militias, which it presents as heroes of that fight, want to undermine the position of the state. Mr Chihheb is circumspect in discussing their case, saying that he supports the militias' demands. "Algeria will never forget them and has already given a lot." But he cannot completely hide his irritation. "Among us it's normal always to feel hard done by, like we are the damned of the earth. But that's crazy in this case," he said. Someone else who may feel slightly hard done by is Aboudjerra Soltani, the leader of the Islamic HMP party in parliament and a loyal coalition partner of Mr Chihheb's RND and the large independence party, the FLN. The HMP, popularly referred to as Hamas, is aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood and was opposed to the violent campaign by the much more radical Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), which won the 1991 elections that were then annulled by the state, sparking the civil war. The HMP, despite its deeply Islamic roots, remained a legal political party throughout and even ended up as part of the governing coalition since 1997. Yet, it recognises that the deck is stacked against it because of the association by voters, pushed by the authorities, between Islam and violence. Rather than forever being a small coalition partner, the HMP, possibly joined by other Islamic parties, might do better in totally free elections, Mr Soltani said. "If they don't scare the people with Islamism and terrorism, et cetera, we may have quite a good outcome, maybe not the majority but it will be interesting," he said. Such talk is still anathema to the large swath of Algerian society that fought to keep out the fundamentalists, including the militias and the many victims of the conflict. Many see themselves as having lost out when the state and the fundamentalists effectively came to an understanding. "A lot of people would like to promote amnesia," said Cherifa Kheddar, chairwoman of the victims' association in Blida. She lost a brother and a sister when what she says was a band of fundamentalists attacked their home in 1996. Blida and the surrounding countryside are dotted with the reminders of loss, often entire farmsteads such as the shell of Mohammed Ferhah's ancestral home in Bouinan forest. Its fire-streaked remains testify to that one night in September 1997 when 15 members of his family were killed. Because property and insurance papers also went up in flames, he has never received compensation. The victims and their families are now mostly regarded as "an inconvenience" by all concerned, she said. Mrs Kheddar does not doubt that the militias such as the Patriots deserve some benefits but she has limited sympathy for their demands. "They did it mostly for themselves. They defended their homes," she insisted. At the very least, the victims too deserve compensation and especially government support for their physical and psychological problems, she said. "But we are not as organised. Nobody even knows how many victims there are. We are much easier to ignore."

John Lyman is the Editor-in-Chief of Foreign Affairs Journal. Rock the Casbah: Algeria and the Arab Spring Posted on 03 June 2011. <http://www.foreignaffairsjournal.org/2011/06/03/rock-the-casbah-algeria-and-the-arab-spring/>

Algiers buys off social protests

Lyman, Editor, Foreign Affairs Journal, 6-3-11

John, Editor-in-Chief of Foreign Affairs Journal. Rock the Casbah: Algeria and the Arab Spring Posted on 03 June 2011. <http://www.foreignaffairsjournal.org/2011/06/03/rock-the-casbah-algeria-and-the-arab-spring/>

Algeria has experienced some level of street demonstrations and civil unrest since the Arab Spring began but due to precautions taken by security forces, sustained street demonstrations similar to the protests in Egypt's Tahrir Square, Tripoli, Libya, Daraa, Syria and Sana'a, Yemen have not materialized. During the first week in January, protests broke out over increased prices for necessities like sugar, flour and oil. As a result, the government slashed taxes by 41 percent and custom duties on foodstuffs. Protests in February did force the hand of the Bouteflika administration to yield to pressures resulting in the lifting of the emergency law. Throughout the protests, the common

grievances levied at the government were the lack of transparency, lack of employment opportunities and a feeling that the future for many Algerians was bleak. Hamid, from Bab El Oued summed up the anger shared by many, "We're fed up of being ignored all the time. We're fed up of being treated like guinea pigs. We are telling this government: you've done nothing for us, we don't recognize you anymore." Protests have continued as late as May but they have consisted primarily of specific interest groups lobbying against the government.

