

Military Spending Controversy

The Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA) has been argued by many to be a watershed moment for the defense community in the United States. The BCA was a legislative effort to address the growing deficits and debt of the United States federal government by imposing what has come to be known as “sequestration” on all levels of the federal government. Sequestration requires financial cuts across all areas of governmental activity and administration over ten years and the impact on the military has been a reduction of appropriations to the level of nine percent per year.¹ Exempt from these cuts are monies appropriated to the Department of Veterans’ Affairs and military personnel accounts (personnel salaries). Commentators have argued that this places a unique burden on weapons acquisition and force levels. Commentators have also noted that the impending expiration of a law that temporarily eased the cuts on the Department of Defense (DoD) makes the upcoming budget cycles of particular significance for appropriation levels. On top of all this the world has been increasingly described by a number of analysts and experts as unstable. Destabilization of the Middle East, military withdrawal from Afghanistan, the rise of China, and the re-articulation of foreign policy and military priorities of Vladimir Putin for Russia are commonly pointed to as threats to the United States and its allies.

Given this convergence of financial issues facing the military and the state of international insecurity, this paper calls for the Cross-Examination Debate Association to consider increasing defense spending as a controversy area for the 2015-2016 season. Specifically, this paper advances the notion that the community should debate a resolution that requires the affirmative to advocate an increase in spending on force, weapons, or readiness levels. While it is common for the community to debate questions that foster consideration of the state of the military, there really has not been a topic in

¹ “Sequestration and the Military,” Military.com, 2015, <http://www.military.com/topics/sequestration>.

recent years that directly considered this issue. The nuclear weapons and war powers topic areas got to some of this debate but neither forced a comprehensive assessment of the military, especially with a budgetary emphasis. Beyond the question of whether the nuclear topic produced the debates this paper calls for the nuclear topic was pre-BCA. The war powers topic was truly distinct from the question in that the affirmative ground was completely unrelated to this paper's focus or dealt with Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding, which is not part of the budget that this paper calls for debate over. A review of the resolutions adopted by CEDA and the NDT reveals a handful of resolutions that called for direction reductions in American military power and even less that called for the affirmative to support military expansion. But again none of these resolutions posed the question of whether the American military should be larger or smaller. Time for this debate has come.

The remainder of this essay will work to sketch out some of the arguments explaining (a) why this an international topic, (b) why the resolution should increase funding, (c) what a resolution might look like, (d) what the ground looks like for the affirmative and the negative. I thank the topic committee and the policy debate community-at-large for their consideration of this paper.

Is this an international topic?

One of the questions that has been posed in regards to this topic area is whether or not it is "international," or more specifically "foreign policy." The consistent reaction of this author has been that it is obviously a foreign policy topic. If debate over the nature and role of the United States military in the world today isn't, then what is? For those persons who do not see this area with same degree of obviousness, there are several arguments.

First, the topic process calls for international topic not necessarily a foreign policy topic. While there may be some debate as to whether expanding the size of the military constitutes a change or increase in our foreign policy, the debate over whether or not such action constitutes a change in our

international posture seems much harder to sustain. The context justifying an increase in defense spending advanced by every expert on the subject is international. It is conceivable that there is a group of authors advocating an increase in troop levels and/or weapons development for explicitly domestic reasons but this seems incredibly unlikely. The Posse Comitatus Act, which limits the domestic involvement of the military in law enforcement, and the distinction between the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security also problematizes a non-international view of the area. Even if one were to make the argument that an affirmative team could advocate military expansion to exclusively prevent a direct military threat to the actual territory of the United States that would still be international.

Second, website organization for a slew of think tanks and other organizations demonstrates the international nature of this topic area. The Council on Foreign Relations includes a “Defense and Security” section on their website. Many other organizations also include defense policy discussions under a “Foreign and Defense” or “Foreign and National Security” heading (American Enterprise, CATO Heritage, and others). ForeignPolicy.com has a “National Security” section and a basic search for “sequestration” produces a slew of articles authored across multiple publications and blogs on their site. While the above is certainly not comprehensive it clearly demonstrates that the question of whether or not increasing defense spending passes the smell test on the “international” question.

Finally, defense spending is fundamentally foreign policy. Talent and Kyl connect the dots between defense spending, international security, and the call in this paper:

Talent, a former U.S. Senator from Missouri, is a Distinguished Fellow at The Heritage Foundation, **and Kyl**, a former U.S. Senator from Arizona, is a Visiting Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, **2013** [Jim and Jon, A Strong and Focused National Security Strategy, 10-31, https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/-strong-and-focused-national-security_165049289761.pdf]

The budget cuts of the past two years, made with no pretense of military analysis, can only be understood as the final and terrible consequence of a generation of strategic drift. America’s leaders do not want America to be unsafe; they simply do not understand America’s “risk management” global mission or the vital connection between the strength of the military and the security of the American people. As a result, they have lost the sense

that there is a connection; they have acted as if decisions have no consequences—as if sustaining the tools of power in a dangerous world is of little importance. It is impossible to reverse the current situation overnight. The answer is not to throw money at the problem; after two years of continuing resolutions and indiscriminate budget cuts, and given the problems with the defense acquisition system, the Pentagon is not capable of absorbing huge budget increases right away. It is essential that the Pentagon be tasked to develop a realistic plan to rebuild the force. The plan should not be heavily influenced by the current budget crisis. Congress and the President need to understand the real needs of the military; once they face the situation honestly, it will be up to them to decide how much additional risk to accept in the name of short-term affordability. As discussed above, the plan should include, at a minimum, increasing the size of the Navy, building and deploying a missile defense system as quickly as possible, modernization of the strategic arsenal, and recapitalizing all three of the armed services. In addition, steps should be taken as outlined above to fix the acquisition system and begin rebalancing compensation for service members. All of this will certainly cost money but will just as certainly save money in the long run. The cuts in defense spending have been a false economy. They have simply pushed expenses for maintenance, training, and capital stock into the future, though everyone knows they cannot be delayed forever. A trucking company in financial distress that does not buy new vehicles or maintain those it has would not thereby become solvent; it would simply mask its underlying fiscal issues at the cost of guaranteeing its eventual collapse. The same is true for the defense cuts of the past few years. The problem with the federal budget is a structural gap between the amount collected for the entitlement programs and the cost of those programs. The gap can be closed only by lowering the cost of those programs, or by increasing the revenue to support them, or both. The failure of the government to address that reality is the proximate political cause of its budgetary dilemma. Cutting defense is not the solution to that dilemma but a symptom. It is how Congress and the President have made the deficit lower in the short term, while continuing to ignore the real budget challenge and increasing the cost of defense in the future. There is another reason why cutting defense will not solve the budget problem. As explained, America's "grand strategy" since World War II has been to prevent both aggression and war by deterring risk before it rises to the level of unmanageable conflict. The tools of power, both hard and soft, are essential to the success of that strategy. It is no coincidence that, as American power has eroded, the global threats to America's vital national interests have grown. No tactic for addressing those threats is likely to be successful if the American military continues to decline. In the context of growing weakness, America's warnings will be ignored; U.S. gestures toward peace will be taken as signs of appeasement; allies will doubt America's commitment, and enemies will question American resolve. All of this is manifestly happening now, and if tensions continue to grow—even if they do not escalate into a costly war—the danger of conflict and global instability will suppress the economic growth without which fiscal solvency is impossible.³⁷ The opposite is also true: **In a fundamental sense, defense policy is foreign policy.** The least provocative way for the United States to improve its global position, and increase the chance for peace, would be to announce, develop, and pursue a plan to renew its power. That would strengthen America's diplomacy, reassure its partners, and channel its competitors and even enemies toward the peaceful resolution of disputes. There would be a sigh of relief around the world. Public threats and "red lines" would be much less necessary. Strength carries a message of its own: A nation that wants peace can afford to walk softly— if it carries a big stick.

Why increase defense spending (resolutionally)?

While a number of people may agree that the idea of debating whether current spending levels by the United States federal government on defense is a good idea, a large number of persons may wonder whether it would be better to instead advocate the reduction of spending on the affirmative side of the resolution. It can be conceded that debating the resolution from the opposite direction would not necessarily be a bad debate topic, there are several arguments in favor of debating a resolution that calls for increased spending.

First, inherency favors an “increase resolution.” The BCA means that the DoD is already in the process of dealing with funding cuts that began in 2013.² It is true that Congress enacted temporary measures to soften the blow of the cuts but all this did was lessen the amount of the cuts in the short-term. Additionally, that legislative deal is about to expire which means significantly larger cuts will be on the books again:

Tiron and Capaccio, Bloomberg staffers, 3-20-2014 [Roxana and Tony, Pentagon’s Gamble on Getting More Money Questioned, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-20/pentagon-s-gamble-on-getting-more-money-questioned.html>]

A congressional budget agreement reached in December, P.L. 113-067, partially eased the cuts for the current year, fiscal 2014, as well as the coming fiscal year, which begins this October and for which appropriators are now developing spending plans.¶ With the deeper spending reductions set to resume in succeeding years, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel and Pentagon planners are lobbying Congress to head off such cuts to military forces and equipment.¶ The 2016 fiscal year “will be a **critical inflection point**.” Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense Christine Fox wrote March 5 in a memo to all military service chiefs. “We will look for a signal from Congress that sequestration will not be imposed in FY 2016.”¶ Ukraine Crisis¶ The crisis in relations between the U.S. and Russia over Ukraine may produce public support for more defense spending, said Oklahoma Republican Tom Cole, a member of the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee.¶ “People begin to see the consequences to lowering our military profile,” Cole said in an interview.¶ If sequestration isn’t replaced in 2016, the Pentagon will be forced to reduce its proposed \$535.1 billion request for fiscal 2016 to about \$500 billion. That’s on top of the \$37 billion in defense cuts for fiscal 2013 and \$25 billion for the current fiscal year. About \$45 billion is to be trimmed in the fiscal 2015 request from the \$541 billion projected last year.¶ The bipartisan support for the current two-year budget plan may not hold in future negotiations, when previous differences in how spending should be allocated could resurface.¶ Non-Defense Cuts¶ Nita Lowey, the ranking Democrat on the House Appropriations Committee, said she opposed continuation of sequestration for both defense and domestic programs. The New York lawmaker said cuts to defense are “very damaging to preparedness, and cuts to the National Institutes of Health, among other areas, in the non-defense part of the budget would be a disaster,” she said in an interview. “I would hope that thoughtful Republicans would prevent that from happening.”¶ Rodney Frelinghuysen, who leads the House Appropriations Defense subcommittee, said he would like to see the sequester, “undone, absolutely.”¶ “We’ll show the critical mass of people on our side of the aisle that regular order is better than continuing resolutions and the sequester,” the New Jersey Republican said in an interview.¶ Some Republicans want to increase defense spending at the expense of domestic programs, while others aligned with small-government groups such as the Tea Party back keeping sequestration in place to ensure federal spending is reduced.¶ Sacred Cows¶ “Sequestration should be used as a tool for us to get actual spending cuts,” Representative Raul Labrador, an Idaho Republican backed by the Tea Party, said in an interview. “Everybody has to put their sacred cows on the table.”¶ Republican Senator Ted Cruz of Texas, also a Tea Party favorite, said that “unsustainable debt” is one of the greatest “national security threats.”¶ “We should address our national defense needs but do so in combination with responsible fiscal restraint on the non-defense side,” Cruz said in an interview.¶ Popular defense programs and personnel would be hit if sequestration isn’t rolled back by Congress. The Pentagon says it would have to cut the number of aircraft carriers to 10 from 11 and adjust the number of helicopters and fighter jets such as F/A-18 E/F Super Hornets made by Chicago-based Boeing Co. (BA) and possibly F-35 Joint Strike Fighters made by Bethesda, Maryland-based Lockheed Martin Corp. (LMT)¶ Paring Forces¶ Instead of the currently planned reduction to about 450,000 troops by 2019, the active Army would have to pare its force to 420,000. The Marine Corps would have to be prepared to reduce personnel to 175,000 from an initial reduction to 182,000, the Pentagon says.¶ Pentagon officials say they would like an answer sooner rather than later about Congress’s intentions on sequestration.¶ “The sooner that we can get a firm indication that sequestration will no longer remain the law of the land, the better, but I can’t sit here” and “put a date on the calendar and say we have to have it by April 1st or May 15th,” Rear Admiral John Kirby, a Defense Department spokesman, said.¶

Furthermore, recent evidence suggests that the Congress will not be lifting the sequestration imposed caps:

² While the BCA was enacted in 2011, there was a window to preparation time for agencies to adjust to impending sequestration and the cuts took effect in 2013.

Bennett, 3-30-2015, [John T., "Budgets Signal Spending Caps Here to Stay," Defense News, <http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-budget/congress/2015/03/30/gop-budget-sequestration-mccain-oco-pentagon/70540238/>

What to do about spending caps is one issue House and Senate negotiators can skip as they craft a compromise 2016 federal budget blueprint. ¶ That's because spending resolutions approved last week by the House and Senate both leave defense and domestic spending caps in place. ¶ "We know now ever since 2011 we have been living with sequestration," Armed Services Committee Chairman Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., said last week on the Senate floor. "While we have been dealing with sequestration, the world has turned into a place with enormous turmoil." ¶ Many of McCain's colleagues, Republican and Democrat, agree. ¶ Yet, both chambers' budget resolutions include the same amount for the Pentagon's base budget: \$499 billion. That's the amount allowed under the 2011 Budget Control Act. ¶ Both chambers approved more overseas contingency operations (OCO) funding — \$96 billion by the House, \$89 billion by the Senate — but defense hawks and Pentagon officials wanted extra base budget monies. ¶ There was little chance of securing that, however, as GOP deficit hawks demanded keeping the defense and domestic caps in place. ¶ As McCain noted during a March 26 appearance at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), his House Republican "Freedom Caucus" colleagues have successfully made spending cuts and deficit reduction more important than many other issues on Capitol Hill.

Even if the cap is raised it will be insignificant:

Eaglen (resident fellow in the Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies at the American Enterprise Institute), 4-22-2015, [Mackenzie, "Ryan-Murray 2.0: The 2016 defense budget by the numbers," AEI, <https://www.aei.org/publication/ryan-murray-2-0-the-2016-defense-budget-by-the-numbers/>

This week, the Republican Congress is expected to unveil its fiscal year 2016 budget resolution just as House defense authorizers start marking up their annual bill. ¶ What will that mean for the US military? Bottom line, the Pentagon should realistically expect no more than \$569 billion from Congress in the final, enacted 2016 budget between base and wartime spending— well under the \$585 billion the president requested for defense. Here's how we will get there. ¶ The final GOP budget resolution will keep base defense spending at the sequestration-level caps of \$499 billion (function 051) with allowable Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) spending up to \$90 billion for DoD (excluding State Department and other funding). While the Republican budget would ostensibly increase Pentagon OCO funding by \$39 billion to \$90 billion compared to the Obama administration's 2016 request of roughly \$51 billion, much of this increase is illusory. ¶ Regardless of the final OCO amount enacted for 2016, the likely outcome is some type of scramble at the end of the year to create a follow-on deal to the 2013 Ryan-Murray Bipartisan Budget Act. ¶ The goal will be to soften Budget Control Act (aka sequestration) spending levels for fiscal years 2016 and 2017, only slightly increasing the base defense budget. OCO will be enacted at levels higher than the president's requested amounts, but not as much as the budget resolution will allow and not as large an amount after the Pentagon revises the war request upward as expected in the coming months. ¶ Why That \$39 Billion in OCO Won't Happen ¶ It is critical to understand that the \$39 billion in extra war spending the Republicans added above President Obama's OCO request of \$51 billion is the ceiling, rather than an amount the Pentagon can expect to receive in reality. Throughout the rest of this fiscal year, that number will be whittled down at each step in the process, from defense authorization to defense appropriations to an eventual continuing resolution (CR) to a "Price-Enzi" deal, and then to a final omnibus spending bill. ¶ First, the Pentagon has likely under-funded its own OCO request for 2016. The Pentagon revised last year's emergency supplemental request upward for fiscal year 2015 from \$58.6 billion to \$63.6 billion. The \$51 billion request for overseas contingency operations included in this year's budget will similarly be increased by the Pentagon about \$9 billion or \$10 billion for a total of roughly \$60 billion. The Undersecretary of Defense, Comptroller, has already told key budget staffers on Capitol Hill that this is a more accurate amount. ¶ Second, while the defense authorizers are likely to mark the annual spending bills up to the full \$589 billion, the defense appropriations subcommittees in both chambers are not likely to appropriate that amount. The more likely target is \$5 billion to \$8 billion less. For instance, final appropriations for both 2014 and 2015 came in several billion dollars below the original authorized topline for defense. ¶ Third, once the bills go to the floor of each chamber for consideration, the extra OCO dollars will be chipped away through amendments. A voting majority in Congress has supported previous amendments to strip this emergency money that was "not requested by the Pentagon." If that standard applies this time, which it will for many members — including fiscal hawks, libertarians, and liberals who all dislike the higher defense numbers but for different reasons — the majority of the \$39 billion in "extra" allowable OCO money is at risk. The liberal-tea party coalition, for example, has banded together to successfully kill unrequested OCO funding in the past through amendments, including \$1 billion in FY 2013 and \$3.5 billion in FY 2014. ¶ Statements by DoD officials that bemoan unrequested OCO fixes will provide significant political backing for further such attempts. Rep. Chris Van Hollen of Maryland has already stated his intention to strip most of the extra \$39 billion in OCO funding in the House budget resolution later in the process. At least 26 Republicans voted against a \$2 billion OCO increase during markup, indicating that bipartisan amendments to eliminate extra war funds are plausible if not likely. While Rep. Mike Turner of Ohio managed to corral 69 House Republicans to support increased defense funding, his topline level was only \$561 billion. HASC Chairman Rep. Mac Thornberry's coalition is aiming higher, but he can't line up any more votes than can the deficit hawks. ¶ Further, the Senate version of the budget was \$292 billion below President Obama's proposed defense spending levels over the 10-year period. This accurately reflects the position of the GOP conference in the Senate. The fact

that the Senate budget resolution kept a 60-vote “point of order” threshold for OCO spending above \$51 billion during committee debate means that most Republicans on the committee support that position. They will not change their views once spending bills hit the floor. The Pentagon can expect the amount removed during floor debate to only go up. In sum, realizing the “extra” \$39 billion in funding will be difficult for the military in both chambers of Congress.¶ Possible Curve Balls¶ In recent remarks on the budget, Defense Secretary Ash Carter gave implicit backing to President Obama to threaten and execute a veto if Congress increases defense without new non-defense money, which they are set to do. If the defense appropriations bill is vetoed, it is unlikely to change by any great degree the money the Pentagon would get in an omnibus bill. Still, it would add political ugliness to the process and continue to underscore that the politics of the defense budget is and will remain wrapped up in taxes, entitlements and non-defense spending.¶ It could get uglier. President Obama could rule through his budget office that the additional allowable supplemental spending by Congress cannot be officially designated as OCO spending. A provision in the original Budget Control Act states that the availability of funding designated by Congress for Overseas Contingency Operations is contingent upon the president’s designating all such amounts and transmitting such designations to the Congress. If the president does not support Congress’ position, which he has made clear he does not, he could choose to send members back to the budget drawing board early in the process by not agreeing to the additional \$39 billion in extra OCO funding. Attempts such as those by Reps. Hunter or McSally to use OCO funds for base budget programs remain similarly constrained by OMB guidance from 2010.¶ The Likely Outcomes¶ After the budget resolution is out of the way, it is likely the defense spending bills that pass in both chambers will not become law. More probable is that the federal government will start the fiscal year operating under another Continuing Resolution as it has done every year since 1997. If that happens again, a 2016 CR of comparable length to last year’s would, for example, result in the temporary loss of \$8.5 billion in OCO funding, since this account will automatically be funded at 2015 levels.¶ That’s when the conversation will begin in earnest later this summer or early fall about the need for the Budget Committee chairmen to craft a follow on to the Ryan-Murray Bipartisan Budget Act to triage the Pentagon patient while providing some fiscal certainty and relief for the military. A similar deal could boost both defense and non-defense spending by \$142 billion over the next two years while seeking \$165 billion in net deficit reduction over the decade if it sought to match the president’s higher discretionary spending levels. Such a deal should prove far more palatable than the “Doc-fix” passed last week, which will add \$141 billion to the deficit over 10 years.¶ If there is a “Price-Enzi” sequestration fix later this year, Pentagon leaders should be sober about how much relief that bill will provide, however. Using the Bipartisan Budget Act framework for an estimate, the Pentagon can expect a base budget of \$510 billion in any Ryan-Murray 2.0 — a modest \$11 billion increase above legal spending caps or sequestration-level amounts. The good news is that OCO levels will not be capped by this kind of a deal.

On top of the actual budget situation is the fact that the authors identified later also lean this direction on the question of what the military has. The affirmative ground evidence all speaks to the fact that force and weapons levels are declining. Certainly there are negative authors on the significance question here but they consistently note that the BCA has not the consequences in terms of cuts instead of saying that the military actually has more troops or weapons. The combination of less money and less “troops and stuff” means the inherency and uniqueness questions support an increase position in the resolution. Allowing the affirmative to further reduce spending will make it unduly hard for the negative to generate good offense in debates unless they either counterplan-in their uniqueness or resort to a very general “hegemony good” argument where they can say the status quo is not as bad as it could be. This second strategy only works if the affirmative advocacy unprecedented levels of spending cuts. If the affirmative chooses to tack-on to the BCA with relatively minor cuts the negative loses valuable uniqueness arguments...and the affirmative probably loses uniqueness for their advantages as well. Requiring the affirmative to increase spending best preserves uniqueness arguments for both sides.

