

# Arctic Controversy Paper

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Thanks to the people who helped edit, work through ideas, and discuss this paper.

Formatting notes – there are both cards in a traditional debate format and endnotes to cite other reports. These articles would be useful as cards, but are more there for people to read into further literature on the current developments happening in the region. There are a few footnotes in the “Neg K” section only.

Feel free to email me if you have questions etc.

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## Arctic Policy and its Importance Today

As the US takes the chair of the Arctic Council this year, the most important and only dedicated multilateral forum in the Arctic, the region is becoming more of a foreign policy focus than ever before. John Kerry's approach to the Arctic Council has been discussed<sup>i</sup> in detail, as well as potential US policy options. The US has pivoted to focus here for foreign policy because of the realization of the overall role it plays across multiple areas, including trade and the environment.

“Due to the geopolitical factors associated with the Arctic, it is important to remind the American public of the potential opportunities for the U.S. to further its goals in the High North...(article continues)...The next two years will be of high importance for the U.S. in terms of establishing itself as a key Arctic state. Therefore, all levels of the U.S. Government should work together with their Arctic partners to take advantage of this historic opportunity.” – Report from the Center for International Maritime Security<sup>ii</sup>

There are many stakes for each Arctic nation in the region, especially regarding economic interests. More people than in the past believe there's an increased risk of conflict in the region, with people<sup>iii</sup> in 5 out of 8 Arctic nations saying the risk of conflict increased in the last year. These 8 main Arctic nations (including Russia and NATO players) have converging economic interests, and recent reports<sup>iv</sup> suggest that concerns surrounding these relationships will only increase. Every week, there are new military provocations by the Russians. They're increasing military presence, and by 2017, they're expected to have even more infrastructure. Putin has developed plans for military basing and rallied a fleet of more than thirty icebreakers<sup>v</sup>, specialized ships that are able to cut through ice nine feet deep and allow other ships to traverse into previously impossible-to-access areas. Russia will build five aircraft carrier squadrons and twenty new frigates<sup>vi</sup> as a complement to the icebreaker development. Their icebreakers are also nuclear-powered<sup>vii</sup> and the largest in the world. At the same time, the United States, a power with similar interests in vast Arctic resources and trade routes, is reluctant to increase development. Yet the Russians are only increasing aggressive moves, in the region and elsewhere. A Russian fighter jet recently intercepted an American plane traveling over the Baltic Sea<sup>viii</sup> - a move experts have said points to a more militarized Russia. These regional disputes spill over and implicate one of the direct places of intersection between Russia and the US. The New York Times this month said: “Russia's military activity in the Arctic and its vast territorial claim to waters there highlight the strategic priority that Mr. Putin has given to the region. The intensifying competition over natural resources has increased the possibility of confrontation, and Russia's annexation of Crimea in March 2014 deeply strained relations with the rest of the council's permanent members.”<sup>ix</sup>

Energy policy intersects relationships with other nations, and the Arctic has nearly 15%<sup>x</sup> of the world's remaining oil. Trade routes will be hotly contested<sup>xi</sup> and private shipping companies are already attempting to get on board. This is relatively new – in 2010, 111 thousand tons of cargo were shipped in the area; just a year later it was over 810,000 tons<sup>xii</sup> of goods. The potential for relaxation of drilling restrictions<sup>xiii</sup> has led to many new questions about the mechanism for future action, including: relations with other oil-savvy nations in the region, performance-based standards for development, environmental concerns, and public-private partnerships. Those

questions have already created political battles in and outside Washington as well, with lawmakers hotly contesting<sup>xiv</sup> the potential for a ‘Russian oil takeover’.

The melting ice, potential for study, and international connections also make the region a key area in climate change cooperation (with new strategies<sup>xv</sup> emerging this year). Secretary Kerry in 2013 said:

“...I begin by saying that there are many areas where the eight Arctic states’ interests overlap significantly...We share many values and priorities. But there is nothing that should unite us quite like our concern for both the promise and the challenges of the northern-most reaches of the earth. What makes this organization so important is that the consequences of our nations’ decisions don’t stop at the 66th parallel. And that’s especially true today, when the threat of climate change is as ominous as ever, its effects are as tangible as ever, and the courage – literally, the courage – that we summon in the coming months and years is as crucial as ever. This is one of the most obvious shared challenges on the face of the planet today.”<sup>xvi</sup> The US takes control of that very organization now, and there are numerous policy questions that need to be answered.

## The Topic Itself

### **The Goal**

A regionally specific yet ground-diverse topic that allows:

- The Aff to access topically unique and innovative and actor- and technologically-specific options in different areas that must take unilateral action.
- The Neg the ability to always have multilateralism good DA's and CP's along with topic areas and K's that apply to each arena of development.
- Both sides the ability to have nuanced impact debates on a variety of issues, including Arctic warfare, Russia, trade, environment, and questions of Native American sovereignty

### **Timely literature that intersects many important areas**

New developments in this region have led to a large amount of literature discussing paths forward. We often do not have opportunities to discuss these Arctic-focused opportunities in any in-depth manner, especially in debates, despite the immense amount of sources becoming available. This topic is an opportunity to explore a different pattern of development, rather than a sole focus on military presence or energy policy. Real policy decisions are done in the context of specific geopolitical situations (think land claim disputes, multilateral organizations, etc.) rather than in broad contexts, and there should be more of a focus on training students to become better versed in specific regional situations (other than the Middle East). Because of the Arctic's unique forum as a convergence of multifaceted interests, training ourselves to understand these issues will not only help us understand vast global problems including US-Russia relations and climate change, but also help provide us with a set of skills to explore future complicated regional disputes. The unilateral vs. multilateral elements that would be directly in the resolution also help us investigate a conundrum that is increasingly a theme in other areas of foreign policy, but in a focused way with a region that is an up-and-coming scene for multilateral cooperation (it's also great for real ground on both sides).

The Arctic is a zone of important activities that are both increasing and being contested every day. This allows for a much more comprehensive body of work than what one might initially expect, and many of these issues are important policy questions that intersect our most urgent concerns today. Many of the things college students (especially international relations and political science majors) are interested in can be found within these areas: trade lane development, Russian relations, multilateralism, energy development, the environment, and Native issues all are important to Arctic policymaking decisions. Locating these discussions into one region also avoids the classic international whack-a-mole scenario where resolutions throw together previously unrelated items.

### **Is it a big enough topic?**

There may not 5 completely different topics within the topic, but the depth, complexity, and process-based nature of the policy ground makes it sufficient to be debating for long periods of time. The amount of mechanisms available also allows for late-season innovation, something particularly important on international topics. The decisions of the Arctic Council and future

policies will also change the nature of topic interactions enough during the season to provide us with a continuous source of new material.

The amount of literature on development and/or presence periods in the Arctic is important because it provides many policy questions to be discussed, and these vary by area, magnifying the amount of options available – the information on this is contained in the specific area sections. The initial “this topic seems small” reaction underestimates the diversity in this literature and will be discussed in the potential topic areas below.

The possibility of making the resolution *unilateral* action only would preserve a litany of Neg arguments about multilateralism through existing institutions including the Arctic Council, NATO, and the UN’s mechanism for land claims.

The Arctic may only be one region, but the ability of the Aff and Neg to contest many relevant policy issues expands the amount of topic education available into other fields, but in a more focused way. We may have had access to talking about natural gas development before, but not in a focused way; the same is true with Russian relations and Native development concerns.

The Russia topic paper from last year was great and well-written, but ran into topic uniqueness issues involving whether or not “pressure” was not a unique issue – this region allows plenty of topic uniqueness while preserving ground in other areas as well. In fact, the United States is lagging behind in any form of Arctic development – in terms of military force, the US has only 2 icebreaking ships; in energy, there is still no formal framework for drilling; in multilateralism, the US becomes the chair of the increasingly important Arctic Council without almost any strategy. All of these ensure separate uniqueness for areas of the topic.

## Ideas for Wording

### **Making it Unilateral**

This is a key part of the topic because it makes the topic innovative for both sides and locks in real Neg ground. In a world where unilateral action is explicit in the resolution, a long-term topic focus would produce benefits for both sides:

- Aff: The topic would allow many actor innovations involving the mechanism and technology of development. The ability to specify different agencies and actors while also being able to specialize in a technological focus allows the Aff plenty of innovation for late-season debating.

- Neg: Multilateralism good is guaranteed Neg ground vs. many of these Affs, and there are a plethora of international organizations (the Arctic Council, UN, NATO, etc.) and bilateral arrangements that counteract offensive action. That means great DA's and mechanism CP's.

