


2015-16 Topic Wording Paper: Demilitarize

Kevin D. Kuswa, PhD

R: United States (military) forces in {place or places} should be fundamentally demilitarized.



Contents

Wordings .....	3
Passive.....	3
Passive global .....	3
Demil Solo (not advised) .....	3
Demil Forces.....	3
Demil other military components .....	3
Long-shot, but worth a try.....	4
R: United States military forces should be fundamentally demilitarized.....	4
or R: The USFG should fundamentally demilitarize its military forces.....	4
Summary Observations .....	5
More: 'Demilitarize' as the Verb .....	6

A word on “Including” .....	7
R: The United States should fundamentally demilitarize {place or places}, including (full) troop demobilization.....	7
R: The United States should fundamentally demilitarize {place or places}, including weapons disarmament. ....	7
R: The United States should fundamentally demilitarize {place or places}, including the removal of all military personnel. ....	7
R: The United States should fundamentally demilitarize {place or places}, including the removal of its troops, weapons, and military vehicles. ....	7
R: The United States should fundamentally demilitarize <b>its forces in</b> {place or places}, including .....	7
Terms / Definitions .....	8
Contextual .....	9
Demilitarization Goes Deeper than Arms Reduction, but there are Examples of Success .....	10
Side-by-side comparisons: Demilitarizing vs. Decrease Presence.....	10
Africa: US should Demilitarize the continent.....	12
To demilitarize is to restrict military measures.....	13
Demilitarize / Demilitarization .....	14
Full circle: “To remove any military presence or function in an area.” .....	14
Also, “To free of military character, purpose” .....	14
“To deprive of military character” .....	14
“To free from militarism” .....	14
Wikipedia Entry for “Demilitarization” .....	15
Forces / Military Forces.....	16
* Aggregation of Military personnel, weapon systems, equipment, and support.....	16
Use Forces, plural. (can be divisible) .....	16
Force = Military Force—a Unit of a military service.....	16
Use, Force, singular (mass noun—needs to be reduced/eliminated as a whole).....	16
Force or Forces works .....	16
= Military strength (mass noun).....	16
= Unit of a nation’s military personnel.....	16
Force = “a group organized for military purposes.” .....	17
Force or Forces = the military or fighting strength of a nation .....	17
A body of persons combined for joint action.....	17
A body of people prepared for action.....	17
Misc. Evidence .....	18
What is “Militarization”? Borders are questionable given cyber war and space militarization.....	18
What can be demilitarized outside of military forces? .....	18
Partial demilitarization would include... ..	19
ISIS: Recent Legislation calls for a withdrawal of the US military, a removal of US armed forces. ....	19
Militarization can be limited or restricted by varying degrees. This may set a baseline standard for what is “substantial” or “fundamental.” .....	20
Attribution problems. ....	20
General context for large-scale demilitarization, not a one-shot deal. ....	21

## Wordings

### **Passive**

R: United States forces in {place or places} should be fundamentally demilitarized.

### **Passive global**

R: United States forces should be fundamentally demilitarized.

### **Demil Solo** (not advised)

R: The United States should fundamentally demilitarize {place or places}.

### **Demil Forces**

R: The United States should fundamentally demilitarize its forces in {place or places}.

### **Demil other military components**

R: The United States should fundamentally demilitarize its troops/forces/military capabilities in {place or places}.

## Long-shot, but worth a try

Given that the line between international and “domestic” or “non-international” is blurry at best, we should entertain a topic that does not specify particular places, but instead focuses on the act of demilitarizing. It would be a broad option, but one that should be on the ballot. This paper is not really about this particular wording, but the global version is a resolution that we should contemplate for inclusion on the slate. This wording could still be considered “international.” In addition, both sides get the big debates they want and the aff can solve but has to act broadly (topicality would matter).

Side note: this would make the kritiks of “area studies” that are probably going to be intrinsic to the topic and are definitely applicable to the process of crafting a topic (it’s all about what regions to include), more available to the aff and the neg.

**R: United States military forces should be fundamentally demilitarized.**

**or R: The USFG should fundamentally demilitarize its military forces.**

## Summary Observations

Although there might be a few places where the US should expand its military, those places are few and far between and arguably are militarized as it is. The more interesting and important debates are in areas where the US already has a major military presence and arguments are being made that such presence should be reduced.

One problem, however, is with the term “presence” because it seems to allow the aff to “hide the military” (make it more covert—an example might be what is happening in Syria), or reduce presence by simply shifting the emphasis from tanks to boots or vice-versa. An aff could also “reduce presence” by moving all of its forces on the other side of the border. Those affs skirt the idea behind “getting the military out” because they would just be changing the form the military takes. There isn’t a complete fix for this and at some point the negative is always going to say “the aff leaves the military intact and maintains the ability to act militarily in the region.” Good—that’s potentially a good argument but we do not want it to go too far. There has to be something better than “reduce presence.”

Moreover, we cannot rely too much on the geographic limits in the topic because many of these military actions transcend borders and warfare is more and more global. It would be better not to have the geographic regions or countries do the limiting or to offer all the variation on the slate of topics (what does “in” really mean?)—we need the verb to do some things for us as well.

In many ways, crafting these wordings, then, is about the verb stem. For this resolution, the verb stem matters because there are different ways to conceive of how to “reduce” a military vs. “demilitarizing.” Those different verbs mean distinct things:

1. “Reduce” (or “limit” or “curtail”) is a very generic term and assumes a static military that can be given certain percentages. The topicality burden in terms of being located in the military area would fall primarily to the things being reduced. That has led to the proliferation of options for the object/noun: commitments, capacities, operations, troops, forces, presence, etc. You can add the “military” adjective in front of those terms, but it is still all about that noun for connecting to the literature of the topic.
2. “Demilitarize” means “dismantle and become less militaristic.” There are a number of different uses of this term but we can narrow the meaning to exactly what we are looking for by using it as a verb (“demilitarize” vs. “demilitarization” or “demilitarization zone”) and by specifying that the forces that must be demilitarized are US forces in a certain place. Yes, there is some overlap in the meanings of “reduce military presence” and “demilitarize US forces,” clearly, but the constructions are distinct enough to offer substantive variety on the ballot.
3. Bidirectionality. This paper is primarily for the resolutions that seek to decrease the US military abroad. It could be somewhat useful for the other direction (expand military forces) in terms of “remilitarizing” or “increasing the militarization of...”, but that’s more of a stretch and is not part of this paper.
4. The verb should not be seen primarily as the place for the negative to find links—it is more important to define the scope and content of affirmative actions. Thus, the word “demilitarize” does not get a lot of “google hits” and its etymology is rather recent (late 1800s), but that should not deter us from using it in the resolution. The evidence that uses the other constructions (“reduce military presence” words) will still provide links, but the focus on demilitarizing as the verb could really crystallize the topic...