The third argument here is rooted in debate history. While this community really has not taken on the military budget question before, there have been topics that both directly and indirectly produce some deliberation on this question. Like the nuclear weapons and war power examples identified above, the overwhelming majority of these resolutions have asked the affirmative to reduce military-related activity. The following topics can be best described as having a significant military component AND have called for reductions in the military:

- 2013-14 War Powers
- 2009-2010 Nuclear Weapons
- 2003-2004 Europe (remove tactical nuclear weapons)
- 2002-2003 Treaties (CTBT, ICC, SORT)
- 1993-1994 (NDT) Curtail the Commander-in-Chief
- 1987 Fall (CEDA) Covert activity in Central America is undesirable
- 1987-1988 (NDT) Reduce commitment to NATO
- 1986 Fall (CEDA) Relations with the USSR outweigh military preparedness
- 1982 Fall (CEDA) Freeze production and development of nuclear weapons
- 1982-1983 (NDT) Prohibit Western Hemisphere military intervention
- 1974 Spring (CEDA) Reduce commitment to Israel
- 1971-1972 (CEDA) Withdraw forces outside Western Hemisphere
- 1966-1967 (NDT) Reduce foreign policy commitments
- 1958-1959 (NDT) Prohibit further nuclear weapons development

The number of resolutions that have offered a “pro-military” angle is much smaller and none of these resolutions has dealt with the controversy advanced by this paper³:

- 2007-2008 Middle East constructive engagement (optional security guarantee)
- 1997-1998 Security assistance to Southeast Asia
- 1995-1996 Security assistance to the Middle East
- 1993 Fall (CEDA) Military Intervention to support democratic governments is appropriate
- 1982 Fall (CEDA) Military support to nondemocratic governments justified
- 1980-1981 (NDT) Increase foreign military commitments

As should be apparent there is a real lack of resolutions advocating increase military activity let alone spending on the actual US military. Other than the 2004-2005 (support for UN peacekeeping) and 2006-2007 (increase persons in domestic/international civic activities including the military as an option)

³ It should be noted that the two pre-merger CEDA resolutions identified (1993 and 1982) were more “values debate” in their orientation and did not ask the affirmative to endorse new and specific instances of military intervention.

resolutions high school debate community, there has also been a lack of explicitly pro-military resolutions there as well. Even if we assume that those students who debated in 2006-2007 advocated reinstating the draft for the armed forces, graduated in spring 2007, and then debated a security guarantee affirmative as first year college debaters, this is a side of an issue that most members of this activity have not had to debate or coach on.

This lack of experience advocating the military on the affirmative within the community gets to the final reason to adopt the increase defense spending topic area: educational/civic values. It is not the place of this paper to advance the arguments for switch-side debate and dissoi logoi but it should be noted that support for these concepts underpins the advocacy being presented in this document. As a result, it is the view of this author that debating an increase in defense spending is of particular educational significance. Based on what has been written already and what will be presented below it is clear that the BCA has created a unique moment in US defense policy. While it clearly made sense to debate “reduce resolutions” in years past (or even in the OCO context), the reductions facing the armed forces make this a unique opportunity to reverse lens of observation. Furthermore, the overriding issue facing the military is the budget question. All questions of capability and strategy come back to the budget debate:

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Relevant to this first assessment, in fiscal year (FY) 2014, the state of the federal budget was the most dominant consideration for DOD and the White House when it came to structuring the defense budget that makes possible the military’s operational posture. This situation, which began in 2011, has affected not only the crafting of defense strategy, but also the capability of the U.S. military and its planning for the future. Practically every single DOD document refers to budget issues in some way. Thus, a brief summary of the budget environment is necessary to understand why the Department of Defense and

the military services are making the decisions they are making with respect to capability, capacity, and readiness.

Beyond the value of learning the claims and warrants employed in the defense spending debate, there is also immense political education value in learning how the budget process works. Whether the committee and community opts to include an offsetting component to the resolution, comprehension of discretionary spending policy's demands for trade-offs, especially in the world of the BCA, is something that is (a) inevitable on this topic and (b) desirable if we are to make ourselves better political advocates. It doesn't take much recounting of the major political confrontations that have taken place in the last four years between the legislative and executive branches to know that questions of how much and how to spend have been extremely prominent. If this area were to be debated from the opposite direction the affirmative plan would occur as a sequestration-friendly activity and as a result would not force the level of budgetary scrutiny required by an increase topic. Finally it should be noted that there is also value in having sustained and focused deliberation over defense policy:

Need a sustained debate about the role and size of the military. Waiting until crisis ensures reliance on poor risk assessment strategies

Gouré, PhD, is a Vice President at the Lexington Institute. He served as the Director of the Office of Strategic Competitiveness in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, **2015** [Daniel, 2015 Index of U.S. Military Strength Assessing America's Ability to Provide for the Common Defense, ed by Dakota Wood, http://ims-2015.s3.amazonaws.com/2015_Index_of_US_Military_Strength_FINAL.pdf]

It is increasingly evident that the current approach to defining a sizing standard is inadequate. In fact, it is not really a sizing standard at all; rather, it is a way to justify reductions in the size of the military in the face of a declining defense budget. Some have characterized the new formulation as a one-and-a-half-war standard, but the threat of major theater wars in Southwest and Northeast Asia is no less serious today than it was when the two major theater war standard was articulated some 20 years ago. If anything, the possibility of two major conflicts that overlap in time is increasing, and the formulation of the mission for the second conflict as the capability to deny an aggressor's objectives or impose unacceptable costs is so vague as to be meaningless. The lack of a clear, more precise and usable standard for sizing the U.S. military leaves defense planners in a quandary: Is the one major theater war to take place in the desert, jungles, or mountains? Is it against a nuclear-armed adversary or one with only limited long-range strike capabilities? Will America have capable allies in theater? The two regions of the world of most interest to military planners are quite dissimilar and require different force structures. Similarly, regarding the second part of the standard, how many fighter wings or strategic bombers are needed to deny an aggressor's objectives or impose unacceptable costs? One nuclear weapon should do it, but America is not about to go back to the good old days of the 1950s. Without a

sense of against whom or when a buildup might be required, it is impossible for the military to judge as it downsizes today how much equipment or which people and capabilities should be retained in order to have the ability to expand in the face of a larger future threat. The public debate on the adequacy of America's national defenses waxes and wanes with every crisis. There is a high point every four years with the publication of the Quadrennial Defense Review. Unfortunately, each QDR is sui generis and, despite claims by each Administration that it has taken a longterm perspective, deals only with near-term challenges. There is no common standard, no yardstick by which to measure the adequacy of U.S. military power over time. Moreover, even though QDRs are required by law to take a long-term perspective on the adequacy of U.S. forces, they have never done so. Rather, they provide a static vision of the adequacy of U.S. military forces and, even then, not against the most formidable threats and adversaries. Hence, the QDR is a backward-looking, out-of-focus Polaroid picture that tells us nothing about how much military power the nation needs relative to both missions and threats. The static, disconnected nature of this analytic approach does not permit an adequate characterization of the arc of strategic trends involving defense spending, force evolution, or technology proliferation. As a consequence, it is easy for negative conditions such as the long-term decline in the U.S. military to be obscured in policy discussions. But this is only half of the problem. The decline in American power has been exceeded by that of its major allies: Not even a handful of NATO countries spend the agreed minimum of 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on defense. This is now a military beset by challenges on all sides. It is worn out from overuse and inadequate modernization. There is a clear and growing negative tilt in the strategic military balance between the United States and its allies on one side of the scales and rogue states and prospective adversaries on the other side. A combination of factors—war weariness, financial crises, unfavorable demographics, entitlement spending's growing weight on national finances, the rising costs associated with modern all-volunteer militaries and the global commons, and a failure to make the case publicly for adequate defense spending—has contributed to the pronounced decline in Western military strength. And now the United States is about to tilt the scales further against its own interests. Sequestration would impose serious and poorly distributed cuts in defense spending across the entire Department of Defense. The military already is reducing end strength, retiring hundreds of airplanes and dozens of ships and slashing training activities. Sequestration will only make the situation worse.

What would a resolution look like?

This section of the paper is very much a work in progress as there are more details to unearth as to the meaning of certain words and phrases that may allow for greater precision in meaning than currently exists. The general idea behind this paper is that the slate of resolutions will all ask the affirmative to increase the capacity, capabilities, and readiness of the United States military. While not a term of art, the informal thinking on the subject has been to conceptualize the resolution as a requirement to increase offensive military spending. As was noted in the introduction, personnel salaries and benefits have been exempted from sequestration so it makes no sense to debate those.

Even if they weren't exempt those are non-international components of military spending. It is also not the intent of this paper suggest that the affirmative should be able increase support for domestic base development. Given this there seem to be a few macro-level questions that will shape how the slate of resolutions come together.

1. Nature of the verb in the predicate?
2. Limit the object in terms of budget categories?
3. Limit the object in terms of areas and branches of the military?
4. Other considerations to facilitate solvency?

Nature of the verb

The budget process is a complicated thing. Under both the BCA and PAYGO requirements increases in spending count against a cap. Increasing spending on one non-exempt activity necessitates a decrease in a corresponding area:

Spar, Congressional Research Service Specialist in Domestic Social Policy and Division Research Coordinator, 6-13-13 [Karen, Budget "Sequestration" and Selected Program Exemptions and Special Rules, <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42050.pdf>]

"Sequestration" is a process of automatic, largely across-the-board spending reductions under which budgetary resources are permanently canceled to enforce certain budget policy goals. It was first authorized by the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (BBEDCA, Title II of P.L. 99-177, commonly known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act). Sequestration is of current interest because it has been triggered as an enforcement tool under the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA, P.L. 112-25). Sequestration can also occur under the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010 (Statutory PAYGO, Title I of P.L. 111-139). In either case, certain programs are exempt from sequestration, and special rules govern the effects of sequestration on others. Most of these provisions are found in Sections 255 and 256 of BBEDCA, as amended. Two provisions were included in the BCA that can result in automatic sequestration:

- Establishment of discretionary spending limits, or caps, for each of FY2012-FY2021. If Congress appropriates more than allowed under these limits in any given year, sequestration would cancel the excess amount.
- Failure of Congress to enact legislation developed by a Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction, by January 15, 2012, to reduce the deficit by at least \$1.2 trillion. The BCA provided that such failure would trigger a series of automatic spending reductions, including sequestration of mandatory spending in each of FY2013-FY2021, a one-year sequestration of discretionary spending for FY2013, and lower discretionary spending limits for each of FY2014-FY2021.

In fact, the Joint Committee did not develop the necessary legislation and Congress did not meet the January 15, 2012, deadline. Thus, automatic spending cuts under the BCA were triggered, with the first originally scheduled for January 2, 2013. P.L. 112-240 subsequently delayed this until March 1, 2013, and President Obama signed a sequestration order on that date.

Under the Statutory PAYGO Act, sequestration is part of a budget enforcement mechanism that is intended to prevent enactment of mandatory spending and revenue legislation that would increase the federal deficit. This act requires the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to track costs and savings associated with enacted legislation and to determine at the end of each congressional session if net total costs exceed net total savings. If so, a sequestration will be triggered.

As the defense-specific evidence above (and below) illustrates, the spending that would be called for the affirmative would be discretionary spending that would count against the BCA-imposed caps. The consequence is that an affirmative increase in defense spending would require some form of offset absent change to, or removal of, the caps. These means there are three options for structuring a resolution:

1. Require an increase in defense spending and allow the required offset to be debated out, unless the affirmative advocates killing the caps.
2. Require an increase in defense spending and mandate some form of internal offset. Wording this may be a little tricky unless you mandate that the offset area is not directly related to capacity, capability, and readiness. An example of action here would be to mandate another round of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC):

Freedburg, 3-11-2015, [Sydney J., Jr., "Give Us Sequester? Bases Will Get Cut: McHugh, Graham," <http://breakingdefense.com/2015/03/give-us-sequester-bases-will-get-cut-mchugh-graham/>]

You know, Sec. McHugh said at one point, this would be a lot easier if you'd authorize another Base Realignment And Closure (BRAC) round. As long as we're not allowed to close any installation outright, he argued, we have to spread the pain to every state with salami-slice cutbacks. Authorize BRAC, and we can do this more efficiently, concentrating the cuts at fewer places.¶ "I went through three BRACs when I was a member of the House, I know how hard they are, and I lost a base," said McHugh, a former congressman himself, after acknowledging his recommendation would be "very unpopular." But, he said, "one of the reasons...that we're looking at having to make reductions across the entire structure of the United States Army, every post, camp, and station, should sequestration return is that we don't have BRAC authority."¶ Counter-intuitively, McHugh argued, "it ends up that it actually helps more bases to actually authorize a BRAC than it hurts."¶ Only Sen. Graham took up the topic. "Rather than asking you about Fort Jackson," he said, referring to his home state base, "I think, Mr. Secretary, you expressed very well that if the Army [has to] implement sequestration numbers...and if we don't have a BRAC, we're really putting the Army in a bad spot."

Or, the affirmative could change the benefits component of the military to fund the plan:

Talent, a former U.S. Senator from Missouri, is a Distinguished Fellow at The Heritage Foundation, and **Kyl**, a former U.S. Senator from Arizona, is a Visiting Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, **2013** [Jim and Jon, A Strong and Focused National Security Strategy, 10-31, https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/-strong-and-focused-national-security_165049289761.pdf]

The All-Volunteer Force (AVF) has been a tremendous success, but it is expensive and growing more so. The annual cost per service member has grown from \$63,640 in 2001, to \$94,533 in 2009.³² This amount does not include health care costs. In part, the growth in compensation costs was inevitable and reflects the quality of a force which, as discussed above, is consistently performing difficult missions while undermanned and depending on increasingly unreliable equipment. Today's servicemen and women are highly skilled professionals who deserve good compensation, and people cannot be recruited or retained unless they are paid what they are worth. But the military compensation package is not properly balanced. The chief problem is that service members are allowed to retire after 20 years regardless of age, pensions are generous, and retirees receive good medical coverage for life. The cumulative effect is that younger service members with families are often cash-strapped; they would like to receive greater compensation in the short term, especially if they are planning to serve for only one or two enlistments. At the same time, their senior colleagues have every financial incentive to retire in their early forties and begin a private-sector career, unless they are in the small cohort of officers who have a real chance to be promoted to general or admiral. When that happens, the military loses good officers and senior non-commissioned officers, and the cost of retiree compensation grows geometrically. The answer is not to renege on commitments to retirees or defeat the expectations of senior military personnel. The answer is to grandfather in those who have advanced on a career path in reliance on existing benefits, while rebalancing compensation for other current service members and future enlistees. Again to quote the Perry–Hadley panel: Updating military compensation and redesigning some benefits does not necessitate cuts in pay or benefits for current service members. Moving toward more flexible compensation packages for future officers and enlisted would instead allow Congress to pay troops with more cash up front while grandfathering in those who are serving today. The compensation system should be dual-tracked: one path for those who serve one or two terms of enlistment, and another for those who intend or decide on a career in uniform. Compensation would be adjusted to meet the different needs of recruiting or retaining each group, and redistributed as required. Cash payments would make up a higher percentage of overall compensation for those seeking shorter lengths of service, when compared to deferred and in-kind benefits. For those who seek to serve longer terms of service, careers could be lengthened and the “up or out” system could be modified to extend the period of active service, reduce retirement costs, and gain the full benefit of investments in training, education, and experience.³³ The exact changes will need to be determined by consultations between the Pentagon and the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, perhaps after recommendations from a commission appointed for that purpose. Again, the purpose is not to save money in the short term—this is not feasible—but to help ensure that the volunteer military remains strong and affordable, with younger service members receiving the compensation they deserve and the military retaining its best personnel throughout their useful careers. Defense planning should have a long horizon. If the changes are made promptly, the transition period can begin right away and the benefits will be substantial within 10 to 20 years.

3. Require an increase in defense spending and mandate an external offset. This would be relatively simple in that it would ask the resolution to increase defense spending by increasing the non-defense obligations under sequestration⁴:

Moore, Distinguished Visiting Fellow in the Institute for Economic Freedom and Opportunity at The Heritage Foundation, **and Griffith**, Research Associate in the Institute for Economic Freedom and Opportunity at The Heritage Foundation, 4-1-5 [Stephen and Joel, Keep the Spending Caps, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/04/keep-the-spending-caps>]

The BCA is far from ideal, but it has produced beneficial results for the U.S. economy and the federal fiscal situation. Under the Budget Control Act, total federal outlays have fallen from \$3.603 trillion in 2011 to \$3.506 trillion through FY 2014.[38] This is the first three-year stretch of declining federal outlays since Dwight Eisenhower’s first term in office. The BCA slammed the brakes on the reckless government activism of 2008, 2009, and 2010.¶ The Washington Post recently called for the cessation of the sequester, complaining that across-the-board cuts are the antithesis of “governing” and a substitute for “making choices.” But this misses the point. The BCA is necessary and desirable precisely because Congress and the President will not make tough choices. The default position instead of cutting wasteful expenditures is to borrow more and more—now \$18 trillion. Borrowing to push the costs of current consumption onto future generations is the essence of bad and unaccountable government. Government is about choosing, but this government, which has run \$1.4 trillion deficits, refuses to choose.¶ If President Obama engineers another end run around the caps with his proposed \$74 billion in new spending this year and \$362 billion over five years, the discipline of the BCA will be forever lost, and we will be back to the free-for-all of 2009 and 2010. Defense spending has been cut sharply. But to restore sensible national security policy, appropriators need to eliminate waste from the defense budget and defund the billions that are diverted to nonsecurity programs, such as a multibillion-dollar green-energy programs, that Obama has stuffed into the Pentagon budget. Rather than bust the overall caps, fiscal conservatives should insist that any increases in defense spending be funded with reductions in domestic spending.¶ If, instead of accepting Obama’s spending binge offer, Republicans can hold to the caps and allow sequester cuts if spending comes in over target, the fiscal picture continues to improve. Under the existing caps, federal discretionary spending will remain benignly flat through the end of 2017. If growth picks up to 3.5 percent, spending could fall below 19 percent of GDP by 2024 compared with the 22.4 percent estimated under the 2016 Obama budget proposal.¶

Limit budget categories?

One of the most important questions driving the construction of resolutions in this area will be how to word the type of spending to be increased. Based on the existing evidence the presumption would be that the affirmative would advocate an increase to DoD military spending in some fashion. If the resolution was written such that it simply spoke to “defense spending” or the “national defense budget” removed from the DoD military context there is a possibility that “all things defense” would become topical:

⁴ The Moore and Griffith evidence also includes a claim that increased defense spending could be offset with non-defense energy programs that are funded by the DoD.

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, 2014

[NATIONAL DEFENSE BUDGET ESTIMATES FOR FY 2015, April 2014,
http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2015/FY15_Green_Book.pdf]

The National Defense budget function (function 050) is comprised of: DoD Military (subfunction 051); Atomic Energy Defense Activities (subfunction 053); and Defense-Related Activities (of other federal agencies) (subfunction 054). This category of the federal budget is interpreted as activities pertaining to the nation's defense, even outside of DoD activities.

Additionally the phrase “military expenditure” is also too broad:

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2015 [SIPRI Definition of military expenditure, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database/definitions]

Where possible, SIPRI military expenditure include all current and capital expenditure on:
the armed forces, including peace keeping forces
defence ministries and other government agencies engaged in defence projects
paramilitary forces when judged to be trained, equipped and available for military operations
military space activities

Such expenditures should include:
personnel

all expenditures on current personnel, military and civil
retirement pensions of military personnel
social services for personnel and their families
operations and maintenance
procurement
military research and development
military construction
military aid (in the military expenditures of the donor country)

Excluded military related expenditures:

civil defence
current expenditure for previous military activities
veterans benefits
demobilization
conversion of arms production facilities
destruction of weapons

At this point there seem to be a few issues:

1. Discretionary defense spending or base defense budget as sufficient?
2. “Capacity, capability, and readiness” qualifier?
3. List strategies?

“Discretionary defense spending” and “base defense budget” are two related phrases that are commonly used to refer to the portion of the defense budget that deals with force levels, training, and weapons acquisition. As much of the evidence cited throughout this paper indicates, these terms are interchangeable in that “base” is used to indicate funding distinct from mandatory programs such as benefit obligations (see the Bennett and Eagle evidence introduced above). The base budget also excludes OCO monies:

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The baseline budget for defense in FY 2014 was \$496 billion, which paid for the forces (manpower, equipment, training); enabling capabilities (things like transportation, satellites, defense intelligence, and research and development); and institutional support (bases and stations, facilities, recruiting, and the like). The baseline budget does not pay for the cost of ongoing operations, which is captured in supplemental funding known as OCO (overseas contingency operations).

That said there are a pair of concerns with these phrases at this point. First, as the definition of the baseline budget provided above indicates things like funding for basing is included. Second, while OCO monies are distinct from the base budget they are in a discretionary (although the politics of increasing OCO money different than that associated with increasing baseline funding).

“Capacity, capability, and readiness” is a phrase that is increasingly used by both governmental officials and outside observers in assessing the strength of the US military.