### **Note on the Area Wordings**

The ground in these areas is diverse and timely. I encourage voters to have confidence in efforts by the committee to adjust the wording that will produce the best topic – voting for topics should be off of the ideal ground and arrangements; technical details about specific wordings is debated in another process.

I encourage the topic committee to spend time focusing on specific wordings that can access the diverse ground below rather than attempting to craft wording that limits possibilities – the benefit of choosing a specific and narrow region is that we should welcome and encourage innovation in Affs and Neg ground, even if it allows for a stretching of some topic wording.

### **Actor**

The US federal government is the best option given the literature; inclusion of the states does not add a lot to the topic. The passive voice conversation is a separate debate/discussion that this paper does not take a stance on.

### **Regional Wording**

“The Arctic Circle” or “the Arctic” preserves that activities must happen in the actual region while allowing a healthy debate over land claims, the expansion of the US exclusive economic zone, and UN regulations on land claim mechanisms.

### **The US code has an official definition of the Arctic as well that explains the concept in terms of territory**

**US Code 15** [15 U.S. Code § 4111 - “Arctic” defined;  
<https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/15/4111>]

As used in this chapter, the term “Arctic” means all United States and foreign territory north of the Arctic Circle and all United States territory north and west of the boundary formed by the Porcupine, Yukon, and Kuskokwim Rivers; all contiguous seas, including the Arctic Ocean and the Beaufort, Bering, and Chukchi Seas; and the Aleutian chain.

**Area Wordings**

I've placed suggestions below the main 3 areas (and the trade sub-area). Each of these "areas" is more a logical grouping of literature and arguments, because there is a lot of ground in each one. For example, the military/multilateral area includes ground about both unilateral military action and engagement with the UN, NATO, the Arctic Council, and more in the other areas.

It's also possible that others may feel strongly about specifying another area or further developing an area of Arctic policy for a wording paper – the committee should be open to this to allow more room for discussion.

**Potential Wording Options**

A rough version of a resolution would look something like the one below, but more questioning of each topic area would be needed before writing a final resolution (and keep in mind there is a whole period of time to develop and vote on that):

The United States federal government should unilaterally increase its activity within the Arctic Circle through a substantial increase in one or more of the following: trade support, military presence, environmental development, energy development, Native American engagement.

The United States federal government should substantially increase its unilateral development of, or presence in, the Arctic Circle in one or more of the following areas: trade, military, environment, energy, and/or Native lands.

## Military and Multilateral Areas

### Other Potential Stems for Topic Wording

“offensive military presence”; “Arctic infrastructure investment”

### Overview

Climate change has melted Arctic ice<sup>xvii</sup>, leading to massive resource discoveries and military build-up. Activity intersects trade, energy, and military policy. There is no mechanism for resolving conflicts or competing resource claims. NATO is currently ineffective because Russia does not trust it, the Arctic Council has no binding enforcement mechanisms even as the US becomes the Chair country, and the UN has no concrete plan to assign land claims without leading to conflict.

Major powers are pursuing military and resource claims in the region. Russia has developed plans for comprehensive military basing and rallied a fleet of more than 20 icebreakers<sup>xviii</sup>. China has begun Arctic development and has a seat on the Arctic Council<sup>xix</sup>. Canada has legitimate claims because of their proximity<sup>xx</sup>. Canada wouldn't begin massive conflict alone, but their strife could cause allies including the US to become involved. Icebreakers are specialized boats that let military and civilian ships access the area.

The US doesn't have icebreaking capability, giving Russia full access to claims. They have taken advantage of this by planting a flag at the North Pole in 2007, building new ships to be ready in the next few years, and doing weapons testing. A weapon testing requires 14-day notification under START, but the US was not notified of a 2012 test<sup>xxi</sup>. Russian development defies the US and other powers, and signals a willingness to “re-imperialize” this region<sup>xxii</sup>. This is rooted in the internal Russian desire for internal control where they project power elsewhere to make sure domestic politics stay strong. Russia will expand at all costs for domestic support.

Here's a comparison of US and Russian materials:

### Current Arctic Military Arsenals, U.S. and Russia

Type	United States	Russia
Submarines	0 assigned*;	35 <sup>xxiii</sup>
Missile Cruisers	0 assigned*;	6
Military Icebreakers <sup>xxiv</sup>	2	19
Current + Planned Bases	1 (Thule <sup>xxv</sup> , Greenland)	6 “compounds” <sup>xxvi</sup>
Drone Monitoring Base	0	1 <sup>xxvii</sup>

\*The United States military could maybe deploy a number of ships to the Arctic region, but does not publicly state that there are ships assigned to only Arctic operations.

### Aff Mechanisms

- Explicit pressure on Russia in this area, whether through diplomatic or military action. Wake's topic paper from last year outlined some of the advantages of getting to this diplomatic area; this would preserve that ability as one of the area options for the Affirmative to choose.

- Offense military engagement, whether specified or unspecified by the Aff. Examples of this include the list below. The Aff would be able to specify any of these. Each one of them also has mechanism ground, both with the Actor of the initial development and the process of presence, greatly increasing the amount of Affs available in this area.

- Arctic basing
- Navy involvement in ship-building
- Coast Guard military drills
- Icebreaking capability
- other weapons testing.
- Other infrastructure decisions and investment that would intersect the trade sub-area below

### **New Icebreaker fleet example**

**Perera 1/19/14** – MA in International and Public Affairs at Columbia. (David, “Second heavy icebreaker not necessary through 2022, says Coast Guard”) Fierce Homeland Security.

<http://www.fiercehomelandsecurity.com/story/coast-guard-needs-least-3-heavy-icebreakers-says-high-latitude-study/>

The Coast Guard can meet icebreaking demands in the Arctic through 2022 without reactivating the laid-up USCGC Polar Sea and the National Science Foundation has proven recourse to other icebreaking capability should the service's single operational heavy icebreaker be unable to break the annual channel to the main American research station in the Antarctic, concludes a Coast Guard analysis. The Coast Guard is grappling with the problem of owning only two heavy icebreakers both older than their expected lifetime of three decades. One, the USCGC Polar Star, recently underwent a \$90 million overhaul intended to give its 37-year-old hull another seven to 10 years of service. The other, the USCGC Polar Sea, is tied up "cold iron" to Pier 36 in Seattle, officially inactive since November 2011 – although it's been effectively inactive since experiencing a catastrophic failure of one of its main propulsion diesel engines in April 2010. In a business case analysis (.pdf) provided to FierceHomelandSecurity by the Coast Guard, the service doesn't actually recommend against undertaking an overhaul of the Polar Sea, but it says it can get by without it. Arctic seasonal demands through 2022 can be met with existing and planned assets, the analysis says. And although a second heavy icebreaker would provide a backup ship capable of carving the navigable channel to McMurdo Station annually necessary for resupplying the NSF Antarctic research outpost, "the cost of this redundant capability would come at the expense of more pressing and immediate operational demands," the analysis states. From 2007 until this year, the NSF has contracted with the Swedish government or a Russian company to break the channel. The Polar Sea is in need of \$99.2 million worth of repairs over three years should the Coast Guard try to extend its life for another 7 to 10 years, the analysis estimates. Due to the ship's age, annual operating costs would go up, from an estimated \$36.6 million in the first year of resumed operations to \$52.8 million in the tenth. That means that the total cost of reactivating the heavy icebreaker for up to a decade – the overhaul, plus operating costs including reconstitution of a crew – would be between \$573.9 million to as much as \$751.7 million, the analysis states. The higher figure has a confidence level risk analysis figure of 90 percent. As climate change causes accelerated warming in the Arctic, the Coast Guard anticipates an increased need for its presence in the area. A 2011 study commissioned by the Coast Guard concluded that the service will need at least three heavy and three medium icebreakers to fulfill its statutory requirements in polar regions, primarily the Arctic. But, the Polar Sea business case analysis says the earlier study didn't assign a timeframe to when projected gaps in mission performance at high latitudes would start appearing, and that "current evidence is insufficient to conclude that significant or moderate changes would occur during the next seven to 10 years."