## More: 'Demilitarize' as the Verb

1. Makes the Object Fiat debates and the “Country in question Kicks out the US” CP less of a focus.

The passive construction puts the emphasis on the existence of the military forces and their purpose instead of which nation acts initially to remove the forces. The neg could still use this CP, but the perm becomes a bit stronger if the aff is advocating that US forces should be demilitarized.

2. “Military Presence” is Problematic

Issues arise from either defining these terms in isolation or defining them so broadly that the “military” component is lost all together. The existence of nuclear weapons and delivery capabilities makes US military presence omnipresent all the time. Mentioning a specific country does not get out of that reality. For example, a “no use” nuclear weapons policy with Central Asia or Africa probably reduces US military presence in those regions but it arguably does not demilitarize our forces that are located there. There is evidence below on this question in terms of other “border-challenging” realities of security policy: space, cyber, and international territories (Antarctica).

3. Generic “Reduction Verbs” are a problem

Trying to use a generic verb that means “to lower” is to put a quantifiable emphasis on the number of certain things (troops, tanks, anti-aircraft, etc.). The problem with that approach is that the issue is not necessarily the number of pieces of equipment of soldiers that is in question—that is part of it, but it is also the act of militarizing a region. An aff should demilitarize instead of trading tanks for advisors or replacing “boots on the ground” with massive drone strikes. The aff should demilitarize. Activate the removal of the military and all that would entail.

What we really want to require is a demilitarization of US forces in a particular country....

## A word on “Including”

I’m not sure this is necessary, but it might be worth exploring an option that using the “including” construction.

This would set up a baseline action that would have to be part of any plan that “demilitarizes.” Some like this construction based on experiences on the constructive engagement / sanctions topic, others think it overly constrains the aff and leads to repetitive PIC debates. My opinion is that it can be useful, but it has to be worded carefully such that the action being mandated (the must include) is an essential and core part of the larger direction.

Some options based on some on-line threads:

**R: The United States should fundamentally demilitarize {place or places}, including (full) troop demobilization.**

**R: The United States should fundamentally demilitarize {place or places}, including weapons disarmament.**


**R: The United States should fundamentally demilitarize {place or places}, including the removal of all military personnel.**

**R: The United States should fundamentally demilitarize {place or places}, including the removal of its troops, weapons, and military vehicles.**

alternative construction for all of these...

**R: The United States should fundamentally demilitarize its forces in {place or places}, including ....**

## Terms / Definitions



## Contextual

A great deal of the contextual material is about US policing and police militarization. There are many sources calling for police to demilitarize. This is related to the meaning of “demilitarize” in terms of the US military abroad. Both entities—police forces in the US and US military forces abroad—are being asked to decrease or eliminate their military strength and purpose.

On an international level, the history of demilitarization points us in the right direction. There are a number of ways to create a “demilitarized space” that depend on who is being demilitarized and who is doing the demilitarization. Our goal in terms of wording the topic is to take the broad history associated with the verb and narrow our scope to US military forces in a particular region.

Louis Rene **Beres**, Winter, '99 (17 Dick. J. Int'l L. 229 “Implications of a Palestinian State for Israeli Security and Nuclear War: A Jurisprudential Assessment”)

After World War I, Germany, as a consequence of the Versailles Treaty, had to demilitarize the Rhineland. Permanent demilitarized zones have been created in the Straits of Magellan (by the border treaty of 1881 between Argentina and Chile); in the Aaland Islands belonging to Finland (according to the Aaland Islands Convention of 1921 between Finland, Sweden and other European powers); and in Norway's Svalbard Archipelago and Bear Island (by terms of the Svalbard (Spitsbergen) Treaty of 1920 between Norway, the United States and the former Soviet Union. The Outer Space Treaty of 27 January 1967 demilitarizes the moon and other celestial bodies (prohibiting the stationing of nuclear weapons and other mass destruction weapons) while Antarctica has been demilitarized by the Antarctic Treaty of 1 December 1959.

n35. The Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I) contains detailed provisions on demilitarized zones.

There are reasons to consider the verb carefully. Safire contends that “disarming” an area or an army means removing weapons, whereas “demilitarizing” could permit some small arms as long as the group cannot assemble for military purposes. According to this distinction, we should strongly consider “demilitarize” because it gets to the intent or purpose of the presence instead of the number of weapons that can be used.

**William Safire, Linguist, '99** (The New York Times June 27, 1999, Sunday, On Language; Faith-Based BYLINE: By William Safire, p16 “Dismilitarize?”)

Few people are for unilateral disarmament. Most Koreans and Americans are familiar, after four decades, with a demilitarized zone, or DMZ.

**Now**, from the war that brought us nonpermissive environment, **we have a distinction drawn between disarm and demilitarize. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Gen. Henry H. Shelton, said on ABC's "This Week": "We never said that we were going to 'disarm' the K.L.A. We used the term 'demilitarize.'"** The Wall Street Journal editorialized on its meaning to the Kosovo Liberation Army: "This distinction apparently means they can keep their hunting rifles, relying on a U.N.-supervised force to protect them from Serbian tanks." **The distinction, more finely put, is this: disarm means "to divest of**

**weapons; to deprive of the means of attack." Demilitarize means "to close a military organization; to remove the military power or potential."**

Now we're into the trickiest kind of semantics. How disarmed do you have to be to call yourself demilitarized? I think it depends, first, on the power of the weaponry: if you carry a rifle or a pistol, you are armed but not necessarily militarized; if you are in an armored personnel carrier or in a choppering gunship, You're in the Army Now. But how about an automatic rifle, a small mortar or a light machine gun? If that's not militarized, what about a little howitzer or a heavy machine gun or shoulder-mounted missile?