The Heritage Foundation/American Enterprise Institute report that is cited throughout, the *2015 Index of U.S. Military Strength*, uses these criteria for their assessment. “Capacity” is defined as the number of forces/systems that exist. “Capability” refers to the quality of the forces and systems relative to the ability to fulfill the current two-war strategy. “Readiness” is based on internal perceptions of the quality of the overall structure. The terms are defined in the methodology to the report:

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Also assessed is the adequacy of the United States' defense posture as it pertains to a conventional understanding of "hard power," defined as the ability of American military forces to engage and defeat an enemy's forces in battle at a scale commensurate with the vital national interests of the U.S. The assessment draws on both quantitative and qualitative aspects of military forces, informed by an experience-based understanding of military operations and the expertise of external reviewers.¶ It is important to note that military effectiveness is as much an art as it is a science. Specific military capabilities represented in weapons, platforms, and military units can be used individually to some effect. Practitioners of war, however, have learned that combining the tools of war in various ways and orchestrating their tactical employment in series or simultaneously can dramatically amplify the effectiveness of the force committed to battle.¶ The point here is that a great number of factors make it possible for a military force to locate, close with, and destroy an enemy, but not many of them are easily measured. The scope of this specific project does not extend to analysis of everything that makes hard power possible; it focuses on the status of the hard power itself.¶ This Index assesses the state of military affairs for U.S. forces in three areas: capability, capacity, and readiness.¶ Capability. Capability is scored based on the current state of combat equipment. This involves four factors: the age of key platforms relative to their expected life span; whether the required capability is being met by legacy or modern equipment; the scope of improvement or replacement programs relative to the operational requirement; and the overall health and stability (financial and technological) of modernization programs.¶ This Index focused on primary combat units and combat platforms (e.g., tanks, ships, and airplanes) and elected not to include the array of system and component upgrades that keep an older platform viable over time, such as a new radar, missile, or communications suite. New technologies grafted onto aging platforms ensure that U.S. military forces keep pace with technological innovations relevant to the modern battlefield, but at some point, the platforms themselves are no longer viable and must be replaced. Modernized sub-systems and components do not entirely substitute for aging platforms, and it is the platform itself that is usually the more challenging item to field. In this sense, primary combat platforms serve as representative measures of force modernity just as combat forces are a useful surrogate measure for the overall military that includes a range of support units, systems, and infrastructure.¶ In addition, it is assumed that modernization programs should replace current capacity at a one-to-one ratio; less than a one-to-one replacement assumes risk in that even if the newer system is presumably better than the older, until proven in actual combat, having fewer systems lessens the capacity of the force, which is an important factor if combat against a peer competitor carries with it the likelihood of attrition. For modernization programs, only Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) are scored.¶ The capability score uses a five-grade scale. Each service receives one capability score that is a non-weighted aggregate of scores for four categories: (1) Age of Equipment, (2) Modernity of Capability, (3) Size of Modernization Program, and (4) Health of Modernization Program. General criteria for the capability categories are:¶ Age of Equipment¶ Very Weak: Equipment age is past 80 percent of expected life span.¶ Weak: Equipment age is 61 percent–80 percent of expected life span.¶ Marginal: Equipment age is 41 percent–60 percent of expected life span.¶ Strong: Equipment age is 21 percent–40 percent of expected life span.¶ Very Strong: Equipment age is 20 percent or less of expected life span.¶ Capability of Equipment¶ Very Weak: Majority (over 80 percent) of capability relies on legacy platforms.¶ Weak: 60 percent–79 percent of capability relies on legacy platforms.¶ Marginal: 40 percent–59 percent of capability is legacy platforms.¶ Strong: 20 percent–39 percent of capability is legacy platforms.¶ Very Strong: Less than 20 percent of capability is legacy platforms.¶ Size of Modernization Program¶ Very Weak: Modernization program significantly too small or inappropriate to sustain current capability or program in place.¶ Weak: Modernization programs smaller than current capability size.¶ Marginal: Modernization programs appropriate to sustain current capability size.¶ Strong: Modernization programs will increase current capability size.¶ Very Strong: Modernization programs will vastly expand capability size.¶ Health of Modernization Program¶ Very Weak: Modernization programs facing significant problems; too far behind schedule (five-plus years); cannot replace current capability before retirement; lacking sufficient investment to advance; cost overruns including Nunn–McCurdy breach. (A Nunn–McCurdy cost breach occurs when the cost of a new item exceeds 25 percent or more over the most recently approved amount or 50 percent or more over the amount originally approved. See Title 10, U.S.C. § 2433, Unit Cost Reports (UCRs).)¶ Weak: Facing procurement problems; behind schedule (three–five years); difficult to replace current equipment on time or insufficient funding; cost overruns enough to trigger an Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) breach.¶ Marginal: Facing few problems; behind schedule by one–two years but can replace equipment with some delay or experienced some funding cuts; some cost growth but not within objectives.¶ Strong: Facing no procurement problems; can replace equipment with no delays; within cost estimates.¶ Very Strong: Performing better than DOD plans, including lower actual costs.¶ Capacity. To score capacity, the service's size (be it end strength or number of platforms) is compared to the force size required to meet a simultaneous or near-simultaneous two-war or two-major regional contingency (MRC) benchmark. This benchmark consists of the force needed to fight and win two MRCs and a 20

percent margin that serves as a strategic reserve. A strategic reserve is necessary because deploying 100 percent of the force at any one time is highly unlikely. Not only do ongoing requirements like training or sustainment and maintenance of equipment make it infeasible for the entirety of the force to be available for deployment, but committing 100 percent of the force would leave no resources available to handle unexpected situations.¶ Thus, a “marginal” capacity score would exactly meet a two-MRC force size, a “strong” capacity score would equate to a plus-10 percent margin for strategic reserve, and a “very strong” score would equate to a 20 percent margin.¶ Capacity Score Definitions¶ Very Weak: 0 percent–37 percent of the two-MRC benchmark.¶ Weak: 38 percent–74 percent of the two-MRC benchmark.¶ Marginal: 75 percent–82 percent of the two-MRC benchmark.¶ Strong: 83 percent–91 percent of the two-MRC benchmark.¶ Very Strong: 92 percent–100 percent of the two-MRC benchmark.¶ Readiness. The readiness scores are from the military services’ own assessments of readiness based on their requirements. These are not comprehensive reviews of all readiness input factors, but rather rely on the public statements of the military services regarding the state of their readiness.¶ It should be noted that even a “strong” or “very strong” score does not indicate that 100 percent of the force is ready; it simply indicates that the service is meeting 100 percent of its own readiness requirements. Often, these requirements assume that a percentage of the military at any one time will not be fit for deployment. Because of this, even if readiness is graded as “strong” or “marginal,” there is still a gap in readiness that will have significant implications for immediate combat effectiveness and the ability to deploy quickly. Thus, anything short of meeting 100 percent of readiness requirements assumes risk and is therefore problematic.¶ Readiness Score Definitions¶ Very Weak: 0 percent–19 percent of service’s requirements.¶ Weak: 20 percent–39 percent of service’s requirements.¶ Marginal: 40 percent–59 percent of service’s requirements.¶ Strong: 60 percent–79 percent of service’s requirements.¶ Very Strong: 80 percent–100 percent of service’s requirements.

The 2014 QDR is consistent with this understanding and refers to “capability, capacity, and readiness” in context of end strength and force structure:

DoD 2014 [Quadrennial Defense Review 2014,

http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf]

Rebalancing capability, capacity, and readiness within the Joint Force. After more than twelve¶ years of conflict and amid ongoing budget reductions, the Joint Force is currently out of¶ balance. Readiness further suffered due to the implementation of sequestration in FY2013, and¶ the force has not kept pace with the need to modernize. We will need time and funding to reset¶ and reconstitute the Joint Force as we transition from operations in Afghanistan. The¶ President’s FY2015 Budget proposal outlines a range of realistic and responsible adjustments in¶ specific areas the Department believes must be made in the near term to restore balance in the¶ Joint Force. The force will become smaller in the next five years but will gradually become¶ more modern as well, with readiness improving over time. Taking the prudent steps outlined in¶ this QDR in the near term will improve the Department’s ability to meet our national security¶ needs should the fiscal outlook not improve. The longer critical decisions are delayed in the ¶ hope that budget caps will be raised, the more difficult and painful those decisions will be to¶ implement, and the more damaging they will be to our ability to execute the strategy if no¶ additional resources are made available. Key end strength and force structure decisions in this¶ QDR include:

Maintaining an Air Force with global power projection capabilities crucial for this¶ updated defense strategy.

We will modernize next-generation Air Force combat¶ equipment – including fighters and bombers – particularly against advancing modern¶ air defense systems. To free resources for these programs as well as to preserve¶ investments in critical capabilities, the Air Force will reduce or eliminate capacity in¶ some single-mission aviation platforms. If sequestration-level cuts are imposed in¶ FY2016 and beyond, the Air Force would have to retire 80 more aircraft, slow down¶ purchases of the Joint Strike Fighter, and make other difficult adjustments.

Sustaining a world-class Army capable of conducting the full range of operations on¶ land, including prompt and sustained land combat as part of large, multi-phase joint¶ and multinational operations by maintaining a force structure that we can man, train,¶ equip, and keep ready. To sustain this force, the Department

will rebalance within the¶ Army, across the Active, Guard, and Reserves. The active Army will reduce from its¶ war-time high force of 570,000 to 440,000-450,000 Soldiers. The Army National¶ Guard will continue its downsizing from a war-time high of 358,000 to 335,000¶ Soldiers, and the U.S. Army Reserve will reduce from 205,000 to 195,000 Soldiers. If¶ sequestration-level cuts are imposed in FY2016 and beyond, all components of the¶ Army would be further reduced, with active duty end strength decreasing to 420,000,¶ the Army National Guard drawing down to 315,000, and the Army Reserves reducing¶ to 185,000.

Preserving Naval capacity to build security globally and respond to crises. Through an¶ aggressive effort to reduce acquisition costs and temporary ship lay-ups, the Navy will¶ modernize its fleets of surface ships, aircraft, and submarines to meet 21st century¶ threats. We must ensure that the fleet is capable of operating in every region and across¶ the full spectrum of conflict. No new negotiations beyond 32 Littoral Combat Ships¶ (LCS) will go forward, and the Navy will submit alternative proposals to procure a¶ capable and lethal small surface combatant. If sequestration-level cuts are imposed in¶ FY2016 and beyond, the USS George Washington aircraft carrier would need to be¶ retired before scheduled refueling and

overhaul. The Department will have to make this decision, which would leave the Navy with ten carrier strike groups, in the 2016 budget submission.

Maintaining the role of the Marine Corps as a vital crisis response force, protecting its most important modernization priorities and ensuring readiness, but planning for an end strength of 182,000 active

Marines. This end strength includes almost 900 more Marines for the Embassy Security Guard program, which will protect U.S. interests and installations abroad. If sequestration-level cuts are imposed in FY2016 and beyond, the Marines would continue their drawdown to an end strength of 175,000.

While more research may provide additional insight into potential stem language, or reinforce confidence in some form of a qualifier based on “capacity, capability, and readiness,” a final consideration is to author resolutions that limit the range of possible actions the affirmative may take to an even more precise and narrow degree. This would probably involve the use of lists that would indicate that the affirmative needs to increase spending for expansion of the force structure, training (perhaps even specific types), and weapons acquisition.

Limit areas and branches?

There are several indirect options for the resolution. The first and most basic would be to leave the resolution more open to the affirmative and simply say that they need to increase defense spending for capability, capacity, and readiness for the US military. A second approach would be to limit the resolution to specific branches of the military or other military activities. The decision here about whether to include “component X” really is one of personal/community preference regarding the size of the resolution. Clearly there is evidence for the affirmative and the negative on all of these fronts for good case debates, and the nature of the resolution in terms of content and the cohesiveness of the stem for the entire topic makes a larger topic more manageable than the past (see Negative Ground section below). That said the more areas included does make the topic that much larger.

So what are the area options? While I will wait and include the evidence below in the Affirmative Ground section of the essay, I will simply note that in this document alone there is evidence for affirmatives that would increase spending for the all “four” branches of the military (Air Force, Army,

Navy plus the Marines). There is also evidence increasing spending on the nuclear arsenal and missile defense. At this point I would argue that the any resolution should include the four branches of the military. Given that there is evidence for all of them and the existence of what I describe as a rather robust set of core negative positions the conceptual clarity of including all of the branches makes sense. I would also argue that it makes sense for community choice to include a more broadly worded option that doesn't prescribe branches/activities as well as some form of "4+" resolution.

Other considerations?

The intent of this paper is to advance a topic area that simply asks the affirmative to expand defense spending. That said it may become apparent in the wording process that expanding the resolitional options such that the affirmative has to "at least" increase spending is needed for effective solvency arguments (for example, it may be noted that the affirmative should also be able call for acquisition reform in addition to increasing defense spending). It is not assumed that this will be the case, and it likely that leaving certain aspect of defense policy change out of the resolution is useful in further increasing the scope of negative ground. This passage has been added to the paper not as a call to seek additional solvency mechanisms but instead as a "qualified blessing" in case such a need arises and there is fear of going beyond the scope of the paper in the future.

AFF Ground

This topic would give the affirmative to discuss a number of different areas of military policy with a number of advantage possibilities. What follows is a brief set of evidence that highlights affirmative plan and advantage areas.

Big Military AFFs

The military is on the brink

Talent, a former U.S. Senator from Missouri, is a Distinguished Fellow at The Heritage

Foundation, **and Kyl**, a former U.S. Senator from Arizona, is a Visiting Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, **2013** [Jim and Jon, A Strong and Focused National Security Strategy, 10-31, https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/-strong-and-focused-national-security_165049289761.pdf]

The situation now facing the American military is extremely grave. In one respect the military is better off than it was in 1981. The all-volunteer force has become a proven, mature, and successful model. America is protected by the best servicemen and women in the history of its military. But there are not enough of them, and they are using a generation of equipment that is reaching the end of its useful life—and that is not sophisticated enough to sustain the technological edge on which they depend when they go into combat. The U.S. is now on the cusp of returning to a hollow force, albeit with different attributes, and a hollow national security posture.

More evidence – Army, Navy, and AF tanked

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In November 2011, as it was becoming clear that the “Super Committee”—formally, the Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction established by the Budget Control Act—would fail to reach an agreement, then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta outlined the effects the law’s “sequestration” provision would have on the U.S. military. Writing to Arizona Senator John McCain, he described a total \$1 trillion cut to defense plans that would be “devastating to the Department [of Defense].” Such deep and rapid reductions “would break faith with those who maintain our military and seriously damage readiness.” Despite the imposition of such cuts, Panetta continued, “the threats to national security would not be reduced.” The United States “would have to formulate a new security strategy that accepted substantial risk” because we were “not meeting our defense needs.” The Pentagon chief went on to detail the scope and scale of the cutbacks, but the message was clear: Sequestration was not just a bad idea, but a dangerous idea.¹ Even President Barack Obama has said that sequestration was never designed to actually happen: “[T]he whole design of these arbitrary cuts was to make them so unattractive and unappealing that Democrats and Republicans would actually get together and find a good compromise... [T]his was all designed to say we can’t do these bad cuts; let’s do something smarter.”² And yet, sequestration is now in effect. Its consequences have proved to be even more immediate and worse than Panetta had predicted. One-third of all Air Force tactical fighter wings were grounded earlier this year. An aircraft carrier set to deploy to the Middle East—a region, as always, in the throes of violent political tumult—will remain in port, as will dozens of other warships. Army Chief of Staff General Raymond Odierno says that the Army has “cancelled six National Training Center rotations for the rest of the year, we’ve reduced flying hours, we’ve had to degrade services at installations.” He predicts “a three- or four-year issue with readiness... I worry about [the Army’s ability to respond to an] unknown contingency.”³

Increasing the defense budget solves all

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https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/-strong-and-focused-national-security_165049289761.pdf

The problem is that America's leaders never explicitly adapted the strategy to the circumstances of the post-Cold War world. Yet mitigation of global risk is even more important today than it was during the Cold War years. The information revolution has knitted the world together both socially and economically in an unprecedented way; what happens in the Middle East, Southern Asia, and even Africa matters directly to America's security and quality of life. At the same time, asymmetric capabilities, further enhanced by the information revolution, have increased the direct threats to the American homeland. Nuclear weapons are easier to develop, and cyber weapons and bioweapons are available even to nascent radical movements, much less nation-states. North Korea, an economic basket case, is already a major threat to its neighbors, and will become a direct threat to the American homeland if it continues to improve its missile capabilities. China's claims to the South China Sea threaten sea lanes through which much of the world's shipping must travel, and China is already regularly attacking the American economy through cyberspace. If the Pakistani government becomes unstable, or is taken over by Islamists, the danger of war with India will grow, and Pakistan's substantial nuclear arsenal will be up for grabs. Iran, the world's chief sponsor of terrorism, is approaching nuclear capability. The fact that Egypt is now in turmoil has further isolated Israel and increased the danger of war in the Middle East. Yemen's failed government means that the country may become a staging ground for terrorism. Al-Qaeda has not been defeated; it has returned to Iraq, spread to North Africa and Yemen, and is now run by Ayman al-Zawahiri, a medical doctor who was in charge of bioweapons laboratories that were operating in Afghanistan before the American invasion. Managing these risks requires a number of hard and soft power tools. The more options at a President's disposal, the greater the chance of containing danger short of conflict. Typically, the various tools reinforce each other, although soft power options are especially dependent on military capability. For example, a fully deployed and functional global missile defense system would substantially increase the potential of diplomatic efforts and economic sanctions to dissuade Iran from developing nuclear missiles in the first place. Moreover, the American military gathers most of the information in support of national intelligence, maintains a visible global presence in support of American diplomacy, patrols the sea lanes to protect trade, and provides support and protection for delivery of humanitarian aid during global disasters. In short, America maintains a large standing military as the foundation of an integrated grand strategy which, for 60 years, has kept the general peace while protecting America's enduring national interests. Sustaining that military requires careful and consistent planning over long periods of time. Decisions made today will affect the armed forces decades from now. The task is not easy, but it is nowhere near as difficult as the kinds of conflict that characterized the first half of the 20th century. It is possible in theory for the United States to move away from the forefront of world events and play the kind of secondary role in global affairs that characterized the first 150 years of its foreign policy. Many in the United States want to do that; they are weary of the burdens of leadership that America assumed three generations ago. But those who want such a change should consider the implications carefully. There is no reason to believe that retreating from the world will allow America to maintain a smaller defense establishment than it does now. The vital interests of the United States are what they are—the threats to those interests will not go away because America is less present in the world. And the cost of defeating or containing those threats will not be reduced if the United States waits to confront them until they have grown to the point that conflict is unavoidable—which is precisely why the “risk mitigation” strategy was adopted in the first place. We should not act as the world's policeman, but should take prudent, responsible measures to ensure a strong national defense. In 2010, Congress took the extraordinary step of creating an Independent Panel to review the plans of the Department of Defense. That panel consisted of 20 defense experts from across the political spectrum. It was co-chaired by William Perry, Secretary of Defense under President Bill Clinton, and Stephen

Hadley, National Security Adviser for President George W. Bush. In the initial section of its unanimous report,⁶ the panel outlined the national interests that together define American security, set forth the most serious threats to those interests in the world today, and then discussed the various options that defense planners should consider. The panel closed this section of the report with an admonition that is relevant today: "[T]here is a choice our planners do not have.... America does not have the option of abandoning a leadership role in support of its national interests. Those interests are vital to the security of the United States. Failure to anticipate and manage the conflicts that threaten those interests—to thoughtfully exploit the options we have set forth above in support of a purposeful global strategy—will not make those conflicts go away or make America's interests any less important. It will simply lead to an increasingly unstable and unfriendly global climate and, eventually, to conflicts America cannot ignore, which we must prosecute with limited choices under unfavorable circumstances—and with stakes that are higher than anyone would like.

Navy AFFs

The state of the Navy is in disarray

Talent, a former U.S. Senator from Missouri, is a Distinguished Fellow at The Heritage Foundation, and **Kyl**, a former U.S. Senator from Arizona, is a Visiting Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, **2013** [Jim and Jon, A Strong and Focused National Security Strategy, 10-31, https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/-strong-and-focused-national-security_165049289761.pdf]

The Navy. The U.S. Navy is the smallest it has been since 1916.¹² It is set to shrink to approximately 250 ships—100 ships fewer than recommended by the Perry–Hadley panel and 60 fewer ships than the Navy's own stated requirement during President Obama's first term. The Navy is also suffering from serious shortfalls in readiness—the Navy is retiring ships faster than it is building them. In 2011, nearly one-quarter of inspected ships failed their annual review.¹³ Meanwhile, half of the Navy's deployable aircraft are not combat-ready, and engines aboard two F/A-18s have caught fire aboard ships underway. While the Navy has shrunk by 15 percent since 1998, it had, before sequestration, managed to deploy a relatively constant number of ships at sea at any given time.¹⁴ Since sequestration took effect, the Navy has routinely canceled deployments.

Sequestration devastates fleet size

Wood is Senior Research Fellow for Defense Programs in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policy, of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at The Heritage Foundation. He served for two decades as an officer in the U.S. Marine Corps, including service as a strategic analyst for the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Secretary of Defense's Director of Net Assessment, **2015** [Dakota L., 2015 Index of U.S. Military Strength Assessing America's Ability to Provide for the Common Defense, ed by Dakota Wood, http://ims-2015.s3.amazonaws.com/2015_Index_of_US_Military_Strength_FINAL.pdf]

In the next five years, the ship count will likely decline drastically relative to previous years. The Navy ship count could hit 274 ships in FY 2015 (using the original Battle Force ship count rules).⁴³ Due to topline budget pressures, the Navy is proposing to decommission one aircraft carrier and 10 frigates, though Congress has yet to finalize whether or not the Navy will be able to retire these ships.⁴⁴ Should sequestration occur in FY 2016 and following years, the Battle Force ship count will continue to decrease, potentially falling as low as 255 by FY 2020.⁴⁵

Strong navy de-escalates all conflict and deters great power war

Roughhead, 7 -- Admiral, US Navy, Chief of Naval Operations

[Gary, James Conway, General, US Marine Corps, and Thad Allen, Admiral, US Coast Guard, "A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower," Oct 2007, www.navy.mil/maritime/Maritimestrategy.pdf]

This strategy reaffirms the use of seapower to influence actions and activities at sea and ashore. The expeditionary character and versatility of maritime forces provide the U.S. the asymmetric advantage of enlarging or contracting its military footprint in areas where access is denied or limited. Permanent or prolonged basing of our military forces overseas often has unintended economic, social or political repercussions. The sea is a vast maneuver space, where the presence of maritime forces can be adjusted as conditions dictate to enable flexible approaches to escalation, de-escalation and deterrence of conflicts. The speed, flexibility, agility and scalability of maritime forces provide joint or combined force commanders a range of options for responding to crises. Additionally, integrated maritime operations, either within formal alliance structures (such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) or more informal arrangements (such as the Global Maritime Partnership initiative), send powerful messages to would-be aggressors that we will act with others to ensure collective security and prosperity. United States seapower will be globally postured to secure our homeland and citizens from direct attack and to advance our interests around the world. As our security and prosperity are inextricably linked with those of others, U.S. maritime forces will be deployed to protect and sustain the peaceful global system comprised of interdependent networks of trade, finance, information, law, people and governance. We will employ the global reach, persistent presence, and operational flexibility inherent in U.S. seapower to accomplish six key tasks, or strategic imperatives. Where tensions are high or where we wish to demonstrate to our friends and allies our commitment to security and stability, U.S. maritime forces will be characterized by regionally concentrated, forward-deployed task forces with the combat power to limit regional conflict, deter major power war, and should deterrence fail, win our Nation's wars as part of a joint or combined campaign. In addition, persistent, mission-tailored maritime forces will be globally distributed in order to contribute to homeland defense-in-depth, foster and sustain cooperative relationships with an expanding set of international partners, and prevent or mitigate disruptions and crises. Credible combat power will be continuously postured in the Western Pacific and the Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean to protect our vital interests, assure our friends and allies of our continuing commitment to regional security, and deter and dissuade potential adversaries and peer competitors. This combat power can be selectively and rapidly repositioned to meet contingencies that may arise elsewhere. These forces will be sized and postured to fulfill the following strategic imperatives: Limit regional conflict with forward deployed, decisive maritime power. Today regional conflict has ramifications far beyond the area of conflict. Humanitarian crises, violence spreading across borders, pandemics, and the interruption of vital resources are all possible when regional crises erupt. While this strategy advocates a wide dispersal of networked maritime forces, we cannot be everywhere, and we cannot act to mitigate all regional conflict. Where conflict threatens the global system and our national interests, maritime forces will be ready to respond alongside other elements of national and multi-national power, to give political leaders a range of options for deterrence, escalation and de-escalation. Maritime forces that are persistently present and combat-ready provide the Nation's primary forcible entry option in an era of declining access, even as they provide the means for this Nation to respond quickly to other crises. Whether over the horizon or powerfully arrayed in plain sight, maritime forces can deter the ambitions of regional aggressors, assure friends and allies, gain and maintain access, and protect our citizens while working to sustain the global order. **Critical to this notion is the maintenance of a powerful fleet**—ships, aircraft, Marine forces, and shore-based fleet activities—capable of selectively controlling the seas, projecting power ashore, and protecting friendly forces and civilian populations from attack. Deter major power war. No other disruption is as potentially disastrous to global stability as war among major powers. Maintenance and extension of this Nation's comparative seapower advantage is a key component of deterring major power war. While war with another great power strikes many as improbable, the near-certainty of its ruinous effects demands that it be actively deterred using all elements of national power. The expeditionary character of maritime forces—our lethality, global reach, speed, endurance, ability to overcome barriers to access, and operational agility—provide the joint commander with a range of deterrent options. We will pursue an approach to deterrence that includes a credible and scalable ability to retaliate against aggressors conventionally, unconventionally, and with nuclear forces.