**Here's an example of evidence for Offensive engagement good – talks about unipolar vs. multipolar engagement and uniqueness as well.**

**Murray 12** (Professor of Political Science @ Alberta, “Arctic politics in the emerging multipolar system: challenges and consequences,” The Polar Journal, 2.1)

It is no overstatement to say that the end of the Cold War was one of the most important events in recent world history. Scholars from many areas of study have used the fall of the Soviet Union as a starting point to explain shifts in security, globalization, humanitarianism and institutional integration, all of which played important roles in world affairs in the immediate post-Cold War era. Since 1991, explanatory models for international and global politics have broadened their scope to include variables such as individual preferences, capitalist oppression, ideational construction, environmentalism, gender and sexual politics, and discursive power to levels previously unforeseen throughout the Cold War years.

As such, we now see the world as a far more complex and nefarious arena in which power and dominance are exercised each day. At the systemic level, the fall of the Soviet Union equated to nothing short of a monumental shift in the way

states would make foreign and defence strategy. For 50 years, the bipolar system was dominated by two superpowers constantly competing and building arms in an effort to balance one another. The end of the Cold War signalled a major shift in systemic arrangement, as the system went from being bipolar to the world entering what was often referred to as the “unipolar moment.”<sup>1</sup> The era of unipolarity and American hegemony in the international system has been marked by stability in an interstate sense, and the realignment of various spheres of influence in the wake of the Soviet Union’s demise. Far from being just a theoretical notion, the unipolar moment has also provided states with an environment in which to pursue their national self-interest where the likelihood of conflict is decreased and great power security competition has been minimized.<sup>2</sup> As such, new areas of foreign affairs and defence strategy have become far more important than they could have been throughout the bipolar constrained Cold War years. One of the most notable examples in this regard has been the increased desire for territorial protection and extension in the Arctic region. In an era of state preoccupation with humanitarianism, terrorism and economic recession, it is being suggested by some observers that the Arctic has become the primary stage through which states, both great and minor in power, can pursue their self-interest in a way that combines soft power cooperation through bodies of governance with hard power and military build-up. As things presently stand, there are a variety of nations and institutions all seeking to claim governing authority over different parts of the circumpolar region. Nations making claims to parts of the Arctic Ocean or other northern waters include Canada, Russia, the United States, Norway, Iceland and Denmark/Greenland. On the institutional side, Arctic governance has been debated and defined by bodies such as the United Nations, the European Union, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Arctic Council.<sup>3</sup> To date, no clear resolution to competing claims is in sight, and in some cases the situation is on the verge of becoming far more competitive as nations such as Russia have resorted to asserting possible military solutions to contested Arctic issues to bolster their declarations. It is important to note the increased levels of interest over Arctic relations between states, but, on this point, little attention has been given to the influence of the international system over this situation. If the unipolar moment has been defined as an era of relative stability and diplomatic coexistence, and tensions in the Arctic are already on the rise, what is to happen when the multipolar system finally emerges in the near future? Since 2005, the status of the United States as systemic hegemon has been in decline due to economic, military and political strains placed on American power capabilities throughout the Bush era and beyond. This decrease in relative power preponderance has been even further exacerbated by the economic recession starting in 2008 and the nation’s inability to stabilize its markets. As such, the predictions of those like Christopher Layne and John Mearsheimer are on the verge of coming to fruition, in that the unipolar moment is about to end.<sup>4</sup> New great powers are rising, the United States is no longer able to prevent these nations from balancing their power, and the once obvious prevalence of American power is far murkier than it was a decade ago. As the multipolar era becomes increasingly likely, one must ponder the effects this shift might have on state foreign and defence strategy-making, especially towards the Arctic region. To date, though its relative power position has declined significantly in recent years, the United States remains the hegemon of the international system, but it is contended here that such status is soon to evaporate. In this context, this article argues that the emergence of a multipolar systemic arrangement is very likely to increase security competition in the system as a whole, and the Arctic will be at the epicentre of such conflict. To lend support to this hypothesis, an examination of the impending shift from unipolarity to multipolarity will be made, as will an account of current security dynamics in the circumpolar region. The article concludes with a stark warning that without some kind of real action towards settling competing Arctic claims, it will be left to states to secure their own territorial assertions through hard power and forceful means. The system is unipolar ... for now In order to evaluate the polarity of the international system in a given historical period, one must identify the hierarchy of power in terms of the number of super or great powers dominating international outcomes. Counting great or super powers can be somewhat difficult in contemporary international relations, as scholars have begun to expand the notions of power and capabilities, but the clearest guideline for being able to identify great powers is through determining capabilities. The reason it is essential to understand the great powers in international relations is that they, above all other states, institutions, non-state actors and ideational forces, are responsible for the daily conduct of behaviour in the international system, and they have been historically accountable for substantial alterations to power distribution since the 1648

*[.....Parts cut off for topic paper length.....]*

Presently, there is little reason to believe that tension and strategic posturing will lead to the outbreak of war in the near future. That said, **as America’s influence continues to wane, other states have shown their desire to take full advantage of the United States’ inability to control northern affairs. If the United States does lose its hegemony, which many commentators believe is inevitable, there will be at least four dyads in security calculations, with Russia, China and India entering the fray, and two of those states have Arctic borders and a historical legacy of conflict.** Power imbalance in the Arctic is already apparent, with only Russia and the United States as great powers, while the other Arctic states are middle or minor powers with no hope of preventing a great power from doing as it pleases. Lastly, miscalculation is evident in the present context, as Sweden and Norway are both arming for possible Russian aggression, though

Russia has shown little or no overtly aggressive tendencies towards Nordic nations. Unipolarity was not going to last forever, but as it fades the probability of northern conflict is ever increasing. The shift to hard power strategies, the effects of climate change, and the decline of the United States all speak to the fact that multipolarity can increase levels of tension and mistrust, thus altering the currently stable nature of Arctic affairs. Efforts at Arctic governance through institutional binding or legal claims, as seen in the Arctic Council and UNCLOS, are able at present to mitigate the ongoing and ever increasing security competition in the high north, but as the system changes from unipolarity to multipolarity, constraining state behaviour becomes increasingly difficult. As such, observers must be mindful of the systemic variables at play when explaining and forecasting Arctic politics, as changes to the structure are very likely to translate into changes to state security strategies.

**This is an article about how Russians are intentionally hiding their belligerence.**

**Huebert 10** – PhD, Professor of Political Science @ U of Calgary. Rob, “The Newly Emerging Arctic Security

Environment,”<http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/The%20Newly%20Emerging%20Arctic%20Security%20Environment.pdf>]

It should be clear that the Russians have been according a growing importance to the Arctic region . They continually issue statements affirming their commitment to peaceful cooperation in the Arctic, which show up in the form of public statements by their leaders and in their primary documents. These same leaders are also very quick to condemn the actions of the other Arctic states as being aggressive and a threat to international peace and security in the region whenever they engage in any form of military related activity. It is clear, however, that the Russians have embarked on a much more assertive use of military force in the region by taking various action – the missile test launches near the pole, the sudden and substantial resumption of the long-range bomber patrols, and the voyages of their surface units into the disputed zones – which exceeds that of any of the other Arctic states. Furthermore, the Russians’ proposed rearmament plans greatly exceed the plans of any other Arctic state. Thus, the Russians have excelled at portraying themselves as cooperative while taking increasingly assertive action. The question remains as to why? Are they merely reasserting themselves as a global power, or, does this new action point to an increasingly assertive Russia? This is not known.

## Negative Ground

- Specific mechanisms for engaging the Arctic Council, which can intersect other topic areas as well, because the Arctic Council is able to work in multiple areas and with multiple countries.

The US current scientific approach is here:

<http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2015/04/150420123025.htm>

- Mechanism Counterplans: Which international organizations should be engaged? Does NATO have a role (beyond the terrible and obvious consult route)? How will the US’s chair of the Arctic Council influence diplomacy? What about land claim development through the UN? All of these are important questions that there are many neg articles for. The role of *private actors* is also important.

**This is from a new report detailing changes to the Arctic Council that could take place**

**Knecht 4-14** [New Observers Queuing Up: Why the Arctic Council should expand - and expel Sebastian Knecht, April 14, 2015; Arctic Institute at the Center for Circumpolar Security Studies]

**There should be no Permanency in Observer Status, One possible solution to the problem of a bloated Arctic Council is to validate the readmission of established observers more carefully.** The yardstick for observers to keep their status should be past commitment based on rigid performance reviews carried out in regular intervals by the Working Group Chairmanships, with involvement of the Arctic Council Secretariat, and discussed by Senior Arctic Officials.