This has yet to be determined. **The second part of the meaning of demilitarized deals with organization. Can a demilitarized group call itself an army?** (The Salvation Army would say yes.) Are a buncha guys hanging around in civies and

calling one another "Mister" demilitarized if they practice maneuvers and draw a table of organization in the sand? **The Pentagon**

**spokesman, Ken Bacon, informs me: "Disarm means to take weapons away from an army. Demilitarize means to disband the army."**

As I get it, the K.L.A. will be disbanded but not disarmed, which suggest its members can keep all their arms as individuals but may not assemble or otherwise get organized. The current meaning will be worked out at the negotiating tables and on

the field, then passed to lexicographers. Meanwhile, we are in a very gray area. I asked a top soldier-diplomat if he would like to set me straight on the latest specific meaning of demilitarize. I am not sure if he replied, "No, thanks" or "No tanks."

## Demilitarization Goes Deeper than Arms Reduction, but there are Examples of Success

**Stearns, GMU Provost/Poli Sci, '13** (ed. Peter N. Stearns, December 2013, *Demilitarization in the Contemporary World*)

Twentieth-century military reduction, its causes and effects, and a potential way forward contemporary world history has highlighted militarization in many ways, from the global Cold War and numerous regional conflicts to the general assumption that nationhood implies a significant and growing military. Yet the twentieth century also offers notable examples of large-scale demilitarization, both imposed and voluntary. *Demilitarization in the Contemporary World* fills a key gap in current historical understanding by examining demilitarization programs in Germany, Japan, Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Costa Rica. In nine insightful chapters, this volume's contributors outline each nation's demilitarization choices and how they were made. They investigate factors such as military defeat, border security risks, economic pressures, and the development of strong peace cultures among citizenry. Also at center stage is the influence of the United States, which fills a paradoxical role as both an enabler of demilitarization and a leader in steadily accelerating militarization. Bookended by Peter N. Stearns' thought-provoking historical introduction and forward-looking conclusion, the chapters in this volume explore what true demilitarization means and how it impacts a society at all levels, military and civilian, political and private. The examples chosen reveal that successful demilitarization must go beyond mere troop demobilization or arms reduction to generate significant political and even psychological shifts in the culture at large. Exemplifying the political difficulties of demilitarization in both its failures and successes, *Demilitarization in the Contemporary World* provides a possible roadmap for future policies and practices. "This important book captures the deep complexity and contingency of the problem of militarization and demilitarization in the post-World War II environment. The thought-provoking essays provide deep and important insights in a global and comparative framework."--Michael Neiberg, author of *The Blood of Free Men: The Liberation of Paris, 1944*

## Side-by-side comparisons: Demilitarizing vs. Decrease Presence

The evidence about the Persian Gulf region will be important to assess. Toby Jones uses a number of terms we are considering in the context of Iraq and the Persian Gulf region, including "demilitarize" and "the reduction of military presence."

Military presence is used in reference to the impact and consequences of massive US militarization in the region—not just military forces, but arms sales, weapons systems, doctrine that governs when threats warrant a military response, and so forth. When we talk about resolving those problems; however, what debate-speak calls "the mechanism," we are talking about the verb demilitarize. That becomes more evident in the next two cards:

Toby C. Jones, Prof. of History at Rutgers University, '11 (author of Desert Kingdom: How Oil and Water Forged Modern Saudi Arabia and an editor at Middle East Report, Dec 22, 2011, "Don't Stop at Iraq: Why the U.S. Should Withdraw From the Entire Persian Gulf," <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/12/dont-stop-at-iraq-why-the-us-should-withdraw-from-the-entire-persian-gulf/250389/>)