No escalation to great power war in a world of naval power

Conway '8 ("A COOPERATIVE STRATEGY FOR 21ST CENTURY SEAPOWER" James T Conway, Et al. Naval War College Review. Washington: Winter 2008. Vol. 61, Iss. 1; pg. 6, 14 pgs)

States seapower will be globally postured to secure our homeland and citizens from direct attack and to advance our interests around the world. As our security and prosperity are inextricably linked with those of others, U.S. maritime forces will be deployed to protect and sustain the peaceful global system comprised of interdependent networks of trade, finance, information, law, people and governance. We will employ the global reach, persistent presence, and operational flexibility inherent in U.S. seapower to accomplish six key tasks, or strategic imperatives. Where tensions are high or where we wish to demonstrate to our friends and allies our commitment to security and stability, U.S. maritime forces will be characterized by regionally concentrated, forward-deployed task forces with the combat power to **limit regional conflict, deter major power war, and should deterrence fail, win our Nation's wars** as part of a joint or combined campaign. In addition, persistent, mission-tailored maritime forces will be globally distributed in order to contribute to homeland defense-in-depth, foster and **sustain cooperative relationships with an expanding set of international partners, and prevent or mitigate disruptions and crises.** a cooperative strategy for a 21st century seapower ⁷ Regionally Concentrated, Credible Combat Power Credible combat power will be continuously postured in the Western Pacific and the Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean to protect our vital interests, assure our friends and allies of our continuing commitment to regional security, and deter and dissuade potential adversaries and peer competitors. This combat power can be selectively and rapidly repositioned to meet contingencies that may arise elsewhere. These forces will be sized and postured to fulfill the following strategic imperatives: Limit regional conflict with forward deployed, decisive maritime power. Today regional conflict has ramifications far beyond the area of conflict. Humanitarian crises, violence spreading across borders, pandemics, and the interruption of vital resources are all possible when regional crises erupt. While this strategy advocates a wide dispersal of networked maritime forces, we cannot be everywhere, and we cannot act to mitigate all regional conflict. Where conflict threatens the global system and our national interests, maritime forces will be ready to respond alongside other elements of national and multi-national power, to give political leaders a range of options for deterrence, escalation and de-escalation. Maritime forces that are persistently present and combat-ready provide the Nation's primary forcible entry option in an era of declining access, even as they provide the means for this Nation to respond quickly to other crises. Whether over the horizon or powerfully arrayed in plain sight, **maritime forces can deter the ambitions of regional aggressors, assure friends and allies, gain and maintain access, and protect our citizens while working to sustain the global order. Critical to this notion is the maintenance of a powerful fleet**—ships, aircraft, Marine forces, and shore-based fleet activities—capable of selectively controlling the seas, projecting power ashore, and protecting friendly forces and civilian populations from attack. Deter major power war. **No other disruption is as potentially disastrous to global stability as war among major powers. Maintenance and extension of this Nation's comparative seapower advantage is a key component of deterring major power war.** While war with another great power strikes many as improbable, the near-certainty of its ruinous effects demands that it be actively deterred using all elements of national power. The expeditionary character of maritime forces—our lethality, global reach, speed, endurance, ability to overcome barriers to access, and operational agility—provide the joint commander with a range of deterrent options. We will pursue an approach to deterrence that includes a credible and scalable ability to retaliate against aggressors conventionally, unconventionally, and with nuclear forces.

Naval power prevents Asian wars

Hultin and Blair 6. (Jerry MacArthur Hultin, Undersecretary for the Navy, Dennis Blair, former President for the Institute of Defense Analysis and Admiral, US Navy, "Naval Power and Globalization," September, 2006 http://www.poly.edu/president/_doc/hultin%20naval%20power.pdf)

Even if the interaction of US and Chinese decisions in future avoids a global naval arms race centered in the Pacific, China will still have a capable regional navy. World events may put China and the United States on opposite sides of an issue or crisis, leading to a maritime confrontation. The most likely location for this scenario is Taiwan. Successful deterrence depends on the United States **having strong naval capability** on station or quickly deployable so that

there is no incentive to China or other adversaries to initiate hostilities. The second Pacific area in which the United States must maintain a deterrent capability based on naval power is around the Korean Peninsula. North Korea is a failing state, but so long as Kim Jong Il and his successors maintain their position of power, they will need to be deterred from military aggression. To maintain deterrence, American naval strategy in the Pacific must preserve its alliance base, its forward deployed posture and its ability to reinforce quickly to assert maritime superiority throughout any crisis situation.

Fleet expansion solves

Talent, a former U.S. Senator from Missouri, is a Distinguished Fellow at The Heritage Foundation, **and Kyl**, a former U.S. Senator from Arizona, is a Visiting Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, **2013** [Jim and Jon, A Strong and Focused National Security Strategy, 10-31, https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/-strong-and-focused-national-security_165049289761.pdf]

Second, the Navy needs more ships. Twenty years ago, the Bottom-Up Review stated a requirement of 346 ships.³⁴ In the middle of the past decade, and under severe budgetary pressure, the Navy estimated it would need 313 ships to perform its global missions. Approximately 10 new ships a year are required to sustain a 300-ship Navy. Today the Navy has 283 ships; the current plan is to build around eight ships per year for the next five years.³⁵ Even if that plan is attainable—and if sequestration stays in force it will not be—the Navy is headed down to a size of 240 to 250 vessels. At that level, America will not have a global Navy. The Navy faces shortfalls of cruisers/destroyers, submarines, and small surface combatants, but more important than the particular make-up of the inventory is the need for additional hulls in the water. The shipbuilding program should be increased as soon as possible to an average rate of 15 vessels per year.

Army AFFs

The Army is becoming too small and relies on dated equipment

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The Army. In October 2007, Secretary Robert Gates had this to say about the condition of the Army: America's ground forces have borne the brunt of underfunding in the past and the bulk of the costs—both human and material—of the wars of the present. By one count, investment in Army equipment and other essentials was underfunded by more than \$50 billion before we invaded Iraq. By another estimate, the Army's share of total defense investments between 1990 and 2005 was about 15 percent. So resources are needed not only to recoup from the losses of war, but to make up for the shortfalls of the past and to invest in the capabilities of the future.¹⁷ The investments that Secretary Gates called for were never made. In fact, the Obama Administration canceled the Army's most important new program of record—the Future Combat Systems, designed to replace many of the Army's tanks and nearly all its tracked vehicles. Today, the Administration is planning to reduce the number of soldiers and Marines by 100,000, despite the fact that the war in Afghanistan will continue through 2014. Most of these readiness concerns arose before sequestration. Sequestration was imposed without any analysis of the impact on the national military strategy of the United States and

without any regard for the consequences on the readiness of the force. While it is, therefore, difficult to determine exactly what additional force reductions the Defense Department will make to implement sequestration, the law creating sequestration exempts military personnel from compensation reductions; and since the Pentagon will have to increase the operations and maintenance budget so that day-to-day readiness can be protected as its capital stock continues to age, the Defense Department will most likely reduce the size of the force even more and take the rest of the cuts out of the budget for recapitalization. A force that is already too small, and must use aging and outdated equipment, is about to get smaller and older—again, without so much as a pretense of strategic or military justification.

Sequestration gutting the army

Wood is Senior Research Fellow for Defense Programs in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policy, of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at The Heritage Foundation. He served for two decades as an officer in the U.S. Marine Corps, including service as a strategic analyst for the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Secretary of Defense's Director of Net Assessment, **2015** [Dakota L., 2015 Index of U.S. Military Strength Assessing America's Ability to Provide for the Common Defense, ed by Dakota Wood, http://ims-2015.s3.amazonaws.com/2015_Index_of_US_Military_Strength_FINAL.pdf]

The U.S. Army is the United States' primary land warfare component. Although it addresses all types of operations across the range of ground force employment, its chief value to the nation is its ability to defeat enemy land forces in battle. As is the case with all of the services, the U.S. Army has sought ways to absorb the budget cuts driven by the Budget Control Act in a responsible manner while still meeting the missions outlined in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance.¹¹ In order to “maintain the proper balance between end strength, readiness and modernization,” the Army has decided to reduce its end strength and accept risk to its modernization programs to preserve readiness levels for a smaller force in the immediate term. In other words, the Army is sacrificing capacity and capability for readiness. The Army's reduction in force size, driven by budget cuts, was in fact accelerated by two years due to the severity of the sequester in FY 2013.¹² From a height of 566,000 in FY 2011, the Army's end strength in FY 2014 was on a downward slide to 490,000 Active Army soldiers by the end of the fiscal year. The ongoing debate between the White House and Congress (and within Congress) over funding levels as constrained by the Budget Control Act of 2011 will determine whether the Army is able to sustain a projected end strength of 450,000 or must reduce further to 420,000 soldiers.

Cuts devastate Army readiness

Cox, defense reporter, **3-27-14** [Matthew, Force Cuts Mean Army Can't Fight Two Land Wars, <http://www.military.com/daily-news/2014/03/27/force-cuts-mean-army-cant-fight-two-land-wars.html>]

With the threat of more sequestration cuts in 2016, service leaders have been warning Congress that the U.S. military -- particularly the Army -- will become too small to handle a combined fight like Iraq and Afghanistan in the future.

The Pentagon's fiscal 2015 defense budget will reduce the active force from 490,000 to a force size of 440,000 to 450,000 by 2019.

But sequestration cuts scheduled to occur in 2016 will likely force the Army to reduce the active end strength to 420,000.

Lawmakers pressed senior leaders to elaborate on the risks of those cuts at a Wednesday hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee's Readiness and Management Support subcommittee.

"Let's say that unfortunately we have to respond to aggression by North Korea -- where none of us wants to end up in a land war -- but let's say we had to go into a land war. What are we able to do?" Sen. Kelly Ayotte, R-N.H., asked.

"In other words ... with the 450,000, what are we able to do? With the 420,000 -- with sequestration -- what are we able to do?"

"We used to have a theory that we could fight two conflicts, and then we went down to one and a half conflicts. Where does our posture leave us in terms of ground forces and where does our posture leave us if we go forward with sequestration?" she asked.

In the "worst-case" scenario of sequestration, the Army would not be able to repeat its performance over the last decade in Iraq and Afghanistan, Army Vice Chief of Staff Gen. John Campbell told Ayotte.

"We couldn't do that at 420,000," he said. "At 490,000, we feel comfortable we can complete the defense strategic guidance with a little bit of risk. At 450,000 that risk goes much higher. Below 450,000, we don't think we would be able to do it."

The Army's active force reached 570,000 at the height of war in Iraq. During that growth, it took "two to three years to grow [brigade combat teams] from scratch," Campbell said.

"People talk about how it's easy ... it's not that easy," he said. "Remember we had brigades where we had to drop down to two maneuver battalions to get the right number of brigades over in Iraq when we had the surge. Now we have BCTs being restructured. We know we need to fight with three maneuver battalions and a reconnaissance piece, and we are trying to reorganize those brigades back and make them more capable. Going to 420,000, we would not be able to do that."

Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps Gen. John Paxton Jr., told lawmakers that sequestration cuts in 2016 would force the Corps to shrink to 175,000.

"At 175,000, we have, for example, 21 infantry battalions," Paxton said. "If the balloon goes up ... we are all in, everybody goes."

In Iraq, Marines operated on a seven-month rotation cycle; soldiers did 12-month rotations.

Ayotte asked what the rotations would like in a future major conflict.

The 175,000-Marine force would be a one-to-two dwell time ratio, Paxton said.

Campbell wasn't as optimistic. An active force of 420,000 does not allow for rotating units back for reset, he said.

"We would not rotate forces," Campbell said. "I just think that is a flawed assumption."

Ayotte asked "What does that mean if you don't rotate forces?"

Campbell said "It means they go over, and they stay."

Service officials maintain that there are other real challenges ahead even without a major ground conflict.

"Even if a major theater war or a major contingency operation doesn't happen just to sustain aircraft readiness, ship readiness and people training -- we are going to be pressed to sustain that in the long haul," Paxton said.

Deters global conflict

Metz, Chairman of the Regional Strategy and Planning Department and Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute, **1-30-12** [Steven, To Maintain U.S. Primacy, Standoff Power is not Enough, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11312/to-maintain-u-s-primacy-standoff-power-is-not-enough>]

Unfortunately, a global power that seeks to shape the security environment, prevent the emergence of conflict and shape the outcome of conflicts that do occur confronts situations and opponents far from its home territory. In these cases, the capability to project force with little risk to one's forces is essential. But preferring standoff methods is one thing; having only standoff capabilities is something entirely different. All U.S. presidents have found that the promotion of American national interests requires balanced military capabilities, with more-direct methods, particularly land power, in the mix. Following the 1991 Gulf War, some military and political leaders came to believe that modern technology had made standoff methods so effective that there was less need for direct military action. The value of land power, according to this group, was in decline. The Sept. 11 attacks and the ensuing struggle with extremists in Iraq, Afghanistan and other parts of the world showed otherwise. For a while, the inclination to place all bets on standoff methods faded. Now this debate has re-emerged. The idea that standoff military methods now outweigh a balanced capability in strategic importance grows from a misreading of recent history. It is based on the belief that Libya rather than Iraq or Afghanistan should be the model for future U.S. military operations. Americans certainly prefer a Libya-style use of force with few or no American casualties. But if that is the limit of the nation's capabilities, it will have no ability to deter or defeat opponents more clever and capable than Moammar Gadhafi's security services; to shape regional security systems; to stabilize countries or regions; and to influence the outcome of conflicts that do not look like Libya. Global trends point toward an enduring need for land power. States will fragment, with accompanying conflict. There is a possibility of renewed proxy wars between regional and global powers. In the absence of effective American land power, aggressors would simply avoid large-scale conventional military operations and devolve to the use of proxies, whether insurgents, terrorists or militias. The United States would be ill-prepared to help its friends resist this form of aggression, thus making it more likely. Fragile states, including those emerging from a conflict or from democratic revolutions, would have trouble finding the assistance they needed to establish stability. The United States would be hard-pressed to lead international efforts to stop humanitarian disasters or genocide, particularly in the wake of a devastating conflict such as a nuclear exchange. Without a balanced military capability, America would lose its ability to shape the world in pursuit of its national interests.

Increasing troop and equipment support for the Army and Marines solves

Talent, a former U.S. Senator from Missouri, is a Distinguished Fellow at The Heritage Foundation, **and Kyl**, a former U.S. Senator from Arizona, is a Visiting Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, **2013** [Jim and Jon, A Strong and Focused National Security Strategy, 10-31, https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/-strong-and-focused-national-security_165049289761.pdf]

The Army and Marine Corps have been fighting two long and grueling engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan for the past 12 years. Even if the current timetable for withdrawing from Afghanistan can be kept, that mission will last until the end of 2014. With no military analysis whatsoever, the Administration plans to cut the size of the Army and Marine Corps by 100,000 service members in addition to whatever cuts may occur because of sequestration. Unless plans are changed, the Army will be at, or more likely below, 1990s levels—which experience has shown were too low. It is at best premature, and at worst dishonest, to conclude that the U.S. Army will not play a vital role in managing risk around the world. The existence of failed and failing states and instability in the Middle East both suggest that there may be need for ground missions even if the Afghanistan drawdown proceeds on schedule. In addition, the Army is needed in the Pacific to conduct joint exercises, train allied ground forces, support American presence and strengthen ties with allies, and deter adversaries, such as North Korea. The top equipment priorities for the Army are enhancing network integration and interoperability, replacing aging combat vehicles, such as the Bradley M2/M3, and enhancing its aviation fleet—in particular, modernizing an aging inventory of Black Hawk, Chinook, Apache, and especially Kiowa helicopters, while also purchasing new unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The Marine Corps has lost much of its amphibious capability in recent years. Its top priority is modernizing and increasing its organic air power, particularly for close air support and vertical assault, which will require the acquisition of new manned aircraft as well as UAVs.

Sequestration undermines AF effectiveness

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According to the Air Force, however, readiness has been declining since 2003.⁸⁹ This trend was further aggravated in FY 2013 by the implementation of sequester, which cut spending on readiness. In FY 2013, flying hours were reduced by 18 percent, and 17 combat-coded squadrons of 40 (43 percent) were temporarily stood down.⁹⁰ In FY 2014, the Air Force prioritized its funding on readiness to make up those shortfalls, but the investment was not sufficient to make up the loss, and the shortfall in readiness still exists in FY 2014 and will persist into FY 2015. In addition to insufficient funding, making up readiness losses takes significant time. For example, standing down a unit for 60 days results in a degraded (unfit for combat) unit. To return the unit to desired levels of proficiency will take six months to a year.⁹¹ Similarly, because of depot delays, "[i]t can take two-to-three years to recover full restoration of depot workforce productivity and proficiency."⁹²

Air Force inventory and forces being gutted due to budget pressures

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The Air Force. The Air Force is smaller than at any time since the inception of the service. It will shrink further as a result of the cuts in recent years. The average age of the B-52 fleet is 50 years.¹⁵ The F-16 fleet has been in service since 1979.¹⁶ The average age of a U.S. commercial airliner, normally subjected to far fewer stresses, is just 14 years. The Obama Administration has already canceled or delayed a number of modernization programs for the Air Force, such as the F-22 air superiority fighter, the C-17 transport aircraft, a new combat search-and-rescue helicopter, a new jet trainer, and numerous space and satellite programs. The Obama Administration has closed or is closing every fighter production line except one—the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. In response to budgetary pressure, the Air Force has slowed its planned buy of F-35s, but even the slowed ramp will be difficult to achieve because of cuts. The United States currently has no active bomber lines of production. China and Russia have 12 fighter and bomber lines open between them today. Many of the Air Force KC-135 aerial refueling tankers pre-date human space flight and are over a half century old. Air Force T-38 training aircraft are twice as old as the students flying them. The F-15 fighter first flew 40 years ago. Promising unmanned-systems programs have also been cut. The MQ-9 Reaper and RQ-4 Global Hawk drones saw their combined 2013 procurement funding reduced by about 17 percent, while space programs saw a cut of nearly 27 percent. The Administration is also cutting the Air Force Reserve and National Guard forces. The President's FY 2014 budget request would cut nearly 800 Guard and Reserve personnel.

These reductions hurt the ability of the Guard and Reserve to meet both their overseas obligations and, for the Guard, responsibilities to the states and governors.

Increasing support for Air Force inventory solves

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Third, the inventory of the Air Force is older than at any time since the inception of the service. As a result, the Air Force is hemorrhaging existing aircraft while also losing modernization funding under recent budgets. For the first time in its history, the Air Force has neither an active air superiority fighter line nor such a fighter under design. The bomber and tanker fleets are archaic—nearly half of the bombers are more than 50 years old—and its space and satellite assets need upgrading. Congress and the President should commit to buying out the requirement for the F-35 (the Air Force's new strike fighter and the only active fighter line currently in production) and should increase the annual purchase because buying in volume saves money. The Air Force should design and build a new nuclear-capable bomber, and it will need to fully fund its new tanker program. New programs should be acquired in a manner consistent with the reforms discussed above

Marines AFFs

Sequestration undermines Marine effectiveness

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The U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) has positioned itself for crisis response and has evolved its concepts to leverage its equipment more effectively to support operations in a heavily contested maritime environment such as the one found in the Western Pacific. In 2014, 4,000 Marines were still fighting in Afghanistan, though force levels have been decreasing as operations draw down. The military will be deploying 10,000 troops to Afghanistan in 2015, and the Marines will make up a portion of those troops. Throughout the year, Marines also engage in various operations elsewhere; for example, they provided humanitarian assistance to the Philippines in the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan.⁹⁴ Per the Defense Strategic Guidance, maintaining the Corps' crisis response capability is critical. Thus, given the fiscal constraints imposed, the Marines have prioritized "near-term readiness" for "longterm health." Specifically, this means prioritizing readiness at the expense of capacity and capability.⁹⁵ This trade-off is a short-term fix to meet immediate needs, but in the long run, the degradation of investment in equipment will lead to lowered readiness. Capacity The Marine Corps has managed the reduction in funding by cutting capacity. Similar to the Army, the Corps' measures of capacity are end strength and units (battalions for the Marines and brigades for the Army). End strength has been decreased from a force of 202,100 Active personnel in FY 2012 to 188,800 in FY 2014.⁹⁶ Of these 188,800 Marines, 6,700 were funded from the Overseas Contingency Operations budget.⁹⁷ As of now, the drawdown is

expected to continue until FY 2015, when the Corps will reach an end strength of 182,100 Active personnel. If sequestration were to occur in FY 2016, end strength would be cut further to 175,000 by FY 2017.⁹⁸ The Marine Corps organizes itself in infantry battalions, which are its basic combat unit. A battalion has about 900 Marines and includes three rifle companies, a weapons company, and a headquarters and service company. The overall reductions in end strength left the USMC with 25 infantry battalions in FY 2014.⁹⁹ By FY 2015, the Corps will have 23 infantry battalions. Under full sequestration, USMC end strength will be able to support only 21 infantry battalions.¹⁰⁰ In 2010, the USMC determined that its ideal force size would be 186,800.¹⁰¹ However, given the budget pressures from the Budget Control Act of 2011 and the new 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, the Corps decided that a force size of “182,100 active component Marines could still be afforded with reduced modernization and infrastructure support.”¹⁰² One impact of reduced capacity is a reduction in dwell time. The stated ideal deployment-to-dwell time ratio is 1:3 (three months at home for every month deployed), which is possible with 186,000 troops.¹⁰³ If the USMC were to shrink to 175,000 troops, the deployment-to-dwell time ratio would be 1:2.¹⁰⁴ This increase in deployment frequency would worsen the degradation of readiness: People and equipment would be used more frequently, with less time to recover between deployments.