Commitment would thereby mean the active and continuous contribution of scientific input, knowledge or material resources to at least one Working Group. Recommendations which observers to readmit for another period should then be forwarded to the Arctic states for approval at the next Ministerial Meeting. If the review reveals insufficient or irregular activity over a longer period of time, observer status should be suspended. As Figure 1 indicates,

several observers only exist on paper. This is true also when all six Working Groups are taken into account. A limited number of observers have over past years never or only sporadically attended any Working Group meeting. It is hence questionable whether they still fulfil the provisions laid out in the Rules of Procedure at all. In any case, their expulsion would come at little costs.<sup>99</sup>

**Quite the contrary, a stricter review system could have a number of positive ramifications. A systematic and coherent application of the Rules of Procedure would lend the Arctic Council more credibility in its policy towards international stakeholders. The threat of expulsion could also serve as an incentive to raise awareness among established observers which role they are able and willing to play in the body,** which lays the groundwork for stepping up their efforts in contributing to Arctic Council governance. Finally, **a review and reporting system would show prospective applicants that observer status in the Arctic Council has a price tag, and requires sustained interest, capacity and relevant expertise to contribute to Arctic science and knowledge production.**<sup>As</sup>

The role of LOST and whether or not it should be ratified intersects these areas as well.

- Environment-based DA's and case turns to the role of this unsustainable development in the region are available

- Russian Aggression/Containment DA: The crux of the literature on whether or not to offensively engage Russia in the region is geared toward their potential reaction; there are many qualified people on both sides who debate the actions and reactions of both policy choices.

### **This is an example of a link card based off of Arctic action**

**Bukkvoll 11** [Head of the Russia Project at the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment, (Tor, "Prospects for peace and cooperation in the Arctic," 9/22/11)]

Headlines predicting a conflict in the Arctic have become a common sight in the international news media over the past five to ten years. The main reason for this seems to be disputes over access to natural resources, primarily oil and gas, something which may spark serious tensions between Arctic states. Sometimes these reports seem to describe a phenomenon over which the states concerned have little or no control whatever. However, international relations are not regulated by the forces of Nature. Political scientist Alexander Wendt's famous phrase that "anarchy is what states make of it" can be just as easily applied to the Arctic: "the potential for conflict in the Arctic is what states make of it". It is of course true that many Arctic states are concerned with their economic and security interests in the region and the danger of a regional conflict. This is in part reflected in practically all Arctic states' increased military presence in the area. At times we see heated rhetoric and mutual accusations of militarization. This is rooted in three main causes: a zero-sum game over access to natural resources; an insufficient level of trust among Arctic states; and the fact that the Arctic has been and will remain a militarily sensitive area, especially for Russia. In addition, climate change and the melting of the Arctic ice cap are likely to substantially increase commercial activity in the region. This may lead to conflicts that are not yet apparent. Speaking about oil and gas deposits, this zero-sum game is unavoidable. Politics cannot increase the volume of available hydrocarbon deposits. Delimitation agreements seem to be the only way of defusing conflicts. The 2011 agreement between Norway and Russia on a close to fifty-fifty division of the Barents Sea shelf among the two countries is a case in point. It is, however, important to note here that far from all hydrocarbon deposits are potential sources of political conflict. In fact, many and probably most deposits are located in undisputed areas. In addition, the possibilities for cooperation on infrastructure, technology development, etc., in connection with oil and gas exploration and development activities, might also make this issue less zero-sum. When it comes to other resources, such as fisheries, we are not necessarily dealing with a zero-sum game. The joint Russian-Norwegian management of Barents Sea fisheries has successfully restored fish populations in the region, bringing them up to record levels. If this responsible and sustainable approach continues, this cooperation is likely to bring both countries significant revenues for a long time. This lack of trust among Arctic states stems both from the fact that policies have been pursued without consultation with the other Arctic states, and from the still often strained relations between Russia and the West. The former is not necessarily difficult to change, but the latter may take longer to overcome. In essence, relations between Russia and the West are going to see ups and downs until the day that Russia eventually joins the Western security community. A security community can be defined as an arrangement among the states of a certain geographical area according to which they no longer see military force as an option for any conflicts that may arise between them. A transformation of this community to include Russia, however, will not take place until Russia becomes a liberal democracy and shares the West's other main political values. However, the fact that Russian membership in the Western security community is not on the cards today, does not mean that work to build confidence is futile. The level of trust between states that do not belong to the same security community can also be successfully increased

through a variety of measures. For instance, despite Norway's NATO membership and the considerable skepticism with which Russia views this organization, the level of trust among the two countries is today at an historic high. This resulted from the two countries, Russia and Norway, being willing to set aside some of their differences in order to achieve common ground on issues of mutual concern. The third factor that sparks the conflict, the military sensitivity of the Arctic, is likely to remain an issue for the foreseeable future. As long as the nuclear powers feel that nuclear weapons are vital to their mutual deterrence capability, Russia in particular will be skeptical of anything that risks impinging on its ability to maneuver its sea and air-based nuclear capabilities in the north. For the Arctic states, it will be particularly important to make sure that the Arctic does not become a heated domestic political issue. Competition between opposing domestic political forces over who is the toughest in defending national interests has often been a major source of international conflict. It is of course only natural, and indeed productive, for Arctic issues to be the subject of internal, domestic political debate, but politicians across the Arctic states should remember that the Arctic is not yet a region defined by conflict. Exploiting the issue for the ulterior motive of demonstrating one's patriotism to the domestic public could have negative consequences, even potentially jeopardizing political and/or military stability in the region. A useful contrast to relations in the Arctic can be seen in the South China Sea. There, adjacent states have also made competing territorial claims fueled by their desire to be involved in the extraction of natural resources. In contrast to the Arctic, however, the military build-up is much more intense, the rhetoric among the competitors much sharper, but the degree of legal regulation much weaker. This does not mean that a South China Sea scenario in the Arctic is impossible, but it does mean that we are not there yet, and it is not inevitable. On a related note, one must also keep in mind that while there is nothing inevitable about a deterioration of relations in the Arctic, the fact that it can or will be avoided should also not be taken for granted. The chances for building peaceful relations in the Arctic are good, but it will demand serious focus, a great deal of dialogue and willingness to compromise from the states involved. Regional cooperation arrangements such as the Arctic and Barents Councils can also play an important role in this regard. Despite the reasons for conflict discussed above, the conditions for conflict resolution through peaceful means are probably more promising in the Arctic than in many other regions where similar conflicts exist. First, all the states concerned, to varying degrees, are relatively economically developed and politically stable. They are therefore likely to be more predictable in their policies than less economically developed and politically stable states. Second, a comprehensive basis of agreements and normative acts for regulating bilateral relations in the area already exists. Third, civilian cooperation among the Arctic states is expanding on issues such as maritime search and rescue and environmental monitoring, to mention just two. Such cooperation could also be expected to have a spillover effect into the security realm. Fourth, in military terms the most significant players in the Arctic – the USA and Russia – face much greater security challenges elsewhere in the world. The USA is concerned by the rise of China's military capacity, their continued ability to be a significant military player in the Pacific, and the defense of U.S. interests in a number of hot spots in the developing world. Russia is concerned by the significant potential for political upheaval along its southern and eastern borders, in addition to also keeping an eye on China's rising military might. Thus, both countries could be expected to work particularly hard to avoid the Arctic becoming yet another area of instability. Fifth, to some extent the Arctic five share a common interest in limiting non-Arctic states' access to the region. On the one hand this could lead to greater cooperation among the Arctic five on limiting outside influence, but on the other hand it could also lead to conflict between them should differences of opinion arise about what the role of "outsiders" should be or whether some should be given priority over others. There are undoubtedly potential sources of conflict in the Arctic that deserve to be taken seriously. Nor can one expect the states that have stakes in the area to shrug off all concern for the defense of their national interests. However, this conflict remains at a low level, and that is something that can be maintained. Neither violent conflict nor lasting peace are inevitable outcomes, but many of the factors discussed here suggest that there are better prospects for avoiding violent conflict in this region than in many other regions of the world where interests collide.

## Trade Sub-Area

There is plenty of discussion in the literature of the benefits of new trade routes that are properly maintained in the Arctic – this would be advantage ground on many of the resolution options, but expands the amount of options, especially if the Aff could engage private actors in regulatory schemes.