Our experiment in militarizing the region has made it more volatile, less free, and more costly to American interests and values. **The U.S. is finally drawing down its military presence from Iraq, but why stop there? Why not reduce or outright remove our military presence from the entire Persian Gulf?** The U.S. has been waging war in the Gulf for more than two and a half decades, since it took up arms against Iran in the closing stages of the Iran-Iraq war. The human and environmental costs have been catastrophic. The presumptive gains of what has amounted to one long war have proven elusive at best. More often than not, the justifications for war have been either ill-conceived or manufactured. The Persian Gulf today is hardly stable or secure. But **permanent war, and our militarization of the Gulf, isn't so much a reflection of regional instability as it is the cause.** Today, **it's still not clear what the United States' strategic priorities are in the Gulf. Are we there to secure access to oil? Protect friendly regimes from unfriendly ones? American policymaking is muddled, a combination of concern about energy security, Iranian aggression, and terrorism. This uncertainty is perilous. And the reality is that none of these challenges really require a significant military presence.** Indeed, if recent history is any guide, a large military footprint in the Gulf will generate more rather than less risk. Historically, oil and "energy security" have been at the heart of American strategy in the Gulf. It is home to the richest oil and natural gas deposits on the planet. It was President Jimmy Carter who most clearly made protecting the flow of oil to global markets a national priority. Carter declared oil a "vital interest" and that any assault on it would "be repelled by any means necessary, including military force." Protecting oil meant protecting its producers. Indeed, much of the war-fighting of the last two decades has been rationalized as necessary to defend Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and their oil, from neighborhood threats. The economic logic that has underpinned all this is based mostly on an assumption that oil is a scarce resource, that there is a tight gap between supply and demand, that ensuring supply is essential to stabilize prices and to protect the global economy from potentially devastating disruptions. None of that is really true. For most of the 20th century, oil companies and oil producing states regularly collaborated to regulate supply in order to limit competition and control prices. There never has been a global oil market. Instead, oil's production and delivery has been managed by a small network of corporate and national energy elites, whose primary concern has been serving their own interests and maintaining their bottom line. **Among the few to benefit from high oil prices are global weapons manufacturers. Oil states have recycled hundreds of billions of dollars in oil revenues through Western economies by purchasing high-tech and expensive weapons systems.** A year ago, Saudi Arabia committed to purchasing a staggering \$60 billion in new weapons from the United States. In spite of spending outlandish amounts to procure some of the world's most modern weapons, Saudi Arabia has not been able to defend itself. Instead, the burden of protecting Saudi Arabia falls on the United States. Advocates of this arrangement argue that the influx of cash is good for the American economy and that it creates jobs in parts of the country that need them. **Oil money also helps pay for expensive military research and development projects, deflecting some of the cost of weapons design from American taxpayers. This** may all be true, but it also **contributes to the militarization and destabilization of the Gulf.** The world today is awash in oil and natural gas. Protecting the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf to global markets is far less necessary than it once was. Over the past generation, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the other oil producers in the region have grown accustomed to bloated national budgets and expensive state-run, cradle-to-grave welfare services, which means that there is greater pressure on them to sell oil than to hoard it. Since the fall of the Shah in 1979, U.S. policy of containing Iran has arguably been linked to its energy security. Of course there's been more at stake than just oil, and since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, concerns about Iran's growing assertiveness and influence in the region have eclipsed those about energy security, at least in public political discourse. It is difficult to untangle where American concerns about Iran overlap with its desire to protect regional allies, and whose interests are primarily being served by the United States' policy of non-engagement. Led by Saudi Arabia, the Arab Gulf states claim that their fears of Iranian ambition are existential. It is certainly true that Tehran is locked in a regional balance of power struggle with Saudi Arabia and that Iran seeks greater influence. But Iran does not seek the destruction of Saudi Arabia or the overthrow of Arab world's political order. In spite of claims to the contrary by the Saudi and Bahraini governments, Iran's revolutionary imperative is a relic of the past. Israel expresses a similar anxiety about Iran as a security threat. And Iran's leaders have played their part in fostering Israeli uncertainty. Iran's potential acquisition of nuclear weapons is a source of concern, of course, as is its support for Hezbollah and Syria. The challenge of how best to deal with Iranian ambition, however, is mainly a political problem, one that has for too long been treated almost entirely through the lens of security and militarism. **The presence of the American military in the Gulf has not only done little to deter Iran's ambitions, it has emboldened them.** Surrounding Iran militarily and putting it under the constant threat of American or Israeli military action has failed to deter the country. Instead this approach has strengthened hardliners within Tehran and convinced them that the best path to self-preservation is through defiance, militarism, and the pursuit of dangerous ties across the Middle East. The rivalry between Iran, the U.S., and its regional partners has turned into a political and military arms race, one that could easily spin out of control. **Less obvious, the United States' military posture has also emboldened its allies, sometimes to act in counterproductive ways.** Saudi Arabia and Bahrain justify their brutal crackdown of Bahrain's pro-democracy movement by falsely claiming Iranian meddling. While American policymakers support democratic transitions in the Middle East rhetorically, their unwillingness to confront long-time allies in the Gulf during the Arab Spring is partly the product of the continued belief that the U.S. needs to keep its military in the Gulf, something that requires staying on good terms with Gulf monarchies. The result is that Saudi Arabia and its allies have considerable political cover to behave badly, both at home and abroad.

The US has moved to “reduce its military footprint” in order to “demilitarize US foreign policy” in the region. This would change the debate from the question of moving troops from one country to another—not really changing the overall military posture of the US in a region and allowing the US to still fight the same larger battles against “terrorism” (or Iran, or energy insecurity, etc.) in the same ways.

Toby C. Jones, Prof. of History at Rutgers University, '11 (author of Desert Kingdom: How Oil and Water Forged Modern Saudi Arabia and an editor at Middle East Report, Dec 22, 2011, “Don't Stop at Iraq: Why the U.S. Should Withdraw From the Entire Persian Gulf,” <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/12/dont-stop-at-iraq-why-the-us-should-withdraw-from-the-entire-persian-gulf/250389/>)

If the Arab Spring has demonstrated anything, it is that the old political order is vulnerable to domestic political pressure. The Middle East is moving to an era of mass politics, in which mobilized publics demand greater rights and greater influence. While many observers believe that the oil states are less susceptible to such pressures, this seems far from certain. In fact, Saudi Arabia, the world's most important oil producer, shares many of social and political-economic characteristics of its beleaguered neighbors, including high unemployment, widespread poverty, popular disillusion with corruption, and an increasingly sophisticated network of grassroots organizations committed to political change. Even flush with considerable oil revenue and the capacity to throw money at its many internal problems, Saudi Arabia has still been forced to unleash its police and security forces to quell unrest. The United States, because of its relationship with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain and its apparent preference for preserving the political status quo in the Gulf, is increasingly seen by the region's citizens as conflated with the violent forces of counterrevolution. **Should revolutionaries and would-be revolutionaries in the Gulf force political transitions in the future, the United States could pay a political price for its long-standing military entanglements. Now, even the White House no longer believes our large military presence in the Gulf is good for combating** the big threat we're supposedly there to contain: **terrorism. Ben Rhodes, the deputy national security adviser for strategic communications, remarked** last week **that the U.S. will seek to reduce the American military footprint there. This would allow "us in many respects to demilitarize elements of our foreign policy and establish more normal relationships,"** he said, **to bring the U.S. security posture in the region more "in line with where we were before 1990."** Rhodes apparently did not comment on either energy security or Iran. While his comments strike the right tone, there may be less to them than meets the eye. **Last week's statement directly contradicted a** n October New York Times **report that administration officials plan to reallocate military resources and combat troops from Iraq to elsewhere in the Gulf, Kuwait in particular.**

## Africa: US should Demilitarize the continent

**Dixon, '08** (“It's Time To Demilitarize US Policy in Africa Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has fomented no less than fourteen wars in Africa -- enough is enough.” By Bruce A. Dixon / Black Agenda Report February 29, 2008, [http://www.alternet.org/story/78187/it%27s\\_time\\_to\\_demilitarize\\_us\\_policy\\_in\\_africa](http://www.alternet.org/story/78187/it%27s_time_to_demilitarize_us_policy_in_africa) )

**It's time to demilitarize US policy toward the African continent. Since the end of the Cold War** in 1989, **Republican and Democratic administrations alike have provided military aid, military training, military assistance and arms transfers to at least 50 out of 53 African nations, and fomented no less than fourteen wars. Bipartisan US policy until now has been about arming Africans,** and keeping the continent hungry, sick, desperately poor and permanently at war with itself. Thanks to our policy of flooding the African continent with arms, the price of an AK-47 assault rifle is lower on the African continent than any place else on earth.