260 2015 INDEX OF U.S. MILITARY STRENGTH Capability The nature of the Marine Corps’ crisis response role requires capabilities that span all domains. The USMC ship requirement is managed by the Navy and is covered in that respective section. Of the Marine Corps’ current fleet of vehicles, its amphibious vehicles—specifically, the Assault Amphibious Vehicle (AAV-7A1) and Light Armored Vehicle (LAV)—are the oldest, averaging 35 and 23 years, respectively. Comparatively, the Corps’ M1A1 Abrams inventory is 13 years old with an estimated 34-year life span, and its fleet of light tactical vehicles such as HMMWVs (“Humvees”) are relatively young, averaging five years. The Corps’ main combat vehicles all entered service in the 1970s and ’80s, and while service life extensions, upgrades, and new generations of designs have allowed the platforms to remain in service, these vehicles are quickly becoming ill-suited to the changing threat environment. For example, with the advent of IEDs, the flat-bottom hulls found on most legacy vehicles are ineffective compared to the more blast-resistant V-shaped hulls incorporated in modern designs. The Corps’ aircraft have age profiles similar to the Navy’s. The USMC has 237 F/A-18 A–Ds and 29 EA-6Bs, which are nearing (if they have not already surpassed) their intended lifespans. Unlike the Navy, the Corps did not acquire the newer F/A-18 E/F Super Hornets; thus, the older F/A-18 Hornets are going through a service life extension program to extend their lifespan to 10,000 flight hours from the original 6,000 hours. This is to bridge the gap to when the F-35Bs and Cs enter service to replace the Harriers and most of the Hornets. The AV-8B Harrier, designed to take off from the LHAs and LHDs, will be retired in 2024. The Marine Corps has one MDAP vehicle program. The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) is a joint program with the Army to acquire a more survivable light tactical vehicle to replace a percentage of the older HMMWV fleet, originally introduced in 1985. The Marines intend to purchase 5,500 vehicles (10 percent of a total of 54,599). The program is still in development but has experienced about a one-year delay due to a change in requirements, a contract award protest, and concerns regarding technical maturity.¹⁰⁵ It should be noted that the Marine Corps has plans to replace the AAV-7A1 and LAV, but those programs are not yet MDAP programs, largely because of recent cancellations and program restructure. The AAV-7A1 was to be replaced by the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV), a follow-on to the cancelled Advanced AAV. However, the EFV was also cancelled in 2011 due to technical obstacles and cost overruns. The follow-on to the EFV was the Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV). Similarly, the Corps planned to replace the LAV inventory with the Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC), which would serve as a Light Armored Vehicle with modest amphibious capabilities but be designed with enhanced survivability. In 2014, the Marine Corps decided to restructure its modernization programs, essentially combining both efforts, cancelling the development efforts for a completely new ACV, and instead opting to upgrade a portion of the AAV-7A1 fleet. In addition, the Corps will purchase new vehicles based on the

MPC concept. In the future, it is likely that this program will become an MDAP. In FY 2014, the Marine Corps' largest investment program was the F-35B program. As planned, the F-35B variant will be the first operational variant of the F-35 family and is estimated to reach IOC by late 2015. The Corps is also purchasing 80 F-35Cs. The service's total procurement of 340 F-35s will not be enough to replace the current inventory of F/A-18s, AV-8Bs, and EA-6Bs, totaling 408 aircraft. Like the F-35A, the F-35B and F-35C variants are subject to development delays, cost overruns, budget cuts, and production problems. The F-35B in particular was placed on probation in 2011 because of its technical challenges. Although probation has since been lifted, a delay in the program timeline is pushing the F-35B IOC date from its original 2012 to 2015. Today, the MV-22 program is operating with few problems and nearing completion of the full acquisition objective of 460 aircraft. It has been steadily replacing the CH-46, a lift platform dating from the Vietnam War. The USMC heavy lift replacement program, the CH-53K, is a bit more problematic. The CH-53K will replace the Corps' CH-53E, which averages 25 years. However, the CH-53K is still in development, and critical technologies necessary to achieve the lift requirements are still unproven. Readiness The Marine Corps' first priority is to be the crisis response force for the military, which is why investment in readiness has been prioritized over capacity and capability. However, in order to invest in readiness in a time of downward fiscal pressure, the Corps has been forced to reduce end strength and delay investment in modernization.¹⁰⁶ Despite the emphasis on readiness, in FY 2014, "60 percent of [the Corps'] non-deployed units [were] experiencing degraded readiness in their ability to execute core missions."¹⁰⁷ This constitutes about 48 percent of the total USMC force.¹⁰⁸ Because the Marine Corps expects to be the first to respond to a situation or crisis, this dictates that all units, even non-deployed units, should be "ready."¹⁰⁹ The Corps has stated that "over the long-term, resourcing short-term readiness by borrowing-forward from long-term investment resources is unsustainable, and will eventually degrade unit readiness to an unacceptable level."¹¹⁰

Increasing troop and equipment support for the Army and Marines solves

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The Army and Marine Corps have been fighting two long and grueling engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan for the past 12 years. Even if the current timetable for withdrawing from Afghanistan can be kept, that mission will last until the end of 2014. With no military analysis whatsoever, the Administration plans to cut the size of the Army and Marine Corps by 100,000 service members in addition to whatever cuts may occur because of sequestration. Unless plans are changed, the Army will be at, or more likely below, 1990s levels—which experience has shown were too low. It is at best premature, and at worst dishonest, to conclude that the U.S. Army will not play a vital role in managing risk around the world. The existence of failed and failing states and instability in the Middle East both suggest that there may be need for ground missions even if the Afghanistan drawdown proceeds on schedule. In addition, the Army is needed in the Pacific to conduct joint exercises, train allied ground forces, support American presence and strengthen ties with allies, and deter adversaries, such as North Korea. The top equipment priorities for the Army are enhancing network integration and interoperability, replacing aging combat vehicles, such as the Bradley M2/M3, and enhancing its aviation fleet—in particular, modernizing an aging inventory of Black Hawk, Chinook, Apache, and especially Kiowa helicopters, while also purchasing new unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The Marine Corps has lost much of its amphibious capability in recent years. Its top priority is modernizing and increasing its

organic air power, particularly for close air support and vertical assault, which will require the acquisition of new manned aircraft as well as UAVs.

Nuclear Weapons AFFs

Status quo policy reducing reliance on nuclear weapons

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The Obama Administration released its Nuclear Posture Review in April 2010, stressing the dangers posed by terrorists in possession of nuclear weapons rather than the continued proliferation by Iran and North Korea, uncertainties about the size of China's nuclear force (or China's ability to arm its vast and growing fleet of theater-range ballistic and cruise missiles with nuclear warheads), and the complexities of third-party nuclear balances, such as that between India and Pakistan. The review provided the rationale for deeper reductions in deployed warheads from 2,200 to 1,500. The Administration has announced its intent to seek further reductions in the number of deployed U.S. nuclear weapons by as much as one-third.¹⁸

Sequester key

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Due in part to the Budget Control Act (BCA) and the resulting budget sequester, and in part to serious cost escalation in Life Extension Programs and infrastructure recapitalization programs, the Administration's budget requests since 2010 have not reflected the commitment to fully fund key nuclear programs on the schedule that it specified to the Senate in November 2010. Congress has decided to support the Administration's request to defer certain programs and slip the schedule for others. The Administration effectively cancelled the CMRR facility in its FY 2013 budget request. Impacts of the BCA and the cost escalation of critical programs will continue to delay and complicate nuclear weapons infrastructure modernization and stockpile sustainment activities.

Sequester kills nuclear readiness

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As noted above, the Administration's missile defense plans are in disarray, as is America's national nuclear infrastructure. While the exact effects of sequestration on nuclear readiness are unknown, it can

only accelerate the trends of the past five years. Past cuts have long delayed efforts to develop a new bomber—still a vital element in the traditional deterrent “triad”—as well as a needed replacement for the Trident submarine-launched ballistic missile and, indeed, for a new ballistic missile submarine itself.

Nuclear Modernization Solves

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First, the United States needs to modernize and perhaps modify its nuclear arsenal, retaining the traditional “triad” of bomber, submarine-launched, and land-based ballistic missiles. Even though the number of deployed warheads will remain historically low, new platforms are critical to ensure the survivability and relevance of U.S. deterrent systems in the multipolar nuclear environment sketched above. Such modernization must begin with a substantial reinvestment in the aging nuclear infrastructure, both to ensure the reliability and safety of current systems, and to have options for the future. For example, current designs are very much the legacy of the Cold War—high-yield warheads that, paradoxically enough, have less deterrent value because they are in danger of appearing too awful to be credible.

BMD AFFs

Increasing support for BMD solves

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During the second Bush Administration, the United States made great progress in developing a global missile defense system. When fully deployed, the missile shield would be an integrated system of sensors and interceptors—operating in air and space as well as on land and sea—that could detect and destroy nuclear missiles around the world. The system is entirely defensive and conventional in nature. The interceptors are kinetic rather than explosive. In effect, the system operates by “hitting a bullet with a bullet.” The technology of missile defense, while not mature in every respect, has proven effective; it is too late to argue that the missile shield cannot be built. The Bush Administration succeeded in deploying a piece of the missile defense system that provided rudimentary protection to the American homeland. Then, during President Obama’s first year in office, the Missile Defense Agency’s funding was cut by over 12 percent.³⁶ The Administration terminated or cut a number of important missile defense programs, including the Airborne Laser, Kinetic Energy Interceptor, advanced kill vehicle, and space-based surveillance system. In addition, the Administration abandoned the missile defense bases in Eastern Europe, which were designed to protect against a launch from Iran. The decision to develop a missile shield was made during the 1980s. It was a classic and far-sighted example of integrating tactics with the riskmanagement strategy that has served the United States so well. Ballistic missile defense is, above all else, a tool of deterrence. Once fully operational, it could have eliminated or, at minimum, substantially negated, the usefulness of nuclear missiles to potential aggressors. This would contain Iranian and North Korean aggression, stabilize Pakistan and Southern Asia, reduce incentives for Russia

and China to build up their nuclear arsenals, prevent a nuclear cascade, and deny terrorists and other radicals a major asymmetric threat. The cuts to missile defense saved only a few billion dollars per year—at the cost of endangering the most important single defensive system the United States can produce. The cuts should be reversed, and Congress and the President should make it a national priority to complete the missile defense system as soon as possible.

Hegemony Advantage

Adversary Defense Spending Up

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Military Investment by America's Adversaries. While it is important to appreciate the longterm downward trends in U.S. military forces and capabilities, this is only half of the problem. It is equally important to appreciate the trends in military investments by prospective adversaries. Over the past five years, the overall share of defense spending by the West has shrunk from around three-quarters to one-half of the global total. For more than a decade, however, China has increased its defense spending by double digits, more even than the annual growth in its GDP. It has developed, deployed, and—according to recent reports— demonstrated an operational anti-ship ballistic missile. And China's area denial/anti-access capabilities continue to grow: Beijing is deploying anti-space forces that could deny the United States the use of space in a future conflict. Furthermore, Russia has announced yet another major defense spending program designed to close the technology gap between Moscow and the U.S. and its NATO allies. Within another decade, the combined defense spending of Russia and China could exceed that of the United States. The International Institute for Strategic Studies' 2014 Military Balance makes a particular point of the contrast between the decline in Western military investments and the sharp rise in defense spending and concomitant arms expansion of programs in the Asia-Pacific region: Whereas defence spending in North America and Europe has stagnated or declined since the 2008 financial crisis, over the same period real defence outlays in China and Russia rose by more than 40% and 30% respectively. In real terms, total Asian defence spending in 2013 was 11.6% higher than in 2010. The largest absolute spending increases over the past year occurred in East Asia, with China, Japan and South Korea accounting for more than half. China now spends about three times as much as India on defence, and more than neighbours Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam combined. These outlays are fuelling heightened military procurement in a region replete with conflicting territorial claims as well as long-standing potential flashpoints. Not least because of the Asia-Pacific's central place in the global economy, the rapid pace of capability development and the potential for accidental conflict and escalation will continue to be of concern.

Overall, the scope for competition—and potential confrontation—is broad. It might develop in different domains, such as space and cyber, through the development of new military technologies, such as directed energy weapons, or even in newly accessible regions, such as the Arctic. For the West, what is clear is that the end of the Iraq War and the impending drawdown from Afghanistan mark neither an end to crises inviting Western military responses, nor a definitive end to Western intervention. Events on Europe's periphery will continue to demand attention, and there remains substantial capacity to deploy force.⁹ Yet because of the limits of the current analytic paradigm, the intersecting implication of these two trends—Western military decline and the growing military capacity of states hostile to Western interests—is never addressed. The current analytic paradigm neither acknowledges these

adverse trends nor makes any serious effort to identify the investments in U.S. military forces, platforms, and capabilities that must be made to reverse them.

Cuts gut readiness and heg

Eaglen, resident fellow at the Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies at the American Enterprise Institute, **3-28-14** [Mackenzie, The Growing Problem of a Shrinking Military, <http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2014/03/27/the-growing-problem-of-a-shrinking-us-military-budget>]

The military's most recent budget request provides even more detail about the consequences of continued automatic spending cuts. Yet the U.S. military's challenges did not start with the automatic budget cuts known as sequestration; they have been underway for years, as the Armed Forces struggle to meet ever-increasing global demands and challenges with fewer forces and resources.¶ This growing strain prompted Navy Admiral Samuel Locklear, U.S. Pacific Command chief, to tell Congress that the Navy's attack submarine requirements are going unmet in the Pacific right now. With the Navy's attack submarine fleet on a path to drop from 55 today to 42 by 2029 — under the most optimistic scenario — outcomes only promise to get worse.¶ This was not the first time the Navy has confessed it lacks the capacity necessary to carry out all of its missions. As Rear Admiral Thomas Moore argued last year, "We're an 11-carrier Navy in a 15-carrier world." Army General Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, expressed a similar concern in his assessment of recent Pentagon strategy, warning that "the smaller and less capable military outlined in the [Quadrennial Defense Review] makes meeting [strategic] obligations more difficult." ¶ Marine General John Kelly recently told Congress that a lack of assets means his command is "unable to get after 74 percent of suspected maritime drug smuggling." Instead, the commanding general warned, "I simply sit and watch it go by." At the same time, in recent years, he has seen China, Russia and Iran make notable efforts to increase their presence and influence in Latin America. Meanwhile, U.S. Central Command boss Army General Lloyd Austin recently testified that "the ability of the services to provide trained and ready forces and critical enablers cause me great concern."¶ The growing gap between strategic obligations (demand) and military capacity (a key part of supply) outlined by these senior officers is troubling. A shrinking military will be able to bring fewer resources to bear the next time it is called to fight and win the nation's wars. This reality should be self-evident, but it may very likely cost American lives in the future.¶ Moreover, a smaller military will have destabilizing consequences around the world. As Dempsey has warned, "Our loss of depth across the force could reduce our ability to intimidate opponents from escalating conflict. Nations and non-state actors who have become accustomed to our presence could begin to act differently, often in harmful ways."¶ A quick look at the headlines shows how these consequences are already becoming manifest. From increasingly (even by North Korean standards) erratic behavior emanating from Pyongyang to Chinese assertions of sovereignty over contested waters to the Russian invasion of Crimea, strategic competitors are emerging to challenge the America-backed status quo.¶ Military strength gives states diplomatic leverage. It complements and magnifies other aspects of national power to give leaders a toolkit from which they can advance national interests globally. Consequently, it should come as no surprise today that as U.S. combat power declines, so too does America's diplomatic influence.¶ If policymakers are troubled by the recent aggressive and revisionist actions of authoritarian regimes, they can act immediately to reverse this trend. As former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently said, "the pace, at which both the Europeans and the United States [are] cutting their defenses, regardless of ... the facts on the ground in terms of the number of ships and number of planes, it certainly sends a signal that we are not interested in protecting our global interests."¶ Federal spending is about making choices on priorities. Washington can reverse this slide by reinvesting in order to match U.S. military power with the commitments that America's military is expected to keep.

Extended cuts crush readiness

AP 3-26-14 [Hollow Force: Deep budget cuts may erode U.S. Army ability to fight long war, <http://freebeacon.com/national-security/hollow-force/>]

The top U.S. Army officer told lawmakers on Tuesday that a return to deep budget cuts as required by law beginning in 2016 would make it difficult for the military to carry out even one extended ground war.¶ General Ray Odierno, the Army chief of staff, told a panel in the House of Representatives that severe, across-the-board budget cuts would force the Army to shrink to 420,000 active-duty soldiers, a level at which it could no longer execute the president's national defense strategy.¶ President Barack Obama's strategy issued in 2012 calls for a U.S. military strong enough to prevail in one major war

while having the ability to deter an aggressor in a second conflict. That was a shift from the earlier longtime goal of being able to win two separate wars simultaneously. ¶ “I’m very concerned that at 420,000 we cannot meet the ... defense strategic guidance,” Odierno told the Armed Services Committee. “I doubt that we could even execute one prolonged, multi-phase operation that is extended over a period of time.” ¶ The Army chief told lawmakers the proposed \$496 billion defense budget for 2015, which calls for an Army of 440,000 to 450,000 troops, would be able to meet the president’s defense strategy, but with “significant risks.” The original 2012 strategy called for an Army of 490,000 troops. ¶ Odierno’s budget concerns were echoed in other hearings across Capitol Hill on Tuesday as lawmakers quizzed senior defense officials about the president’s proposal for Pentagon spending in 2015 and the department’s five-year defense plan. ¶ Many lawmakers lamented declining U.S. military readiness following cuts to training and maintenance. ¶ Army General Curtis Scaparrotti, the head of U.S. forces in South Korea, said 28,500 U.S. troops currently in the peninsula could handle the threat from the North, but he said he was worried about the preparedness of reinforcements in a crisis. ¶ “I am concerned about the readiness of the follow-on forces,” Scaparrotti told the Senate Armed Services Committee. ¶ In our theater ... I rely on rapid and ready forces to flow into the peninsula in a crisis. ¶ And in a House appropriations panel, Navy Secretary Ray Mabus said budget uncertainty had prompted a year’s delay in a Navy decision on whether to refuel or decommission the aircraft carrier USS George Washington halfway through its expected life. ¶ “We want to keep that carrier, and her associated air wing,” Mabus said, but noted that the cost of refueling and operating it would be \$7 billion over five years. ¶ “That’s why we did it, to give us a little more decision space, to give Congress a little more decision space,” he said. ¶ The budget concerns come as the Pentagon is struggling to implement nearly \$1 trillion in cuts to projected spending over a decade as required by the 2011 Budget Control Act passed by Congress and signed by Obama. ¶ The law required \$487 billion in direct cuts to defense spread over a decade, plus another \$500 billion in automatic, across-the-board reductions that would not take place if Congress negotiated an alternative way to curb spending. ¶ Congress failed to reach a deal, and after several legislative delays the across-the-board cuts, known as sequestration, went into effect for the first time last year nearly halfway through the fiscal year. ¶ The move forced the Pentagon to put civilian defense workers on temporary leave and prompted the military services to idle some warships, cancel Army training, reduce flying hours and take other steps to save money. ¶ Concerned about the impact, Congress reached a two-year budget deal late last year that eased some defense cuts. But Pentagon planners have already begun worrying about what will happen when the deeper spending cuts return in 2016. ¶ Odierno told lawmakers the \$496 billion defense budget for 2015, which met the caps set by Congress but also included a plan for \$26 billion in additional spending, was the “floor of what we need” to carry out the U.S. defense strategy. ¶ “Once we go below that, we can no longer execute the strategy,” he said. “We’re going to have to ... amend the current strategy or develop a new strategy.”

Sequestration killing military effectiveness – impacts all branches and the arsenal

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Finally, we assessed the military power of the United States in three areas: capability, capacity, and readiness. We approached this assessment by military service as the clearest way to link military force size; modernization programs; unit readiness; and (in general terms) the functional combat power (land, sea, and air) largely represented by each service. We treated the United States’ nuclear capability as a separate entity given the truly unique elements that make it possible, from the weapons themselves to the supporting infrastructure that is fundamentally different from that which supports conventional capabilities. The three areas of assessment (capability, capacity, and readiness) are central to the overarching questions of whether the U.S. has a sufficient quantity of appropriately modern military power and whether military units are able to conduct military operations on demand and effectively. The common theme across the services and the United States’ nuclear enterprise is one of force degradation resulting from many years of underinvestment, poor execution of modernization programs,

and the negative effects of budget sequestration (i.e., cuts in funding) on readiness and capacity. While the military has been heavily engaged in operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere since September 11, 2001, experience is both ephemeral and context-sensitive. As such, valuable combat experience is lost over time as the servicemembers who individually gained experience leave the force, and it maintains direct relevance only for future operations of a similar type (e.g., counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and major conventional operations against a state like Iran or China are fundamentally different). Thus, though the current Joint Force is experienced in some types of operations, it is still aged and shrinking in its capacity for operations. We characterized the services and nuclear enterprise on a five-category scale ranging from "very weak" to "very strong," benchmarked against criteria elaborated in the full report. These characterizations are not a reflection of the competence of individual servicemembers or the professionalism of the services or Joint Force as a whole; nor do they speak to the U.S. military's strength relative to other militaries around the world. Rather, they are assessments of the institutional, programmatic, and matériel health or viability of America's hard military power. Our analysis concluded with these assessments: I Army as "Marginal." The Army was at the low end of the middle grade ("marginal") in capacity and capability and scored quite low in readiness (as reported by the Army), the three scores combining to place it in the low end of the middle category. I Navy as "Marginal." The Navy scored quite strong in readiness but at a cost to future capability. Deferred maintenance has kept ships at sea, but at some point in the near future, this will affect the Navy's ability to deploy. Combined with a weak score in capability (due largely to old platforms and troubled modernization programs) and a "marginal" score in capacity, the Navy is currently just able to meet requirements. I Air Force as "Strong." The Air Force flies a lot and has significantly more aircraft than required for a two-MRC force, but it is an old Air Force, and its modernization programs are problematic. Still, its high scores in capacity and readiness placed it in the best position of all of the services. I Marine Corps as "Marginal." The Corps' strongest suit was in readiness, but even here there are problems as stated by the Corps itself. While the fighting competence of the service is superb, it is hampered by old equipment, troubled replacement programs for its key ground vehicles, and a shrinking force. The progress it has made in replacing its rotary-wing aircraft is a notable bright spot in its modernization portfolio. I Nuclear Capabilities as "Marginal." Modernization, testing, and investment in the intellectual/talent underpinnings of this sector are the chief elements plaguing the United States' nuclear enterprise. Its delivery platforms are good, but the force depends on a very limited set of weapons (in number of designs) and models that are quite old, in stark contrast to the aggressive programs of competitor states. In aggregate, the United States' military posture is rated as "Marginal." Overall, the Index concludes that the current U.S. military force is adequate to meeting the demands of a single major regional conflict while also attending to various presence and engagement activities. Clearly, this is what the military is doing now and has done for the past two decades, but it would be very hard-pressed to do more and certainly would be ill-equipped to handle two, near-simultaneous major regional contingencies. The consistent decline in funding and the consequent shrinking of the force are putting it under significant pressure. Essential maintenance is being deferred; fewer units (mostly the Navy's platforms and the Special Operations Forces community) are being cycled through operational deployments more often and for longer periods; and old equipment is being extended while programmed replacements are problematic. The cumulative effect of such factors has resulted in a U.S. military that is marginally able to meet the demands of defending America's vital national interests.