Memories of civil war in 90s and piecemeal government reforms prevent revolution in Algeria

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While conditions might be ripe for revolution and a continuation of the Arab Spring sweeping the region, the memories of the 1990s have largely scarred this country of 34 million and will act as a counterweight to those seeking wholesale change through revolution. Additionally, the government is adept at insuring that the discontents have money in their pockets through increased wages. According to the International Monetary Fund, the government has raised wages for civil servants by 34 percent. Moreover, while Libyans, Syrians and Egyptians have taken to the streets to rally against their autocratic leaders, President Bouteflika is viewed more or less, as a figurehead and is not the sole target of Algerian anger. Algerians have had the same political system since their country gained independence in 1962 and it is this political system which street level Algerians despise. Patronage, corruption and nepotism are seen as the norm in Algerian society. Without political connections many Algerians find their job prospects dim and view a political system controlled by a few as the cause of their problems. "Nepotism exists all over the world, of course, but nowhere does it dominate political, economic, and social life as comprehensively as it does in the greater Middle East... Nepotism is one of the big reasons why so many of these strongmen now face extinction. The rage that has united young Arabs from Tunis to Tripoli is fueled not just by hatred of their rulers but also by the widespread and entirely valid belief that those rulers intend to bequeath power to their equally loathsome offspring," Romesh Ratnesar argues in Bloomberg Businessweek. Additionally, corruption pervades many sectors of the economy and acts as an impediment for business owners who are not willing to pay under the table bribes. According to Freedom House, "High levels of corruption still plague Algeria's business and public sectors. The energy sector is viewed as especially graft prone." Of 178 countries surveyed in the Transparency International's 2010 Corruption Perceptions Index, Algeria ranked 105.

Waaaaay more freedom in Algeria than other "arab spring" countries

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However, even with these structural deficiencies, some Algerians would contend that President Abdelaziz Bouteflika has attempted to address many of Algeria's problems. Moreover, many Algerians would admit that the country enjoys any number of freedoms not present in Libya and elsewhere. For example, some Algerians would contend that they have a modicum of democracy, freedom of the press, and when necessary, Algerians have been allowed to cry foul to the international press. While far from ideal, this is a marked improvement from the 1990s. "There are an array of restrictions on press freedom, but the situation has improved since the peak of the civil war in the mid-1990s. Privately owned newspapers have been published for nearly two decades, and journalists have been aggressive in their coverage of government affairs, though readership is limited by an illiteracy rate of about 30 percent," Freedom House writes.

They're trying to be more democratic—sociopolitical reforms now

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Algeria's government would argue that reorganizing the state has been a monumental task considering that the country emerged from a gruesome civil war a little over a decade ago. Taking this into account, government officials argue that shifting from dealing with the threat of terrorism and internal strife to tackling endemic unemployment will take time. "It's not easy to build a good democracy and to open and to develop the country... We try," argues Algeria's Communication Minister Nacer Mehal. By some estimates, with the unemployment rate hovering around 50 percent for Algeria's youth, the government is aware that it must improve its efforts to address this problem. The government has begun to offer microcredits to prisoners to prevent recidivism and to women. Additionally, due to revenues resulting from oil and gas discoveries, the government is quickly building housing and providing government jobs CGAP points out, that due to a severe shortage of banks for private citizens, the need exists for microlending institutions.

They need microcredits

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Additionally, due to revenues resulting from oil and gas discoveries, the government is quickly building housing and providing government jobs CGAP points out, that due to a severe shortage of banks for private citizens, the need exists for microlending institutions. According to CGAP, "It is estimated that approximately 30 percent of Algeria's population uses banking services, with only one bank branch or post office for every 7,250 inhabitants. The 1.25 million workers in the informal sector, who have no access to credit, and the small proportion of banked households, also give an idea of how large the unmet credit needs are. The potential for developing microfinance looks immense, in view of the needs that the financial sector fails to meet." CGAP continues, "The prospects for the development of inclusive financial systems in Algeria are very attractive, given the very favorable overall economic context and the inadequacy of the current system....The government has a key role to play in strengthening the financial sector, especially in implementing actions that fall outside the scope of private-sector investment and concern public services and national planning and development....Today, the government is genuinely interested¹¹⁰ in developing microfinance and it favors the creation of one or more new institutions. This interest is fully in line with that of international public-sector and private-sector investors and is likely to give rise very soon to the creation of new credit institutions to provide financing primarily for the vast sector of very small enterprises." Whether the government follows through on providing microcredit or creates the conditions for microcredit institutions to exist will be a long-term challenge. In the short-term, a policy which undoubtedly will create jobs is the \$286 billion infrastructure development program which seeks to address the countries crumbling infrastructure.