## To demilitarize is to restrict military measures

The act of demilitarizing completely would be to “prohibit measures of a military nature” based on the 1959 Antarctic Treaty.

KRISTEN E. EICHENSEHR, UCLA School of Law, ‘15 (January, 2015, *Georgetown Law Journal* 103 Geo. L.J. 317, “The Cyber-Law of Nations”)

In 1958, the United States invited the eleven other countries that had participated in the Antarctic program of the International Geophysical Year to a conference to discuss an Antarctic treaty. n150 After only six weeks of deliberation, **the Antarctic Treaty was signed on December 1,**

**1959**. n151 The treaty freezes n152 preexisting territorial claims and establishes that the treaty does not constitute a “renunciation or diminution” of existing claims to territorial sovereignty or prejudice any state’s position with regard to any other state’s claim. n153 It further specifies that no acts while the treaty is in force “shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica,” and [\*345] no claim to territorial sovereignty may be made while the treaty remains in force. n154 **The treaty** also

**demilitarizes Antarctica, prohibiting “any measures of a military nature” and specifying that “Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only.”** n155 It protects the “[f]reedom of scientific investigation” n156 and creates a system of inspections whereby observers from States Parties may be designated to carry out inspections of other states’ installations and equipment in Antarctica. n157 Observers are subject to the jurisdiction of the state they represent. n158

## Demilitarize / Demilitarization

\* Note: we are after the verb more than the noun, but they obviously inform each other.

**Full circle: “To remove any military presence or function in an area.”**

**Also, “To free of military character, purpose”**

**British Dictionary, No date** (<http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/demilitarize>)

British Dictionary definitions for demilitarize

demilitarize

/di:'militə,raɪz/

verb (transitive)

**1. to remove any military presence or function in (an area)**: demilitarized zone

**2. to free of military character, purpose**, etc: 11 regiments were demilitarized

Derived Forms

demilitarization, demilitarisation, noun

**“To deprive of military character”**

**“To free from militarism”**

**Collins English Dictionary, '12** ( Collins English Dictionary - Complete & Unabridged 2012 Digital Edition © William

Collins Sons & Co. Ltd. 1979, 1986 © HarperCollins Publishers 1998, 2000, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2012,

<http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/demilitarize> )

**verb (used with object), demilitarized, demilitarizing.**

**1. to deprive of military character; free from militarism.**

2. to place under civil instead of military control.

3. to forbid military use of (a border zone).

## Wikipedia Entry for “Demilitarization”

Reduce a nation’s army, weapons, vehicles.

Reduce a country’s military strength abroad.

Converting a military to civilian forces

Reducing weapons or weapons systems

Creating a zone with restrictions on the military

<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demilitarisation>

Demilitarisation or **demilitarization is the reduction of a nation's army, weapons, or military vehicles to an agreed minimum**. Demilitarisation is usually the result of a peace treaty ending a war or a major conflict. A drastic voluntary reduction in size of a victorious army is called demobilization. **Demilitarisation was a policy in a number of countries after both world wars. In the aftermath of World War I the United Kingdom greatly reduced its military strength.** The resulting position of weakness during the rise of the Nazi regime in Germany was among the causes that led to the policy of appeasement. **The conversion of a military or paramilitary force into a civilian one is also called demilitarisation.** For example the Italian Polizia di Stato demilitarised in 1981, and the Austrian Gendarmerie merged with the national police, making up a new civilian body. Demilitarisation can also refer to the policies employed by Allied forces during the occupation of Japan and Germany after World War II.[1] The Japanese and German militaries were re-badged to disassociate them from their recent war history, but were kept active and reinforced to help the allies face the new Soviet threat that had become evident as World War 2 ended, and the Cold War began. **Demilitarisation can also refer to the reduction of one or more types of weapons or weapons systems** (See Arms Control) or the removal of combat equipment from a warship (See Japanese battleship Hiei). **A demilitarised zone is a specific area, such as a buffer zone between nations previously engaged in armed conflict, where military persons, equipment or activities are forbidden.**

## Forces / Military Forces

\* **Aggregation of Military personnel, weapon systems, equipment, and support.**

**DoD Military Dictionary, '05** (Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. US Department of Defense 2005, <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/force>.)

**Force:**

1. **An aggregation of military personnel, weapon systems, equipment, and necessary support, or combination thereof.**
2. A major subdivision of a fleet.

Use **Forces**, plural. (can be divisible)

**Force = Military Force—a Unit of a military service**

**Free On-line Dictionary, no date** (<http://www.thefreedictionary.com/military+force>)

**Force:**

- Noun 1. **military force - a unit that is part of some military service**; "he sent Caesar a force of six thousand men"

Use, **Force**, singular (mass noun—needs to be reduced/eliminated as a whole)

**Free On-line Dictionary, no date** (<http://www.thefreedictionary.com/military+force>)

**Force:**

**A body of persons or other resources organized or available for a certain purpose**: a large labor force.

**Force or Forces works**

= **Military strength (mass noun)**

= **Unit of a nation's military personnel**

**American Heritage, '11** (American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fifth Edition. Copyright © 2011 force, <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/force>)

**Force:**

- 5.
- a. **Military strength**.
  - b. **A unit of a nation's military personnel, especially one deployed into combat: Our armed forces have at last engaged the enemy**.

**Force = “a group organized for military purposes.”**

**Collins, English Dictionary, '03** (Collins English Dictionary – Complete and Unabridged © HarperCollins Publishers 1991, 1994, 1998, 2000, 2003, <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/force>

**force**

(fɔ:s)

**(Military) a group of persons organized for military or police functions:**

**Force or Forces = the military or fighting strength of a nation**

**A body of persons combined for joint action**

**Random House, '10** (Random House Kernerman Webster's College Dictionary, © 2010, <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/force>)

**force**

(fɔrs, fɔʊrs)

9. **Often, forces. the military or fighting strength, esp. of a nation.**
10. **any body of persons combined for joint action**: a sales force.