Negative teams have access to ground engaging private actors, relaxing regulations on shipping, and engaging in cooperative ventures with other nations, all of which are either not unilateral or not direct USFG action

### **This is an example of the use of the Navy in port communication**

**Burke et al. 8** (Sharon burke is a senior fellow for CNAS. Christine Parthemore is a research associate at CNAS. Jay Gulledge, Phd, is the senior scientist for the Pew Center on Global Climate Change; Nirav Patel is the Bacevich fellow at CNAS. Michael Horowitz, Phd, is a non-resident fellow at CNAS, “Uncharted Waters: The U.S. Navy and Navigating Climate Change”, December 2008, [http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS\\_Working%20Paper\\_CNO\\_ClimateChange\\_BurkePatel\\_Dec2008.pdf](http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Working%20Paper_CNO_ClimateChange_BurkePatel_Dec2008.pdf))

Disruptions to global shipping and commercial ports resulting from climate change will present challenges to the Navy. First, since open global maritime trade is important for the American economy, the Navy already works to keep sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and other access routes for trade open. As a threat to maritime trade, port disruptions could draw in the U.S. Navy. In particular, as the most powerful maritime actor in the world, maritime rescue and recovery operations could draw on U.S. naval resources, especially if American allies and major trading partners control the at-risk ports. Second, naval deployments are often facilitated by visits to ports in many nations, only some of which host official American naval installations. Disruptions to key commercial ports could force changes in how the Navy plans deployments. Finally, commercial ports serve as coordinating hubs for maritime trade. Focusing trade on key hubs allows for the concentration of safety and security resources around patrolling those sea-lanes between the hubs. Major damage to key commercial hubs could drive a diffusion of maritime trade to many smaller hubs. The growth in piracy off the coast of Somalia in recent years highlights the risks involved in even a relatively coordinated global maritime network. Invest in Ice Breaking Capacity. Since the U.S. Coast Guard possesses only three icebreakers, one of which is not currently operational, the Navy should encourage and support Coast Guard investment in new icebreakers. The use of icebreakers will still be necessary for the near future even if the Northwest Passage becomes navigable for a greater portion of the year. An operational icebreaker fleet is critical for helping U.S. Naval vessels, as well as maintaining U.S. presence and defending U.S. economic and other interests in the Arctic.

## Native + Environmental Area

### Potential Stems

“Native American engagement” plus one of the following:  
 “environmental development”; “sustainable development”; “environmental science”;

### Overview

As we develop the Arctic and the ice melts due to cascading climate change, there will be even more environmental concerns that are introduced with the emergence of activity. This area of the topic would allow innovation on the types of environmental policy the government could participate in. Article Journal reports say that the current multilateral framework is failing, for structural reasons including a lack of real sustainable development and less scientific cooperation than what is needed.<sup>xxviii</sup>

### **This article is about the timeliness of these concerns in the context of the region**

**Kelly 4-21** [Cathleen Kelly is a Senior Fellow at American Progress specializing in international and U.S. climate mitigation and resilience; “John Kerry’s Mission To Save The Arctic”; 4/21/2015; <http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2015/04/21/3648934/kerry-arctic-council/>]

**John Kerry is heading north.** On Friday, the **U.S. Secretary of State will travel to the Canadian Arctic city of Iqaluit, Nunavut, where he will take temporary reins of the Arctic Council, a forum that**

**could ultimately determine the fate of the Arctic.** At the biennial Arctic Council ministerial meeting in Iqaluit, Canadian Environment Minister Leona Aglukkaq — the current Arctic Council Chair — will turn the chairmanship of the eight-nation body over to Kerry.

While it might be cliché to call this a critical juncture for the Arctic, **Kerry is assuming this role at a time of**

**unprecedented uncertainty for this diverse and fast-changing region.** **The Arctic is warming twice as fast as the rest of the planet, driving rapid melting of sea ice, glaciers and ice sheets across the region.** These changes are exposing **Native Alaska coastal communities to punishing storm surges, erosion, and sea-level rise, and putting some villages on the brink of falling into the sea.**

Rapid melting of the Greenland ice sheet and glaciers are major drivers of global sea-level rise, leaving coastal and low-lying areas in the United States and around the world vulnerable to flooding. **Further, as permafrost thaws, it could release a total of 120 gigatons of carbon into the atmosphere by 2100.** Scientists warn that worldwide carbon emissions must stay below 1,000 gigatons over the same

timeframe to prevent catastrophic climate change. Chiefly, **Kerry has the rare opportunity to lock in a legacy of**

**curbing global warming in the Arctic** — **a move that could keep communities intact and save**

**species from extinction.** During his two year chairmanship, **Kerry has committed to address climate change, strengthen Arctic Ocean stewardship and improve the economic and living conditions of Arctic**

**communities.** After the Iqaluit meeting, Arctic nation ministers will not convene again until 2017, after President Obama leaves office.

Depending on who next occupies the White House, Kerry may have only limited time to drive real changes from the Arctic Council. He can remedy this by doing a couple of things. First, he could convene with President Obama an Arctic summit sometime this year. Such an event could elevate public awareness of the consequences of unchecked climate change and build momentum for a strong global climate agreement at the December climate negotiations in Paris. The United States could also use the summit to secure pledges from Arctic Council nations and observer states to cut black carbon pollution — one of the most dire threats to the Arctic — and to launch a Global Ice Alliance to encourage other countries to also reduce this pollution. **The U.S. could also update the U.S. Department of Interior Bureau of**

**Ocean Energy Management’s (BOEM) air quality standards for new oil and gas** development off the Alaskan coast to specifically limit black carbon pollution. Scientists say black carbon pollution may be responsible for more than 30 percent of recent warming in the Arctic. Whether it is deposited by local sources or drifts in from lower latitudes black carbon pollution covers ice and snow with a sooty heat-trapping blanket. This accelerates warming by reducing the reflectivity of Arctic snow and ice, and by melting sea ice into the dark ocean waters that absorb more heat. The United States is responsible for 61 percent of black carbon pollution from Arctic nations. Globally, the U.S. and other Arctic Council members and observer countries — including China, India, Japan, South Korea, Germany, and the United Kingdom — contribute more than 60 percent of black carbon pollution.

**U.S. policies, including diesel regulations, are helping to cut black carbon emissions. But these cuts may be undermined by increases in Arctic**

**black carbon pollution from oil and gas exploration, flaring, shipping, and other sources.** For example,

Interior Department Secretary Sally Jewell recently validated 2008 oil leases in Alaska's Chuckchi Sea, and her agency is reviewing Shell Oil's application to resume oil exploration there this summer. Seven Senators recently wrote to Jewell, asking the Department to solicit information on the availability of black carbon pollution control technologies for offshore activity there. And experts acknowledge that black carbon could be reduced without hurting the economy. "We have the technology today to cut black carbon emissions from many of the engines associated with oil and gas exploration and production," said Joe Kubsh, executive director of the Manufacturers of Emission Controls Association, in a statement. Hosting an official summit, announcing new black carbon standards in the U.S., and securing black carbon reduction pledges from other countries — these are just some of the things Kerry could do to leave a meaningful climate leadership legacy during his time at the helm of the Arctic Council. Whether he does or not, however, remains to be seen.

## Ground

- Polar-Based Research – US research on ice core data impacts climate change discussions in multiple areas, and the area of Arctic science has been a new focus in the literature for environmental exploration and efforts.

**This article discusses the importance of scientific approaches in the region**

**World Economic Forum 14** [Demystifying the Arctic; January 2014; Authored by the Members of the World Economic Forum Global Agenda Council on the Arctic Davos-Klosters, Switzerland 22-25 January;

[http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GAC/2014/WEF\\_GAC\\_Arctic\\_DemystifyingArctic\\_Report\\_2014.pdf](http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GAC/2014/WEF_GAC_Arctic_DemystifyingArctic_Report_2014.pdf)]

**Natural resource development, sustainable economic growth, ecosystem protection and an understanding of the impacts of climate change in the Arctic all have one thing in common: a**

**pressing need for more science.** Despite intense global interest, the Arctic remains one of the world's least-studied environments.

While a few areas have received a relatively high level of attention and funding (e.g. Arctic Alaska, the Greenland ice sheet, ocean-floor bathymetric mapping to support Article 76 claims of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea [UNCLOS], the Barents Sea), the vast majority of Arctic landscapes, oceans and ecosystems, as well as the climate, have received little field study. The lack of basic scientific understanding and datasets now pose a challenge for both business and environmental interests. **An**

**urgent need exists among public and private actors for new scientific observations, including long-term monitoring and mapping programmes, improved computer modelling and development of new technologies, ranging from autonomous sampling platforms to satellite observing systems.**

Moreover, climate change in the Arctic affects climate elsewhere in the northern hemisphere, meaning that understanding the Arctic region will have a positive impact on managing the environment in non-Arctic areas.