They need to attract FDI or economy will decline

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While the program will create jobs, in the long-term it will add to Algeria's already large budget deficit. Long-term challenges remain for Algeria. The International Monetary Fund describes Algeria's economic

climate from 2000 to 2010 as “very positive”. However, the next decade potentially could be described as the complete opposite unless the government does more to create a healthy business climate in order to attract FDI (foreign direct investment) and divests itself from an economy based solely on its oil and natural gas reserves. “Unlike other middle-income economies, for many decades, Algeria has not been able to attract large amounts of FDI.... The lack of FDI could have negative effects on Algeria’s growth prospects as empirical research has proved extensively the positive impact of FDI on economic growth. Moreover, in a world economy where control of knowledge and technology are essential assets for companies, ownership limits on foreign subsidiaries, such as those contained in Algeria’s new FDI rules... could deter foreign investors,” the IMF contends.

No taste for another revolution

Ghezali, 4/3/11

Rabah, Huffington post, Why Has the Arab Spring Not Spread to Algeria? Posted: 04/ 3/11 06:43 PM ET http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rabah-ghezali/why-has-the-arab-spring-n_b_844182.html abah Ghezali is a French attorney at law specializing in international dispute resolution and corporate law. He is a contributing writer to E!Sharp and has been published in Talking Transatlantic. Born of Algerian parents who immigrated in France, he grew up in a very disadvantaged neighbourhood (the so called “banlieue”). As a second-generation migrant, Rabah had virtually no chance of being admitted to a good university and succeeding professionally. This background has led him to be particularly interested in issues related to migration, discrimination and interfaith dialogue. Especially since his experience in the United States where he has worked as French lecturer at the Ohio State University, he is a staunch supporter of the transatlantic relationship. Rabah is a founding member of the Transatlantic Network 2020 (TN2020) that aims to bring fresh and innovative perspectives on the transatlantic relation by connecting rising North American and European leaders of tomorrow

Far from being unprecedented in modern North African history, these recent events were long-preceded: **in October 1988, a spontaneous and massive Algerian demonstration filled the streets**, protesting shortages and calling for the democratization of a corrupt, autocratic, and inward-looking regime. Demonstrators wielded a plethora of slogans and banners (“We are human beings!” announced one) **and the army opened fire, killing some 500 to 800 people**. Ultimately, however, the demonstration proved effective in spite of this violent oppression: it marked the end of the one-party system and the brief rise of political pluralism. Democracy was tragically short-lived. When, **in January 1992, the Islamic Salvation Front won the elections, the army skillfully exploited the “Islamic threat”: it first deposed the perennially powerless President Chadli, and then annulled Algeria's first multi-party legislative elections. Its actions provoked a brutal civil war -- the brunt of which was borne by ordinary, non-partisan Algerians. Waves of violence from both sides left more than 150,000 dead and a further 10,000 missing. More recently, 9/11 and the War on Terror have been used to rhetorically legitimize the military's use of force, construing it as part of a broader, global struggle: for the Algerian military, their dirty war was, in fact, the first fight against Islamic extremism. Needless to say, in the aftermath of this carnage Algerian civil society has little appetite for demonstrations -- a fact that goes some way towards explaining why Algeria appears (for the moment, at least) as the odd-man-out in the spread of the Arab democratic movement. Since Algeria's independence in 1962, the army has held power -- or, more precisely, the Department of Intelligence and Security. Algeria went through four Presidents between 1991 and 1999; not one served out their mandate in full. This flux only ended in 1999 when the incumbent president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, came to power. While the Egyptians and Tunisians celebrate ousting their dictators, Algerians are realistic enough to insist on “business as usual” even when faced by the resignation of a President.**

Social fragmentation prevents uprising

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Algerian society is too fragmented for concerted action, despite isolated pockets of resistance in the independent trade unions. The regime exploits divisions and plays Algerians off against each other along familiar lines -- French versus Arab- speaking, Arab versus Kabyle, "Islamist" versus "Democrat", besides multi-way ethnic and tribal tensions. Besides these divisions, Algeria is also distinctive in the relationship between its capital and provinces. In the recent uprising in Egypt and Tunisia, there was a synergy of capitols and provinces: Cairo was quickly supported by the rest of the country, while revolution in a small provincial town had ramifications in Tunis. By contrast, past protests in the Algerian capital of Algiers have had little impact in the rest of the country. In Algeria, there is little solidarity between Algiers and provinces; the lead of the comparatively rebellious capital is not necessarily followed. While there are many social revolts (in 2010 alone there were around 900 incidents) in Algeria, they are fragmentary and often parochial in aim. The rebellious youth and antiquated weak political opposition are mutually distrustful and incapable of forming an anti-government front. Revealingly, in February 2011 the opposition could only gather an ineffectual 2,000 demonstrators in Algiers. In response, the regime mobilized 30,000 policemen, effectively bribing them with a 50% pay increase that was applied retrospectively to their salaries for the previous three years in order to ensure their loyalty. Until now, therefore, the regime has proved hugely successful in exploiting these various divisions in order to perpetuate a system that offers no prospect of improving the lives of the majority. The poorest and most desperate suffocate under the "hogra" (the term used to describe the contemptible attitude of the authorities vis-à-vis the people) and take the streets, but they do so less as a coherent political act and more because it is the only channel for expressing resentment. Lamentably, a program for gradual improvements and the fair distribution of oil revenue has no place in these protests.