**A body of people prepared for action**

**Dictionary of Collective Nouns and Group Terms. '08**, <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/force>

**Force**

**a body** of men (sic.) **prepared for action**, 1375; a body of police; policemen (sic.) *collectively*, 1851. See also **army, host, troop**.

## Misc. Evidence

**What is “Militarization”? Borders are questionable given cyber war and space militarization.**

KRISTEN E. EICHENSEHR, UCLA School of Law, '15 (January, 2015, *Georgetown Law Journal* 103 Geo. L.J. 317, “The Cyber-Law of Nations”)

Control of territory is a fundamental attribute of sovereignty, and **states typically maintain a military sufficient to provide at least some defense of their borders.** **However, the unifying feature that this Article has identified between the old domains and cyber is the lack of borders--the lack of Westphalian sovereignty--in the domains.** Each domain therefore poses a similar question: **how and to what extent should states militarize a domain that no state is obligated to defend?** For outer space and Antarctica in particular, the international community decided that militarization should be somewhat limited or prohibited entirely. For cyber, however, this section argues that demilitarization is unlikely and not necessarily desirable--but neither is turning cyber into a law-free zone, as Russia and China sometimes seem to suggest. **Rather, the best course for cyber is "regulated militarization" through application of existing international laws regarding the use of force and armed conflict, and perhaps through bans on particular types of weapons.**

**What can be demilitarized outside of military forces?**

There are aspects of US policy that can be demilitarized. In Afghanistan, for example, aid policy has been militarized. Aid is used as coercion and becomes a weapon of war. Demilitarizing US policy would open this up to the aff.

**MADRE, '09** (Six Alternatives to a Troop Surge in Afghanistan Posted on Tuesday, December 1, 2009 <http://www.madre.org/page/madre-articles-134/news/six-alternatives-to-a-troop-surge-in-afghanistan-247.html>)

Proponents of a troop surge argue that development cannot be pursued without security; but the inverse is equally true. In a country with the world's highest infant mortality rate, there can be no security without development. **The US is undermining development by militarizing humanitarian aid.** The army's "Provincial Reconstruction Teams" blur the line between combat operations and aid delivery. They use humanitarian aid as a bargaining chip to extort information from civilians. **The practice turns urgently-needed aid into a weapon of war and endangers recipients by associating them with the US military. The US should demilitarize aid operations** and fund community-based, Afghan-led reconstruction efforts to enable access to food, clean water, health care and primary education. **Aid should be channeled through Afghan organizations to ensure that funds reach those most in need instead of reverting back to private US-based contractors.**

## Partial demilitarization would include...

Contextual example of disengaging militarily from the Persian Gulf region would be: “withdraw military personnel,” reduce spending on military infrastructure, end weapons sales and transfers, and remove military power projection like the Fifth Fleet.

Toby C. Jones, Prof. of History at Rutgers University, '11 (author of Desert Kingdom: How Oil and Water Forged Modern Saudi Arabia and an editor at Middle East Report, Dec 22, 2011, “Don't Stop at Iraq: Why the U.S. Should Withdraw From the Entire Persian Gulf,” <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/12/dont-stop-at-iraq-why-the-us-should-withdraw-from-the-entire-persian-gulf/250389/>)

There are compelling reasons to believe that **the Obama administration will not demilitarize the Gulf to pre-1990 levels, as Rhodes said.** The majority of U.S. military facilities, including the al-Udeid airbase in Qatar and the headquarters of the Navy's Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, were built after 1990. New military spending and new construction are planned for 2012. The State Department has requested around \$26 million dollars for new construction at the Fifth Fleet's Bahrain headquarters. This is not a huge sum, but it was requested as Bahraini security forces carried out a brutal crackdown on its own people. American priorities are, sadly, all too clear. **The status quo is never easy to change, especially when it comes to institutions as risk-averse as the Pentagon and State Department and to practices as entrenched as the 25-year U.S.-Gulf alliance. A new strategic approach, one that relies less on the projection of military power, will seem replete with risk.** Skeptics will warn that Iran would be emboldened, that terrorists would seek a foothold, and that the flow of oil would be imperiled. But these fears are exaggerated. To the extent that these dangers are

plausible at all, it's because our current policy makes them possible. The greatest risk is proceeding ahead with the status quo. **To disengage from our fraught and increasingly counterproductive Gulf presence would require the U.S. to begin withdrawing its military personnel from the region, reduce its spending on existing infrastructure, put an end to the weapons pipeline, and look for places from which it can depart immediately, such as moving the Fifth Fleet out of the Gulf and reducing the Navy's burden in patrolling the Gulf.** This would not mean abandoning the region altogether. Given its global reach, **the United States will always retain the capacity to project military power, but the terms should be limited.** The challenge is less about finding friendly ports to station personnel than it is about charting clearer and more effective terms of political engagement with allies and rivals. And this requires a new strategic doctrine, one that makes clear to regional actors that the era of open security guarantees -- which have proven so dear to both Americans and to the hundreds of thousands who have died since the United States began its military build-up -- is over. This would not mean the loss of leverage or influence, but in fact the opposite. Once it is clear that the United States is not solely committed to preserving the status quo, regional states will no longer believe they can ignore American calls for reform, restraint, and respect for human rights. Indeed, it is the belief in the Gulf States that they have "special relationships" with the United States. **Where the presence of the military has constrained American leverage, its removal will increase its power in other ways.** After all, even with a struggling economy, the United States will for the foreseeable future remain the world's greatest military and economic superpower. The Gulf states are wealthy and resource rich, but they are beholden to the free movement of labor, capital, and oil. Once oil has to flow in a free market, rather than in one controlled by producers who operate under Western military protection, they will be subject to a range of "normal" kinds of political and economic leverage. Using these sources of leverage would prove less problematic for an America that is struggling with the gap between its interests and values in the less-than-democratic Gulf. Since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the limits of American power and the constraining effects of the United States' Gulf alliances have been clear. It would be better for us, and better for them, to end our failed three-decade experiment in the Gulf.