Budget Caps kill Strategy

Jeremy **Herb**, 4-13-2015, "The sequestration monster myth," POLITICO, <http://www.politico.com/story/2015/04/sequestration-ash-carter-congress-defense-pentagon-116899.html>

Others argue that concerns over the sequestration warnings are overblown, because the potential for the cuts is very real, regardless of whether they are because of a formal sequester or not.

“The words are wrong, but the intent is shared,” said Mackenzie Eaglen, a defense analyst at the conservative-leaning American Enterprise Institute. “There’s consensus on what it means, and therefore it doesn’t matter. ... It means a budget of \$499 billion, and in everyone’s mind, it means reverting to the caps.”

At the Pentagon, a defense official said military leaders have clearly expressed their need for funding above the \$499 billion BCA defense cap.

“From the beginning, DOD officials have been saying that in order to support the current defense strategy, we need sustained funding levels in excess of the BCA caps,” the official said. “Funding below the president’s budget level, whether that was through sequester or through appropriating to the BCA caps, would increase the risk to our ability to execute the defense strategy.”

Sequester is devastating readiness and US leadership at a time of challengers

Talent, a former U.S. Senator from Missouri, is a Distinguished Fellow at The Heritage Foundation, **and Kyl**, a former U.S. Senator from Arizona, is a Visiting Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, **2013** [Jim and Jon, A Strong and Focused National Security Strategy, 10-31, https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/-strong-and-focused-national-security_165049289761.pdf]

When President Obama took office, the armed services of the United States had already reached a fragile state. The Navy had shrunk to its smallest size since before World War I; the Air Force was smaller, and its aircraft older, than at any time since the inception of the service. The Army was stressed by years of war; according to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, it had been underfunded before the invasion of Iraq and was desperately in need of resources to replace its capital inventory. Since the President took office, the government has cut \$1.3 trillion from defense budgets over the next ten years. The last such reduction was embodied in sequestration. At the time sequestration was passed, the top leaders of the military, and of both parties (the very people who enacted sequestration), warned that it would have a devastating effect on America’s military. And so it has. The defense sequester was the worst possible thing to do to the military, at the worst possible time, in the worst possible way. Coming on the heels of the reductions from 2009–2011, it has resulted in large cuts to the Pentagon accounts that support day-to-day readiness. The Navy is routinely cancelling deployments. Earlier this spring, the Air Force grounded one-third of its fighters and bombers. The Army has curtailed training for 80 percent of the force. Our strategic arsenal—the final line of national self-defense—is old, shrinking, and largely untested. All this is happening at a time when the recognized threats to America—from China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, the inaptly named “Arab Spring,” and a resurgent and spreading al-Qaeda—are manifestly rising.

Two-War Strategy Advantage

Key. Sequester tanks.

Talent, a former U.S. Senator from Missouri, is a Distinguished Fellow at The Heritage Foundation, **and Kyl**, a former U.S. Senator from Arizona, is a Visiting Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, **2013** [Jim and Jon, A Strong and Focused National Security Strategy, 10-31, https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/-strong-and-focused-national-security_165049289761.pdf]

As discussed above, America's top civilian leadership has failed to adapt the strategic foreign policy of the United States to the post-Cold War world. That has been a tremendous handicap for the Pentagon. Defense planners use high-level strategic guidance to determine the "national military strategy"—the roles and missions that the military must be able to perform to play its role as the foundation of America's foreign policy. From the national military strategy, the Pentagon develops a "force-sizing construct"—the framework from which it plans the future size and shape of the military. In the absence of strategic guidance, defense planners have had to deduce a national military strategy from the habits of the Cold War years and the actions of American Presidents since the fall of the Berlin Wall. To that end, the George H. W. Bush Administration developed the "two-war" force-sizing construct in the early 1990s; the Pentagon decided that America's military needed to be sized and shaped so that it could decisively defeat two nation-state adversaries in separate theaters nearly simultaneously without a general mobilization. The two-war construct was based on five relevant assumptions: First, the primary purpose of American power was, as it had been since the late 1940s, to deter conflict or manage it at the lowest possible level. Maintaining a standing military with the capability of decisively winning two wars at once created the greatest probability that war could be deterred. Second, the foundation of deterrence had been a robust nuclear force—since Reagan, in conjunction with missile defense efforts. While the two-war construct has served as a reliable benchmark regarding conventional forces, none of the nuclear posture reviews—by any Administration—has produced anything analogous. The size of the force has been simply a matter for negotiation with the Russians, with no real consideration of the requirements for deterrence in a "multipolar" nuclear world—a more complex strategic environment where many actors have nuclear capabilities of one kind or another, and may be in conflict with one another but not the United States. Third, the two-war construct allowed room for secondary deterrence. If the United States did have to go to war the two-war standard meant that America would still have the ability to prevent a second conflict from starting at the same time. Fourth, there was a possibility that the United States would indeed have to fight two regional conflicts at the same time: Even in the 1990s, the Middle East, Southern Asia, and the Korean peninsula were potential sources of conflict. Since then, America has fought wars simultaneously in two of those theaters. Fifth, the nature of conflict varies enormously depending on a host of factors, including geography, distance, and the strengths of the adversary. War in the Western Pacific would require substantial naval and air strength, for example, whereas war in Southern Asia or Korea would also require significant land power. The United States often does not have the advantage of knowing precisely when and where tensions will rise. As a result, to be fully prepared to fight even one regional conflict in all the places where it might occur, the United States must sustain different packages of force at a level that supports the two-war construct. These different packages create necessary redundancies. Unfortunately, it is all too easy to mislabel these necessary redundancies as wasteful. A force capable of winning two wars simultaneously or nearly so, would also be capable of carrying out the myriad standard peacetime missions, which would reassure the world that America intends to continue playing a global role. The rationale of the two-war construct was laid out well in the Pentagon's 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review: As a global power with worldwide interests, it is imperative that the United States now and for the foreseeable future be able to deter and defeat large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames, preferably in concert with regional allies. Maintaining this core capability is central to credibly deterring opportunism—that is, to avoiding a situation in which an aggressor in one region might be tempted to take advantage when U.S. forces are heavily committed elsewhere—and to ensuring that the United States has sufficient military capabilities to deter or defeat aggression by an adversary that is larger, or under circumstances that are more difficult, than expected. This is particularly important in a highly dynamic and uncertain security environment. We can never know with certainty when or where the next major theater war will occur, who our next adversary will be, how an enemy will fight, who will join us in a coalition, or precisely what demands will be placed on

U.S. forces.... A force sized and equipped for deterring and defeating aggression in more than one theater ensures the United States will maintain the flexibility to cope with the unpredictable and unexpected. Such a capability is the sine qua non of a superpower and is essential to the credibility of our overall national security strategy. It also supports our continued engagement in shaping the international environment to reduce the chances that such threats will develop in the first place. If the United States were to forego [the two-war construct], our standing as a global power, as the security partner of choice ... would be called into question. Indeed, some allies would undoubtedly read a one-war capability as a signal that the United States, if heavily engaged elsewhere, would no longer be able to help defend their interests.... This fact is also unlikely to escape the attention of potential adversaries. A one-theater war capacity would risk undermining both deterrence and the credibility of U.S. security commitments in key regions of the world. This, in turn, could cause allies and friends to adopt more divergent defense policies and postures, thereby weakening the web of alliances and coalitions on which we rely to protect our interests abroad.²² Administrations over the past two decades have interpreted the two-war construct in different ways, and some have tried—because of budgetary pressure—to lessen the standard and thereby justify reductions in the force. But the logic underpinning the two-war construct is irrefutable, and in the end, every Administration has affirmed it. In 2012, the Obama Administration adopted strategic guidance to the following effect: As a nation with important interests in multiple regions, our forces must be capable of deterring and defeating aggression by an opportunistic adversary in one region even when our forces are committed to a large-scale operation elsewhere.... Even when U.S. forces are committed to a large-scale operation in one region, they will be capable of denying the objectives of—or imposing unacceptable costs on—an opportunistic aggressor in a second region.²³ When the two-war construct was developed in the 1990s, the Clinton Administration conducted a “Bottom-Up Review” (BUR) of the military to develop a force structure that would enable the armed forces to meet the two-war standard. This was a time of relative quiet around the world, when American planners did not foresee the near-term rise of Chinese power, the extent of Russia’s aggressive nationalist policies, or the uptick in global terrorism. The BUR force structure was criticized at the time for being too small and in particular for shrinking the size of the Army too much. Nevertheless, it was substantially larger than the end strength of the military today, and the force at that time was using equipment that was relatively newer and technologically more up-to-date than the current capital stock. Since that time, the military has been deployed at a much higher rate, and has operated with a substantially smaller force than was projected as necessary by the BUR. As a result, in 2010, the Perry-Hadley panel warned that the military was facing a “train wreck” unless all the services, and particularly the Navy, were recapitalized with modern equipment. The panel recommended substantial additional funding, along with thorough acquisition and compensation reform, to enable the armed forces to carry out the national military strategy. Immediately after the panel report, Secretary Gates submitted budgets that, while allowing for a modest increase in funding, were inadequate to carry out the panel’s recommendations. As discussed above, Congress and President Obama cut almost \$1 trillion from those budgets, with painfully little analysis of the impact on the military. If fully implemented, sequestration will cut another \$500 billion. Two conclusions are inescapable. First, the Perry-Hadley panel was correct in concluding that America needs a military that, taken as a whole, is at least as strong as the Bottom-Up Review force of the 1990s. That force may well have been inadequate at the time, and—given the danger of terrorism, the surge in Chinese strength, North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs, the increasingly aggressive stance of Russia, the instability caused by the Arab Spring, and the growing isolation of Israel—global risk is much higher today than it was in the 1990s. The shape of the force should be different than what was deemed appropriate 20 years ago, but its total strength should be at least as great. Second, America’s armed forces today, despite the quality of their personnel, are not capable of meeting the two-war standard at the heart of the national military strategy. In fact, given the high operational

tempo of the past 10 years, and the constant emphasis on “low-intensity” conflict operations of the kind undertaken in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is questionable whether the force could decisively win even one major regional conflict, other than a counter-insurrectionary operation, within an acceptable margin of risk. The “train wreck” of which the Perry-Hadley panel warned is happening, and sooner than the panel thought possible. America is on the cusp of a hollow national security posture.

Asia Pivot Advantage

Sequestration kills an effective pivot

Klingner, Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center. He served for two decades at the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency, **2015** [Bruce D., 2015 Index of U.S. Military Strength Assessing America’s Ability to Provide for the Common Defense, ed by Dakota Wood, http://ims-2015.s3.amazonaws.com/2015_Index_of_US_Military_Strength_FINAL.pdf]

The Asia Pivot policy is sound only if the requisite military forces are deployed in the Pacific—a number that must be commensurate with a stated increase in the region’s importance. Without such a deployment, the Pivot will fail to reassure allies or deter potential opponents. Claims that U.S. forces in the Pacific will be immune from duties elsewhere or from budget cuts that will affect the U.S. Joint Force over the next several years simply do not hold water. Though the U.S. Army and Marine Corps were increased by 100,000 troops to handle the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, U.S. soldiers and Marines were also removed from Asia to serve in those wars. Even well before sequestration-mandated budget cuts, it was obvious that the United States was underfunding defense requirements essential to maintaining security commitments in Asia. In February 2012, Panetta testified that the United States would rebalance its force posture to emphasize Asia, but he added that the defense budget maintained only the current bomber, aircraft carrier, and big-deck amphibious fleets and restored Army and Marine Corps force structure in the Pacific to pre-Iraq and pre-Afghanistan deployment levels.¹⁵ On the surface, the Obama Administration’s 2015 budget projections appear to maintain current levels of defense spending. As economist Robert Samuelson points out, defense spending in nominal dollars (unadjusted for inflation) remains static between 2013 and 2024: \$626 billion in 2013 and \$630 billion in 2024. However, a closer review of these numbers reveals that, once adjusted for inflation, U.S. defense spending drops by 25 percent.¹⁶ It is difficult to envision how the President’s Pivot can be executed successfully with such a decrease in defense spending, a point underscored by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, who has stated that, with sequestration budget cuts, the military is in danger of becoming “a hollow force, one that is not ready, one that is not capable of fulfilling assigned missions. In the longer term, after trimming the military enough to restore readiness and modernization, the resulting force would be too small—too small to fully execute the president’s defense strategy.”¹⁷

Increasing force numbers key to the pivot

Klingner, Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center. He served for two decades at the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency, **2015** [Bruce D., 2015 Index of U.S. Military Strength Assessing America’s Ability to Provide for the Common Defense, ed by Dakota Wood, http://ims-2015.s3.amazonaws.com/2015_Index_of_US_Military_Strength_FINAL.pdf]

Although there have been no force reductions in the Pacific as there have been in other commands, the cuts in the overall defense procurement and training budgets have already negatively affected U.S. forces in the Asia–Pacific region. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Katrina G. McFarland

admitted in March 2014 that as a result of defense budget cuts, “Right now, the [Asia] pivot is being looked at again, because candidly it can’t happen.”¹⁸ The ability of the U.S. to fulfill its security obligations rests on two factors: the actual number of military forces available and the quality of those forces. Having requisite forces in the long term requires sufficient ongoing funding for their procurement. The quality of those forces is determined in part by adequate training. Current U.S. defense budgets for military forces in the Pacific are insufficient to provide for numbers or quality, let alone both. Navy Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert has told Congress that in order to meet the global needs of combatant commanders, the Navy would need a 450-ship fleet. Currently, the Navy has 289 ships and hopes to achieve a 306-ship fleet by the end of the decade, but attaining 306 ships would require a shipbuilding budget of \$18 billion per year over the next 20-plus years. Since the current FY 2013–FY 2019 plan is for only \$13 billion per year, “the largest fleet of current ship designs that the Navy would be able to afford is 30% smaller than the goal—or about 220 ships.”¹⁹ Representative Randy Forbes (R–VA), Chairman of the Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, has expressed concern that “in 2007 we met 90-percent [sic] of the combatant commander’s requirements. This year we will only meet 43 percent.”²⁰ In addition, the current defense budget does not include funding to refuel and overhaul the USS George Washington, which could lead the Navy to have to decommission the aircraft carrier. Doing so would reduce the carrier fleet from 11 to 10, despite then-Secretary of Defense Panetta’s pledge that “the President of the United States and all of us have decided that it is important for us to maintain our carrier presence at full strength. And that means we’ll be keeping 11 carriers in our force.”²¹ Given that the Navy historically dedicates from one-third to one-quarter of its deployed fleet to operations in the Pacific, such a dramatic decrease in fleet size can only have a negative impact on the United States’ naval capabilities in the region. Marine Corps Naval and amphibious operations are the backbone of U.S. military deterrence and defense capabilities in the Pacific. Yet Admiral Samuel Locklear, III, PACOM commander, testified that due to a lack of large amphibious ships, landing craft, and other amphibious vehicles, the Navy and Marine Corps do not have enough assets to carry out contested amphibious operations in the Pacific if a crisis were to arise.²² Locklear added that there is a “continuing demand” for PACOM to provide other deployed and ready forces to the other regional combatant commanders, creating “periods in PACOM where we lack adequate intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities as well as key response forces, ultimately degrading our deterrence posture and our ability to respond.” The Marine Corps has stated that it would need 54 amphibious assault ships to fulfill the validated requirements of all the combatant commanders. That would be the number needed to deploy three Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs), since each MEB requires at least 17 ships for a force of 17,500 Marines and all their gear. But the Navy’s shipbuilding budget—a critical factor for U.S. forces in the Pacific—has not been sufficient to meet combatant commander requirements for years, so the Marine Corps and Navy have had to settle for the ability to transport and deploy less than two full MEBs—nearly half of required capabilities. The most recent Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) again validated the requirement for 38 amphibious warships to move two MEBs, but current fiscal pressures led to a decline from 33 to 28 warships, meaning that the Corps’ actual ability to conduct a large-scale amphibious operation will amount to a mere 1.5 MEBs, or roughly a half-dozen battalions of Marines with their supporting aviation—presuming that all amphibs from around the world were brought together for a single operation. The latest Navy plans do not envision a force of 33 amphibious warships until at least the mid-2020s, which would still meet only two-thirds of the total requirement.²³ Then-Marine Commandant General James Amos warned that defense cuts could “translate into increased loss of personnel and materiel, and ultimately [place] mission accomplishment at risk.”²⁴ Twenty retired Marine Corps generals wrote Congress in March 2014 to warn that the shortage of amphibious ships—and the reduced maintenance of the existing fleet—had “degraded our current national security capabilities and will have negative effects long into the 21st century.”²⁵ Beyond this, Marine Corps

fighter squadrons used to have 12–14 aircraft available. Now they usually have 12, but in 2015 that may decrease to eight deployable aircraft per squadron. U.S. Air Force. The U.S. Air Force has grounded 13 combat squadrons (250 planes), nearly one-third of its active-duty fighter and bomber squadrons. Air Force officials said they have implemented a “tiered readiness” approach for active-duty air combat units and warned that there may not be sufficient combat air power to respond immediately to contingencies. Moreover, for every month a squadron does not fly, it takes an equal number of months to retrain the pilots.²⁶ Recently, the Air Force had to cancel a two-week flying exercise in which units from the Asia–Pacific region and allied air forces would have trained together. The 374th Airlift Wing in Japan had to cut its flying program by 25 percent and cancel its participation in a combined drill in Thailand called Cope Tiger.²⁷ U.S. Army. The Army has had to cut training above squad and platoon levels, including all but one of the Combat Training Center rotations scheduled for brigades this fiscal year. Depot maintenance was also halted, and the Army cut flying hours from aviation training, creating a shortfall of pilots. General Raymond T. Odierno, the Army Chief of Staff, told Congress that “should a contingency arise, there may not be enough time to avoid sending forces into harm’s way unprepared.”²⁸ General Curtis M. Scaparrotti, commander of U.N. and U.S. forces in Korea, testified that he has doubts about America’s ability to counter a largescale North Korean attack effectively due to the low readiness of forces stationed outside of Korea. He warned that “[a]ny delay in the arrival or reduction in readiness of these forces would lengthen the time required to accomplish key missions in crisis or war, likely resulting in higher civilian and military casualties.”²⁹ In other words, cuts in the defense budget affect the ability of the U.S. military to prepare for and engage in operations in general, but especially the Pivot to Asia.

Sequestration freaks out allies

Klingner, Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center. He served for two decades at the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency, **2015** [Bruce D., 2015 Index of U.S. Military Strength Assessing America’s Ability to Provide for the Common Defense, ed by Dakota Wood, http://ims-2015.s3.amazonaws.com/2015_Index_of_US_Military_Strength_FINAL.pdf]

Asian allies, initially heartened by the renewed U.S. focus on the region, continue to express concern about China’s unrelenting assertiveness in pushing extralegal sovereignty claims on their territories. The weak U.S. response to Beijing’s bullying led the Philippines, one of just a handful of American treaty allies, effectively to cede its claims to the Scarborough Shoals. Consequently, an increasingly nervous Tokyo has called repeatedly for stronger U.S. support to deter similar Chinese intimidation against the Japanese-controlled Senkaku Islands. South Korea and Japan watched with growing dismay as Washington first cut \$480 billion from the long-term military budget only to warn then of the catastrophic consequences that sequestration would have for U.S. armed forces. Yet when the sequester hit, slicing an additional \$500 billion, Washington claimed that it could still fulfill American security commitments, though admittedly with “additional but acceptable risk.”⁴⁰

Confidence in US commitments shaky – proves now key and that overall budget numbers are insufficient to maintain confidence

Pennington, AP staffer, **3-25-14** [Matthew, US commanders say budget cuts could hurt response to security crisis in Asia, <http://www.greenfieldreporter.com/view/story/de78768ed0f64f4d9212a1cca4cc3711/US--United-States-Asia-Military>]

Top U.S. military officers in the Asia-Pacific said Tuesday that budget cuts could hurt the ability of American forces to respond to a security crisis, including on the Korean peninsula. Pacific commander Adm. Samuel Locklear said U.S. allies are carefully watching American defense spending, and are starting to question U.S. "staying power" as a guarantor of security. Locklear and Gen. Curtis Scaparrotti, who commands U.S. forces in South Korea, were testifying before the Senate Armed Forces Committee on the defense budget for 2015 that trims spending and aims for a smaller, more modern force rather than a larger one less prepared for combat. Some in Congress, however, see that as an approach that weakens U.S. capabilities in a period of growing uncertainty in Europe and Asia. Senators in particular voiced concern about the double-digit annual growth in China's defense spending and development of more and better warships and submarines, and the threat posed by a nuclear North Korea. In prepared testimony, Locklear said budget uncertainties "ultimately reduce our readiness, our ability to respond to crisis and contingency as well as degrade our ability to reliably interact with our allies and partners in the region." Scaparrotti said U.S. forces in Korea are "fully resourced" but he voiced concern about the readiness of "follow-on" forces that would be needed if a security crisis broke out on the divided peninsula. The U.S. retains 28,500 troops in South Korea, a legacy of the 1950-53 Korean War that ended in an armistice rather than a formal peace treaty. Scaparrotti said North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is less predictable than his predecessor and so poses a greater threat. He said a recent spate of tests of Scud missiles from a new, rapid-fire multiple rocket launcher were intended to demonstrate North Korea's capabilities to the U.S. and South Korea as they hold annual military exercises. Senators questioned Locklear about China's increasing military capabilities that the Pacific commander said would not challenge America's global military supremacy for decades but were giving the Asian power "the ability to influence the outcome of events around many of our partners and our allies." Although U.S. defense spending still far exceeds China's, U.S. forces are spread much further afield. Budget pressures have added to doubt about the Obama administration's ability to follow through on its rebalance of forces as it winds down military involvement in the Middle East, and the size of the U.S. Navy as it looks to deploy more ships to the Pacific.