The Affirmative has access to increasing research through government action; the Negative has an ability to read arguments regarding the role of private companies and grants.

- Specific technologies that could work with other areas – the ability to have an Affirmative that could change drilling equipment to make it more environmentally sustainable would access a lot of the science-based ground and intersect other important energy issues. The potential to link topic areas together should be embraced in this context, because Arctic development is a continuously changing issue that has often-converging future strategies.

**Here's a solvency advocate of a specific technology dealing with early warning technology to protect Arctic communities.**

**Hermann 4-24** [The Arctic Institute; As Arctic Council chair, US can redefine the DEW Line for the 21st Century; Victoria Herrmann, April 24, 2015]

**Although climate change adaptation has been listed as a priority of the U.S. State Department's Arctic Office, it has been grossly overshadowed by the call to build icebreakers and strengthen international cooperation.** Addressing transportation concerns for shipping and buttressing global dialogue are both profound and

urgent issues. **But as northern communities face deteriorating public safety and economic instability**

**from climate change, Kerry must not forget those 700,000 Americans that call the North home.** ¶

Much can and should be done over the next two years to safeguard Alaskans against a changing environment. As a first step toward a more comprehensive Arctic adaptation strategy, Kerry should set up a federal relief program to help those most in need today. ¶ **Thirty-one villages in Alaska face imminent threat of destruction from shoreline erosion and flooding.** Many of these villages have 10 to 20 years of livability before their streets, schools, and homes become uninhabitable. At **least 12 have decided to relocate – in part or entirely – to safer ground. Moving an entire community not only takes sustainable town planning and land negotiation; it also takes hundreds of millions of dollars.** Despite these high costs, current federal programs for disaster assistance are limited, and oftentimes unavailable to village relocation projects. ¶ Kerry can prioritize America's Arctic residents in need early in his chairmanship by bolstering federal funding and technical support for Alaska villages facing relocation. He can work with President Barack Obama to express the need for federal funds for Arctic climate relocation through the presidential budget request, and with Alaska's U.S. Sen. Lisa Murkowski to allocate part of the national budget to assist emergency Arctic relocation plans through the newly established Arctic Caucus. Acting in line with his priority for international cooperation, Kerry could even create a regional Arctic Council fund for climate disaster assistance for endangered communities throughout the circumpolar region. By establishing such financial assistance programs nationally and internationally, Kerry can ensure the safety of not only America's Arctic residents, but also show American leadership in both Arctic security and climate change policy. ¶ **The Arctic is inevitably the world's distant early warning system for climate change. The North Pole will be the first and potentially hardest hit by ecological shifts and weather pattern variations.** But unlike the original DEW line, America as chair of the Arctic Council today must think beyond providing security to the Lower 48 to include those Arctic villages that face serious and immediate danger from climate change. **It must invest in local adaptation infrastructure – like relocation plans – that**

**foster economically, environmentally, and culturally thriving communities for its citizens at the top of the world.**

- Animal Science: Ecosystem patterns and the study of plants and animals have important roles in Arctic development, and Affs could explore these areas, whether in an advantage or in a mechanism about research.

- Engagement with Native American groups in the region – the Inuit and many other tribes are directly interested and engaged in development discussions, and the tensions are bound to heat up between tribal and non-tribal US claims in the region. Both sides will be able to read critique-based arguments regarding the role of Natives in these societies, and the body of literature is often more intertwined with government decisions (especially drilling and military development), making it good for debaters of all interest backgrounds.

### **Example of Native interests in development patterns**

**Bennett 09** – Mia Bennett. (“Alaska Natives travel to D.C. to lobby against ANWR drilling”, Foreign Policy Association, <http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2009/11/12/alaska-natives-travel-to-dc-to-lobby-against-anwr-drilling/>, November 12, 2009)

**The Alaska Wilderness League** organized a trip to the nation's capital this week to lobby the Obama administration against oil drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge and in offshore areas. **Sarah James, an elder of the Gwich'in nation, was one of the leaders of the delegation. She traveled** all the way **from Arctic Village, Alaska**, the northernmost indigenous village in the U.S., **to Washington, D.C.** this week as member of the group. **James has a considerable amount of clout in the indigenous community**, as she is **a member of the International Indian Treaty Council and a member of the Arctic Village Traditional Council. She also won the prestigious Goldman Environmental Prize in 2002 for her work to protect caribou** in ANWR. She and other members of **the Gwich'in tribe are primarily concerned about how the oil industry will affect porcupine caribou. The tribe has a strong connection to the caribou, as their diet traditionally relies on caribou** as a protein source. The Gwich'in people also consider ANWR to be sacred calving ground for the caribou. **Oil pipelines could affect the delicate ecosystem** in ANWR, thus **disrupting the caribous' habitat. Pipelines have been known to break migrating caribous' legs.** The northern region of Alaska, specifically ANWR, serves as the prime mating grounds for the caribou, so **any decrease in the**

**number of calves produced could have a severely deleterious effect on the entire caribou population.** On the contrary, it is worth noting that the caribou have lived with oil development for the past thirty years around Prudhoe Bay, and the size of the herd there has actually increased. In Washington, the Alaska Wilderness League delegation met with high-level members of the Obama administration, including Assistant Interior Secretary Tom Strickland and Larry Echohawk, head of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. In the past, James has remarked, **"We are caribou people. It's our clothing, our story, our song, our dance and our food. That's who we are. If you drill for oil here, you are drilling right into the heart of our existence."**

### **Example of the relationship with hunting grounds as Negative argument as well**

**AP 07** – Associated Press. ("Court Further Delays Alaska Offshore Drilling", NBC News, [http://www.nbcnews.com/id/20297414/ns/us\\_news-environment/t/court-further-delays-alaska-offshore-drilling/#.U7HCCfl6Vpk](http://www.nbcnews.com/id/20297414/ns/us_news-environment/t/court-further-delays-alaska-offshore-drilling/#.U7HCCfl6Vpk))

The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals also indicated that **environmental and Alaska Native groups have a good chance of prevailing in their effort to keep the energy giant out of the Beaufort Sea.** Petitioners, including **the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission and the Center for Biological Diversity, have "raised serious questions and demonstrated that the balance of hardships tips sharply in their favor."** the ruling said. The appeals court's decision bans Shell from exploration activities pending a review of anti-drilling petitions. It comes after the court ordered a monthlong halt to drilling in July. At issue is whether the U.S. Minerals Management Service complied with the National Environmental Policy Act in granting offshore leases to Shell. "If we had a rational energy policy, this area would never have been offered for leasing in the first place," said Brendan Cummings, ocean program director for the Center for Biological Diversity in San Francisco. "We believe **the government's environmental analysis was woefully inadequate.**" Shell's drilling program includes sites not far from the edge of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge in northeast Alaska. **Polar bears, various bird species and endangered bowhead whales live in the refuge and surrounding territory.** Alaska **Natives hunt the whales** for food under federal subsistence rules **and fear underwater seismic surveys could prompt the migratory animals to travel farther from shore.** Environmental groups say large-scale industrial activities could jeopardize the health of Arctic wildlife.

## Economy and Energy

### Potential Stems

“energy development” (in the Arctic Circle); “energy investment”

### Overview

Economic competition and the quest for energy dominance will result in further escalation. The Arctic may have 90 billion barrels of oil, zinc deposits, and huge amounts of natural gas. Some countries have begun research and planning for development. There is no governing mechanism over these developments<sup>xxix</sup>. Shipping is an additional sector of activity, and some companies have explored options for quicker shipping of goods from Asia and Europe to North America<sup>xxx</sup>. This activity would complement both military and energy drilling actions. The US has not signed the LOST Treaty and therefore has no concrete claim to land. Under current frameworks, states are supposed to request an extension of their EEZ for energy, but that has not been a priority<sup>xxxi</sup>. This dilemma gives rise to more uncertainty, and that uncertainty is great for ground on this topic.

### Affirmative Options

- The Aff would be able to specify different types of energy projects that are tied to the region as well, expanding the potential for topic innovation. This area probably makes the “biggest” contribution to a broader topic for this reason.
- Natural gas and/or drilling – many actors with the Courts, Congress, etc.; many regulations on performance-based standards, etc. make this a very unique and changing area. New Department of Interior regulations on drilling have changed the landscape since the last energy-based topic as well, and its intersections with the other topic areas make the new approach unique.
- Adding “investment” could be good or bad depending on the goals of each person – it expands the amount of Affs available, but could lead to a proliferation of small ‘invest in X company or tech’ arguments. That private sector ground may be best saved for the Neg, but it’s worth exploring.