## ISIS: Recent Legislation calls for a withdrawal of the US military, a removal of US armed forces.

Sarah Lazare, June 4 (staff writer Common Dreams, ¶ <http://www.commondreams.org/news/2015/06/04/after-ten-months-will-congress-finally-be-forced-debate-war-isis> ¶ June 04, 2015, Common Dreams ¶ After Ten Months, Will Congress Finally Be Forced to Debate the War on ISIS?)

For first time since US air war on ISIS began ten months ago, **lawmakers push legislation calling for withdrawal of military forces.** **A small group of bipartisan congressional lawmakers on Thursday introduced legislation calling for the withdrawal of the U.S. military from Iraq and Syria,** in a surprise move that could, for the first time, force a real debate on the 10-month-old war on ISIS. ¶ Reps. Jim **McGovern** (D-Mass.), Walter **Jones** (R-N.C.), and **Barbara Lee** (D-Calif.) invoked the War Powers Resolution when introducing the legislation, **which directs President Barack Obama "to remove United States Armed Forces deployed to Iraq or Syria on or after August 7, 2014" within 30 days or by the end of the year.**

## Militarization can be limited or restricted by varying degrees. This may set a baseline standard for what is “substantial” or “fundamental.”

KRISTEN E. EICHENSEHR, UCLA School of Law, ‘15 (January, 2015, *Georgetown Law Journal* 103 Geo. L.J. 317, “The Cyber-Law of Nations”)

The international community agreed to prohibit or limit militarization to varying degrees for the high seas, outer space, and Antarctica. The limits on militarization of these domains can be arranged on a spectrum. At one end, the Antarctic Treaty embraces total demilitarization. It prohibits "any measures of a military nature" and specifies that the continent "shall be used for peaceful purposes only." n270 In the middle, the Outer Space Treaty places some limits on military activities, but does not prohibit all such activities in outer space. It prohibits States Parties from placing nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction in outer space or on celestial bodies. n271 The Outer Space Treaty also demilitarizes the moon and other celestial bodies, specifying that they may be used "exclusively for peaceful purposes," and prohibiting military bases, weapons testing, and military maneuvers on celestial bodies. n272 (The Moon Treaty also includes provisions demilitarizing the moon. n273) At the other end of the spectrum is UNCLOS, which declares that "[t]he high seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes," n274 but does not prohibit all military activities. These precedents provide a range of options for demilitarizing or limiting militarization of cyberspace. For example, a cyber treaty could prohibit military measures using networks or attacks on systems connected to networks, which would mirror the Antarctic Treaty's prohibition on "any measures of a military nature" n275 and the Outer Space Treaty's prohibition on military maneuvers on celestial bodies. n276 Or it could prohibit placement or testing of weapons on networks and systems connected to networks, which would mirror (though broaden) the Outer Space Treaty's prohibitions on placing nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction in outer space or on celestial bodies, and on testing weapons on celestial bodies. n277 Alternatively, a cyber treaty could simply specify that the Internet and cyberspace should be used only for "peaceful purposes," along the lines of UNCLOS. n278 China and Russia's proposed International Code of Conduct for Information Security appears to suggest each of these possibilities to some extent. The Code lists as its purpose ensuring that networks are "solely used to the benefit of social and economic development and people's well-being, and consistent with the objective of maintaining international stability and security." n279 States adhering to the Code would commit "[n]ot to use ICTs including networks to carry out hostile activities or acts of aggression and pose threats to international peace and security," and "[n]ot to proliferate information weapons and related technologies." n280 The Code's terms and main provisions lack specificity, but they appear aimed at removing ICTs and cyber more generally as a means and domain of military (or at least hostile military) action. The possibility of demilitarization has also been raised in unofficial dialogues between CSIS and CICIR, which in June 2012 proposed "[r]estrict[ing] weaponization of cyberspace (by which [CICIR] meant restrictions on the development of special software like Stuxnet)," [\*367] including "pledges not to use cyber warfare and refrain from developing a cyber range and cyber weapons." n281 Several characteristics of cyberspace and cyberconflict could make demilitarization or limits on militarization desirable.

## Attribution problems.

Cyber militarization changes the calculus because more states (and non-states) have offensive capabilities and it's not only “place-less” in many ways, it's also hard to tell who is behind the various operations.

KRISTEN E. EICHENSEHR, UCLA School of Law, ‘15 (January, 2015, *Georgetown Law Journal* 103 Geo. L.J. 317, “The Cyber-Law of Nations”)

The extent of the attribution problem is unclear and debated. Some argue that attribution is not a significant problem as a technical matter n304 or as a strategic matter. n305 Others, however, argue that attribution problems pose significant strategic challenges by undermining deterrence. n306 What is clear is that there is more of an attribution problem with regard to cyber than with regard to nuclear weapons during the Cold War, when only a few states possessed such weapons. Attribution challenges relate to deterrence because an attacker is more likely to attack if it believes that it will not suffer retaliation; conversely, an attacker is less likely to attack if it believes, as nuclear states did during the Cold War, that the victim or its allies will quickly identify the source of the attack and retaliate against the attacker's assets.

## General context for large-scale demilitarization, not a one-shot deal.

Melvin A **Goodman**, national security and intelligence columnist for Truthout , '09 (The Urgent Need to Demilitarize the National Security State ¶ Tuesday, 20 October 2009 10:12, <http://www.truth-out.org/archive/item/86502:the-urgent-need-to-demilitarize-the-national-security-state>, Melvin A Goodman¶ Melvin A. Goodman is national security and intelligence columnist for Truthout. He is senior fellow at the Center for International Policy and adjunct professor of government at Johns Hopkins University. His 42-year government career included service at the CIA, State Department, Defense Department and the US Army. His latest book is "Failure of Intelligence: The Decline and Fall of the CIA."