Russia Advantage

Undoing cuts key to heg – solves Russia

Donnelly and Schmitt, co-direct the Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies at the American Enterprise Institute, **3-27-14** [Thomas and Gary, Reverse the Defense Cuts,

<http://www.nationalreview.com/article/374292/reverse-defense-cuts-thomas-donnelly-gary-schmitt>]

To put it plainly: Congress should immediately restore the defense-budget cuts imposed under the Budget Control Act — not just the sequestration provision but the reductions included in the “baseline” law — through an “emergency” supplemental appropriation that avoids the delays and deals that would accompany any attempt to “pay for” the changes with offsetting cuts elsewhere. The Republican party has a further obligation to offer a more complete alternative: If the GOP takes the Senate in the fall and keeps its House majority, it can reshape budget legislation that not only tries to restore fiscal responsibility but remembers the federal government’s responsibility to defend the nation and the nation’s global-security interests. And the next Republican presidential candidate must articulate the need for American power and a plan for comprehensive rearmament to preserve the increasingly fragile peace. That’s because while Putin’s aggression in Europe is the proximate motivation for slowing the pace of American disarmament, there are other motivations as well, in the Middle East and East Asia. And so, while targeted reinvestments keyed specifically to the Russian threat — in nuclear deterrence, missile defense, increasing U.S. forces in Europe, and building up the forces of front-line European states — are necessary, they are hardly sufficient. Republicans, in particular, should remember the wisdom of

the Reagan buildup, a whole that was bigger than the sum of its parts. Its ultimate strategic importance did not depend on any one element of military power but lay in the fact that it denied the Soviet Union any clear advantage: The naval contest was a lopsided one that forced the Russian fleet to stay in its home waters; investments in land forces and tactical aircraft redressed the conventional balance along the Central Front in Germany; the modernization and expansion of nuclear capabilities, notably intermediate-range forces in Europe, offset decades of Soviet effort; the Strategic Defense Initiative helped convince Moscow that there was little point in continuing the competition.¶ This is a moment filled with possibility, one in which America might awake from the befuddlement of the post–Cold War era and the hangover of Iraq. Alas, President Obama seems more likely to hit the snooze button and go back to sleep. It is up to the other branch of government and the opposition party to do what they can — start the process of rearmament — when the commander-in-chief will not.

NATO Advantage

Sequester is killing training with Europe

Wood is Senior Research Fellow for Defense Programs in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policy, of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at The Heritage Foundation. He served for two decades as an officer in the U.S. Marine Corps, including service as a strategic analyst for the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Secretary of Defense’s Director of Net Assessment, **2015** [Dakota L., 2015 Index of U.S. Military Strength Assessing America’s Ability to Provide for the Common Defense, ed by Dakota Wood, http://ims-2015.s3.amazonaws.com/2015_Index_of_US_Military_Strength_FINAL.pdf]

Yet, despite the importance of training with European partners, there is a concern that defense cuts are having a detrimental effect on such exercises. In early 2013, then-commander of European Command, Admiral James Stavridis, told Congress that he was cancelling about 140 security assistance programs with European allies due to sequestration.⁶ His successor, General Philip Breedlove, told The Army Times that the U.S. has canceled 45 percent of military-to-military training events with European partners.⁷ In fall 2013, NATO held its Steadfast Jazz 2013[¶] exercise. This was one of the largest NATO joint[¶] exercises since the end of the Cold War, and the largest[¶] live-fire exercise since 2006. It included over[¶] 6,000 personnel from NATO members and nonNATO[¶] partners. The U.S. only sent 200 soldiers.[¶] These cuts to training come at a very inopportune[¶] time. General Breedlove has described NATO[¶] forces as being “at a pinnacle of interoperability.” He[¶] further states that sustaining these levels of interoperability[¶] requires that NATO “continue to build the[¶] capabilities and capacities to be a credible and effective[¶] Alliance and we need to sustain our interoperability[¶] through rigorous and sustained training, education[¶] and exercises.”^{8¶} In June 2014, the U.S. announced a \$1 billion[¶] European Reassurance Initiative that is meant to[¶] bolster transatlantic security. A portion of the funding[¶] will “increase exercises, training, and rotational[¶] presence across Europe but especially on the territory[¶] of our newer allies.”^{9¶} While the additional funding[¶] is a step in the right direction, it is not a long-term[¶] solution; the need to sufficiently fund training programs[¶] remains unresolved. In fact, funding for this[¶] initiative was included in the Overseas Contingency[¶] Operation (OCO) budget—generally considered to be[¶] a budget for temporary, not permanent, priorities—a[¶] fact that did not escape the attention of NATO allies,[¶] with the Poles referring to it as “insufficient.”¹⁰

Economy Advantage

Increasing defense spending solves the economy – cuts are net worse

Talent, a former U.S. Senator from Missouri, is a Distinguished Fellow at The Heritage Foundation, **and Kyl**, a former U.S. Senator from Arizona, is a Visiting Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, **2013** [Jim and Jon, A Strong and Focused National Security Strategy, 10-31, https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/-strong-and-focused-national-security_165049289761.pdf]

We examine the need for stronger national defense in the context of the current debt crisis. Our argument is that the shrinking military budget is a symptom of the growing federal debt rather than a solution to it, that the readiness shortfalls caused by the recent cuts will cost far more to remedy than they have saved, and that, in the current global environment, American weakness is contributing to a rising tide of conflict that will undermine economic growth.

Special Operations Trade-off Advantage

Conventional weakness increases reliance on SOF – this undermines their ability to fulfill key missions

Bucci, PhD, is Director of the Allison Center. He served for three decades as a U.S. Army officer, including as Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, and as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, **2015** [Steven P., 2015 Index of U.S. Military Strength Assessing America's Ability to Provide for the Common Defense, ed by Dakota Wood, http://ims-2015.s3.amazonaws.com/2015_Index_of_US_Military_Strength_FINAL.pdf]

Given SOF's relatively solid posture and future, as well as their ability to execute subtle yet critical indirect activities, they may be the most advantageous force choice for the difficult period America is entering. Between the lack of appetite in both American government and the public for large-scale force deployments, as well as the fiscal difficulties facing the GPFs, SOF will likely be required to assume increasing amounts of responsibility. It is hoped that lawmakers will reverse the U.S. military's decline. Until that time, however, policymakers might be tempted to consider SOF as an alternative way to boost military capacity in the immediate future. The indirect activities performed by USSOCOM will likely be called upon increasingly to provide for the protection of American interests or at least to mitigate the threats to those interests. In that spirit, the following should be understood about Special Operations Forces: | There are different types of SOF that have different purposes, values, and skills. | The health and effectiveness of SOF are tightly linked to the professional health of the conventional forces: One cannot be substituted for the other. | The nature of SOF and the missions they perform enables the U.S. to engage with the world in ways and to an extent not possible with conventional forces alone. | Understanding how to use SOF properly preserves conventional force capabilities and capacities. SOF can prepare areas where the U.S. anticipates that military operations might be necessary, is already conducting operations, or is trying to avoid becoming more involved in a given conflict or operation. Properly used, SOF can preclude problems altogether, reduce the size of conflicts if greater force is deemed necessary, amplify the effectiveness of conventional forces, establish relationships with indigenous forces of both state and non-state actors, provide precise targeting, and give high-resolution awareness that maximizes the likelihood of operational success. They can do all of this with a small footprint and while avoiding unintended or undesired damage. SOF will be a key part of any bridge strategy as America manages a declining military structure in the midst of a growing threat environment. They can help to set the operating environment in the most advantageous manner possible. They are not, however, a replacement for conventional capabilities. Indeed, there are

numerous missions that SOF cannot perform: They cannot fight pitched battles with heavy forces; they cannot execute naval power projection; they cannot deploy strategic nuclear weapons. Furthermore, without an adequate recruitment base, SOF are hard to sustain, and without adequate conventional support, it becomes more difficult either to deploy SOF or to provide them with adequate support. When used correctly, however, SOF are extraordinarily valuable, even irreplaceable, in advancing U.S. security interests. Such proficiency does come with a cost, as SOF are an expensive asset when compared “man to man” with conventional forces—and wasteful to taxpayers if they are misused. Policymakers must therefore strike an important balance: correctly deciding where, when, and for what purpose SOF should be deployed. There is simply no substitute for a strong and capable conventional ground force, but the same is true for SOF. Yet these units are not interchangeable, and it is unwise to place additional stress on SOF by expecting them to take on tasks for which they are not intended.

Austerity increases SOF reliance

Bucci, PhD, is Director of the Allison Center. He served for three decades as a U.S. Army officer, including as Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, and as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, **2015** [Steven P., 2015 Index of U.S. Military Strength Assessing America’s Ability to Provide for the Common Defense, ed by Dakota Wood, http://ims-2015.s3.amazonaws.com/2015_Index_of_US_Military_Strength_FINAL.pdf]

In the post-9/11 period of war and subsequent military drawdown, Special Operations Forces (SOF) appear likely to grow in numbers, funding, and importance—but not necessarily in general understanding. One of the most flexible and useful instruments in America’s national security toolbox, SOF are regularly referred to incorrectly, incompletely, and with little depth of knowledge by policymakers. SOF are neither a panacea nor an insignificant oddity. If utilized correctly, they bring great benefit to the nation; used poorly, their capabilities and sometimes their lives are wasted. How, then, should this nation think about these compelling and often mythologized warriors and their role in supporting America’s vital national interests? During times of austerity, the government often looks for ways to get “more bang for the buck.”¹ When this budgetary philosophy is applied to the military, SOF, with their reputation for doing great things with fewer troops and resources than large conventional forces, seem like a bargain. This vision of a “surgical” capability that is made up of mature, “hard” professionals who make the right choices at the right time and that avoids the need to deploy larger formations of citizen soldiers at great expense can be very compelling.

NEG Ground

To a certain extent a good bit of the negative ground provided by this topic has already been covered and as a result there is less evidence provided in this section of the paper. What follows is an overview of the negative arguments that exist at the core of the topic area followed by a brief amount of evidence that supplements evidence provided above that has negative functionality.

Case Debate

The ability for to have high-quality debate on the case should be obvious. There is debate to be had about whether or not sequestration actually will have the impact described by many of the affirmative authors. Furthermore there is quality debate to be had about the importance of particular components of the military and the reality of the harms posed by the affirmative. Given that a large number of the members of this community have seen surface level debates over whether or not the “army is key to hegemony,” the importance of “air power to dampen conflict,” and so forth (as well as debates over the need for a military presence in “Area X”) these cards have been omitted from this document. That said it should be noted that this is not meant to indicate that these debates will be redundant with debates that have already occurred. As the evidence provided above proves there is a real question as to whether or not the military actually operates at the levels assumed in much of this previously used evidence and that is why this topic creates unique educational opportunity on these fronts. Finally, the negative should be able to use infrastructure limitations (such as the acquisition reform argument) to make basic solvency objections in addition to arguments that increasing spending doesn’t produce the desired results.

Sequestration threat not real

Jeremy **Herb**, 4-13-2015, "The sequestration monster myth," POLITICO, <http://www.politico.com/story/2015/04/sequestration-ash-carter-congress-defense-pentagon-116899.html>

Defense Secretary Ash Carter warns that sequestration will make the nation “less secure.” Sen. John McCain says it will set the military “on a far more dangerous course.” And Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Martin Dempsey says it will prompt “a dramatic change in how we protect our nation.” There’s just one problem: The sequestration monster lurking around the corner isn’t really coming. Yes, the Pentagon is at risk of seeing its fiscal 2016 budget reduced by tens of billions of dollars as a result of the spending limits under the 2011 Budget Control Act. But the prospect of sequestration — across-the-board cuts reaching almost every nook and cranny of the Pentagon — is nearly as remote as the possibility of the Loch Ness monster showing up on the Senate floor. Sequestration has become shorthand for the budget cap that would limit Pentagon spending to \$499 billion next year if Congress does not change the law. While it sounds like a small rhetorical shift, some budget analysts say the use of the “S-word” is intentional — so the potential cuts sound worse than they really are. “What has happened over the three-year period is sequester has become a boogeyman,” said Gordon Adams, a former budget official in the Clinton administration who’s now a professor at American

University. “The bottom line here is it’s scary; sequester is scary. ... So, if you use the sequester word, you’ve got a boogeyman you can scare everyone with.”

Todd Harrison, a defense budget analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, blames the Pentagon for muddying the waters by constantly warning of sequestration’s devastation.

“I’m just exhausted by the misuse of the term sequester, and I point the finger firmly at DOD,” Harrison said. “They made a deliberate decision to start calling it sequester-level instead of BCA budget level, because sequester sounds worse.”

Cuts exaggerated

Kramer 3-4-2014 [Mattea, "Sequestration’s Impact on Military Spending, 2013 – 2014," National Priorities Project, <https://www.nationalpriorities.org/analysis/2014/sequestration-impact-on-military-spending-2013-2014/>]

Defense Sequester, 2013¶ Sequestration began on March 1, 2013. While the Budget Control Act originally slated a \$54.6 billion cut to defense accounts, that number was reduced by the American Taxpayer Relief Act (ATRA), also known as the fiscal cliff deal. The ATRA and other adjustments to the defense sequester reduced cuts down to \$37.2 billion for fiscal 2013.¶ In addition, the Pentagon was granted flexibility to apply part of these cuts to funds from previous budgets that had not yet been spent; these funds are known officially as “prior year unobligated balances.”¶ Accounting for these adjustments to the defense sequester, the cuts ultimately amounted to a 5.7 percent reduction to projected pre-sequester spending in fiscal 2013, as the following table summarizes.¶ Adjustments to Defense Sequestration in FY2013 Source¶ Sequestration according to Budget Control Act \$54.6 billion Government Printing Office¶ Reduction in cuts through American Taxpayer Relief Act and other adjustments \$17.4 billion Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments¶ Cuts applied to "prior year unobligated balances" \$6 billion Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments¶ Actual cut to FY2013 budget \$31.2 billion ¶ Actual cut as percent of pre-sequester Budget Control Act defense cap 5.7% ¶ Defense Sequester, 2014¶ In fiscal 2014, the Budget Control Act once again mandated a \$54.6 billion sequester cut to defense accounts. However, in December 2013, the Bipartisan Budget Act reduced the cuts by more than \$20 billion, down to \$34 billion.¶ Sequestration applies only to the Pentagon’s “base” budget – that is, its regular operational budget, excluding war funding. War funding is known officially as “Overseas Contingency Operations” (OCO). According to analysis by Todd Harrison of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, the Pentagon included an estimated \$20 billion in non-war funding to the OCO budget when it prepared its 2014 budget proposal, thereby mitigating the effects of sequestration.¶ Furthermore, when congressional appropriators wrote 2014 war funding into law they added an additional \$10.8 billion of non-war funding – widely referred to as a slush fund – to the budget, as Winslow Wheeler of the Project on Government Oversight has shown.¶ In total, these reductions and adjustments reduced the 2014 defense sequester down to 0.6 percent of projected pre-sequester spending, as the following tables summarizes.¶ Adjustments to Defense Sequestration in FY2014 Source¶ Sequestration according to Budget Control Act \$54.6 billion Governing Printing Office¶ Reduction in cuts through Bipartisan Budget Act \$20.382 House Budget Committee¶ Non-war funding in 2014 war budget proposal, estimate \$20 billion Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments¶ Additional funds added by appropriators \$10.8 billion Project on Government Oversight¶ Actual cut to FY2014 budget \$3.4 billion ¶ Actual cut as percent of pre-sequester Budget Control Act defense cap 0.62% ¶ Looking Ahead to the Defense Sequester in 2015¶ News reports continue to emphasize the devastating effects of sequestration on national security, but the numbers show otherwise. Defense accounts absorbed a modest 5.6 percent cut in 2013 and, through the use of its war budget as a loophole, almost entirely avoided cuts in 2014. At the same time, sequestration has reduced funding for domestic programs – from Head Start to cancer research – that did not have the flexibility to avoid cuts the way the Pentagon has. Yet military spending could much more easily absorb reductions; in the

decade following Sept. 11, 2001, U.S. military spending grew by 35 percent, while domestic discretionary programs grew by 12 percent.¶ The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 has already reduced the level of cuts slated for 2015, and with this week's release of President Obama's 2015 budget proposal, there is reason to believe the Pentagon will continue to avoid the lion's share of sequestration in the future. The president has asked for an additional \$26 billion in 2015 for military spending as part of his budget request, relative to previously projected spending levels. He's also asking for an additional \$115 billion in military spending for fiscal years 2016 through 2019. Finally, the Pentagon is likely to continue to use the war budget as a loophole to supplement its regular funding. In fact, recent news reports indicate that the Pentagon will continue to ask for a "war" budget even after troops have left Afghanistan.

Prereq to spending increases is acquisition reform

Talent, a former U.S. Senator from Missouri, is a Distinguished Fellow at The Heritage Foundation, **and Kyl**, a former U.S. Senator from Arizona, is a Visiting Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, **2013** [Jim and Jon, A Strong and Focused National Security Strategy, 10-31, https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/-strong-and-focused-national-security_165049289761.pdf]

The Pentagon's acquisition system must be fixed. Every one of the armed services has experienced huge cost overruns in crucial programming in recent years. When the Air Force first envisaged the F-22, it projected a fleet of 750. This requirement was pared down by 1991, when the service signed a contract with Lockheed Martin for 648 F-22s at a unit cost of about \$134 million per fighter.²⁴ The Congressional Research Service estimates that the F-22 ended up costing \$185 million per plane, and as a result the program was terminated with only 187 acquired.²⁵ The Army estimated that the Future Combat Systems (FCS) program would cost \$4 billion a year for three brigade sets of FCS equipment per year.²⁶ The price grew to \$117 billion for 15 brigade sets plus \$18 billion for the FCS spin-off program before the program was ended without any platforms having been produced.²⁷ The Navy thought its DDG-1000 Destroyers could be acquired at a price of roughly \$1 billion per ship, and planned to buy 32.²⁸ The program actually cost \$4.3 billion per vessel and was terminated after only three ships were commissioned.²⁹ As discussed above, the Pentagon's acquisition system is not the sole reason for these and other procurement disasters. Inadequate and inconsistent funding and the decline of the defense industrial base are also to blame. But any reasonable plan for rebuilding the military must include comprehensively recapitalizing the inventories of all three services. Congress cannot be expected to provide the necessary funding without confidence that the procurement of new platforms will occur on schedule and at a reasonable price.¶ The Pentagon has been in a constant state of acquisition reform for 20 years, but most of the changes came in the form of additional regulations and personnel that compounded the problem.¶ Three relatively simple steps will fix the system.¶ First, a clear chain of command and accountability must exist for each program. Currently, there are dozens of officials and entities that control program development and acquisition; each has input but none has clear responsibility. The Perry–Hadley panel identified this diffusion of authority and accountability as the chief problem with Pentagon acquisition:¶ The Panel believes that the fundamental reason for the continued underperformance in acquisition activities is fragmentation of authority and accountability for performance, or lack of clarity regarding such authority and accountability. Fragmented authority and accountability exists at all levels of the process, including identifying needs, defining alternative solutions to meeting the need, choosing and resourcing the solution, and delivering the defined capability with discipline on the agreed schedule and within the agreed cost. In the current system, the complex set of processes and authorities so diffuses the accountability for defining executable programs intended to provide the needed increment of capability that neither objective is achievable—

either rapid response to the demands of today's wars or meeting tomorrow's challenges.³⁰ Fixing the system will require establishing a tight chain of command over programming. The key officials in the chain should be the three service secretaries, each working closely with the chief of staff of their service. Those officials have the authority under the law to control acquisition in their respective services; that authority should be respected, and they should be responsible for all aspects of design, contracting, and production. They must be experienced and strong executives who can resist the demands from their services for changes in requirements or contracting that delay or increase the cost of programs. The service chiefs should report to the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L) and then to the Secretary or the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Those nine officials—the three service secretaries; the three service chiefs of staff; and the Under Secretary for AT&L, the Secretary of Defense, and the Deputy Secretary—should constitute the chain of command for acquisition. The President and Congress should support their authority and hold them accountable for results. Second, those in the chain of command should plan for new platforms that they reasonably believe can be delivered within five to seven years. That will discipline the process to minimize changes in requirements, reduce delays, and control costs. The primary need now is for new equipment with reasonable capability in the field as soon as possible. Technology older than seven years is likely to be obsolete upon delivery anyway. The platforms should be engineered so that they can be gradually upgraded with new technologies and capabilities. This kind of "spiral development," where the initial model of a platform is designed and built quickly and then upgraded after deployment over time, was common and successful during the defense buildup of the 1980s. The F-16 fighter aircraft was designed in the mid-1970s; the first F-16 was deployed in 1980. The aircraft has been continually upgraded and is expected to be operationally relevant through 2025. Over 4,000 F-16s have been procured. In contrast, the design and building of America's most modern fighter aircraft—the F-22—took from 1991 to 2005, and its technology was obsolescent from the time it was deployed. The cost of the program soared so high that production was cancelled; there will be no upgraded versions of the F-22, and all the initial research and development investment will result in fewer than 200 airplanes.³¹ Third, competition should be encouraged at both the design and production phases. Once a program is designed, production of key elements should be dual-sourced to ensure that no single contractor can hold the government hostage to delays and cost increases. Initially, it will be difficult to increase competition because the defense industrial base has declined, but once the government has a plan for recapitalization across the services, and it is clear that Congress intends to stick to funding targets for new programs, capital should flow into the defense sectors and the number of competitors will increase.

Disadvantages

First, there are a number disadvantage areas and impact turn possibilities on this topic. The most basic of all negative strategies would be the "hegemony bad" debate given the link evidence provided above for an affirmative advantage. Additionally, there are a number of hegemony-related disadvantages that would emerge as the plan would impact a slew of global relationships. Second, the budget disadvantages are numerous. As the definitional cards provided at the top of this paper show, it is inevitable that that the affirmative is constrained by the fiscal world that it occurs in. The affirmative

generally has two options contingent on resolution wording: (a) increase defense spending and force a corresponding offset or (b) solve the offset problem by breaking the caps altogether. If the affirmative links to an offset then there are possibilities for both military and non-military trade-off disadvantages depending on the way the resolution is structured. If the affirmative chooses to break the caps then there is the fiscal discipline disadvantage argument contained in the Moore evidence. Third, there are a bunch of ways to advance the politics disadvantage. Republican “hawks” would support most plans. Tea Partiers opposed to deficit spending would be opposed to the plan. Democrats are generally thought to be opposed to the plan. The impending election would impact the political calculations behind support and opposition. Fourth, there would be a number of internal strategy and trade-off arguments that could be supplemented by counterplans. For instance, while there is the possibility of a Special Forces advantage because force expansion in other areas of the military, there is the equal ability for the negative to use these arguments to structure a Special Forces disadvantage that argues the SOF have strategic and tactical superiority to alternative forms of military engagement.