### Broader land management policy is also impacted by this area

**Comer 4** (Robert, D., Regional Solicitor in the Rocky Mountain Region – Department of the Interior, “Constitutional Conflicts on Public Lands: Cooperative Conservation: The Federalism Underpinnings to Public Involvement in the Management of Public Lands,” University of Colorado Law Review, Fall, 75 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1133, Lexis,

In contrast, **individuals actively involved with on-the-ground public land management issues** in the West **are calling for more local involvement in the federal land management decision process**. Even those who might be characterized as being on opposite sides of the philosophical spectrum have argued forcefully for approaches to conservation that recognize and incorporate local cooperative conservation processes. n133 Advocates of cooperative conservation are hopeful that **these decision processes will break through the paralysis and litigation borne of the current conflicts in federal land and water resource management to yield improved resource decisions informed by local knowledge**. In essence, **they see value in local involvement and seem not to share the fear that the local interests will dominate the process, make unlawful decisions, or [\*1155] unduly influence federal land managers**. n134 **Cooperative conservation group involvement in federal land management is**

considered to be "**an experiment in new governance**," a revival in Jeffersonian democracy." n135 Thus, cooperative conservation should not be viewed as a political effort when advanced administratively. n136 Some may view these broad grants of authority to invoke cooperative federalism as diminishing the authority of the Secretary and abdicating federal management responsibilities. n137 However, **these grants provide more latitude in the exercise of discretion and create potentially important options in public land management and decision processes**. Congress and the courts have provided guidance on permissible delegations of authority, the contours of which may be more limited when undertaken through executive discretion rather than through legislation. But, the underlying concept remains the same. Cooperative conservation is one of many tools available to federal land managers, a tool that should be used when it will serve the essential purpose of better conserving our land, water, and wildlife resources. The Department of the Interior has recognized the importance of cooperative conservation. n138 When local partners are enlisted to assist with federal resource management activities, federal dollars go further, as do the efforts, energy, and contributions of local participants - those with the most immediately at stake from federal land management decisions and actions; those who live in the communities directly affected by federal land management decisions. Examples and reasons abound to create consensus through collaboration. Some of these reasons are financial in nature. For instance, during the last two years of the Clinton Administration, funding diminished by nearly fifty percent in the Land and Water Conservation Fund n139 and has subsequently declined even further. In addition, federal dollars can be stretched by partnering, which brings private resources to bear. The Department of the Interior is developing a partnership initiative and has instituted a Cooperative Conservation Initiative. n140 Federal properties, such as the California Coastal National Monument, are actively involved in partnering on a day-to-day basis. [\*1156] Some examples are noteworthy. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the Consolidated Salish and Kootenai Tribes have proposed tribal management of some maintenance, educational, and visitor service activities for the National Bison Range in Montana. n141 In Colorado, citizens have proposed an important regional land management experiment called the Northwest Colorado Stewardship Partnership. n142 Local government and interested community members have an interest in broader day-to-day management responsibility over certain nearby federal lands. A wide-ranging collaboration of BLM, Moffat County and other stakeholders are seeking to identify federal land stewardship priorities and methods for implementation. n143 **The objective is to demonstrate new innovative methods for federal land management that ensure responsible use of natural resources while maintaining or enhancing the area's custom and culture**. n144 The concept is worthy of detailed consideration to determine how best to utilize community-based planning in the federal land management process. Another initiative is the Eastern Nevada Landscape Restoration Project. n145 This initiative seeks to develop consensus on the overall health of ten million acres in the Great Basin ecosystem in Eastern Nevada and to implement actions to restore ecosystem health where lacking. BLM has formed a partnership with seventy-five independent nongovernmental partners in an effort to guide its activities and develop broad-based goals and objectives. Other reasons to support cooperative federalism as a tool in public land management involve good stewardship. Diverse parties are working to improve the quality of riverine habitat along the Duck Trap River in Maine and Buffalo Creek in Pennsylvania. Similarly, the Malpai Borderlands Group is seeking to improve grazing practices, restore the Prairie, and create a grass bank in Arizona and New Mexico. In Alaska, scientists and fishermen are partnering to improve fishing techniques to protect the albatross population. n146 Ripe for collaboration are the harvest of timber fuels and public safety activities that arise under President Bush's [\*1157] Health Forests Initiative. **These partnership initiatives supplement federal dollars with private money, initiative, knowledge, and enthusiasm for locally based land management and protection**.

- Methane Extraction: A big impact in relation to the environment that intersects energy and ecosystem-based concerns, plenty of mechanisms (DOE, DOI, private investment, etc).

### Importance of federal funding in this area

**MethHAC 7** (Federal Methane Hydrate Advisory Committee – Report to Congress, “An Assessment of the Methane Hydrate Research Program and An Assessment of the 5-Year Research Plan of the Department of Energy”, June 2007, <http://www.fossil.energy.gov/programs/oilgas/hydrates/MHAC-07-ReportToCongress-final.pdf>)

An adequate domestic supply of natural gas is **a significant component** of America’s energy security.

**The National Methane Hydrate Program**, established by the Methane Hydrate Research and Development Act of 2000, Public Law 106-193 (May 2, 2000) (Methane Hydrate R&D Act), as amended by Section 968 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Public Law 109-58

(August 8, 2005), **presents a significant opportunity** to determine the potential of methane hydrate as an

**important long-range domestic** and international **energy resource**, as well as to identify and understand environmental

concerns associated with this resource. **Current estimates of the volume of natural gas trapped in hydrates**

**within the United States are on the order of 200,000 trillion cubic feet** (TCF). Even if only a small fraction of this

volume is recoverable, this natural gas resource could provide an enormous contribution relative to the current domestic consumption level (22

TCF per year) and expected future growth in demand. **Hydrates represent a potentially significant energy supply** for

the Nation. However, estimates of the methane hydrate resource are poorly understood, and estimates of the portion of the gas that could

ultimately be economically recovered are even less well understood. **Production of natural gas from hydrates** is pre-

commercial and is **not likely to be undertaken by industry alone** due to the availability of other proven gas supplies and

the long lead time necessary to prove the economic viability of this resource. **A Federal-industry-academic partnership is**

**required to advance the long-term goal of quantifying the resource and developing and testing options for commercial production.** Additionally, our ability to quantify the level of methane dissociating from hydrates in nature is poorly understood. Natural gas from hydrates is a potentially powerful source of greenhouse gas emissions that is not well documented in the scientific literature that forms the basis for the current policy debate related to climate change. Understanding this aspect of hydrate science is also an important part of the research funded by the Methane Hydrate R&D Act. **The Department of Energy budget for methane hydrate activity was flat at about \$9 million per year from 2001 to 2005 and has received only a modest increase (to \$12 million per year) in 2006 and 2007. Other energy-hungry countries, such as Japan, India, China, and South Korea, are each annually outspending the United States on hydrates-related research by up to a factor of ten.** These countries are developing essential skills and knowledge that will enable them to take early advantage of whatever energy security the hydrate resource may provide. **Unless significant increases in funding occur, the presently under-funded DOE program is unlikely to make the necessary gains in technology and understanding that will be required to advance our own national energy security goals within an acceptable time frame.** This is a source of deep concern to the Committee. **Continued low levels of national funding, despite a mandate that the U.S. hydrate program remains comprehensive and well-managed, will relegate the program to a caretaking role rather than making it a principal force in worldwide methane hydrate research and development.** As a result of prior Federal investment during the 1980s, as well as more recent R&D investments, the United States has maintained what is perhaps the world's most comprehensive and advanced Methane Hydrate Advisory Committee - Report to Congress 06/15/2007 ii methane hydrate science knowledge base. However, **without an appropriate increase in funding, the United States will quickly lose this strategic advantage.**

## Neg Ground

- Drilling/Exports-Based DA's: There are still large restrictions on exports of LNG and other energy, and the plan could spur changes to that. The Affirmative's potential ability to ship oil through the Arctic could magnify these risks. The impact levels to these DA's are broad and implicate many of the Affirmative's best ground as well.
- Process/Mechanism-based CP's: Lexis searches generate many hits on different proposals for adjusting federal and state regulations on the use of land and agency development within the region.
- Cooperative Engagement: Russia's Gazprom and Shell have signaled some willingness to cooperate on energy issues; Negative teams could have access to CP and DA ground based off of cooperation (rather than unilateral energy development) in the region.

## Critical Neg Ground

This is its own section because it applies to multiple topic areas.