No credible opposition parties in Algeria

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Another reason for the Arab spring not spreading to Algeria is its political vacuum. The very nature of authoritarian rule is to deny the possibility of legitimate opposition; it prohibits or circumscribes organized political actors' activities and prevents the possibility of an opposition emerging that can debate and offer alternatives. In Algeria, there are currently no political parties that can provide the country with a credible vision. As a consequence, the popular movement can only ever be defensive -- fighting oppression and rejecting the socio-political situation -- rather than taking the offensive and offering a positive program.

Insulated from international criticism

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To a greater extent than in many other Arab countries, the regime in Algeria is insulated from the international community's criticism because it does not depend on tourism (like Tunisia) or on the US aid (like the Egyptian army). Moreover, since the US and Israel have no truck with Algeria it is hard to see America repeating its role in Egypt. It seems equally unlikely the European Union would act. Aside from memories of colonial conflict with France, Algeria provides for 10% of the EU's gas and oil demand at a time of rising prices and energy insecurity.

Could Be a Revolution

Anti-regime anger building in Algeria—could be a rev

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This relative quietism hardly reflects satisfaction with the regime's performance. The Algerian people should be the beneficiaries of rising gas prices and the discovery new reserves, but instead the country has disintegrated economically and socially. It continues to lack just about everything, be it housing, health, or jobs, and what it does possess is deficient and requires rebuilding. The state flaunts its \$150 billion reserves in foreign currency, revealing the full extent of the fissure between a privileged clique in power and the rest of society that thinks about eating and dreams about emigrating. Since 1962, successive governments failed to build a real state or an economy; instead, they aimed to neutralize and contain resentment towards the regime. In reality, rage against the regime has been building up for fifty years.

Could be a coup and popular uprising

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The retired generals responsible for annulling the 1992 elections still hold power, but they have eschewed diluting control and bringing in a younger generation of generals into the foray. The result is discontent among many generals in their fifties. Blamed for Algeria's disintegration, it remains to be seen whether these generals will continue their involvement with a discredited regime. Combined with widespread discontent, the fall of Ben Ali in Tunisia and Mubarak in Egypt, this military "generational clash" presents the possibility of an explosive cocktail. The only realistic hope for change in Algeria is an internal coup within the army, but, as always in a country with such a turbulent past, it would be foolhardy to predict the outcome.

There COULD be a rev in Algeria

Lyman, Editor, Foreign Affairs Journal, 6-3-11

John, Editor-in-Chief of Foreign Affairs Journal. Rock the Casbah: Algeria and the Arab Spring Posted on 03 June 2011. <http://www.foreignaffairsjournal.org/2011/06/03/rock-the-casbah-algeria-and-the-arab-spring/>

Algeria has largely avoided the type of unrest witnessed in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Libya and Yemen. This could all change due to the slow pace of promised reforms by Algeria's President Abdelaziz Bouteflika. Earlier this decade Algeria faced an uncertain future after emerging from years of a civil war

that began in the 1990s and resulted, by some accounts, in the killing of over a 100,000 people. Algeria still faces the difficulty of dealing with groups like Al Qaeda in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb which has been known to rely on attacks against the government officials and others seen as pro-Western. Andrew Hansen writes in the Council on Foreign Relations, "Terrorist activity in North Africa has been reinvigorated in the last few years by a local Algerian Islamist group turned pan-Maghreb jihadi organization: al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). A Sunni group that previously called itself the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), the organization has taken responsibility for a number of terrorist attacks in the region, declared its intention to attack Western targets, and sent a squad of jihadis to Iraq. Experts believe these actions suggest widening ambitions within the group's leadership, now pursuing a more global, sophisticated, and better-financed direction." **One of the largest problems facing Algeria and the likely cause of unrest in the streets is unemployment for the country's youth. While Mr. Bouteflika did lift the 19-year-old emergency law, many would contend that unless more is done, Algerians under the age of 30, who make up 70% of the population, will take to the streets en masse and demand more structural changes.**