The **national security policy** inherited by President Barack Obama **has been increasingly militarized over the past two decades despite the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the demise of the Warsaw Pact, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war**. The president has addressed the problem incrementally, reducing growth in spending in his first defense budget, establishing a timeline for withdrawal of American military forces in Iraq, returning to arms control negotiations with Russia and supporting international diplomacy in dealing with such problems as Iran's nuclear program. At the same time, however, President Obama has appointed too many retired general officers to sensitive national security positions; provided too much support for new weapons, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems; and continued support for Georgian and Ukrainian membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. **The outcome of the current high-level debate over adding troops to support a misbegotten counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan will provide an indication of the president's willingness to demilitarize the national security arena and to restructure civil-military relations that have tilted heavily in the direction of the Pentagon.** President **Obama's predecessors since 1981 contributed to the militarization of US national security policy**. President Ronald Reagan demanded unprecedented defense spending in peacetime when the Soviet Union was in decay and decline. He also endorsed the Goldwater-Nichol Act in 1986 that created a new class of military viceroys (commanders in chief or CINCS) to make regional foreign policy, which marginalized the role of the State Department. President George H.W. Bush deployed 26,000 troops to Panama (Operation Just Cause) only one month after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, indicating that use of force would not play a lesser role despite the new international environment. President Bill Clinton weakened our ability to conduct international diplomacy by abolishing the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the United States Information Agency and substantially reducing funding for the Agency for International Development (AID). Clinton became the first president in 35 years to fail to stand up to the Pentagon on an arms control treaty, when he was unwilling to challenge the military's opposition to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). President Obama, unfortunately, has still not named a new head of AID, and has not thrown his support to ratification for the CTBT. **Militarization of national security policy or reliance on the military to pursue objectives better pursued by other means reached a high point under President George W. Bush.** He declared a "war on terror" or a "long war" and enabled the Pentagon to be the leading agency in combating terrorism around the world. His policies of unilateralism and pre-emptive attack, which were proclaimed in his speech at West Point in 2002, marked a radical revolution in American foreign policy. He also ineffectually relied on saber rattling against Iran and North Korea instead of resorting to traditional diplomatic tools to limit their nuclear programs. Finally, he abrogated the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the cornerstone of deterrence since 1972, and funded a national missile defense that has not been established as workable, but remains the largest line item for a weapons system in the defense budget. There is very little competition in the building of US weapons systems, which are behind schedule and over budget as the United States has pursued a spending spree on weapons that have little relevance to the effort to combat terrorism. **The United States is spending more than the rest of the world combined on its military (\$670 billion), its intelligence community (\$75 billion) and its homeland security (\$50 billion), leaving the State Department and AID extremely underfunded. Cost overruns on the largest weapons system last year exceeded \$300 billion.** **The United States is also responsible for 70 percent of all sales in the global arms market, including \$30 billion in sales to nations with scarce resources in the developing world.** **The Pentagon dominates the training and equipping of foreign military forces with very little legislative oversight or interagency coordination. For the past two decades, Congress has slashed funding for diplomacy and permitted the overseas headquarters of our regional military commanders to double their cold war size.** These policies have increasingly alienated the United States from the rest of the world, which did not share the view that the Iraq war and the "war on terror" were contributing to international safety or stability. The Defense Department has proven to be a blunt instrument for planning and executing global operations against terrorist threats. The policies of torture and abuse, secret prisons and extraordinary renditions, moreover, meant the United States was no longer seen as a beacon of liberty to the world, but as an imperialistic bully with no respect for international law. **The award of a**

**Nobel Peace Prize to President Obama marked the first international recognition that a US president was prepared to reverse these policies and to demilitarize American national security policy.** President Obama must

understand that the Pentagon has fought every arms control and disarmament treaty over the past 35 years, beginning with President John F. Kennedy's Partial Test Ban Treaty and continuing with the SALT and START treaties, the CTBT, the Land Mines Ban and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty that banned an entire class of nuclear weapons systems. President Obama needs to widen the dialogue with Russia to find common ground on limiting tactical nuclear weapons as well as open a dialogue with China to create more transparency and confidence-building measures on strategic weapons. He needs to

revive the moribund arms control community and make sure that the Policy Planning Department at the State Department takes a more active role in long-term plans for disarmament. The Pentagon's Office of Net Assessment engages in long-term planning for developing and using nuclear weapons, but there is no comparable institution in the policy or intelligence communities that advocates arms control and disarmament. The Pentagon dominates the intelligence community with the control of most intelligence spending and intelligence personnel. **Most intelligence collection requirements flow from the Pentagon, and deference within the policy community and the Congressional Intelligence Committees for the "warfighter" has meant that tactical military considerations have overwhelmed collection for strategic geopolitical considerations. The militarization of intelligence has weakened the kind of community that President Harry Truman created 60 years ago and will complicate efforts to rebuild the nation's strategic intelligence capabilities.** One of Truman's goals was to create an intelligence agency (CIA) that would challenge military estimates - not join the team. President Obama has chosen retired generals to be the director of National Intelligence or the intelligence tsar, the national security adviser, the broker for a settlement in the Sudan and the ambassador to Afghanistan. In doing so, the president took a page out of his predecessor's appointment book, which included retired generals as secretary of state, special envoy to the Middle East to restart the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and the deputy director of Homeland Security. The current policy debate over Afghanistan is dominated by position papers written by the Pentagon and Gen. David Petraeus's CENTCOM headquarters, and is not benefiting from a National Intelligence Estimate that would represent the views of 16 military and civilian intelligence agencies. Meanwhile, there are insufficient Foreign Service Officers (FSO) to deal with myriad international issues. At the present time, there are more servicemen and women marching in military bands than there are FSOs. The Bush administration used the Pentagon to shift US strategic priorities away from Europe and Asia and toward the Middle East, Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia, with misguided conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan contributing to the loss of American blood and treasure. **President Obama's speech on Afghanistan later this month should provide numerous clues to the outcome of the campaign that pits militarization versus demilitarization.** He has the task of repudiating the military legacy of the Bush administration, but this requires a political campaign and not merely a speech or two on Afghanistan or Iraq. It has been 20 years since the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the end of the cold war, long past time for an American president to lead a genuine debate regarding the role of military power in the implementation of American foreign policy. In order to lead such a debate, **President Obama must level with the American people about the failure of military power in Iraq and Afghanistan,** the limits and constraints of military power and coercive diplomacy in dealing with nuclear problems in Iran and North Korea and the inability of the United States to confront its serious domestic issues because of the resource demands of the Pentagon, the intelligence community and the Department of Homeland Security. **Our objectives must be reconciled with our resources.**