Additional evidence for disadvantages:

Plan unpopular – bipartisan support for cuts

Talent, a former U.S. Senator from Missouri, is a Distinguished Fellow at The Heritage Foundation, **and Kyl**, a former U.S. Senator from Arizona, is a Visiting Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, **2013** [Jim and Jon, A Strong and Focused National Security Strategy, 10-31, https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/-strong-and-focused-national-security_165049289761.pdf]

But the failure to avoid sequestration, that is, the failure to prioritize national security and deal with debt reduction, tax revenues, health care entitlements and plain partisan politics, suggests an underlying and perhaps more serious problem. “Peace through strength,” the cardinal and bipartisan principle of American politics since World War II has all but collapsed. So has the “Reaganite” corollary, which had remained the nucleus of the larger consensus coalition. For generations, leaders of both parties agreed: American strength was a good thing, and the first purpose of the federal government. If there is any bipartisan agreement now, it is that defense spending can and should be reduced. At the same time, the leaders of both parties continue to embrace the idea of American “leadership.” But since the end of the Cold War, no President has successfully and durably defined the purposes of American power, or articulated a consistent and coherent military strategy. Confusion is the result, measured both by public opinion and Pentagon planning. There is no agreement either on America’s security interests, or how the military should defend them. If a democracy does not understand clearly

what it is trying to achieve in its foreign relations, it will not be able to sustain the military capabilities that are necessary to achieve it. To be sure, there are special interests that support particular parts of the defense budget, like individual procurement programs, health research, and benefits for retirees. But there is no strong political constituency for the “top line” of the defense budget (the total amount spent on the military every year), and, as the sequestration experience demonstrates, even considerable opposition to it in both parties. Republicans want to shrink the government as a whole, and Democrats begrudge dollars that are taken away from social spending. Both parties have elements that are suspicious of America’s global role, and both parties are weary of protracted conflicts like those in Iraq and Afghanistan.

___ Plan reignites a major debate within the GOP – Tea Party opposes removing the DoD from cuts and opposes interventionist policy

Lobe, Washington Bureau Chief of the international news agency Inter Press Service, '13 [Jim, Ten Years After Iraq War, Neo-Cons Struggle to Hold Republicans, 3-20, <http://www.lobelog.com/ten-years-after-iraq-war-neo-cons-struggle-to-hold-republicans/>]

Ten years after reaching the height of their influence with the invasion of Iraq, the neo-conservatives and other right-wing hawks are fighting hard to retain their control of the Republican Party. That fight was on vivid display last week at the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) here where, as the New York Times observed in a front-page article, the party appeared increasingly split between the aggressively interventionist wing that led the march to war a decade ago and a libertarian-realist coalition that is highly sceptical of, if not strongly opposed to, any more military adventures abroad. The libertarian component, which appears ascendant at the moment, is identified most closely with the so-called Tea Party, particularly Kentucky Sen. Rand Paul, whose extraordinary 13-hour “filibuster” against the hypothetical use of drone strikes against U.S. citizens on U.S. territory on the Senate floor last week made him an overnight rock star on the left as well as the right. McCain dismissed Paul and his admirers as “wacko birds on the right and left that get the media megaphone” and charged that Republican senators who joined Paul – among them, the Senate Republican Leader, Mitch McConnell – during his oratorical marathon should “know better”. But, beyond drones, the party is deeply divided between deficit hawks, including many in the Tea Party who do not believe the Pentagon should be exempt from budget cuts and are leery of new overseas commitments, and defence hawks, led by McCain and Graham. The split between the party’s two wings, which have clashed several times during Barack Obama’s presidency over issues such as Washington’s intervention in Libya and how much, if any, support to provide rebels in Syria, appears certain to grow wider, if for no other reason than deficit-cutting will remain the Republicans’ main obsession for the foreseeable future. For now, it appears that the deficit hawks have the upper hand, at least judging from the reactions so far to the Mar. 1 triggering of the much-dreaded “sequester” which, if not redressed, would require the Pentagon to reduce its planned 10-year budget by an additional 500 billion dollars beyond the nearly 500 billion dollars that Congress and Obama had already agreed to cut in late 2011. “Indefensible,” wrote neo-conservative chieftain Bill Kristol in his Weekly Standard about Republican complacency in the face of such prospective cuts in the military budget. “(T)he Republican party has, at first reluctantly, then enthusiastically, joined the president on the road to irresponsibility,” he despaired. The great fear of the neo-conservatives is that, given the country’s war weariness and the party’s focus on the deficit, Republicans may be returning to “isolationism” – a reference to the party’s resistance to U.S. intervention in Europe in World War II until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in Dec 1941. Just as Adolf Hitler’s subsequent declaration of war silenced the isolationists, the rise of the Soviet Union after the war – and its depiction as a global threat – ensured that the party remained committed to a hawkish

foreign policy over the next 45 years.¶ The end of the Cold War, however, created a new opening for those in the party – particularly budget-conscious, limited-government conservatives – who saw a big national security establishment with major overseas commitments as a threat to both individual liberties and the country’s fiscal health.¶ Thus, many Republican lawmakers went along with significant cuts in the defence budget that began during the George H.W. Bush administration. The party also split over a number of military actions in the 1990s, including Bush’s “humanitarian” intervention in Somalia, and Bill Clinton’s campaigns in Bosnia and later Kosovo.¶ Republican lawmakers also strongly opposed Clinton’s dispatch of troops to Haiti to restore ousted President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1994.¶ Indeed, it was during this period that the neo-conservatives allied themselves with liberal interventionists in the Democratic Party to help prod an initially reluctant Clinton to intervene in the Balkans.¶ And in 1996, Kristol and Robert Kagan co-authored an article in *Foreign Affairs* entitled “Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy,” that was directed precisely against what they described as a drift toward “neoisolationism” among Republicans.¶ The following year, they co-founded the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), whose charter was signed by, among others, eight top officials of the future George W. Bush administration, including Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz.¶ The new group was not only to serve as an anchor for Republicans who supported its founders’ vision of a “benevolent (U.S.) hegemony” in world affairs based on overwhelming military power, but also as a lobby for ever higher defence budgets and “regime change” in Iraq, as well as a more confrontational relationship with China which it saw as the most likely next challenger to a U.S.-dominated global order.¶ Occupying key positions in the new Bush administration, these hawks took full advantage of 9/11 and reached their greatest influence when, exactly 10 years ago this week, the U.S. launched its invasion of Iraq to “shock and awe” the rest of the world into compliance with the new order.¶ And while a tiny minority of Republicans, including notably, Paul’s father, Rep. Ron Paul, and Sen. Chuck Hagel – who was just confirmed as Obama’s defence secretary despite an all-out neo-conservative campaign to defeat him – voiced strong reservations about the war at the time, the overwhelming majority of the party enthusiastically embraced it, sealing the hawks’ own domination of the party.¶ Ten years later, however, that domination is increasingly under siege, not only because of the growing national consensus that the Iraq invasion was a major strategic debacle, but also because of the increasing popular concern – noted in a number of major polls over the past six months – that Washington simply can no longer afford the kind of imperial vision the hawks have promoted.¶ And the fact that younger voters – so-called millennials, aged 18-29 – are, according to the same polls, especially repelled by that vision can only strengthen those in the party calling for a more restrained foreign policy.¶ Still, true to their nature, the hawks will not give up without a fight, and their hold on the party remains strong, as demonstrated most recently by the fact that only four Republican senators, including Paul, voted to confirm Hagel, a Republican realist, in his new post.¶ “It is way too early for budget hawks to declare victory,” noted Chris Preble of the libertarian Cato Institute on foreignpolicy.com last week. “The neocons won’t go down without a fight, and they will have other chances in the months ahead to ratchet the Pentagon budget back up to unnecessary levels.”

Counterplans

Again a good of the evidence demonstrating the counterplan potential on this topic has already been introduced. The first area of counterplan potential lies in the offset question posed by the resolution and this has been discussed in the definitional section of the paper as well as in the above disadvantage section. The second major area of counterplans are strategic counterplans that advocate

increasing support for a different component of the military or advocate limiting the affirmative plan to a specific use or area of the world. A third counterplan area would have the United States ask other nations to increase their defense burdens or would seek non-military solutions to the problems identified in the first affirmative constructive.

Additional evidence for counterplans:

Rely on allies or focus on parts of the world

Lynn E. Davis, senior political scientist, is director of RAND's Washington office, 2012/2013, "U.S. Forces Face Strategic Trade-Offs," RAND Review, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/periodicals/rand-review/issues/2012/winter/us-forces-face-trade-offs.html>

The first strategic choice for the United States is to decide whether its overseas military presence can be reduced and diversified because its allies in Europe and Northeast Asia have the ability, economically and militarily, to assume primary responsibility for their own security. Such a choice could involve the United States reducing bases and combat forces in Britain, Germany, Japan, and South Korea. The remaining permanent U.S. overseas presence would provide the bases and forces for immediate responses to future threats and to reassure U.S. allies and partners. The United States would then have the flexibility to expand its presence across Southeast and Southwest Asia if threats in those areas were to increase or if partners were to request assistance.

If relying more on U.S. allies seems risky, given their reliance on nonmilitary responses to potential military threats and their political and economic constraints, the United States would face other strategic choices. One is whether it is time for the United States to rely primarily on U.S.-based forces to respond to global crises and conflicts, keeping only a small global forward presence to reassure allies and partners. Such a choice would be based on the perspective that deterring and responding to China, North Korea, and Iran will depend not on a permanent U.S. overseas presence but rather on the ability of U.S. military forces at home to surge into those regions in the event of crises or conflicts. Relocating U.S. military forces to the United States would have the advantage of reducing their vulnerability to expanding missile threats.

Choosing to reduce the U.S. overseas military presence would not make sense, however, if leaders decide that such a presence plays an important role in deterring and responding to one or more of the threats from China, North Korea, or Iran and in reassuring U.S. allies and partners. The strategic choice that then arises is whether the United States should maintain its global posture essentially as today and prepare to increase its overseas presence in Southeast and Southwest Asia if threats expand there. Retaining existing bases would have the advantage of reducing the risks associated with not being able to return to those bases after giving them up.

Such a robust global posture, though, could become too expensive or politically problematic. Therefore, the final strategic choice would be whether the United States should focus its overseas presence more on Asia (because of China's expanding military activities) or more on the Middle East (because of threats to stability and the flow of oil from a potentially nuclear-armed Iran).

Focusing on Asia would mean keeping U.S. bases and military forces in Japan and South Korea, then expanding deployments and exercises to the extent that they become politically feasible with countries in Southeast Asia. Focusing on the Middle East would mean keeping U.S. bases in the Gulf Cooperation Council states and in Africa to quickly blunt any attacks on U.S. partners in the region while relying on surging military forces from the United States for contingencies in Asia. In either case, the choice would

require the reorientation of U.S. military forces in Europe to assist any surge of forces from the United States in response to crises and conflicts in whichever region (the Middle East or Asia) where the U.S. presence would be reduced.

Those debating the future U.S. global posture need to make explicit their perspectives on what role U.S. military forces should play overseas and then decide from the menu of strategic choices outlined above. While there are no right or wrong choices, focusing first on U.S. global security interests makes it more likely that the selected overseas presence will best serve the highest interests and not be based on unrelated considerations, such as the political pressures of allies and congressional leaders.

Detailed assessment of the strength and weakness of the allies/areas CP is available here:

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2012/RAND_OP379.pdf

Kritiks

This document is devoting a minimal amount of space to critiques. This is not because critiques are not relevant nor valuable on this topic but because it is probably obvious to many just what all kritiks are possible here. Security arguments, threat construction arguments, American exceptionalism arguments, capitalism arguments, risk arguments and so forth are all examples of fertile critical ground for the negative to explore on this topic.

Additional kritik evidence:

The affirmative is part of a traditional deployment of risk assessment that is doomed to fail

Mazaar, Associate Director, Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program, RAND Arroyo Center; Senior Political Scientist, **4-13-15** [Michael, RETHINKING RISK IN DEFENSE, <http://warontherocks.com/2015/04/rethinking-risk-in-defense/?singlepage=1>]

Admiral William Gortney, commander of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and Northern Command, was recently discussing the threat posed by advanced Russian long-range conventional cruise missiles. These weapons, Gortney testified, provided Russia with deterrent options “short of the nuclear threshold.” As a result, “NORAD will face increased risk in our ability to defend North America against Russian air, maritime and cruise missile threats.”¶ That term—“risk”—is cropping up more and more frequently in national security assessments. Senior military and civilian leaders constantly refer to the importance of dealing with risk. Just about every piece of testimony now employs the term. Dozens of risk management frameworks crowd the national security enterprise. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) introduced a framework for assessing risk in the national security enterprise that has since become a standard approach throughout various parts of Department of Defense.¶ All of this is based on the idea that institutional or procedural risk management can be a powerful tool. So it can, and many sophisticated risk frameworks are making useful contributions to defense planning, for example within specific services. But the irony is that elements of the U.S. national

security community are relying more and more heavily on an instrument that has been called into question in the field where it was most advanced—financial services. The financial industry had developed arguably the most elaborate procedures and models for measuring and mitigating risk, but those techniques didn't prevent leading financial firms from often unknowingly swallowing massive amounts of risk that led to their destruction.¶¶ Over the last year I've conducted a study to consider the lessons of this experience. I have come to believe that, notwithstanding a number of well-designed risk frameworks being employed for very specific purposes, the way we use risk in national security has too often been ill-defined and misleading. We need a more focused and precise understanding of risk at the highest levels. In the process of developing one, we should judge risk processes by one fundamental criterion—the degree to which they contribute to the making of effective strategy.¶ Defining Risk¶ It's commonly suggested that there are four basic elements of strategic logic: ends, ways, means, and risk. Most defense policy experts will have a pretty quick—and mostly shared—idea of what we mean by ends and means. "Ways" are a little more abstract, but there is a clear and well-established definition: the manner in which the means are employed to achieve the end.¶ Now ask yourself: What do we mean, in strategy, by "risk"? Chances are, some will say "gaps between ends and means." Others will say "threats." Still others will say, "Dangers created by my proposed strategy." Some might answer the question by listing various categories of risk, such as operational, strategic and institutional. This is the essence of the problem at the moment: there are a half-dozen ways of thinking about risk in national security—which means, at the highest level of national policy, that there is none at all.¶ In its simplest sense, the concept of risk refers to things that can go wrong in relation to something we value. A fairly standard definition conceives of risk as the probability times the consequence of such malign developments, but not all approaches use probability or consequences in quite that way. Broadly speaking, risk is the potential for something bad to happen, and risk management is the effort to assess and mitigate those things.¶ Two challenges make any discussion of risk and risk management very tricky. One is that there are so many forms of and approaches to risk management that any general discussion could misinform. Any evaluation of a specific risk process needs to take into account its particular design, the problems it's trying to address, and its methodologies.¶ A second challenge, closely related to the first, is that different types of national security issues demand very different risk approaches. National security issues fall across a wide spectrum, from very deterministic and predictable to totally uncertain—from the actuarial assessment of personnel costs to the choice of how big to make the Joint Force. Criticism of the way risk is used at one end of the spectrum might not apply to the other. Classic, data-driven risk analysis is entirely appropriate for some issues, and a number of services are using it in creative ways to assess key institutional choices. But a big lesson of the financial crisis is that large-scale strategic decisions under uncertainty are a very particular sort of problem: Value-laden choices full of unpredictable variables, nonlinear dynamics, and human factors on which no optimal answer will be available, such as what balance to strike among various domains of military capability, or whether to invade Syria. Risk is commonly used to assess these choices, too, but the limits of what risk assessments can do under uncertainty calls for extreme caution.¶ Challenges to the Effective Assessment of Risk¶ There are a number of obvious challenges to any effort to enhance our approach to risk. One is that, as noted above, the concept remains ill-defined. "Risk" is sometimes presented as the gap between requirements and capabilities, or as threats in the strategic environment, or as a synonym for chance, or the reservoir of possible negative consequences of actions. Both finance and national security have developed dozens of sometimes excruciatingly specific categories or types of risk: credit, reputation, regulatory, operational, strategic, institutional, and on and on.¶ If we want to use the term "risk" as merely a noun with a whole range of possible definitions, none of this poses a problem. But if we want a planning tool that offers meaningful analytical value to the making of strategy, we will need something more precise.¶ A second challenge stems from risk management's origins as a probabilistic—that is to say, quantified—discipline. Formalized risk management has often been grounded in elaborate models

and algorithms designed to promise reliable forecasts. From the infamous bond market models of Long-Term Capital Management in the 1990s to complex Value at Risk (VaR) approaches in pre-crisis investment banking, financial wizards convinced themselves that they had cracked the code of markets. Risk officers would report highly specific risk estimates to boards and CEOs (“there is a 5% chance of losing more than 25% of invested capital over the next year”). And the whole edifice was built—partly—on sand, promising a degree of mathematical reliability it could never deliver.¶ This was because financial markets—like the national security context—are highly non-deterministic environments, characterized by complexity and uncertainty. Mistaking nonlinear environments for deterministic ones is a guaranteed path to ruin, a point that folks like Nicholas Nassim Taleb, Benoit Mandelbrot and Paul Davidson have been making for years. The lesson for the emerging architecture of risk assessments in national security is clear enough—to be careful about using data-driven judgments to assess uncertain contexts.¶ Third, unless they are very carefully designed and executed, highly complex and seemingly deterministic risk presentations can camouflage more than they reveal. Critical and ultimately calamitous assumptions were baked in to finance industry risk estimates for subprime-based derivatives, but these assumptions were seldom conveyed to senior decision makers. The same is often true in defense today: What judgments, assumptions and outright guesses had to be made in order to produce a given level of risk? How many were close-run findings that could easily have gone the other way? Too often risk assessments have involved subjective judgments used to generate color-coded assessments without sufficient detail on their assumptions. Such singular verdicts (“moderate risk”) can offer leaders the opportunity to close their minds when any good risk process ought to be doing just the opposite—be very clear about the assumptions and nuances behind the results to force senior leaders to discuss and debate key issues.¶ Fourth and finally, the two most common uses of the term—gaps between ends and means, and threats—can perhaps be better served by other functions in the strategy process. Means-ends relationships are critical, but can be captured in straightforward sufficiency analyses. Threats ought to be covered in any good environmental scan. Each of these two tasks is arguably better accomplished, and contributes more effectively to strategy, if the term risk is left out of these two dialogues altogether: “sufficiency” and “threat” are more exact and properly suggestive indications of what the strategist is trying to determine in these areas.¶ Toward a More Precise Concept¶ At the broadest levels of defense and national security planning, then, our use of risk could well fall short of expectations for its contribution to strategy. The obvious next question is what can be done about it—the principles of more effective assessment of risk. That will be the subject of a follow-on article, but for now it’s worth mentioning two important steps: define a shared concept of risk that is most likely to contribute to strategy, and create disciplined, institutionalized and routinized stages in the strategy-making process to assess risk in that way.¶ On the first issue, my research suggests that the most profound risk disasters come from insufficient attention to and awareness of the potential risky consequences of intended or favored strategies. The incentive structure for senior leaders and the leading implications of a number of cognitive biases all tend to mute outcome-oriented risk analysis. When catastrophes strike, whether a financial crisis or the collapse of a company like Enron or a foreign policy debacle such as the Bay of Pigs or chaos in post-invasion Iraq, the culprit is often the same: decision makers simply refused to take seriously the potential consequences of their hoped-for plan.¶ A critical role for risk in strategy, then, is to focus on the potential negative consequences of strategic choices. Risk would be defined as “things that could go wrong through the implementation of alternative strategies.” The risk function would be structured to create a rigorous, disciplined dialogue about the possible implications of various options. The goal would not be to prevent bad outcomes. Instead the purpose of an outcome-oriented risk process would be to ensure that leaders make strategic judgments with eyes wide open to possible consequences.¶ Risk is, of course, sometimes used this way today. Many national security officials think of risk in terms of outcome analysis, whether consciously or not. When financial institutions conduct an operational risk assessment of a proposed new investment,

they are doing outcome-oriented analysis. The best risk frameworks are designed to promote rigorous dialogues about the consequences, for operational or institutional objectives, of various choices.¶ But risk is not only used in this way, as we have seen, and certainly not always employed to open eyes to possible consequences. Dozens of historical cases show that deep thinking about consequences is brushed off—or even actively avoided—as much as it is embraced. No formalized process exists to ensure rigorous outcome-oriented risk assessment when making defense or national security choices. If we want such a function, the defense and broader national security establishment will need to make a conscious choice to ground that particular approach in doctrine, practice, and policy.¶ Institutionally, such a shift could be implemented with a few fairly simple reforms. A future defense policy document could build on the QDR risk framework with a definition of risk related to outcomes. Beyond Defense, a future administration’s equivalent of NSPD-1, the basic document outlining the national security process, could specify that outcome-oriented risk assessments would be required for all major national security decisions.¶ In both cases, the directives would need to lay out categories or criteria to measure outcome-oriented risk. A risk assessment would not be said to be complete, for example, unless it included an evaluation of effects on U.S. military institutions, reactions by other actors, possible second-order effects, the implications of failure, and so forth. The process should be structured not to generate singular findings (such as “moderate risk”), but rather to break out more discrete elements to generate disciplined and well-informed conversations about risk among senior leaders. An effective risk process should force decision makers to talk about potential consequences in rigorous and nuanced terms, with the goal of informing and shaping their judgment. The risk assessments themselves are not the goal—they are only means to the broader objective of risk-informed decision making.¶ As we continue to approach the use of risk in national security, a more focused, disciplined approach to outcome-oriented risk can help ensure that the issue offers the best value to strategy. Risk dialogues can be a major ally in enhancing the strategic judgment of senior decision makers, but only if the national security establishment comes to a more specific and shared understanding of the concept.

Conclusion

In closing it is clear that the area of increasing defense spending merits consideration. While this document is not comprehensive in assessing the evidence it is obvious that (a) there is a controversy, (b) it is an international topic, (c) a resolution that is clearly worded and provides ground for both sides is doable, and (d) there is plenty of ground for both sides to debate from. While I recognize that this paper does not identify an area (or better yet, a to frame an area) that the community has traditionally looked to when considering international and military debate topics, it is clear that the presence of sequestration has changed the inherency and uniqueness calculations on this issue and heightens the significance of this issue as a short-term and longer-term issue warranting our attention. If readers of this essay have questions or comments, please feel free to post your thoughts to the CEDA Forums or email me at your convenience.

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