What The US gives Algeria

USAID sponsors a Mentouri University Partnership program

OVERVIEW

The Government of Algeria recognizes that the lack of proper training and opportunity for youth undermines the country's prospects for long-term stability and prosperity. In Constantine, the student population is expected to reach 120,000 by 2012. Currently, there are 80,000 students at Mentouri University. However, most of these students graduate with few hopes for a good job, indicating the need for a comprehensive program that supports human capacity development and job placement. The U.S. Embassy in Algiers, USAID, and Mentouri University have designed the university partnership program to strengthen Mentouri's business, English language, and job placement programs. It is carried out through a partnership with an American university. Staff exchanges, technical assistance and other collaborative work will lead to curricula more in tune with the area's job market, a well-functioning career center, and training for the teachers in continuing the programs. The business community in Constantine is also expected to be a partner in achieving the program's goals. Through this program, USAID and Embassy Algiers expect to contribute to a better educated, more skilled cadre of young Algerians capable of making a difference in Algeria's future and in the region's stability. This is a three-year program that began in 2009, carried out in partnership with Higher Education for Development.

OBJECTIVES

The program has five main objectives:

Develop a larger cadre of teachers able to effectively deliver university training, with a corresponding improvement in students' knowledge;

Increase Mentouri University's capacity to provide high quality instruction in English and Management;

Establishment a functioning career development center at Mentouri University;

Develop and deliver training modules on foundation or "soft skills" for the workplace; and

Equip the staff at Mentouri University to provide advisory services and training for workplace skills.

We gave them \$50,000 once after a flood

02/15/06

We gave them some money after an earthquake

http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/countries/algeria/fy2003/Algeria_EQ_FS01_06-09-2003.pdf

\$7.2 million in food aid in FY 11

http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/ffp/algeria.fs.01.04.11.pdf

Here is what we give them...

Congressional Research Service 4-13-11

Algeria Current issues

<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21532.pdf>

Congress appropriates and oversees little bilateral development aid for Algeria, but Algeria benefits from military cooperation and security assistance programs. Between FY2007 and FY2009, the Defense Department allocated at least \$658,000 for military-to-military conferences and joint combined exchange training (JCET) programs under TSCTP. Also as part of TSCTP, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) was allocated \$2 million in FY2009 for educational programs to counter violent extremism. 76 In FY2007, Algeria benefitted from a portion of two Defense Department-administered "Section 1206" regional programs: a \$1.1 million, 7-country regional package labeled as "Partner Nation Intelligence Capability Aid," and a separate \$5.8 million, 15-country regional maritime security package. 77 The State Department's Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) has administered projects in Algeria to promote democratic governance, improved education, and an enhanced financial sector; and the U.S. National Democratic Institute (NDI) has an ongoing program to strengthen political parties, civil society, and the media. 78 A provision included in annual appropriations legislation—most recently,

Section 7086 (c) of the FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act, P.L. 111-117, signed into law on December 16, 2009, which has been carried over via subsequent continuing resolutions—prohibits certain types of bilateral economic and security assistance “for the central government of any country that fails to publicly disclose on an annual basis its national budget, to include income and expenditures.” The restriction may be waived on a country-by-country basis if the Secretary of State reports to the Committees on Appropriations that to do so is in the national interest of the United States. Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources Jacob Lew signed an FY2010 budget transparency waiver for Algeria on March 25, 2010. 79

We only give them 2.7 million dollars

**Table 1. U.S. Bilateral Foreign Assistance to Algeria
(State Department and USAID)**
(thousands of dollars; historical dollars)

	FY2008 Actual	FY2009 Actual	FY2010 Actual	FY2011 Request ^a	FY2012 Request
NADR	317	500	775	550	700
INCLE	198	0	0	870	870
IMET	696	898	950	950	1,300
ESF	400	0	0	0	0
DA	0	400	710	400	0
Food Aid (P .L.480)	6,816	0	6,213	0	0
Total, above accounts	8,427	1,798	2,610	2,770	2,870

Source: U.S. Department of State Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, FY2010-FY2012; figures provided to CRS by the State Department, 2010.

Notes: NADR = Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs, INCLE = International Narcotic Control and Law Enforcement, IMET= International Military Education and Training, ESF = Economic Support Fund, DA = Development Assistance. This table does not reflect assistance appropriated for regional programs, nor funding administered by other agencies, such as the Defense Department.

a. Enacted funding figures for FY2011 are not available.