Security and other specific Arctic K ground is a great and often policy-relevant option for the Neg. There are many publications that discuss critical theory in the context of the Arctic, and these often question the underlying assumptions behind why want to develop in the first place. Fortunately, there are a lot of discussions of alternative approaches, whether through concepts of “human security”, dis-engaging altogether, and/or embracing more multilateral views of development.

### **This is an article dealing with feminist critiques of Arctic development**

**Dittmer et al 11** [Jason Dittmer a, \* , Sami Moisio b , Alan Ingrama , Klaus Dodds c a Department of Geography, University College London, Pearson Building, Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT, United Kingdom b Department of Geography, University of Oulu, Finland c Department of Geography, Royal Holloway, University of London, United Kingdom; “Have you heard the one about the disappearing ice? Recasting Arctic geopolitics”; *Political Geography* xxx (2011) 1e13; Science Direct] Arctic ‘openness’ is central to the performance of Arctic geopolitics, enabling sabre-rattling by the five Arctic Ocean coastal states. The region’s coding as a feminine space to be tamed by masculine exploits provides an arena for national magnification. The remoteness and difficulty of maintaining permanent occupation of the far north also makes it a space where overlapping territorial claims and competing understandings of access to transit passages can (at the moment) co-exist with relatively little chance of actual combat (Baev, 2007). As we shall see, this is particularly true of the US/Canadian arguments over the legal status of the NorthWest Passage. In this way the discursive formation of Arctic geopolitics is also bound up with neo-realist ideas about the inherent tendencies of ‘states’ towards ‘conflict’ over ‘resources’, ‘sovereignty’ and so on e ideas that have been subject to extensive critical deconstruction in IR and political geography, but which are being rapidly reassembled in relation to the Arctic. The Arctic is thus a space in which the foundational myths of orthodox international relations are being reasserted. It might be said that it is not just the Arctic climate that is changing, with knock on effects for state politics and international relations, but rather that the region is being reconstituted within a discursive formation that renders it amenable to neo-realist understandings and practices inconceivable for other, more inhabited regions. Accepting the premises of ‘Arctic geopolitics’ risks both obscuring the liveliness of Arctic geography (Vannini, Baldacchino, Guay, Royle, & Steinberg, 2009) and enabling the sovereign fantasy that coastal states and their civilian and military representatives have previously enjoyed security via effective territorial control and may establish it once again.

### **Representations of the Arctic are not neutral – they rely on masculine hierarchies. We have a choice between continuing the pattern or moving away from it.**

**Ingólfssdóttir 11** [Auður H Ingólfssdóttir is Assistant Professor at Bifröst University, Iceland, holds a BA degree in international studies from University of Washington (Seattle), a diploma in professional journalism from University of Iceland, and a Master degree in international relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University (Boston); “Climate Change and Security in the Arctic: The promise of Feminism”; 11/12/2011; [http://www.nikk.no/Climate+Change+and+Security+in+the+Arctic%3A+The+promise+of+Feminism.b7C\\_wljQXR.ips;](http://www.nikk.no/Climate+Change+and+Security+in+the+Arctic%3A+The+promise+of+Feminism.b7C_wljQXR.ips;)]

The Arctic has often been presented as a pristine territory, waiting to be discovered. The travelogues of Arctic explorers created an image of a cold, dangerous and distant, yet mysterious region. Only the brave and heroic dared to travel there. The gendered aspect of discourses related to Arctic exploration in the

19th and early 20th century is obvious. Not only were all the explorers men, but the image of the explorer was one of a warrior whose goal was to conquer. In his recent book *The Future History of the Arctic*, Emmerson recalls a quote from a letter written by the famous Arctic explorer Fridtjof Nansen to the journalist W.T. Stead: "True civilization will not have been reached until all nations see that it is nobler to conquer nature than to conquer each other". Whereas the image of the explorer is of the masculine hero, the Arctic as a region is feminized. The Arctic environment is pristine, untouched, almost virginal. It is to be conquered by the brave explorer, as demonstrated in Nansen's quote. Masculine values have also dominated in more recent times, when the Arctic became a playing field for superpowers to demonstrate their military might. After the Cold War, however, there has been greater emphasis on demilitarization of the region and cooperation among states. But how does climate change and the melting of the Arctic ice cap influence this picture? Will these environmental changes threaten the peace and stability of the region, leading to a race for resources and a competition between and among states? Or will climate change provide added incentives for cooperation among states and other stakeholders? The answers are not clear. Currently there are two competing discourses on climate change and security in the Arctic. One draws from the realist perspective in international relations, in which power politics between states dominates; the other can be linked to liberalism, emphasizing the mutual benefits of cooperation. Certain aspects of the second discourse, however, could also be identified with other, more radical approaches calling for a transformation of values and of the relationships between states and citizens and between humans and nature. This is where feminism becomes relevant. Are feminine values still pushed to the margins in the field of geopolitics? Or have they entered the stage as an accepted player, capable of making a useful contribution to the shaping and implementation of policy?

*Below is Fifelski's section of last year's Russia topic paper that deals with the K; it is very useful in assessing these elements (used with permission from Justin Green):*

Many of the affirmatives on this topic will assume solvency based on international norms: the history of [insert mechanism] dictates that Russia will take the desired action of the plan. While these positivist assumptions often result in success, they also occasionally fail. History has proven that when they do fail, either: (a) an action that involves military force occurs or, (b) nothing happens and the pressure is toothless.<sup>1</sup>

When these norms are enforced, it comes at a cost. The anxiety of the west, which dictates the containment of the non-western Other, in this instance, Russia. In doing so, a security regime is established that necessitates the eradication of anything that counters it. Plenty of literature discusses how the epistemic function international norms create self-fulfilling prophecies that make affirmative impacts inevitable; furthermore, the perpetuation of norms increases the propensity of intervention and proxy wars.<sup>2</sup>

Pressure, regardless of the form, will rely of Eurocentric and colonialist assumptions of the world: the United States is the good country and must work to contain the evil Russian empire.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The Greater Harm. (2013). from [www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2013/09/syria-and-international-norms](http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2013/09/syria-and-international-norms)

<sup>2</sup> Duffield, M. (2008). Global Civil War: The Non-Insured, International Containment and Post-Interventionary Society. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 21(2), 145-165.

Goh, I. (2009). Becoming-Animal. *Diacritics*, 39(2), 37-57.

Thomas, W. (2001). *The Ethics of Destruction: Norms and Force in International Relations*. Ithica: Cornell University Press.

<sup>3</sup> Mutua, M. (2001). Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights. *Harvard International Law Journal*, 42(1), 201-245.

An affirmative that pressures Russia to change its posture towards human rights, for instance, operates from a double-standard that ignores the human rights abuses that occur in the United States. Furthermore, this positing of Russia can be spun to justify conservatism, capitalism, and military intervention.<sup>4</sup>

The literature questions the efficacy of using pressure to achieve desired results. Miroslav<sup>5</sup> notes that pressure from the outside world is often spun as a way of legitimizing the regime. This is especially true in quid-pro-quo negotiations; even if leaders can benefit, risk aversion dictates that a party prevent taking any and all losses. Relying on a number of psychological and international relations theories, Nincic concludes that policy makers must first understand the underlying notions of bargaining and exchange, if they want any mechanism involving pressure to be effective.

Jaeger<sup>6</sup> studied how the discourse is used by the West to vilify Russia in Baltic States. A historical memory of Russia from the Cold War resulted in a discourse of fear, creating racial fissures that require one to either identify with the West or with the evil Russian empire. While this research is somewhat dated, it is relevant to the current situation because it is about how rhetoric was used in the Baltic States to further the goals of NATO.

Sjöstedt<sup>7</sup> argues that it is necessary to understand the function of identity if one wants to break down the constructions of Russia as a threat. The identity of an American constructs how one knows Russia, and vice versa. The countries then use these powers to prevent the diffusion of information, hence controlling the agenda and debate on the issues. Therefore, she argues, it is necessary to focus on micro-political facets of the US-Russia relationship before looking at larger structures of power.

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<sup>4</sup> Badiou, A. (2002). On Evil: An Interview with Alain Badiou. from <http://www.cabinetmagazine.org/issues/5/alainbadiou.php>

<sup>5</sup> Miroslav, N. (2010). Getting What You Want: Positive Inducements in International Relations. *International Security*, 35(1), 138-183.

<sup>6</sup> Jaeger, O. (2000). Securitizing Russia: Discursive Practices of the Baltic States. *Peace and Conflict Studies*, 7(2).

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